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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the religious and political behaviour of Indonesian and 
Malaysian official ulema vis-a-vis their respective states. Official ulema are 
those Islamic religious scholars w/ho serve in state-sponsored institutions. In 
Indonesia, the main official ulema institution is the MUl (Ulama Council of 
Indonesia); but for Malaysia, official ulema function in at least one of the 
following institutions: the JKF-MKI (National Fatwa Committee); JAKIM 
(Department of Islamic Development Malaysia); and IKIM (Malaysian Institute 
for Islamic Understanding). The study looks at the state-ulema power dynamic, 
in particular, two processes. The first is "co-optation," which refers to states' 
attempts to neutralise ulema's influence. States invite ulema to participate in the 
religious bureaucracy and support their ideology and policies in return for 
rewards, status and recognition. The second is "capture," which refers to ulema 
capitalising on their position in state institutions to strengthen their authority, to 
gain access to important political and economic networks, to lobby their 
personal or groups' agenda, and to push through agendas that are not 
necessarily those of the state which co-opted them. 
There are two central questions in this study. First, as the Indonesian and 
Malaysia states strive to co-opt official ulema, in what ways have official ulema 
managed to capture parts of their respective states? Second, has the increase 
in political competition since the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to stronger or 
weaker capture by official ulema in both countries? In answering these 
questions, I engage with existing writings on Indonesian and Malaysian official 
ulema. These works have made two broad generalisations. First, official ulema 
are becoming more conservative and Islamist compared to their behaviour in 
the past. Second, they had been co-opted by the state during the authoritarian 
rules of Suharto and Mahathir, but MUl has been more assertive and powerful 
vis-a-vis their respective states in the competitive political environments after 
1997. 
The study also engages with theoretical debates in the field of connparative 
politics. It is particularly interested in interest-mediation models: pluralism, 
corporatism and state-in-society. The study deploys the concept "capture" as a 
way of building on Migdal's state-in-society approach, which is interested in 
states' and societies' construction of authority vis-a-vis one another. My 
research demonstrates how official ulema can capitalise from their co-opted 
positions by influencing public policy in their favour; affecting appointments of 
state personnel; enhancing their authority to make religious, social, and political 
pronouncements; and accessing material and other resources to achieve 
personal material goals. 
I argue that Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies shaped 
contemporary official ulema capture objectives. During the New Order period, 
MUl's role was limited to issuing fatwas and explaining national policies to the 
masses, and doing strictly what the government wanted. Since 1997, MUl 
wanted Indonesian laws to recognise its role in Islamic economics, halal 
certification, and public morality. In contrast, since the 1980s, the Mahathir 
government has entrusted Malaysian official ulema with these roles. The ulema 
had much wider scope for action and influence right from the start. However, 
since the Abdullah Badawi government (2003-2009) came to power, they have 
claimed exclusive rights to interpret the state's ideology; appeal for the right to 
define Islam; and seek to fulfil other material interests. 
I also contend that the Malaysian official ulema's capture of the state has 
proceeded much further than that of their Indonesian counterparts. Three 
modalities explain Malaysian ulema's relative success: they have a clear 
institutional role, a coherent ideology, and organisational unity. The Malaysian 
ulema have maximised their capture ability by successfully projecting 
themselves as the unassailable defenders of Islam, Malay supremacy and 
Malay rulers, paralleling the ruling party, UMNO's, ideology. The absence of 
these factors in MUl—a reflection of its organisational fragmentation—impeded 
its capture of the state as evidenced in its failed bid to monopolise the sharia 
economy, halal-certification, and authority to define "deviants." However, MUl's 
persistence in lobbying for an alternative Islamic order, through promoting 
programmes such as sharia tourism, sharia cinema, and sharia entertainment, 
demonstrates a capture in progress, rather than a failed capture. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Setting 
In 2004, the prominent Islamic studies scholar, Abdullah Saeed, noted the 
general decline in "official" ulema's legitimacy. He wrote, "The situation of the 
official ulema today... is perhaps worse than any time in Islamic history... it is a 
myth that the ulema today bestow substantial religious legitimacy on the 
modern nation state" (Saeed, 2004, p. 21)} By ulema, he was referring to 
Islamic scholars trained in the religious sciences. They read subjects such as 
law {fiqh), exegesis (fafe/r), theology (kalam), and the traditions of the Prophet 
(hadith). Official ulema refer to religious scholars working in the bureaucracy or 
state-sponsored institutions (Saeed, 2004, p. 14). According to Saeed, the 
increase in states' control over Islamic institutions such as endowments, 
schools, and mosques has contributed to official ulema's decline in influence 
(p.22-24). 
Saeed's opinion is consistent with how some Islamic studies scholars perceive 
the ulema. They characterise official ulema as having been co-opted by the 
state. They also deem official ulema "rubber stamps" and "lackeys" of ruling 
elites, surrendering independent theological judgment in exchange for material 
rewards and status.^ These compromises contradict the ideal ascribed to ulema 
by the Prophet Muhammad, that they are religious scholars, guardians of the 
' Turner (2008) also makes this argument, though he discusses the decline of both the official 
and non-official ulema's authority. Turner cites the rise of diaspora communities and the advent 
of new media as the reasons for ulema's decline. See Turner, 2008. 
^ See Walid's (2012) MA thesis on the Singapore official ulema. I will also be discussing other 
works, such as Bligh (1985), Kechichian (1986), Khuri (1987), and Ghozzi (2002) that imply 
official ulema's co-optation in Chapter Two. 
faith, heirs of the prophet, and voices of the tvmmaf (religious community). 
In the Middle East, it is doubtful whether official ulema can issue religious 
rulings independently of the state. For example, prominent Qatar-based jurist 
Yusof Al-Qardawi (b.1926) questioned the ability of Al-Azhar ulema, including 
Sayyid Tantawi (b.1928-d.2010), to rule independently of the state (Skovgaard-
Petersen, 1997, p. 186; 2009, p. 44).^ Tantawi spent almost three decades as 
an official ulema: the Grand Mufti of Egypt (1986-1996) and the Rector of the Al-
Azhar University (1996-2010). Al-Qardawi accused Tantawi as having been co-
opted by then-President Hosni Mubarak to serve in state-sponsored institutions. 
Al-Qardawi preferred Muslim scholars to elect democratically the Rector of Al-
Azhar University to serve the ummat (Bayoumi, 2010)." Al-Qardawi was not 
alone in criticising Tantawi's co-optation. Ebrahim Moosa, professor of Islamic 
studies at Duke University, remarked that "Tantawi was not only pro-Western, 
he was often pro-authority and did his best to satisfy such authority, even if it 
meant that he had to cut corners with the body of ethical and moral rulings in 
Islamic teachings" (Graham, 2010). 
This study asks if the perception of ulema as co-opted by the state applies to 
contemporary official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia. Prominent religious 
elites in Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed their doubts about official 
ulema's autonomy. Tok Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, a veteran Malaysian ulema and 
politician from PAS (Parti Islam se-Malaysia or Islamic Party of Malaysia), 
^ The Egyptian state appoints the Grand Mufti of Egypt and the Rector of Al-Azhar University. 
Similarly, the life stories of classical jurists challenging their despotic rulers evoke the 
standards of the ideal religious scholar. For instance, the Sunnis often hail classical jurist Ibn 
Hanbali (d. 855) as "protector of the faith." Ibn Hanbali chose imprisonment rather than altering 
his theological position as instructed by the authoritarian Abbasid Caliph Ma'mun (d.833). 
signalled his reservations about official ulema.® He felt that ulema should be 
dictating political affairs and not taking orders from ruling elites (umara), namely 
politicians from UMNO (United Malays National Organisation). Similarly, Said 
Aqil Siroj, the General Chairman of Indonesia's NU (NahdIatuI Ulama or Revival 
of the Ulema), questioned official ulema's legitimacy. Referring to the MUl 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council of Indonesia), Said Aqil remarked 
In the past, Suharto expected MUl to protect his authority. MUl represented 
many members from different organisations to defend Suharto. Now [after the 
downfall of Suharto], MUl functions differently. However, MUl is still part of the 
government, and obtains their budget from them. The genuine ulema, as 
defined in the Quran, are not from MUl, but from the ormas [organisasi 
kemasyarakatan or civil organisations] such as NU and Muhammadlyah. ® 
Said Aqil added, "Don't expect an institution under the government to expand. 
The state controls MUl. The ulema in NU are independent. The state does not 
control our thoughts. We are free to speak on matters based on our principles."^ 
Such negative perceptions of official ulema do not only apply to Indonesia and 
Malaysia, but also to neighbouring authoritarian Singapore, a state similar to 
Indonesia under Suharto (1966-1998) and Malaysia under Mahathir (1981-
2003).® The biography of Syed Isa Semait, the former mufti of Singapore, 
depicts the Singapore Malay/Muslim community's suspicion of official ulema in 
MUlS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura or Islamic Religious Council of 
® Interview with Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, former Kelantan Chief Minister and Spiritual Guide 
{mursyidul am) of PAS, 7 April 2013. Nik Aziz shared his views on not wanting to be a mufti. He 
said, "I am continuing the task of the Prophet Muhammad, and not serving in institutions that 
form part of the colonial legacy." Nik Aziz was still the Chief Minister of Kelantan at inten/iew. 
He stepped down after the general elections in May 2013. 
® NU and Muhammadlyah are two of the largest ormas (societal organisation) in Indonesia. All 
ormas have to register under the ormas regulation (RUU Ormas) Law No. 8/1985. 
^ Interview with Kiai Haji Said Aqil Siroj, Chairman of NahdIatuI Ulama (NU), 2 March 2013. 
During the interview, he was very critical of MUl, despite being a member the MUl advisory 
board. 
® The PAP (People's Action Party) has governed Singapore since 1959. 
Singapore).® The few lines from the former mufti's biography below demonstrate 
public perception of state co-optation 
The lack of trust had been the biggest challenge for MUlS in its founding days. 
Staff who had worl<ed in IVIUIS in the early days recalled meeting neighbours in 
the kampungs (villages) and hearing the descriptions like pengampu kerajaan— 
that they were the "stooge of government." Haji Salim Samat, for many years 
the driver for MUlS, once recalled how his predecessor had had unpleasant 
things thrown at the MUlS van. And the Mufti himself had experienced his share 
of verbal criticism. It had not been easy (Syed Zakir, 2012, p. 166). 
Research objectives and central questions 
This study compares the religious and political behaviour of the official ulema in 
contemporary Indonesia and IVlalaysia. The common perception of official 
ulema is that they surrender their authority to the states' ruling elites in 
exchange for status, prestige and salaries. However, recent scholarship on 
Islamic religious authority, such as Hatina (2009b) and al-Atawneh (2009), have 
questioned the notion of official ulema as passive. These works, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, suggest that official ulema are not as passive as 
perceived. Comparative politics debates, which propose that the relationships 
between states and societal actors are complex, strengthen the need to rethink 
official ulema's behaviour. States may not be as dominant in society as co-
optation theorists suggest. On the contrary, official ulema can transform into a 
dynamic social group utilising instruments entrusted to them by the state to: 
strengthen their own authority; fulfil their personal and material interests; and 
lobby for their personal or group's agenda that may counter the states' core 
values. Official ulema adopt strategies that amount to what I define as "capture." 
® MUlS is a statutory board formed by the Singapore government to administer Islamic affairs 
for the minority Singaporean iVIuslim community. Ttie mufti is the tiighest state-appointed 
religious leader by the President of the Republic. 
This study has two central questions. First, as the Indonesian and Malaysian 
states strive to co-opt official ulema; in what ways have the official ulema 
managed to capture parts of their respective states? Second, has the increase 
in political competition since the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to stronger or 
weaker state capture? In answering these questions, I engage with existing 
studies on official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as theoretical 
debates in the field of comparative politics, with focus on a number of official 
ulema institutions at the national level. The state authorises these institutions to 
make religious pronouncements in the form of fatwas (Islamic legal opinions). 
For Indonesia, I focus on the MUl (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council 
for Indonesia);''" and for Malaysia, the JKF-MKI (Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis 
Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam or National Fatwa Committee),^^ 
JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia), and IKIM (Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or 
Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia). Throughout this study, the term 
"state" refers to the central government of Indonesia and the federal 
government of Malaysia. In the case of Indonesia, I refer to local governments 
as the provinsi (provincial) or the sub-provincial level kabupaten/kota (disthcts), 
while for the case of Malaysia, the local governments are referred to as the 
kerajaan negeri.^^ 
" Popular preachers, mosque leaders and religious teachers deem MUl as Indonesia's Islamic 
legal authority. During my fieldwork, Professor Quraish Shihab, a prominent Indonesian ulama, 
directed me to MUl when I approached him for an interview. Quraish declined an interview 
because he regarded MUl members as more relevant to my study on official ulema. 
" JFK-MKI is a department within a federal institution, MKI (Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal 
Ugama Islam Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia). While MKI oversees Islamic 
administration of the whole country, it is not an ulema institution. The Malaysian prime minister 
chairs the council. In contrast, the ulema makes up the membership of the JKF-MKI. 
Malaysia adopts the federal government structure. In Malaysia, the state government is 
commonly referred as the kerajaan negeri. 
The study acknowledges at the outset that MUl and JKF-MKI are not direct 
comparisons. The two institutions differ in terms of origins, functions, structure 
and their relations with regional branches. The level of funding the two 
institutions receive from their respective states also varies considerably, with 
JKF-MKI receiving from the Malaysian government multiple times more than 
MUl obtains from the Indonesian government. However, these differences do 
not invalidate comparing Indonesian and Malaysian official ulema and their 
institutions. First, the aspects selected for comparison are broadly similar; they 
include departments related to fatwa production, Islamic economics, halal 
certification, and public morality. The study also considers Malaysia's JAKIM 
and IKIM as official ulema institutions, and they will be analysed together with 
JKF-MKI. The combined roles of these Malaysian institutions are comparable to 
those of MUl's in the aforementioned aspects. 
Second, the purpose of comparison is to understand the capture process in 
each of the two countries. The study demonstrates how ulema have used 
platforms provided to them by the state to influence the state. In fact, the very 
differences found in these institutions—in the form of funding, function, 
structure, membership—explain different types of capture. Central to the study's 
argument is that, compared to their Indonesian counterparts, the Malaysian 
ulema can capture the state more effectively because their institutional roles are 
clearly defined. Therefore, the dissimilarity of the MUl and JKF-MKI does not 
affect the main arguments of the study. I will revisit the significance of 
comparing MUl with JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. 
Conceptual tools: measuring co-optation and capture 
This study applies the concepts co-optation and capture to describe the 
dynamic between states and official ulema. Both concepts measure the ability 
of each group to influence, resist, and/or capitalise on one another. Political 
science and sociology scholars use the concept co-optation to describe the 
behaviour of states or ruling elites (Bertocchi & Spagat, 2001; Gandhi & 
Przeworski, 2006; Selznick, 1948). Co-optation refers to a state's strategy to 
neutralise oppositional voices. It is also a strategy to entrench its legitimacy in 
the eyes of its citizens.^^ Selznick conceptualised co-optation as a mechanism 
of adjustment, a process "of absorbing new elements into the leadership of 
policy-making or policy determining structure of organisation as a means of 
averting threats to its stability or existence" (cited in Krygier, 2012, p. 50; 
Selznick, 1948, p. 34).'"' Although co-optation theorists do not deny that these 
new elements can also shape and influence policies, sometimes in ways that 
states do not anticipate, they do so in a peaceful manner by not challenging the 
tenets of the states' ideology. In co-optation, states cajole or discipline these 
new elements to abide by basic rules. States expect these new elements to 
influence policies from "within" rather than external agitation such as mass 
demonstration, protest, or rebellion. In return, the state provides these new 
elements with rewards and concessions that include, but are not limited to, 
salaries, contracts, and prestige. The strength of these new elements dictates 
the degree of rewards and concessions. According to Gandhi and Przeworsksi 
(2006), the greater the societal groups' threat towards the state, and the greater 
Another study that has applied co-optation theory includes Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) 
examine how unstable governments in post-communist states give large benefits to a large 
number of beneficiaries, whereas stable governments give large benefits to small groups. 
" Note the different usage of the term co-optation and co-option. Co-option refers to the 
behaviour of the persons or groups who aligns himself/herself to the ruling elites. In contrast, 
co-optation refers to the process undertaken by the state. 
the likelihood of rebellion, the larger the state concessions. 
Bayat, a social anthropologist, coined the term "socialization of the state" to 
describe societal groups' co-optation of the state. He argues that states do not 
always achieve their objectives, and bow to societal pressure. Citing the 
example of how the Turkish public's desire for more civic liberties pressured the 
governing AKP (Turkish Justice and Development Party) to preserve secularism 
and democracy, Bayat contends that society need not take up arms to influence 
the state; rather, they can establish new lifestyle and new modes of "thinking, 
being, and doing things" (Bayat, 2010, p.251).''® The author goes so far as to 
suggest that the socialization of the state is "governmentality in reverse". 
I introduce the concept of "capture" to fill this theoretical gap to describe the 
possible ways societal actors capitalise on state co-optation. Scholars of 
political economy have applied the concept capture to demonstrate the ways 
firms shape business rules and regulations in their favour The targets of 
capture are monetary or fiscal policies. The aims of capture include the ability of 
firms to control legislative votes, to command key instruments of the state, to 
obtain favourable executive decrees and court decisions, and to establish 
important business connections. In capture, individuals, groups, firms in both 
public and private sectors aim to shift laws, regulations, decrees, and other 
governmental policies (basic rules of the game), to their own advantage 
(Yakovlev, 2006, p. 1036). 
Selznick, who was the first sociologist to apply co-optation, made this point. In his book TVA 
and the Grassroot: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization, which he published in 
1949, Selznick discussed how co-opted subjects behaved in ways contrary to those expected 
by the state. Individuals and sub-groups in co-optation structures formed networks and informal 
structures of communication that weakened the official chain of command See Selznick 1949 
pp. 251-252. 
In this study, I apply the capture concept to analyse official ulema's strategies to 
influence policies, laws, and distribution of resources. These strategies include 
directly lobbying politicians and civil servants, or indirectly influencing public 
opinion (through fatwas and other religious advisories). The following ideal 
measurements are used to illustrate what constitutes official ulema's successful 
capture and state co-optation: first, the extent to which they influence state 
policies as opposed to legitimising them; second, the extent to which they 
influence the appointments of state personnel as opposed to the state 
determining them; third, the extent to which state religious bureaucracies and 
institutions enhance ulema's authority as opposed to undermining it; fourth, the 
extent to which they monopolise discourse or counter the interests of the state 
as opposed to opinions determined by the state; and fifth, the extent to which 
ulema are able to access resources that help them achieve goals apart from 
state-provided benefits and concessions. I will elaborate upon these ideal 
measurements as part of the theory review in Chapter Two. In reality, the co-
optation and capture dynamic is not a zero-sum game. A successful capture 
does not always amount to a failed co-optation. Furthermore, the object of co-
optation and capture may also be different for separate cases. Thus, one should 
measure the extent of co-optation or capture in relative terms: what actors aim 
to achieve and they actually achieved. 
The study refers to co-optation and capture as practices of states and societal 
actors, and this makes Migdal's work on the "state-in-society" approach 
relevant. Migdal (1988, p. 228) says that states and societies construct their 
authority vis-a-vis one another, and it is thus important to examine their 
practices to dominate the other instead of the images they portray. Through 
studying states' practices, one can observe their struggles in exercising 
dominance over their respective societies. These struggles also apply to states 
political scientists characterise as "strong." In Migdal's view, the state is not a 
"centralised, unified organisation establishing pre-eminence over the population 
in a given territorial space" but rather every state's attempt to assert its power 
on society is bounded by limitations and resistance (Migdal, 2001a, p. 4). 
Migdal emphasises the factors that facilitate or hinder actors' influence.^® To 
build from Migdal's approach, I apply concepts of co-optation and capture to 
distinguish the practices of the states and official ulema respectively. 
Argument 
Both official ulema in Malaysia and Indonesia are trying to expand their powers 
but from different starting points and with contrasting successes. I argue that 
Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies during the Islamic resurgence 
period (from 1970s onwards) have shaped as well as constrained the degree to 
which the contemporary official ulema have been able to capture state 
institutions." MUl's and the Malaysian official ulema's contrasting capture 
objectives demonstrate this. Suharto has limited the role of MUl to issuing 
fatwas and translating national policies, but it now wants to greatly expand this, 
pushing for Indonesian laws to recognise its role in Islamic economics, halal 
certification, and public morality. In contrast, the Mahathir government entrusted 
Migdal's state-in-society approach will be discussed further as part of the theory review in 
Chapter Two. 
The Islamic resurgence movement will be discussed in Chapter Four. It is a period marked 
with rising piety and demands made by sections of the community for greater Islamlsation in the 
public and private spheres. 
Malaysian official ulema with these roles. After IVlahathir's retirement in 2003, 
Malaysian official ulema want to expand their authority by retaining the power 
arrangement during his rule. Yet, they also claim exclusive rights to interpret the 
state's ideology in their favour; seek to fulfil personal and group material 
interests beyond the extent originally allocated by the state; and appeal for the 
right to define Islam. Nonetheless, I stress that these aims do not necessarily 
emerge out of their political, economic, or material interests, but genuine 
attempts to bring the state and ummat close to Islamic ideals. 
When measured by their very own aims, as indicated in the official ulema's 
fatwas, writings, sermons and pronouncements, I contend that Malaysian official 
ulema's ability to capture the state is much greater than their Indonesian 
counterparts. In other words, MUl is struggling to achieve its objectives and 
facing an identity crisis in the post-New Order period. Three modalities of 
capture account for the Malaysian official ulema's relative strength: they have a 
clear institutional role; a coherent ideology; and organisational unity. Comparing 
official ulema's experience in the two countries also shows that there is no co-
relation between capture and state strength. This contradicts many works that 
point to MUl's increasing strength and assertiveness after the fall of the New 
Order. Conversely, after the 1997 financial crisis, Malaysian official ulema have 
been successful in their capture even though there has been no regime change. 
Three modalities of Capture 
I contend that the three modalities discussed below best explain the contrasting 
outcomes of official ulema's capture. These variables are stronger in the 
Malaysian case than the Indonesian one. First, the Malaysian constitution 
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clearly recognises the roles of official ulema institutions. The institutional and 
legal demarcation of authority between official ulema institutions and the state is 
also clearer in Malaysia compared to Indonesia.^® According to Article Three of 
the Malaysian Federal Constitution, the powers of the official ulema are limited 
to the religious councils of each neger/.^® Nonetheless, when Mahathir became 
prime minister in 1981, his government (UMNO) undertool< significant reforms 
that consolidated the powers of official ulema at the federal l e v e l . I n 1992, the 
government established IKIM, and later strengthened the powers of JAKIM in 
1997.^'' These federal institutions were accorded authority in areas such as 
halal certification, issuing standard sermons for Friday prayers, management of 
Haj pilgrims, research, and censorship. In contrast, the Suharto government did 
not accord MUl similar powers to these Malaysian institutions. Formed in 1975, 
MUl's main role was to translate the concepts of national development 
(Departemen Penerangan R.I, 1975). MUl's fatwas are not legally binding; the 
state and Muslim citizens can choose whether or not to heed them. During the 
New Order, MUl fatwas generally did not contradict state ideology. Moreover, 
Kemenag (Kementerian Agama or Religious Ministry) continues to have 
executive power over important aspects of Islamic affairs such as Islamic 
education, Haj, research and training. As I will argue in this study, Suharto's and 
This clear demarcation is derived from British colonialism. The separation of powers between 
the state, Malay rulers, and official ulema at the federal level, and the negeri levels, started 
during the colonial era. This arrangement continued after Malaya gained independence in 1957. 
For discussion on Malayan constitution prior to Malayan independence, see Fernando 2006 
and Abdul Aziz, 2013. 
Article Three of the Malaysian Federal Constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion of the 
federation, but the administration of Islam is a state (negeri) matter. The Malay rulers are the 
Head of Islam of their respective negeri. 
In 1988, the shariah court system was empowered, enlarged, and equipped with an 
administration independent from the Islamic religious councils and the office of mufti (Maznah 
Zarizana, & Sim, 2009, pp. 65-66). From 1988, the civil courts cannot hear cases related to 
Muslim family laws and religious matters, which fall under the jurisdiction of the shariah courts 
The roles and functions of JAKIM and IKIM will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
Mahathir's different treatments of official ulema shaped and constrained their 
capture aims and strategies up until today. 
Second, the Malaysian official ulema are better at aligning their interests around 
the ideology of the ruling elites compared to those from ML)I. The Malaysian 
ulema claim to be the defenders of the five principles of the Rukunegara: Belief 
In God; loyalty to King and country; upholding the constitution; sovereignty of 
the law; and behaving well and morally. Defending the Rukunegara is crucial for 
Malaysian ulema, as it legitimises the very institutions they occupy. They are 
also ardent supporters of UMNO's ideology. UMNO slogans ketuanan Melayu 
(Malay supremacy), Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), Islam Hadhari (Civilisation 
Islam), and Islam Wasatiyyah (Moderate Islam) feature regularly in their 
sermons, writings and discourse. Those same ulema also rely on the patronage 
of the Malay rulers to assert their authority. In contrast, MUl was unable to use 
the Indonesian state's ideology Pancasila to its advantage. The religiously 
neutral philosophy underlying Pancasila restricted MUl from using Islam as a 
rallying point to align its interest with the state's. Pancasila stands for: belief in 
Almighty God, the sovereignty of the people, national unity, social justice, and 
humanity. Though vague, Pancasila constrains Indonesians from advancing 
their interests on religious grounds. In fact, even today, some MUl members 
want to adopt shariah as the organisation's ideology. According to MUl 
secretary, Ustaz Isa Anshary, "MUl has a general principle {pedoman dasar), it 
is no longer Pancasila. Compare Pancasila and Islam, Islam is bigger."^^ 
• Interview with Isa Anshary, MUl Secretary, 6 December 2012. 
Third, the capacity of the Malaysian official ulema to exercise collective 
responsibility and elite cohesion is better than their Indonesian MUl 
counterparts. Malaysian official ulema unite when dealing with the state. This 
ulema unity was evident during the latter part of the Abdullah Badawi 
government (2003-2009). The official ulema also have the option of co-
operating with UMNO, and/or the Malay rulers, and even the opposition, 
depending on which circumstances favoured them. In contrast, orientational and 
ideological differences among MUl members weakened the institution's ability 
to capture. Members with different religious outlooks, aims, and interests 
influence the organisation in different ways. Frequently, there is public 
disagreement between MUl leaders. Internal rivalry and bickering has also 
weakened the institution. 
Caveats to the argument 
I present my argument and the three types of capture above with several 
qualifications. I acknowledge that there are other possible intervening variables 
that contribute to the co-optation/capture dynamic in both countries. These 
factors include inter alia contrasting political cultures, geography and population 
sizes. Yet, these stark demographic and geographical differences should not 
hinder comparison of both countries, since the focus here is on actors and 
institutions at the national level of both countries. In addition, the presence of 
the Malay rulers gave Malaysian ulema another equally powerful patron able to 
counter-balance the state's influence. Monarchical institutions survived in 
Malaysia but not in Indonesia, except Yogyakarta province, where the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta is automatically the governor.^^ The nine Malay rulers remain the 
titular heads of Islam and Malay culture of their negeri, and their institutions 
were retained during British colonial rule (Amoroso, 2014).^" Hence, there is 
another layer of authority in Malaysia, the Malay rulers, when it comes to the 
administration of Islam. They are the pre-eminent authority and final arbiter on 
religion in the country. There are no alternative patrons available to MUl, 
because NU and Muhammadiyah tend to see MUl as a rival. It has to rely on 
society's support to offset the state's influence. 
I am also not implying that the Malaysia ulema's case is a complete success 
and MUl's an utter failure. The objectives and strategies of co-optation and 
capture differ in both countries (Jessop, 2008).^® The Malaysian ulema's 
success is measured in relative terms in comparison to MUl's. Thus, Indonesian 
and Malaysian official ulema capture should be analysed as "works in 
progress." However, the bigger interest in understanding co-optation and 
capture processes is how these processes affect governance, discourse, and 
security. Understanding these processes would allow me to re-visit existing 
conclusions made in the literature about official ulema. 
" The province of Solo also has a Sultan, but he acts more as a symbolic ruler than having any 
political power. 
Being titular and symbolic heads does not mean their power is these areas are insignificant 
for there are instances where they speak in ways that symbolizes their leadership and power in 
these areas. 
^^ I refer to Jessop's "strategic-relational" approach in understanding the contrasting strategies 
states adopt in response to society. 
Significance of history in comparing Indonesia and IVIalaysia 
Given the two countries' proximity and shared history, political scientists, 
economists and sociologists are attracted to comparative studies on Indonesia 
and Malaysia (some examples are Alatas, 1997; Hadiz & Teik, 2011; Pepinsky, 
2009; Preston, 2012; Ufen, 2009). Geddes (1990), however, cautions against 
selecting cases for comparison based on dependent variables (or conclusions). 
Selecting cases based on dependent variables, Geddes warns, biases our 
findings (p.149). Delineating common denominators underlying cases with 
similar outcomes may ignore the fact that the same denominators can also exist 
in cases with different outcomes. Therefore, I avoid selecting cases based on 
the conclusions made by existing literature. Had I relied on the existing 
literature, I would have concluded that MUl's capture had been more successful 
than the JKF-MKI, and I would have designed my fieldwork to look for factors 
that contribute MUl's success and Malaysian official ulema's failures. 
Instead, I selected Indonesia and Malaysia as case studies based on what 1 see 
as plausible independent variables that could explain contemporary official 
ulema's behaviour, without discounting other variables. One plausible variable 
is how different regime types empower ulema institutions. MUl was formed 
under an authoritarian, repressive government while the Malaysian ulema 
institutions were established under a pseudo-authoritarian government. Suharto 
did not accord Indonesian official ulema institutions powers and sought to 
maintain the country's religiously neutral philosophy Pancasila. Evidently, 
Indonesia's banking regulations did not specify MUl's role until 2008. After 
struggling for almost a decade, it was only in 2014 that MUl's role in halal 
certification is formally recognised by the state and DPR (Dewan Perwakilan 
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Rakyat or Indonesian Legislative Assembly).^® In contrast, Mahathir delegated a 
substantial amount of power to these official ulema institutions. His government 
either created new institutions (such as IKIM) or empowered existing ones 
(JKF-MKI and JAKIM). JAKIM was elevated to undertake most of the state's 
Islamic administration: including halal certification, Islamic banking and finance, 
censorship, and issuing the list of religious speakers for Federal mosques, and 
for ceramah (sermon) schedules. 
The reasons for the two states' differential treatment of official ulema will be 
explored in Chapter Four. In summary, Mahathir had to make more concessions 
to official ulema than Suharto. In the 1970s, there were already numerous 
channels for ulema to oppose the state in Malaysia but few in Indonesia. In 
Malaysia, the ulema had PAS to voice their opposition to the state; and while in 
Indonesia ulema had the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United 
Development Party) as a political vehicle to oppose the state, the party was 
weakened by internal conflicts (to be discussed in Chapter Five). Suharto 
ensured that PPP remained weak by constantly intervening in its internal affairs, 
threatening to cut its funding if it opposed the government, and marginalising 
outspoken ulema in the party. 
These contrasting strategies stand out from the many similarities both cases 
have. Both governments were strong and efficient states; had to respond to 
global Islamic resurgence movement from the 1970s onwards; experienced 
splits within the ruling elite in the 1980s; co-opted ulema, influential Islamic 
intellectuals, and activists to support their industrialisation and nation-building 
MUl's success and struggles in capturing the state shall be discussed in Chapter Six. In that 
chapter, I shall also discuss topics such as the halal economy, halal certification, and other 
Islamic enterprises. 
objectives; built institutions and implemented state-led Islamisation policies; and 
were generally weakened after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.^^ The decision to 
compare the two cases follows on from Bara's (2009) argument that: 
"Comparative political analysis aims at providing a more scientific basis of study 
of political institutions and behaviour, and to avoid unsubstantiated 
generalisations which will prevent results of such investigations from being 
regarded as reliable" (p.42). 
Because I see Suharto's and Mahathir's policies as making important 
contributions to contemporary ulema's behaviour, re-visiting both countries' last 
40 years of history is important to understand why Suharto and Mahathir 
accorded these roles and powers to ulema institutions.^® My approach is in line 
with what Pierson (2003) refers to as "slow-moving" processes, where the 
impact of social processes can be observed only in the long run (p. 189). 
According to Pierson, since many important social processes take considerable 
time to unfold, researchers may ignore many important variables if they attempt 
to explain causality by only observing recent events (p. 178). 
The study underlines two vital contexts that explain the co-optation/capture 
dynamic: the Islamic resurgence movement of the 1970s to the 1990s; and the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. Since the 1970s, there has indeed been a marked 
shift in religious orientation amongst the ummat towards conservatism. This 
I do not deny that the degree of these similarities varies. For example, Malaysia was not as 
authontanan as Indonesia. Islamic resurgence influenced Malaysia greater than Indonesia In 
addition, after the Asian financial crisis, UMNO remained in power while the Golkar collapsed 
All these similarities will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
Even though the study focuses on both countries' history since the 1970s, I do not discount 
the significance of historical events throughout the last century and how they contributed to the 
contemporary official ulama institutions. For comprehensive account of the history of Indonesia 
and Malaysia, see Andaya, 2001; Azyumardi, 2006; Gullick, 1969; Pringle, 2010; Ricklefs 
2008). 
shift has resulted in a global islamic resurgence movement (see for example 
Chandra, 1987; Nagata, 1984; Zainah, 1987), a subject that will be dealt with 
separately in Chapter Four. Islamic resurgence refers to the endeavour by 
groups to "re-establish Islamic values. Islamic practices, Islamic institutions. 
Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of the Muslims everywhere" 
(Chandra, 1987, p. 2). These groups sought to "re-create an Islamic ethos and 
an Islamic social order guided by the Quran and the sunnah, in line with the 
Quranic ideal that 'Islam is a way of life' or ad-c/een" (Chandra, 1987, p. 2). This 
phenomenon shows the interconnectedness of global islamic discourse with 
those in Indonesia and Malaysia. Understanding Islamic resurgence and the 
actors involved during that period is important in examining contemporary 
capture. From the 1990s, these actors were part of the religious leadership and 
continued to be so after the departure of Suharto and Mahathir. Reading the 
discourse of resurgence actors—such as leaders of dakwah (the call to spread 
the message of Islam) groups, university lecturers, and ulema—is important as 
they reflect the broader capture aims of the contemporary official ulema to 
Islamise the current state. 
Understanding continuity and change in state-official ulema relations would be 
unsatisfactory without explicating the significance of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. The Asian financial crisis was a watershed event that significantly altered 
the political landscape of Indonesia and Malaysia. With Indonesia's economy 
devastated during the crisis, student protests contributed to the downfall 
Suharto's 32-year rule. It was also during the Asian financial crisis that Mahathir 
sacked his popular deputy Anwar Ibrahim, which triggered the reformasi 
movement and mass protests that divided Malaysians at a scale unprecedented 
during Mahathir's rule (Weiss, 2006).^® Ultimately, the Asian financial crisis 
contributed to the more competitive political environment of both countries in the 
subsequent years, though Indonesia faced this earlier than Malaysia. This 
transformation shaped the conclusions scholars make about the relationship 
between official ulema and the states in both countries. In a snapshot, scholars 
portray the Malaysian ulema as continuing to act as passive agents of UMNO 
because no regime change occurred (Hamayotsu, 2005; Shiozaki, 2010). MUl, 
on the other hand, has been portrayed as becoming more assertive towards the 
Indonesian state and society compared its behaviour during the New Order 
(Moch Nur, 2005; Nadirsyah, 2004). A review of these works will be conducted 
in Chapter Two. The study disagrees with the conclusions made by existing 
writings: they have overstated MUl's influence in the religious domain, and 
understated the Malaysian ulema's powers to influence the state. 
Significance of Islamic thought in co-optation and capture 
One aspect the study seeks to grasp is the role ulema play in contemporary 
society. Based on existing writings, some authors undertake normative 
approaches to understand ulema's role in modern societies. Zaman (2005), for 
instance, associated ulema as agents of social change and custodians of 
Islamic tradition. Other authors demonstrate the various roles ulema play in 
reality. Authors in the edited volume Varieties of Religious Authority: Ctianges 
and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam map out ulema's authority 
can manifest in different forms (Azyumardi, Dijk and Kaptein, 2010). In this 
study, I focus on how ulema negotiate the roles states assign to them. It asks if 
Anwar's dismissal divided UMNO more greatly compared to the party's crisis in 1987, when 
Mahathir was challenged by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah for UMNO presidency. 
ulema are constrained by being part of state structures and whether can 
influence religious discourse. 
Understanding religious authority cannot be separated from analysing Islamic 
ideas, orientation, and thought, because it is necessary in conceptualising how 
official ulema construct their authority against the state and the ummat. 
Debatably, the more pious or conservative the society, the more powerful the 
official ulema. States need to listen to the sentiments at the grassroots, which 
also explains why Suharto and Mahathir implemented major Islamic policies 
during the Islamic resurgence. Moreover, discussing the role of ideas, 
orientation and thought is relevant because scholars are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the rising conservatism in Indonesia and Malaysia, especially 
how it affects religious minorities (for example Bruinessen, 2013; Chandra, 
2002; Parish, 2005; Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Hefner, 2011, p. 282). These 
minority groups included the Ahmadiyahs, Shiahs, Christians, liberals and those 
who converted out of Islam. Scholars of Indonesia are concerned about attacks 
and discrimination towards minorities. Similarly, scholars of Malaysia have 
expressed concerns about the intolerance of Malaysian Muslims, for example 
banning the use of the word "Allah" by non-Muslims, the declaration that Shias 
are deviants; and the forbidding of Muslim-non Muslim marriages. 
However, what is the role of the official ulema in this rise of societal 
conservatism? They are either reflecting the growing conservatism in the 
ummat and hence being in touch with community opinion; or if I am to apply 
Riaz's view (2008, p. 38), they are the ones shaping the consciousness and 
ideas of the religious community. I reiterate my position that in capture, the 
official ulema are not necessarily fulfilling their material and economic interests; 
some genuinely believe that Islamisation is beneficial for the ummat. On the 
other hand, official ulema are pragmatists. They can switch between 
conservative and progressive ideas depending on whichever circumstances 
benefit them (Mannheim, 1986).^° 
Definitions 
In this section, I define the research parameters of the study. First, I discuss the 
concept of ulema in Islam and then locate them in the context of Indonesia and 
Malaysia. This will be followed by a description of state bureaucracies and 
institutions to be analysed. I then delineate the period of study. 
The ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia 
The term ulema is mentioned in the Holy Quran twice and is often used to refer 
to the "scholars of Islam." Traditionally, the Muslim community regarded the 
ulema as a group of Islamic scholars. A hadith recorded the Prophet 
Muhammad as saying the ulema were "heirs of the Prophet" {waratsatui 
anbiya). The ulema quote this hadith to identify themselves as authorities in 
religious matters, gatekeepers of religious learning, and guardians of faith. As 
such, the ulema often present themselves as "custodians of an authoritative 
dogma, reproducers of an authoritative legacy, and interpreters of authoritative 
law" (Ghozzi, 2002, p. 317). Unlike Christianity, the majority of Muslims do not 
regard the ulema as an ordained priesthood. In Catholicism, the religious 
Olle, 2009, made a similar argument. Olle's worl< on IVIUI will be discussed as part of the 
literature review in Chapter Two. 
structures are neatly separated from society, where ordained priests are 
considered mediators between God and human beings. While priests perform 
sacramental functions and intercession between God and man, this is generally 
not the case for the ulema. The ulema act as religious scholars who provide 
guidance on theological matters.^'' 
Muslims distinguish ulema from other elites by virtue of their education. They 
identify ulema based on their training in Islamic disciplines or revealed 
knowledge. Religious science training can be received either earlier or later in 
their educational life. The terms "Islamic" disciplines and "revealed" knowledge 
are highly contested. ^^  Hasan al-Turabi, for instance, would include chemists, 
engineers, economists, jurists, social scientists, natural scientists, public 
leaders, philosophers and those who enlighten society as ulema too (al-Turabi, 
1983).^^ However, a majority of Muslims generally refer to ulema as religious 
elites trained in the religious sciences. In this study, I define the ulema as those 
who received their training in the religious sciences, "Islamic" disciplines, and 
theology. Their fields of study include law, exegesis, theology, and traditions of 
the Prophet. By nature of their training, the ulema function as jurists, 
theologians, grammarians, teachers, mufassirin or writers of Quranic 
commentary, and muaddithin or interpreters of hadith (Hussain, 2006). The 
ulema must have the ability to read and converse in Arabic in order to interpret 
Although there is no priesthood in Islam, some Muslims do see faith as having a clergy. Khuri 
(1987) argues that the concept of the clergy exists amongst some Shia circles (p.293). Several 
sufi groups, similarly, believe in the mystical powers of the saints (wali) and sufi masters. 
Conversely, some Muslims do not include sufi syaikhs as part of the ulema ranks (Green, 1978, 
p. 26). For the majority of Muslims, not only are the ulema ordinary human beings, they also 
remain a very fluid social category, and far from being a unified social class. 
^^  The notion of "Islamic disciplines" arose in the seventh and eighth centuries AD. The 
dichotomy between "Islamic" disciplines and "non-Islamic" (secular) disciplines did not exist 
during the time of the Prophet and his companions, who were largely very practical individuals. 
Islamic disciplines emerged as a reaction towards the early Abbasid caliphate's translation 
movement of books on philosophy, mathematics and physical sciences (Saeed, 2004, p 16) 
^^  Cited in Hatina, 2009. 
the Quran, hadith, and classical Islamic sources. They have the competency to 
deal with matters pertaining to religious beliefs, rituals, and ethical codes. 
Moreover, the Muslims regard ulema as the spiritual, moral, and intellectual 
custodians of Islam. Hence, ulema define problems falling within the sphere of 
religion and provide solutions based on what they deem divine law. In some 
Muslim societies, the ulema must not only receive training in madrasah 
(traditional Islamic school), they must also take up appointments in offices 
deemed "religious." This has its precedence during the Ottoman caliphate, 
where those who studied in madrasah and received ijazah (diplomas or degree) 
secured appointment as mosque functionaries, teachers or judges, could be 
regarded as ulema (Chambers, 1972, p. 33). 
In contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia, religious knowledge is taught in 
Islamic boarding schools {pesantren or pondok) and madrasah. In Indonesia, 
the pesantren system remains the most traditional form of Islamic education 
where learning is mostly through reading texts (Millie, 2008, p. 107). One of 
the most notable pesantren is Tebuireng in Jombang, founded by Kiai Hasyim 
Asyari (also one of NU's founders) in 1899.^ ® Tebuireng became the model for 
many other pesantren in Indonesia and produced many influential ulema. In 
Malaysia, the pesantren are commonly referred to as the pondok and are 
located in rural parts of the Northeast Peninsular Malaysia (particularly in 
Kelantan and Kedah).^® Yet, the pondok system has become less popular than 
The training in the pesantrens or Islamic boarding schools is regimental. According to Ustaz 
Akbar Kurniawan, a young religious scholar of MUl who graduated from a pesantren, "Our life is 
full of education. We wake up at 4am every day. Our activities are controlled by the sound of the 
bell, just like in the army." Interview with Akbar Kurniawan, MUl member, 4 March 2013, 
One of the principle aims of NU's formation in 1926 was to defend the Islamic tradition of the 
pesantren against the tide of modemism that confronted the Malay world in the early 20th 
century, especially from Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam (Bruinessen 1994 pp 32-41) 
This point was made during an interview with Dr Fauzi Deraman, Associate Professor Faculty 
of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya, 6 February 2013. 
the madrasah.^'' The madrasah is a day school that runs in the same way as 
modern/secular schools. A madrasah student has to obtain a certain grade and 
pass examinations in order to advance to the next level. The madrasah does 
not require students to study classical texts and its curriculum combines both 
religious and non-religious subjects.^® Apart from the religious sciences, these 
schools also teach vocational, technical, and "secular" subjects. In Malaysia, 
madrasah students have to sit for national examinations prepared by the 
Ministry of Education, and sit for "religious" subjects prepared by the religious 
councils. In Indonesia, a similar madrasah system exists in parallel with the 
pesantren and the national school system. Since the 1970s, the Indonesian 
state has attempted to modernise the madrasah, and the Kemenag designs the 
curriculum. Indonesian madrasahs teach and require students take national 
exams. Since that time, some pesantrens have adjusted their curriculum by 
introducing new teaching methods, subjects, and grading systems while 
retaining core "religious" subjects (Mun'im, 2010, p. 62). 
Most ulema today are graduates from Islamic universities. Some of the more 
popular destinations of tertiary religious institutions that offer traditional Islamic 
learning are the Al-Azhar University (Cairo), Darul-Ulum Deobandi (Pakistan), 
Islamic University of Madinah (Saudi Arabia), Yarmouk University (Jordan), 
International Islamic University Malaysia (Malaysia) and State Institute of 
Islamic Studies (Indonesia). However, Al-Azhar University remains the most 
^^Indonesian also use the term pondok is also used although less common compared to in 
Malaysia. The pondok system is Malaysia were weakened by the challenge of the reform 
movement of the early 20th century (A. Firdaus, 1985). Students of the prominent Tok Kenali 
(1868-1933) later built many madrasahs in Malaya such as Madrasah Manabi al-ulum wa Matali 
an-Nujum at Bukit Mertajam (Province Wellesley) and Madrasah al-Falah at Pulau Pisang near 
Kota Bharu Kelantan (Firdaus 1985, p. 10-17). 
At the primary level, it is called the sekolah rendah agama, whereas at the secondary level, it 
is called the sekolah menengah agama. 
prestigious institution of religious learning in the Sunni world. The curriculum of 
the madrasah and universities of the Sunni Muslim world—Indonesia and 
Malaysia not excluded—is fashioned largely on Al-Azhar's structure (Azhar, 
2006, p.113-114).^® 
As previously explained, some ulema are officially recognised by the state 
(Saeed, 2004). These ulema work in religious bureaucracies or state-sponsored 
bodies dealing with Islamic policies and fatwas. It should be noted that the term 
official ulema is an ideal-type, analytical category that distinguishes those who 
obtain state recognition from those who do not. In other words, if a question on 
who has the authority to speak on religious matters and issue fatwas arises, 
states will point to their official ulema. Nevertheless, in reality, Muslims do not 
generally use the term official ulema and non-official ulema. To begin with, 
society has different criterias as to who should be called ulema. There are 
disagreements whether ulema are self-ascribed, society-defined, or state 
defined, because the concept of "ordained' ulema, akin to ordained priesthoods 
in Christianity, does not exist in Islam. Some societies define ulema more 
loosely than others. They include religious preachers as ulema, even though 
they have not contributed to any scholarly debate or writings. 
The official ulema obtain "formal legitimacy" and the state appoints them into 
positions within the apparatus. Their positions include mufti, qadis Qudges), and 
officials in religious departments. The official ulema have access to key 
institutions of the state such as the religious councils, which are sources of 
Despite their in training the religious sciences, the role of the ulema is not solely confined to 
mosques. In his study of the Tunisian ulema from 1873 to 1913, Green categorizes the ulema 
as serving three main functions in society: Islamic higher education, sharia justice and Muslim 
worship (Green, 1978). 
power and social prestige (Mills, 1959; Norshahril, 2010a). In 1916, Haji Abdul 
Karim Amrullah, prominent Indonesian uiema, described the mufti institutions in 
Johore as follows: 
To become a Government Mufti in Malaya is a great glory. You have an official 
uniform, with a whole banana-comb epaulette on the shoulder, a jubbah 
embroidered with gold thread, a silk turban, and your own car. The ra'yat 
[people] fear and obey you, eat the scraps from your table, your spat on sireh. 
And If you want to get married Bismillah! (Roff, 1994, p. 67) 
The elevation of the ulema into religious bureaucracies, as a salaried and 
professional class, means that their authority is attached to an office and not 
necessarily to popularity. Their tasks include representing the state in 
international meetings and conferences; leading prayers in national events 
(such as the opening of the parliament or legislative assembly); and speaking 
on behalf of the state on religious issues. 
However, some ulema obtain popular legitimacy independent of these state-
sponsored institutions: through credentials, appeal, conduct, and piety. In 
Weber's terms, popular legitimacy here may be in the form of charismatic 
authority (Weber, 1978). The claim to charismatic authority may take the form of 
moral grounds, including p ie ty .Char isma also extends to the ways their ideas 
are articulated in public, the events they attend, the way they dress, the 
lifestyles they lead, the issues and concerns they discuss, and the prestige of 
their descent (Ghozzi, 2002; Nagata, 1984). Traditional and new media may 
further boost popular legitimacy. Furthermore, informal organisations such as 
sufi/tariqahs may provide popular legitimacy. In these tariqah groups, the ulema 
can obtain legitimacy by being the son, or even student, of a prominent sheikh. 
For instance, the Arabic names carrying the term "sayyid" symbolizes descent 
from the Prophet and Hadrami. Lastly, another form of popular legitimacy is 
' Interview with Ichwan Sam, IVIUI Secretary General, 3 December 2012. 
through the possession of mystical and magical powers, such as the ability to 
cure an illness or foretell the future."^ 
The ulema bear titles that signify their authority and status vis-a-vis ordinary 
religious teachers and preachers. Titles are to be conferred—either by the state 
or society or both—based on educational background, occupation, and the 
offices they occupy. Graduates of the pesantren who eventually become 
religious teachers bear the title "kiai" or "ustad." In Indonesia, the term kiai often 
comes with the title "haji" (hence Kiai-Haji or KH), which means the ulema have 
performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, the fifth pillar of Islamic faith. In Malaysia, 
the term Kiai-Haji is not used by the ulema. The Malaysian muftis are identified 
as sohibus samahah, an Arabic term which means the "honourable." Other 
popular titles for the Malaysian ulema are Tok Guru (mainly graduates of 
pondok), murshidul am (General Guide), and ustaz (teacher). Some other titles 
for ulema amongst the sufi/tariqah circles include the sheikh and habib. The 
latter is more common for individuals of Hadrami descent. 
Official ulema institutions and religious bureaucracies 
This research limits its examination of the official ulema to the main religious 
bureaucracies and state-sponsored institutions of both countries. In the case of 
Indonesia, the study focusses on MUl. For the case of Malaysia, the study shall 
focus on the number of muftis and key office holders (such as directors and 
deputy directors) in the federal religious institutions and departments. 
This is not to say that ulema in the state bureaucracies are necessarily less popular less 
charismatic or less qualified than those who are not part of such formal institutions They may 
also possess traditional and/or charismatic authority. Indeed, some ulema may be offered 
positions in the state bureaucracy and also to run as candidates in elections as a result of their 
popularity. 
specifically JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM. In general, the official ulema in these 
institutions represent their respective countries in international meetings; issue, 
research, and/or enforce fatwas; and engage in administrative matters 
pertaining to Islam. The discussion of these institutions here is brief, as details 
of their roles and structures will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
The Suharto government formed MUl in 1975. The reason he gave for setting 
up MUl was that there was a need to establish a nationwide body of ulema to 
represent Muslims. Based on the official narrative, the state formed MUl to 
foster unity amongst the Muslims in the country that acts as a forum that 
includes representatives from the various Islamic organisations. The state's 
narrative on MUl's establishment seems a noble one, but scholars and 
commentators are inclined to think that the institution was meant for social 
control (Bramantyo, 2009; Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 51). 
However, it is the Kemenag and not MUl that functions as an administrative 
body which oversees religious matters in Indonesia. It has charge of the six 
official religions recognized by the constitution, namely Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism."^ Kemenag is divided into 
the central (pusat) and provinces {provinsi), and has branches at the district 
(daerah) levels. Despite the general move towards decentralisation that 
happened during post-Suharto rule (Bunts, 2009), Kemenag's powers mostly 
rest with the central office. According to Article 10/2004 on Law Making, 
provincial or local governments do not have the power to make regulations on 
matters of religion. This power has been legislatively reserved for the national 
The ministry was established based on Article 29/1945 constitution that upholds the Oneness 
of God principle, while guaranteeing the freedom of every inhabitant to embrace his religion 
(Noer, 1978, p. 8). This principle was later embodied the state's ideology Pancasila. 
government by action of article 10(3) of law 32/2004 on regional autonomy. 
The reason why I focus on MUl in this study is that the Kemenag is not an 
ulema institution, even though at least three of its departments—Ditjen Bimas 
Islam (Direktorat Jeneral Bimbingan Islam or Directorate for Islamic Guidance); 
Islam); Ditjen Pendis (Direktorat Jeneral Pendidikan Islam or Directorate for 
Islamic education); and Ditjen Haji (Direktorate Jeneral Penyelengaraan Haji 
dan Umrah or Directorate for Haj and Umrah)—deal with Muslim affairs. The 
Islamic directorate oversees the management of tithe (zakat), endowments 
(wakaf), and marriage. The Haj department handles the needs of pilgrims to 
Mecca and liaises with the agencies that offer services to the pilgrims. Not all 
Kemenag's personnel can be considered ulema, as some do not receive any 
form of training in the religious sciences, and the society does not recognise 
them as part of the ulema class. But the most important reason why I do not 
consider the Kemenag as an official ulema institution is because it neither 
issues fatwas nor gets involved in fatwa research. As mentioned earlier, the 
most important criterion for classifying ulema is the authority to issue (or 
research on) fatwas. 
In Malaysia, I focus on the JKF-MKI (National Fatwa Committee) because it is 
the closest Malaysian comparison to MUI.''^ The JKF-MKI is a forum where 
muftis from various negeri meet to discuss issues concerning Malaysia. The 
JKF-MKI, was established in 1970, under Article 11 of the MKI (JAKIM, 2013b). 
See Appendix 1# for the list of JKF-MKI Members as at 2014. Undeniably, both MUl and the 
Malaysian muftis are not perfect comparisons. MUl represents as a loose network of ulema that 
, ® state-sponsored platform, whereas the Malaysian muftis are civil servants 
MUl officials are not appointed by the state but receive yearly funding from the state, while the 
Malaysian muftis are appointed by the Malay rulers and are salaried government employees 
This committee is made up of the chairman, who is appointed by its members, 
the muftis of the 13 negeri, the mufti of the Federal Territory (Wilayah 
Persekutuan), and nine other Islamic scholars. The council also included other 
professionals and legal experts appointed by the Council of Rulers (Majlis Raja-
Raja). 
Apart from the JKF-MKI, I include federal institutions JAKIM and IKIM as part of 
my analysis. JAKIM acts as a secretariat for the JKF-MKI, which meets six 
times in a year, or more if required. IKIM acts as the research and intellectual 
institution that hosts meetings with the JKF-MKI. Both JAKIM and IKIM act as 
enforcement bodies for the JKF-MKI and complement one another. I am also 
including JAKIM in my analysis because it oversees some of the roles and 
functions of MUl, such as issuing halal certificates (for food products and 
cosmetics). The powers of JAKIM are extensive including overseeing 
Kemenag's role. It undertakes the administration of Haj and religious education 
for national schools {sekolah agama rakyat).^'^ However, unlike in Indonesia, 
there is no "religious affairs" Minister in Malaysia, but only a de facto minister 
under the Prime Minister's Office who oversees religious affairs. 
Time frame 
This study focuses on post-Suharto Indonesia (after 1998) and post-Mahathir 
Malaysia (after 2003). For Indonesia, I am referring to the presidencies of 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 to 
"" Interview with an UMNO member, 8 February 2013. The Islamic schools fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Islamic religious councils in the negeri. However, some these schools receive 
financial assistance from the federal government. These religious schools are called Sekolah 
Agama Bantuan Kerajaan and adopted the curriculum determined by the Ministry of Education 
and JAKIM. 
2014). In Malaysia, the case study shall be limited to the prime ministerships of 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib Abdul Razak (2009 onwards). 
During this period, both states experienced a more competitive political 
environment compared to the years under Suharto and IVIahathir. Political 
competition was further enhanced as a result of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. In Indonesia, the student protests led to Suharto's resignation and the 
weakening of Golkar. In Malaysia, the sacking of the deputy prime minister 
Anwar Ibrahim eroded support for UMNO. 
Nevertheless, my reference to both countries as experiencing more political 
competition does not imply that they are transitioning to post-authoritarianism in 
the same manner. Indonesia has undergone a regime change and transition 
from an authoritarian state to a more democratic state (Weatherbee, 2002). 
Malaysia, on the other hand, has neither been highly authoritarian, except 
during the 21 months under the National Operations Council after the 1969 
racial riots, nor democratic (H. Crouch, 1996, p. 30)."® Malaysian elections are 
competitive, and they are held once in every five years though Malaysia 
continues to witness the uninterrupted rule of UMNO since 1957. However, 
since 2006, UMNO has weakened, and is less popular than it was in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The 2008 General Elections saw, for the first time, the failure of the 
ruling BN coalition (Barisan Nasional or National Front) to regain two-thirds 
majority in the federal parliament. For BN to lose five states in one election to 
the opposition is also unprecedented in Malaysia's history. BN did not recover in 
the 2013 General Election, where it failed to obtain 50 per cent of the popular 
vote, and once again failed to obtain two-thirds majority in parliament. However, 
Parliament was re-convened in February 1971. 
a relatively weakened UMNO does not mean that Malaysia has become less 
authoritarian. Malaysia can still be regarded as what Case (2004) terms as a 
"pseudo-democracy" and what Ufen (2009, p. 320) describes as "electorally 
competitive authoritarian regime." Hence, the phrase "more competitive political 
environments" is more accurate in describing the political situation in both the 
Indonesian and Malaysian states today. 
Methodology 
This study builds on the state-in-society approach (Migdal, 1988).''® According 
to Migdal, existing studies on state-society relations emphasise the image of the 
state. This is manifested in the corporatist and bureaucratic-authoritarian 
approach, where the state is portrayed as either "autonomous and effective, or 
hapless, and bumbling, unstable," and "ineffective in carrying out their grand 
designs" (Migdal, 2002, p. 68). Migdal distinguishes the "practices of the state" 
from the "idea of the state itself." Rather than seeing state and society as 
dichotomous social structures, Migdal's state-in-society approach depicts 
society as a combination of social organisations. According to Migdal, "Various 
formations, including the idea of the state as well as many others (may or may 
not include parts of the state) singly or in tandem offer individuals strategies of 
personal survival and, for some, strategies of upward mobility" (Migdal, 2001b, 
p. 49). More importantly, individuals' selection of a range of strategies depends 
on a variety of factors. They may either be coerced into making such decisions 
or be offered material or monetary incentives (Migdal, 2002, p. 70). 
The basis for applying this approach shall be discussed further in the literature review in 
Chapter Two. 
Migdal challenges the notion that states are the prime movers of macro-level 
societal change, although he does not discount the state as continuing to be the 
most important social actor. He argues that the actions of states, more often 
than not, are constrained by their domestic environment. Societies continue to 
shape the powers states have, the nature of their policies, the issues of concern 
to the leaders. Migdal's approach in studying the "practices" of the state, rather 
than treating the state as a coherent, controlling organisation, has debunked the 
notion of strong state and passive society (White, 2013, p. 5). In other words, 
there can also be a situation where the society is relatively stronger than the 
state. As Migdal points out, state-society relations should not be seen as a zero 
sum equation, with clear winners and losers (Migdal, 2001b, p. 20). 
This study's findings support Migdal's assertion that the state is not as strong as 
scholars often assume. However, existing studies using Migdal's framework 
stop short of pointing out the limitations of the state without extending the 
analysis to the limitations of societal actors. In addition, scholars who apply 
Migdal's approach often conduct research in the penpheries of the state in order 
to demonstrate states' limitations. This study of ulema located within the state, 
and their behaviour vis-a-vis the state as autonomous actors, fills this 
theoretical gap, and extends Migdal's approach to accommodate the influence 
of societal forces on the state. 
Nonetheless, Migdal's state-in-society approach informed my fieldwork strategy 
and data gathering. My fieldwork was mainly located in Jakarta and Kuala 
Lumpur between November 2012 and May 2013. My fieldwork largely consisted 
of interviewing official ulema from both countries. On average, each interview 
lasted for one to two hours. While this study focuses on the official ulema, the 
interviews also included academics, civil-society activists, politicians, non-
official ulema, bureaucrats and cabinet ministers who closely interacted with 
ulema. The personalities selected have significant influence in the community 
by occupying important offices in the state, and most importantly, are in a 
position to be informed due to close acquaintance with the events and meetings 
attended by the official ulema. Apart from these interviews, I had numerous 
conversations with the public, activists, and students in institutes of higher 
learning, and conducted participant observation in mosques. I also attended 
fatwa meetings, public forums (where the official ulema spoke), and 
conferences. My research also relies extensively on secondary data. Official 
comments and press releases published in the media were examined. Also, my 
fieldwork involved library research, and I spent some time the libraries of MUl 
and NU, and the universities in both countries. Apart from examining academic 
works, theses, and newspaper reports, I also relied on online videos. 
Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two discusses the relevant literature on the study of ulema and my 
theoretical framework. The literature review engages three kinds of writings: 
works on the ulema; works on MUl and Malaysian ulema; and theoretical 
debates in political science. First, I highlight how research/scholarly writings on 
ulema deal with the subjects of co-optation and capture. Second, I examine the 
works on the Indonesian and Malaysian ulema, particularly MUl and the 
Malaysian muftis. I argue that existing literature places too much emphasis on 
the political nature of their fatwas, not enough on the significance of their 
behaviour. Third, I highlight the various theoretical debates dealing with state-
society relations, pluralism, corporatism, and state-in-society relations. This 
chapter makes a case for applying the political economic framework, namely 
state capture, in discussing the religious and political behaviour of the official 
ulema. 
Chapter Three focuses on the MUl for the case of Indonesia, and the JKF-MKI, 
JAKIM and IKIM for the case of Malaysia. The chapter discusses the roles, 
structure and evolution of these institutions by focussing on their contemporary 
status, and sets up the discussion for Chapter Four and Chapter Five that 
draws out the significance of these institutions' origins. The chapter 
acknowledges that official ulema institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia have 
many differences. However, in demonstrating co-optation/capture dynamics in 
both countries, I make a case why MUl and JKF-MKI are comparable cases. 
Chapter Four describes the political and social context that contributed to 
Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation policies. The chapter discusses the 
Islamic resurgence movement that was marked by a shift in the religious 
outlook of the Muslims. During this period, there was a rise in piety in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia. This chapter also examines the different religious 
cleavages in both countries. Indonesian Muslims are divided into the 
traditionalists and modemists, while Malaysia between the ethno-nationalists 
and Islamists. Generally, traditionalists argue that Muslims should follow the 
four classical Islamic jurists Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafie, whereas 
modemists contend that religious teachings should consider the contemporary 
context. Ethno-nationalists emphasise on cultural aspects of religious traditions 
while Islamists desire a return to the Islamic "golden age" and are anti-cultural in 
their religious outlook. Discussing these cleavages is important in 
understanding why Suharto and Mahathir devised the co-optation strategies the 
ways they did. 
Chapter Five explores the different ways Suharto and Mahathir managed 
Islamic resurgence and other threats to their authority in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the 1970s, Suharto aimed to neutralise the traditionalists, and in the 1980s, 
sought to counterbalance the military. His co-optation instruments include the 
creation of PPP, MUl, and ICMI. Mahathir, on the other hand, strengthened 
traditional religious institutions and built new ones to subdue challenges from a 
more Islamist PAS. The federal government undertook "soft" Islamisation 
programs—such as establishing Islamic banks. Islamic universities, and 
strengthening Islamic bureaucracies—as well as empowering the official ulema. 
I contend that these varying co-optation strategies affected the official ulema's 
ability for capture in the 21®' Century. The main argument of this chapter is that 
Suharto did not empower the ulema the way Mahathir did, and this affected the 
official ulema's behaviour later. I classify Suharto's co-optation as symbolic 
institutionalism and Mahathir's as substantive institutionalism. 
Chapter Six assesses MUl's success in capturing the post-Suharto state. I 
argue that MUl in contemporary Indonesia continues to function under the 
shadow of the New Order. The Suharto government defined and confined the 
powers of MUl. In addition, MUl's internal fragmentation hinders its quest for 
capture. Apart from the success of the DSN-MUl (Dewan Shariah Nasional or 
National Shariah Board) to be recognised by the state to oversee the countries' 
Islamic banking and finance, MUl's attempts to stamp its authority on other 
domains such as halal certification, islamic tourism, and formal recognition as 
Islamic "watchdog" for deviant and immoral practices remain unsuccessful. 
Chapter Seven examines the religious and political behaviour of the Malaysian 
official ulema and highlights their success in capturing the state. Although they 
function under their respective Malay sultan in each negeri, they are intolerant 
of attempts to weaken their institutions both internally and externally. The muftis 
inherited stronger and more powerful institutions because of Mahathir's 
Islamisation policies. This chapter demonstrates how the Malaysian official 
ulema preserve their powers by championing the ideology of ketuanan Melayu 
(Malay supremacy held by UMNO and Malay royalty) and an ethno-centric and 
exclusivist form of religious conservatism. 
Chapter Eight is a conclusion recapping several points in comparison to the two 
states. It also summarizes how the thesis contributes to existing works on the 
ulema in Southeast Asia, as well as the broader theoretical debates in 
comparative politics. It ends with an examining of future trends in the religious 
discourse in Indonesia and Malaysia. 

Chapter Two 
Literature and theory review 
This chapter summarises the academic and theoretical writings relevant to 
answering the two central questions of this study. How have the Indonesian and 
Malaysian official ulema sought to capture their respective states; and has 
greater political competition led to more or less capture? This literature and 
theory review is divided into three parts. First, I discuss the broader writings on 
ulema co-optation and capture in the Islamic world. In doing so, I hope to 
establish the extent to which official ulema are co-opted. Second, I examine 
studies on MUl (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council of Indonesia) and 
Malaysian ulema to ascertain research gaps, particularly regarding co-optation, 
capture and their relationship to increased political contest. Third, I discuss 
theoretical works on state-society relations and interest-group mediation 
models. I ask to what extent these political science models allow for new 
interpretations and conclusions about official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Close examination of these theoretical models is important because recent 
works have questioned the strength of states in the modern world. Much current 
political science writing seems to suggest that societal groups' capture can co-
exist with state co-optation. 
Studies on ulema 
In formulating the research questions for this study, I have examined a number 
of works on ulema outside Southeast Asia. Scholars have studied ulema as 
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groups (mainly country specific) and as individuals."^ Studies of individual 
ulema emphasise their life stories and development of Islamic thought 
philosophy and ideology. The biographies and scholarly contributions of 
renowned ulema such as Said Nursi of Turkey (Abu-Rabi, 2008; Markham, 
2009; Vahide, 2005), Hamka of Indonesia (Akmal, 2012; Irfan, 2013; 
Muhammad Nazar, 2012; Shobahussurur, 2008), Al-Qardawl of Qatar 
(Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009), and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran (Koya, 2009), 
among others, have been well studied. While these works concern ulema's 
personal histories, some of them touch on their struggles with state co-optation. 
Works on Said Nursi (b.1877-d.1960), in particular, focus on his strategies 
confronting Kemal Ataturk's military rule. In a situation in which all religious 
activities were restricted, Nursi reverted to underground faith-based activism 
and developed ideas less critical of Ataturk. As he became less critical of the 
military regime, Atarturk did not ban the Nursi movement. Yet, it was through 
this underground movement that Nursi was then able to strengthen his networks 
and develop a mass following, which became more assertive after Ataturk's 
demise in 1938. Similarly, Hamka's biography provides details of how he stood 
by his principles in refusing to heed Suharto's demands (Irfan 2013). In 1981, 
Hamka resigned as MUl's chairman as he refused to withdraw a fatwa that 
prevented Muslims from expressing Christmas greetings. 
Some insights can be drawn from these ulema biographies which are relevant 
The sample of works focussing on ulema through the country specific approach is summed 
up as follows: Egypt (Brunner, 2009; Hatina, 2010; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009), Indonesia; 
(Fealy & Barton, 1996; Moch Nur, 2005; Suzaina, 1999), Iran (Algar, 1972; Floor, 1983; Ghozzi, 
2002; Lambron, 1983), Malaysia (Mohamed Nawab, 2006; Norshahril, 2011), Morocco 
(Munson, 1993), Ottoman Empire (Chambers, 1972; Levy, 1983; Repp, 1986), Saudi Arabia (al-
Atawneh, 2009; Bligh, 1985; Hatina, 2009; Kechichian, 1986), Singapore (Y. Firdaus, Wan 
Hussein, & Mohd Rahman, 2010; Noor Aisha, 2008; Walid, 2012), South Asia (Aziz, 1983; 
Friedman, 1983; Zaman, 2002), Syria (Commins, 2009; Gilbert, 1978), and Tunisia (Brown 
1972; Ghozzi, 2002; Green, 1978). 
to co-optation and capture. However, this study approaches the ulema as a 
social group. Hatina (2010, p. 5) claims that, in the main. Western scholars 
perceive ulema losing their authority and independence as they enter into state 
structures. Most European and North American political scientists conclude that 
ulema serve their religious communities, providing independent religious 
judgement in line with Islamic traditions by not being part of any state 
sponsored institution. Earlier, I cited works by Saeed (2004), which provide a 
general overview of the decline of official ulema; and Peterson and Graf (2009), 
which focuses on Al-Qardawi's perception of Egyptian Mufti Tantawi as ceasing 
to be a genuine religious scholar; as supporting official ulema co-optation. 
Others who share this view include Ghozzi (2002), Bligh (1985), Kechichian 
(1986), and Khuri (1987). In comparing the Tunisian and Iranian ulema, Ghozzi 
(2002) singled out "institutional autonomy" as one of three indicators measuring 
the ability of ulema to influence the state. He suggests that ulema are in a better 
position to influence the state if they accumulate three forms of institutional and 
symbolic capital, namely doctrinal consensus, institutional autonomy, and 
leadership charisma. Ghozzi shows how the Tunisian and Iranian ulema 
capitalise on ulema institutions to secure a combination of all three types of 
capital. 
Similarly, Bligh (1985) suggests that ulema's authority generally declines after 
they co-operate with rulers. Bligh argues that the authority of Saudi Arabian 
ulema in the twentieth century, namely the descendants of Muhammad Ibnu 
Abdul Wahab (b. 1703-d. 1792), waned after co-operating with the royal family. 
Muhammad Ibnu Abdul Wahab was the founder of the purist Wahhabi school of 
thought. The alliance between his followers and the descendants of Muhammad 
ibn Saud (known as the House of Saud) led to the formation of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in 1932. Bligh argues that since the 1980s, Saudi official ulema 
were not allowed to hold any key positions in the regime other than less 
prestigious appointments in the Ministry of Justice and Education. They were 
also expected to rubber stamp every ruler's decision (p.47). Bligh suggests that 
the Saudi ulema's survival impulse rests on abandoning the coalition with the 
house of Saud when it no longer served the interests of the Wahhabi and 
refraining from confronting Saudi leaders on religious matters. 
Kechichian (1986) argues that the perception of the royal family co-opting the 
Saudi ulema's triggered the rebellion and the seizure of the Holy Mosque 
(Masjid al-Haram) in 1979. The rebellion was led by Juhaiman Ibn Muhammad 
Utaibi and directed against official ulema. The rebels perceived the official 
ulema as lacking independence after gaining prosperity through financial 
support from the Saudi Royal family (p.59). This accusation was particularly 
directed at the Saudi Grand Mufti Abdul al-Aziz ibn Baz (1910-1999). 
Kechichian goes so far as to suggest 
Clearly, what is implied in the accusations made by the attackers is that the 
ulema have reconciled themselves to exercising their religious authorities in 
tandem if not in the shadow of the political authorities. The question, thus, is 
whether this awareness, and its consequent practice, diminishes in any way the 
legitimized power base of the religious establishment in Islam (p.62). 
Khuri's (1987) comparative study on the Sunni and Shia ulema also concludes 
that official ulema compromise their authority to make independent religious 
pronouncements when they co-operate with ruling elites. Official ulema have 
limited power to influence state policies and outcomes. Focussing on the Sunni 
official ulema in Lebanon, Khuri states that 
All the jurists who serve in the sharia courts, including the Mufti, are 
appointments finalized by government. Although the opinions of high religious 
43 
authorities are solicited by the ruling elites, as a symbol of protecting the Islamic 
tradition, the final decision still rests in the hands of the power structure (p.299). 
Khuri then quotes the words of a qadi [judge] who suggested that official ulema 
may ruminate on issues but it is the government that has the final authority 
(p.299). However, Khuri concedes that the interference of the power elites in the 
appointment and placement of Islamic jurists does not nullify or disturb the 
continuity of "latent, invisible structures that bind the jurists together in network 
constellations reaching sometimes far beyond the political boundaries of a 
single Islamic state" (p.300). In other words, Khuri is suggesting that the 
ulema's co-operation with the rulers allowed them to tap into the state's 
resources and assert their influence in neighbouring countries.'*® 
There are, nevertheless, studies that have challenged this co-optation thesis. 
While these studies refer to different issues, historical moments, and cultural 
settings, they point out the various ways the official ulema utilise their access to 
state power to build personal networks with the ruling and business elites, 
acquire resources for personal benefit, and exercise influence beyond what is 
expected by the state under co-optation arrangements. For example. Levy 
(1983) concludes that the [official] ulema during the Ottoman ruler Sultan 
Mahmud ll's reign (1808-1839) demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism in 
ensuring the survival and preservation of their interests when dealing with the 
regime.''® Similarly, Hatina (2009b) argues that the incorporation of early 
twentieth-century Middle East ulema into the state apparatuses, and their 
seeming political quietism may not necessarily be the result of passivity. The 
He also cites the case of how employment networks in Lebanon were dominated bv the 
jurists. 
The use of the term official ulema is not from the original author. Nevertheless, the author is 
implying ulema who function in the religious bureaucracies. 
official ulema's discourse contains "elements of conformity, submission, and 
reform, as well as protest and dissent" (p.252). He cites the example of how 
official ulema used their positions to demand "Islamic cultural authenticity" akin 
to those of Islamists, a group the state deplored. According to Hatina, the 
criteria for measuring power and authority in terms of political power are 
inaccurate (p.249). This shows that the state's ability to co-opt official ulema 
may not always be successful; official ulema can in return influence the state. 
Hatina argues that accusations of contemporary ulema's weakening authority 
have found their way into many Western academic works (p.251). These claims, 
according to Hatina, are not true.®° 
Marsot's (1973) study of eighteenth-century Egypt also shows the ability of 
official ulema to amass wealth and land, fulfilling their personal interests beyond 
the rewards allocated by the state. He argues that although the ability of official 
ulema to stand up for Islam seemed to be in decline, when they were co-opted 
into state structures, the wealth they amassed, particularly as landowners of 
estates and waqf (endowments) and as merchants, made them among the most 
powerful economic players in the Egyptian society. According to Marsot, 
The ulema, therefore, while not belonging to a money-producing milieu 
notwithstanding had some opportunities for amassing riches, and those of them 
who set out to do so were successful in their endeavours. And while the 
majority of the ulema remained poor, the high ulema, save for an exceptional 
handful of dedicated scholars, became rich and politically influential, the two 
sides of the same coin (p. 144). 
By the same token, al-Atawneh (2009) was cautious in concluding that the co-
The works he cited include those by H A R Gibb, Elie Kedourie, Bernard Lewis and Ira 
Lapidus in the 1950s and the 1960s, and Emmanuel Sivan, Martin Krammer, Olivier Roy, Gilles 
Kepel, Barry Rubin, Haim Gerber, John Voll, and John Esposito in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Hatina also disputes the claim made by Kramer, Voll, and Esposito about the 'decline of the 
ulema's and 'religious establishment in decline' in the modern era (p.251). The claim that the 
religious establishment in decline is made because the ulema are seen as mainly confined to 
the mosque and the madrasa (Islamic religious schools). 
optation of the ulema into state bodies automatically led to the decline in their 
authority. By examining the relationship between Saudi tribalism and Wahhabi 
teachings,^^ al-Atawneh observes that measuring power is more complicated 
than often assumed because distinguishing between power from influence is 
impossible. It is difficult to determine who is influencing whom. He argues the 
"distribution of power between the ulema and the umara (political leaders) has 
never been clear despite two centuries of mutual relations' and the ulema can 
increase 'their influence over policies and government circles'" (p.214). Thus, 
the official ulema can dictate government policies from within the state's 
structures, which they would not have been able to do had they not been part of 
these structures. al-Atawneh's conclusion here strengthens my claim that 
capture and co-optation can co-exist. He posits that through co-operation with 
the state, the official ulema had extended their control in the Saudi Ministy of 
Justice, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, the Ministry of 
Pilgrimage, the Committee of Commanding Good and Forbidding Wrong, as 
well as foreign affairs portfolios the World Muslim League and the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth (p.215). The ability of official ulema to accept Saudi's 
tribalism with their brand of Wahhabi Islam makes their co-operation 
sustainable. 
Zaman (2002) also cautions against considering contemporary ulema declining 
in authority. Though referring to South Asian ulema, he argues that ulema 
generally are capable of re-constructing their authority when confronted with 
Al-Atawneh clearly spells out his disagreement with the views of scholars such as Aharon 
Layish, who stated that the modern Saudi ulema 'have ceased to be one of the two foci of 
power alongside the umara, though they still belong to the political elite and play an important 
role, especially m times of crisis' (p.213). Al-atawneh also disagrees with O. Y. al-Rawaf who 
stresses that The ulema have exercised very little or no influence over major policies 
concerning foreign affairs, intemal security economic development, oil production and pricing 
wealth distribution and regional allocation, or political participation" (p.214). 
modernisation and secularism. His view contradicts Saeed's (2004), who 
argued modernisation and secularism weaken the authority of official ulema. 
Zaman sees the ulema as having the ability to utilise the new media to their 
advantage in defence of their authority, Zaman (2005) disputes the claim of 
some scholars who perceive the ulema as "a mere relic of the past, as having 
been entirely co-opted by the ruling elite, as altogether mired in an unchanging 
view of both Islam and the world and, in any case, as having little interest or 
importance to contribute to contemporary Islamic discourses" (p.62). Instead, he 
contends that: 
The ulema have not only undergone significant changes in the modern world, 
they have often adapted in a variety of ways to the transformation around them 
and have thereby come to play roles of considerable importance in countries 
like Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and elsewhere. These roles are 
varied and, while they can be usefully compared across Muslim societies, they 
are, in each instance, the product of particular configurations of local, national, 
and international factors (Zaman, 2005, pp. 61-62). 
I situate Zaman among those scholars who question the notion of official ulema 
and co-optation. These scholars portray official ulema as a dynamic social 
group exercising influence over the ruling elites. According to Zaman, ulema 
contribute to building democratic and civil society (Zaman, 2005, p.62). Despite 
these challenges to the co-optation thesis, I argue that the perception of official 
ulema co-optation remains dominant not only in academia, but also in Muslims' 
everyday discourse. This was demonstrated during my interaction with the 
Muslim community in Indonesia and Malaysia throughout my fieldwork. The 
groups expressing most dissatisfaction of official ulema are, unsurprisingly, the 
ulema who refused to take up positions in the religious bureaucracies and state-
sponsored institutions. These "non-official" ulema chose to participate in political 
parties or civil-society organisations (including ormas) instead of serving directly 
the state. Besides these unofficial ulema, other secular elites have questioned 
the authority of official ulema. 
Studies on Indonesian and IVIaiaysian official ulema 
After reviewing the literature on ulema generally, what can we discover from 
examining ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia that enlightens discussion of co-
optation and capture? In this section, I investigate the literature on MUl (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council of Indonesia) and Malaysian official ulema. 
To date, there have been few studies that compare both countries' 
contemporary ulema.®^ Azyumardi's (2004a; 2006) examination of the spread of 
Islam into the Malay Archipelago is the closest comparative work done on 
ulema in both countries, though his analysis concerns the seventeenth to 
eighteenth century Malay world. He traces the interactions of three Southeast 
Asian ulema—Nur al Din al-Raniri, al Sinl<ili, and Yusof Al Makasari—with the 
Middle Eastern ulema and how they contributed to renewal and reformist 
orientation in the Malay world. Other comparative works tend to focus on the 
writings and ideas of important religious elites, including professionals, 
politicians, intellectuals, and the ulema. The later chapters in Riddell's (2001) 
Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World compare the views and religious 
worldview of the ulema in the Malay world. In the same vein, Fealy and 
Hooker's (2006) Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia provides multiple voices of 
Southeast Asian Muslims, and features some of the contemporary ulema 
writings. 
^^  Existing comparative studies on Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia have focussed on the 
states' management of Islam (for example Fealy, 2005) and the study of personalities and 
groups' Ideas, discourse and writings (Fealy & Hooker, 2006; Riddell, 2001). 
Comparative works on official ulema in both countries have also focussed on 
fatwas. One is the edited volume by Abdul Monir and Wan Roslili (1998) entitled 
Mufti dan Fatwa di Negara-Negara ASEAN.^^ The articles in the volume 
describe the fatwa-making processes in Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Singapore. Likewise, Hooker's (1997) article compares the themes of fatwas 
issued by the Islamic religious councils in Malaysia and MUl in Indonesia. 
Focussing on fatwas related to medical sciences (cornea transplant and blood 
transfusion). Hooker argues that the ulema in both countries insist on the 
stressing Islamic values in medical matters (p.22), though the contrasting 
interpretations of what constitute Islamic values result in dissimilar fatwas 
issued by the Malaysian and Indonesian official ulema. In all, scholars have 
badly neglected comparative studies of official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia 
especially their broader roles as political actors within the state. 
Studies on MUl in Indonesia 
Generally, scholars have studied official ulema institutions from both countries 
separately. I now turn to the studies of MUl before examining the Malaysian 
official ulema. Mohammad Atho's (1993) thesis is the first to discuss MUl's 
fatwas during the New Order period. His thesis traces the methods applied by 
MUl members in producing fatwas. Atho argues that during the New Order MUl 
did not have a consistent methodology for issuing fatwas. MUl issued fatwas 
based on political and cultural circumstances. Atho contends that the MUl 
Fatwa Commission also issued fatwas to support Suharto's policies (p. 119). He 
cites fatwas on frog breeding; the edibility of rabbit meat; the permissibility of 
mechanical slaughtering of animals; and family planning, to demonstrate MUl's 
The title can be translated as Ivlufti and Fatwa in ASEAN countries. 
support of state's policies. Mohammad Atho's thesis tends to support the 
argument for strong co-optation of IVIUI, even though he mentions instances in 
which IVIUI goes against the state. The idea of MUl occasionlly opposing the 
state Is also supported by scholars writing before the fall of the New Order 
(Bruinessen, 1996; Hooker, 1997).®'' 
Most writings on MUl were published after 2000. Wahiduddin's (2004) study 
focuses on how MUl's fatwas have significantly impacted Indonesian laws 
(p.229). He observes that between 1975 and 1997, eleven fatwas were 
incorporated into Indonesian law. During Hamka's chairmanship (1975 to 1981), 
MUl's fatwas were incorporated into the RUU Narkotik (Narcotics Law) and 
RUU Kesejahteraan Anak (Children's Welfare Law). While none of the fatwas 
issued during Shukri Ghozali's chairmanship (1981-1984) formed part of any 
law, fatwas passed during Hassan Bash's tenure (1984-1998) were 
incorporated into at least seven laws (Wahiduddin, 2004, p. 229).®® On the one 
hand, he concludes MUl has captured these aspects of the state during the 
New Order period. On the other, his work offers little evidence to suggest that 
these fatwas contradict the state's ideology, and more particularly, the regime's 
wishes. 
Academics in the field of law have alluded to the doctrinal aspects of MUl's 
fatwa. Mohamad Abdun and Asnawi (2011), for instance, focus on MUl's fatwa 
on abortion. The fatwa reveals the dialectic between Islamic law and ethics on 
Tnoo" ^ i r ® ® ® ® " examples of the family planning program, and the Porkas lottery in the 
1980s. There were disagreements within MUl, but the members chose not to voice their 
disagreements with the state publicly. 
' ' Wahiduddin (2004) also deliberates on how MUl lobbied Its fatwas so that they were 
incorporated into laws. During the New Order, MUl negotiated with the state through lobbyina 
religious organisations and leaders from the pesantrens. However, on issues concerninq pubHc 
morality, MUl lobbies institutions that are closer to the state such as ICMI (p 231) 
the one hand, and the state discourses and social norms on the other. The 
authors seek to demonstrate how MUl's fatwas can contradict the state's 
position, and in some ways, are progressive. Unlike ulema in many Muslim 
societies who totally object to abortion, MUl's fatwa allows abortion in the case 
of necessity (dahira) and need (haja): if a pregnant woman is suffering a life 
threatening disease such as cancer or tuberculosis; and if the pregnancy 
jeopardises the mother's life.®® Abortion is also justified when doctors detect the 
foetus as incurably genetically defective. MUl's fatwa also justifies abortion for 
victims of rape. 
Recent studies on the MUl in the post-Suharto era shift the focus from the 
doctrinal/legal aspects of MUl's fatwas to more legal/political ones.®^ To 
illustrate, Moch Nur (2005) argues that MUl fatwas changed from supporting the 
Suharto regime to occasionally opposing government policy. Comparing the 
behaviour of MUl during the governments of Suharto, Habibie and 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Moch Nur argues that MUl distanced itself from the state 
after the fall of Suharto, and brought itself closer to the perceived "orthodoxy" 
position. MUl also increasingly issued tausiyahs (advisories)—not fatwas—to 
comment on political issues and became more assertive in the public domain. 
The subject of MUl becoming more conservative and assertive than the New 
Order period is also discussed in Gillespie's (2007) article. He argues that the 
MUl's Fatwa No. 7/2005 opposing pluralism, liberalism and secularism, often 
^ MUl's stand on abortion is that termination can be performed before ttie 40'" day of gestation. 
IVIUI however states that Islam forbids abortion from the time that a blastocyst implantation 
takes place within the mother's uterus, or when the pregnancy resulted from illicit sexual 
intercourse. 
These works focus on MUl's fatwas, with the studies published after 1998 focus on 
contentious issues such as apostasy, liberal Islam, and Ahmadiyah (M. Crouch, 2009; Gillespie, 
2007; Moch Nur, 2005; Mohamad Abdun, 2014; Mohammad Atho, 1993; Nadirsyah 2004' 
Syafiq, 2011). 
known by the unattractive acronym SIPILIS manifests the institution's attempt to 
demarcate a new role in the public domain, one which is aligned with the ummat 
and the state. He highlights that recent developments in Indonesia manifest the 
conservative thinking underpinning the 2005 fatwa. Gillespie also suggests that 
MUl's building resentment over the dominance of pluralist religious thought in 
Indonesia resulted in MUl fatwa No 7 being released.®® 
Nadirsyah (2004), on the other hand, focuses on fatwas, the method of handing 
them down; their sources; their relationship between national and local levels, 
and their subjects. He contends that it is not easy for MUl to satisfy both the 
society and government, and that it has to select its arguments very carefully in 
order to find a balanced way of helping Muslims deal with present-day problems 
not covered in the Quran and sunnah. Moreover, Nadirsyah accounts for the 
diverse kinds of fatwas issued by MUl, ranging from the conservative to the 
progressive. He questions how members from NU (NahdIatuI Ulama or Revival 
of Ulama) and Muhammadiyah, some of whom are also members of the MUl 
reconcile their differences for a collective fatwa (p. 167). He points out that 
ulema at the national level are more moderate than those at the provincial level 
(p. 174), and that the fatwas at the provincial level may contradict those of the 
national level. I agree with Nadirsyah's differentiation of ulema behaviour at the 
national and provincial level which strengthens my argument that MUl ulema do 
not constitute a homogeneous group. 
Gillespie also sees MUl as carrying the historical baggage as the main spokesperson for the 
New Order regime. But, MUl 's continuing reliance on the government funding means MUl will 
continously be accused of collusion and bias everytlme it agrees with unpopular government 
policies, or that it will have an uneasy and difficult relationship with the government whenever 
there are disagreements. Gillespie remains sceptical of MUl 's ability to demarcate a new role for 
itself in a rapidly changing Indonesia. 
Syafiq (2011) discusses MUl's position on religious freedom. In demonstrating 
MUl's transformation from co-opted to independent, Syafiq recounts how Ali 
Yafie, a former MUl chairman (1998-2000), candidly asked President Suharto to 
resign in 1998 (Syafiq, 2011, p. 5). He then describes howlVIUI underwent three 
major shifts in the post-Suharto era. First, it tried to distance itself from the 
Abdurrahman Wahid government. Second, in 2000, MUl amended its basic 
ideology from Pancasila to Islam. This paved the way for MUl to represent the 
voices of the more radical groups. Third, MUl introduced the concept of tenda 
besar (big tent), in a way to embrace all the Muslim organisations in Indonesia 
(Syafiq, 2011, p. 7). Syafiq asserts that MUl has become the sole authority on 
akidah (faith) matters. MUl has been able to exercise its influence on the 
protection of the akidah since 2005 with the fatwa on Ahmadiyah, JIL (Jaringan 
Islam Liberal or Islam Liberal Network), Inkar Sunnah, Shia, Islam Jamaah, and 
Darul Arqam (Syafiq, 2011). I disagree with Syafiq's point that MUl's fatwas on 
akidah are the most authoritative amongst the ormas. MUl members who feel 
the institution's fatwas represent the interests of all Indonesians often make this 
claim. Muhammadiyah and NU ulema interviewed during fieldwork were critical 
of MUl fatwas, claiming that they are conservative and do not represent true 
Islamic principles. 
There are also studies that shift the focus from central MUl to provincial MUls, 
particularly their role in promoting attacks on "heretics." In his study of MUl East 
Java, Olle (2009) interviewed one MUl member to understand the institution's 
role in promoting religious violence. Olle believes that groups such as FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front) conduct violent attacks on 
religious minorities in order to generate issues. He does not see MUl as an 
institution that condones violence. However, Olle later contradicted himself by 
suggesting MUl supported attacks on "heretics" so that the state would ban 
these groups (p. 111). Similar to Olle's work, Moch Nur (2012) has conducted 
research on MUl in the Banten province. Moch Nur examines MUl Banten's 
contribution to the violence on Ahmadiyahs in the province (Moch Nur, 2012). 
He claims that the groups that attacked "deviants" have abused Banten MUl's 
fatwas on deviancy. I agree with Olle's and Moch Nur's findings on how local 
MUl fatwas have been used by violent groups to justify attacks on religious 
minorities. However, I suggest that the behaviour of local MUl members do not 
represent the behaviour of central MUl. During my conversations with central 
MUl members, some condemned the behaviour of their local chapters. 
Three general conclusions can be drawn from the works on MUl discussed in 
the previous paragraphs. First, existing works portray MUl as having 
transformed itself from a loyal institution of the New Order government (1965-
1998) to one that is more independent if not absolutely separate from the 
governments of Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. This transformation was accompanied by a paradigmatic 
shift from a state-centred institution to an ummat (people)-centred one (see for 
example comments by Moch Nur, 2005, 2010). Second, scholars are concerned 
about the increasing levels of conservatism expressed in the religious rulings of 
MUl especially during the post-New Order period. Scholars deem MUl's fatwas 
as encouraging groups such as FPI to attack Shias and Ahmadiyahs (M. 
Crouch, 2009; Moch Nur, 2013; Mohamad Abdun, 2014; Mun'im, 2013; Syafiq, 
2011), Third, scholars place strong emphasis on the political intent of MUl's 
fatwas and that they strongly affected government policies. These scholars also 
imply MUl's fatwas are widely followed by Indonesians (Nadirsyah, 2004; 
Ricklefs, 2013; Wahiduddin, 2004). 
Studies on JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM in Malaysia 
The perception of state co-optation is dominant in discussing the behaviour of 
the Malaysian official ulema. Rais (1995, p. 249), for instance, believes that the 
state uses the official ulema as a tool to deflect any Muslim challenges. 
According to Rais, the Mahathir government instructed the JKF-MKI 
(Jawatankuasa Fatwa Kebangsaan or National Fatwa Committee) to issue a 
fatwa against the Darul Arqam movement in 1994, declaring the movement 
deviant. On the 6 August 1994, the Prime Minister's Office organised a special 
JKF-MKI meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The swift decision to ban the movement 
was significant because the committee meeting took place just three days after 
the deputy minister, Abdul Hamid Othman, suggested that the Darul Arqam be 
banned as soon as the muftis declared the movement illegal (Norshahril, 2010b, 
p. 134). Normally, the committee takes months, if not years to issue a fatwa. 
Furthermore, for an issue to be discussed at the committee, at least one ruler 
has to raise it during the Council of Rulers meeting. The swiftness of the Darul 
Arqam fatwa prompts questions about whether it was the Malay rulers or the 
Prime Minister's Office that initiated the fatwa meeting. 
Shiozaki (2010) views the Malaysian official ulema as having surrendered their 
autonomy to the UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) government. 
Shiozaki contends, "Ulema became bureaucratic under governmental control. 
Many ulema were institutionalised. Their authority and influence in society were 
weakened" (p. 101). He then points out UMNO's ability to weaken official 
ulema's influence. Shiozaki goes so far as to suggest that 
The power to centralise and standardise the administration by the Federal 
Government is very mighty indeed. Islamic activities were also incorporated in 
the centralisation and the institutionalisation processes. In the process of 
bureaucratisation, ulema lost their autonomous position in Muslim society. 
Bureaucratised ulema lost their authority and influence in the Muslim masses. 
Islamisation policy enlarged the impact of Islam in Malaysian society. However, 
on the other hand, Islamic activities came under the control of the modern 
government. Islamic activities lose their dynamism if they stay under 
governmental control (p. 103). 
The subject of co-optation of the Malaysian ulema is central to Hamayotsu's 
(2005) doctoral thesis. She observes that the Malaysian state co-opts the 
religious elite in the same manner as the British colonial powers did. According 
to Hamayotsu, federal institutions co-opt the religious elite and the government 
mobilises and employs them to support its national development efforts (p.249). 
But co-optation does not only serve the interests of the state. She suggests that 
many of the ulema enjoy being close to powerful politicians and journalists. In 
addition, she claims UMNO co-opts JAKIM and IKIM ulema to support the 
state's agenda for their brand of Islam (p.267).®® 
On the other hand, Maznah's (2013) study focuses on the processes that 
empower official ulema. She concludes that the authority of official ulema is tied 
to the bureaucratization of Islam, which resulted in the homogenization and the 
"ring-fencing" of the Muslim subject. Homogenization, she argues, is the 
outcome of the state's decision to accord religion official and codified definition, 
while ring-fencing involves expanding the spheres of social life under shariah. 
She sees homogenization and ring-fencing as resulting from; the empowerment 
It has to be pointed out that Hamayotsu's thesis was written during the early years of 
Abdullah Badawi government, and may not have incorporated the religious controversies that 
took place just before the 2008 elections. 
of legal-bureaucratic Islam through the creation of federal institutions, the 
restructuring, multiplication and proliferation of the Islamic institutions at the 
negeri level; the inclusion of more provisions, regulations and laws under 
shariah statutes; and the harmonization of civil with shariah systems.®" 
Maznah's work underscores the processes that raise official ulema's capability 
for capture of the state today. I agree with Maznah's analysis, particularly on 
how Mahathir's policies in the 1980s expanded the authority of official ulema. I 
would add also that Mahathir's policies were in line with the societal demands 
for greater Islamisation in the public sphere. 
Other studies on Malaysian official ulema are descriptive and focus on the 
fatwa-making institutions (Hasnan, 2006, 2008; Hooker, 1993; Othman, 1981; 
Zulkifli, 2008a, 2008b). Hooker (1993) focusses on religious council fatwas from 
1960s to the 1980s, while Othman (1981) discusses the evolution of the fatwa-
making institutions in the various negeri as well as criticisms of these institutions 
in the 1980s. In 1981 Othman call for negerilo standardise fatwas and increase 
the number of experts in the fatwa committees.®^ M.A Zulkifli's (2008a, 2008b) 
works focus specifically on the fatwa-making processes in Negeri Sembilan. He 
describes the significant changes occurring in Negeri Sembilan in 1999, where 
the negeri government granted the Chief Minister more powers than the ruler to 
appoint the mufti (p. 16). Hasnan's (2008) work is broader than Zulkifli's as he 
gives an overview of the fatwa-making process in Malaysia.®^ Hasnan's work 
Maznah (2013) argues that the harmonization of shariah involves two groups. The first group 
sees harmonization as in line with the expansion of the islamic agenda. The second group, by 
contrast, genuinely seeks to synchronise the gaps between the shariah and civil courts. 
However, she posits that the first group is in the upper hand, and that most religious 
bureaucrats see UIVINO as their patron (p. 128). 
In 1988, Mahathir took up this call through the upgrading of the official ulama institutions 
(discussed in Chapter Three). 
See also Hasnan, 2006. 
highlights the similarities and differences between fatwas passed by the 
religious council. He also highlights the method in which the rulers appoint 
religious council members in the various negeri. He then criticises the fatwa 
institutions' inability to standardise fatwas among negeri, its ineffective 
procedures, and incompetent shariah committee members (p. 128-148). 
From the works reviewed in previous paragraphs, it is clear the notion of 
Malaysian official ulema's co-optation (particularly by UIVINO) remains strong in 
this field of literature. Non-official ulema (from NGO, opposition PAS, university 
lecturers) expressed the same impression dunng my interviews with them. 
Overall, the literature on the IVlalaysian official ulema's religious and political 
behaviour remains underdeveloped and under-researched. There is a strong 
focus, particularly from Malaysian academics, on the fatwa-making processes. 
What explains this lack of interest in studying more broadly official ulema? I 
suspect two main reasons: one, scholars assume that the behaviour of official 
ulema corresponds to state expectations, and two; many official ulema are 
inaccessible to researchers. During my fieldwork, Malaysian official ulema were 
careful not to disclose any "sensitive" information, as they are bounded by the 
88/1972 Official Secrets Act.®^ 
Most of the existing studies on the Indonesian and Malaysian ulema focus on 
mass-based organisations and civil society. In Indonesia, many studies have 
examined NU (Bruinessen, 1994; Bush, 2009; Fealy & Barton, 1996; Suzaina, 
1999), Muhammadiyah, (Nakamura, 1983; Noer, 1973), and Persatuan Islam or 
" Among the contents of the Act is ensuring civil servants do not disclose any confidential 
information to foreign "agents." 
Persis (Federspiel, 2001). In Malaysia, scholars have researched on ulema 
as parts of political parties UMNO and PAS (Ahmad Fauzi, 2006; Parish, 2004; 
Punston, 1980; Kamarulnizam, 2002; Llow, 2004, 2009; Malhi, 2003; Muller, 
2014; Mohamed Nawab, 2006; 2014). 
Pew studies have applied political science models in the study of ulema in 
Southeast Asia. Two exceptions that have applied such models are Suzaina's 
(1998) and Porter's (2002).®® Porter (2002) uses corporatism to explain state-
Muslim relations during the Suharto era, and dedicated two chapters to 
discussing NU and MUl. On the other hand, Suzaina applies Migdal's state-in-
society approach to measure NU's responsiveness in its dealings with the New 
Order regime. Her study concludes that, "Despite enjoying the power of being a 
mass-based and autonomous grassroots movement, the inherent inability of the 
NU organisation to act as a cohesive political force weakened its overall 
bargaining powers vis-a-vis the Suharto regime" (1998, p. 372). Following 
Porter and Suzaina, this study hopes to engage interest-group politics theories 
to understand the interactions between the state, society, and the official ulema. 
The remaining sections of this chapter discuss these theoretical debates. 
In the Malaysian case, studies that examine the Muslim resurgence of the 1970s are popular 
amongst scholars (Chandra, 1987; Hussin, 1990; Jomo & Cheek, 1992; Liow, 2009; Nagata, 
1984; Zainah, 1987). This was the period when the dakwah movement sprouted (discussed 
later in Chapter Five). 
Scholars have applied the corporatist in the examination of the European experience in 
forming Islamic religious councils. Laurence (2009) argues that state-Muslims relations in 
Europe which conform to the corporatist model drew their experience from how they managed 
Christian and Jewish groups in the past. His work also examines state-Muslim relations within 
the past 15 years, especially the establishment of quasi-monopolistic Islam councils by national 
interior ministries. 
Theoretical debates: pluralism, corporatism, and state-in-
society 
Scholars in the field of Islamic studies generally accept the notion of official 
ulema co-optation. In this section, I explore how comparative politics concepts, 
particularly interest-mediation models, can be applied in this study to provide an 
alternative interpretation of official ulema behaviour. Characterising religious 
institutions as interest groups is not novel. Warner's (2000) Confessions of an 
Interest Group: The Catholic Church and political parties in Europe describes 
how churches across Europe behaving like any other interest groups 
articulating needs, mobilising voters, establishing alliances with political parties 
and state elites in order to entrench their influence in society.®® Throughout this 
theory review, I ask two questions. First, can these models be aptly applied to 
the Indonesian and Malaysian official ulema? Second, how useful are these 
models in explaining the co-optation/capture dynamics of state-official ulema 
relations? The interest-mediation models debate has undergone several 
developments since the 1960s. The trend has shifted from pluralism (1960s), 
corporatism (1970s to 1990s) to the state-in-society approach (since 2000). In 
this section, I review the pluralist and corporatist models. This will be followed 
by a discussion of Migdal's state-in-society approach. 
Pluralism: Reality or Ideal? 
Pluralism, as a school of thought, is based on the Western and European 
experience of democratization and industrialization. The underlying philosophy 
of pluralism is the rejection of the tyranny of the majority and it shares many of 
In her book, Warner (2000) argues that the Catholic Church behaves like an interest group 
akin to a "firm in a market seeking a supplier of goods" (p.4). She controversially applies the 
rational-choice theory or cost-benefit analysis in characterising the behaviour of the Catholic 
Church. 
the principles of neo-classical economics: many vendors restrain other sellers 
from raising prices to consumers (Schwartz, 1998, p. 5). Schwartz argues that 
in the pluralist model, equally powerful and multiple sets of leaders exist, each 
of them commanding different political resources. Some may have control over 
voters and organisations, others control money and economic resources, and 
still others control mass media and public image (p.3-5). The pluralist model 
ensures conflicting interest groups are free to enter the public sphere, and since 
society is far too fractionalised, not one of these groups can dominate the public 
sphere. 
Nevertheless, political scientists cannot agree on whether the pluralist model 
exists in reality, or only as an ideal. Does competition between interest groups, 
dispersed inequalities, and countervailing power—qualities of pluralism 
endorsed by proponents of the model—exist in reality? In truth, some interest 
groups are inevitably more powerful than others and the larger, powerful groups 
often succeed in carving out niches for themselves within public decision-
making bodies. Powerful actors in society can mobilise their political and social 
values within institutions, and restrict public debate to issues they deem 
important. Taking the case of Islamic representation in Indonesia as an 
example, no other interest group matches the membership size, support, and 
resources of the mass-based organisations NU and Muhammadiyah. In 
Malaysia, political parties UMNO and PAS have been the most dominant actors 
in shaping the Islamic discourse since the 1940s. Thus, pluralism's assumption 
that barriers of entry are fluid is largely unrealistic when applied to the 
Indonesian and Malaysian context. The pluralist model, therefore, is best seen 
as an "ideal" type when discussing interest-group politics in the current 
67 Indonesian and Malaysian context. 
Furthermore, Interest groups have to work within the values and principles 
underlined by the well-organised, resource-rich groups. As Schwartz (1998) 
rightly points out, "the organised and active interests of small groups tend to 
triumph over the unorganised and unprotected interests of larger groups" (p.8). 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, organised groups, such as Golkar (Golongan 
Karyawan or The Party of Functional Groups), NU, Muhammadiyah, UMNO, 
and PAS are better placed than other groups to dominate the Islamic agenda. 
Organised groups with long histories tend to be more successful pushing their 
agendas than less organised ones. Thus, I perceive pluralism as too idealistic in 
its assumptions. 
Corporatism: The notion of the "strong" state 
Corporatism, in many ways, presents a challenge to pluralism. However, 
significant to this study the model's assumptions bear the traits of strong states 
and co-optation. In 1974, Schmitter wrote a very influential essay Still the 
century of corporatism? refuting the proponents of the pluralist model. Schmitter 
defended the relevance of corporatism in modern-day polities by pointing out 
the model's different forms. He argues that the state plays the leading role in 
structuring and regulating interest groups; organizing them along functional 
rather than class lines; regulating, creating, and setting the ground rules for the 
Even countries where pluralism is believed to have originated from, such as the US cannot 
claim to have fully met all the assumptions of the model. In reality, there is never an equality of 
conflict as pointed out by the model. According to E.E Schattschneider, all forms of political 
organisation are biased in promoting a particular kind of conflict and suppressing some other 
forms of conflict (cited in Schwartz, 1998, p. 6). Sharing this view, Williamson (1989) argues that 
dominant groups restrict the decision making process to relatively innocuous issues and 
manage to exclude more fundamental issues those which defines the nature of the system itself 
(p.57). 
organised internal activities of given interests categories, and the internal 
interactions between groups and the state (Porter 2002). According to Schmitter 
Corporatism as a system of interest representation In which the constituent 
units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports (Schmitter, 1974, p. 94). 
The corporatist model is often associated with the presence of the strong state. 
Will iamson's (1989) elaboration of the concept confirms this 
It (corporatism) is also widely referred to as the regular and close involvement 
of the organised interests with the public bureaucracy and ministers in the 
formulation of policy which in most instances economic policies. Corporatism 
involves the licensing, recognition, compulsory membership of designated 
categories. By and large, the state ensures controlled emergence, numerical 
limitation of interest organised groups (p.9). 
Wiarda's (2009) definition of corporatism also fits the model's close association 
with the notion of the strong state. He defines corporatism as "a system of 
social and political organisation in which major societal and interest groups are 
integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under 
state guidance, tutelage and control, to achieve coordinated national 
development" (p. 93).®® Although he applies the model to Latin America and 
Northern Europe, Wiarda does not see corporatism as unique to these 
countries. The model's close association with the strong state makes it 
attractive for political scientists to match it with Indonesia and Malaysia (Hsiao, 
2001; King, 1977; Maclntyre, 1994; Porter, 2002). Hsiao (2001) even uses the 
term corporatism and authoritarianism interchangeably. 
In corporatism, the state accords "peak" organisations or associations, which 
According to Wiarda, the role of the state in this system, and its relation to the main corporate 
or societal interest groups, make up a political society. 
act as its agents, representational monopoly over constituent members.®® The 
state indirectly disciplines and control the behaviour of the members, making 
them conform to the goals of the state. Only a "selected" few have the right to 
represent their interests to the state. Representation is however restricted to 
state-determined rules, values, and modus operandi because of the 
institutional, financial, and authoritative dependence upon the state. 
Porter (2002) classifies the New Order state's management of Islamic interests 
as corporatist and MUl as the "peak" organisation representing Muslim 
interests. He claims that MUl members can convey Muslims' interests to 
President Suharto through the Minister of Religious Affairs, and liaise directly 
with the military in a special joint committee Social Communication (Kosmos) on 
religious issues related to national security (p.78). This corporatist arrangement 
gives the impression that the state co-opted MUl members. According to Porter 
(2002) 
Its tendency to issue fatwa and pronouncements in support of government 
policy measures left MUl exposed to accusations by independent ulema and 
Muslim intellectuals that it furnished religious opinions and viewpoints primarily 
in order to satisfy the regime's wishes (p. 78). 
I concur with Porter's opinion that MUl members issue fatwas to support the 
government. They issued these fatwas because the Suharto government 
stipulated their role was to support and translate the government's policies. 
Nevertheless, there were instances in which MUl's fatwas went against the New 
Order's wishes. 
Nevertheless, recent studies on interest-group politics in China, Japan, and 
Chalmers (1985) argues that corporatism starts with the state and defines group interests In 
terms of their relations with the state. 
Nonetheless, Porter (2002) also suggests that there are varieties of corporatism (p. 10-12). 
South Korea challenge the assumption of associating corporatism with the 
strong state and co-optation. These challenges came from scholars who utilised 
the civil society paradigms and state-in-society models (discussed a bit later). 
Extensive fieldwork, as well as analysing policy papers and official reports, 
enabled these scholars to understand the implicit and indirect challenges to 
state power, amidst perceived co-optation (Bian, 1997; Koo, 1993).''^ Even the 
proponents of corporatism point at the possibility of society playing a leading 
role vis-a-vis the state within corporatism as analysis moves away from the 
national to the sub-national (O'Donnell, 1977; Williamson, 2010). While 
corporatism at the national level focuses on the involvement of elite and key 
state actors and members of state institutions, studying the meso-level 
corporatism or micro-level corporatism gives a more nuanced picture of the 
nature of relations, particularly with the non-state sectors (Williamson 1989, 
p.146). 
Schmitter (1974) pointed out the need to move away from analysing 
corporatism as a state-led process. He distinguished societal-corporatism from 
state-corporatism. Societal corporatism refers to liberal and democratic 
arrangements whereas state corporatism refers to the more authoritarian 
context. Agreeing with Schmitter, Schwartz (1998, p. 12) argues that, "The 
authoritarian state will attempt to enforce social peace by deliberately 
Criticisms of corporatism not only come from the proponents of the pluralist model, but also 
from the followers of the model as well. Challenges to corporatism have led to many of its 
proponents pointing out the model's different variants. Some remain sceptical about situating 
corporatism as a theory and believe that corporatism is mainly an aspect of the continuum of 
pluralism not to be treated as a theory on its own. Williamson (1989) argues that corporatism 
theorists largely focus on theoretical and conceptual issues rather than the empirical findings 
(p.66). Hence, he urged one to distinguish "descriptive" corporatism and "theoretical" 
corporatism, the former emphasises of empirical data whereas the latter on the level 
abstraction. Williamson's criticism is compelling when it amounts to the model being applied to 
Muslim interests. 
destroying incipient pluralism, repressing the autonomous articulation of 
subordinate class demands through the imposition of interest organisations 
from above." Corporatised interest groups can "lighten the load of parties, 
parliaments, and public servants and contribute to governability by aggregating 
demands as well as articulating them, formulating and implementing policies as 
well as lobbying them" (Schwartz, 1998, p. 12)7^ 
Many of the assumptions pointed out by the corporatist model remain valid in 
the context of Indonesia and Malaysia, especially in modelling interest-group 
politics during the non-competitive political environments under Suharto and 
Mahathir Mclntyre (1994), Hadiz (1994), King (1977) and Milne (1983) have 
applied the corporatist model in relation to the labour, agricultural, military, 
businesses and trade union sectors. The popularity of this framework is 
understandable given the dominance of the strong state or the developmental 
state theses in explaining the success of the Southeast Asian Tiger economies 
during the 1980s to the early 1990s. Nevertheless, recently, the state-in-society 
perspective has challenged the corporatist approach. 
State-in-society: The limitations of the strong state 
Corporatism has become less fashionable in modelling interest mediation 
between state and society. Even the model's proponent, Wiarda (2009) 
conceeded that in the 1980s and 1990s corporatism went into decline (p. 100). 
According to Schmitter (1974): "Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems 
with relatively autonomous, multi-layered territorial units; open competitive electoral process 
and party system; ideologically varied, coalitional based executive authorities- even with highly 
"layered" or pillared political subcultures. State corporatism tends to be associated with political 
systems in which subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power- elections are 
non-existent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single 
party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are 
such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language or regionalism are repressed" 
(p.105). 
The reasons he cited for its decline were: the third wave of democratization that 
began in Eastern Europe and Latin America, lowering of tariffs barriers and 
greater mobilization as a result of the formation of the European Union; the end 
of the Cold War in 1989; the acceptance of the Washington Consensus, and 
globalization (p. 100). The model's decline has given way to the state-in-society 
approach proposed by Migdal (2002). My classification of state-in-society as a 
an "approach" is deliberate because it never attempts to function as a model, 
but depicts state-society relations as being more complex than pluralism and 
corporatism assumes. I make this claim even though Migdal has classified the 
state-in-society idea as a model. Migdal counters the stark-contrast portrayal of 
states as autonomous and effective on the one hand, and ineffective on the 
other. Migdal argues that the practices of the state must be distinguished from 
the idea of the state itself (2002, p.70), where the state and society are not seen 
as dichotomous social entities. 
Migdal challenges the notion that states are the prime movers of macro-level 
societal change as corporatism scholars often portray them. He argues that 
domestic environments constrain the actions of states, more often than not. 
"The autonomy of states, the slant of their policies, the preoccupying issues for 
their leaders, and their coherence," Migdal contends, "are greatly influenced by 
the societies in which they operate" (2002, p.76). In return, states present 
opportunities and constraints that mould social organisations and structure 
society. Thus, the state-in-society approach does not mean the role of the state 
should be ignored, as the state has made a large imprint on the vision of 
society. Instead, the state remains a core analytical category, although scholars 
should not treat its authority as omnipotent (White, 2013, pp. 7-8). 
Thus, Migdal's state -in-society approach generates a rethinking of the 
functioning of strong states. Contrary to how states try to portray themselves to 
their citizens, their powers are limited. Applying IVIigdal's approach, Klinken and 
Barker's (2009) edited volume shows that the Indonesian state Is not composed 
of static rulers in closed institutions, single, homogeneous and coherent entities. 
There are divisions and Inherent contradictions within the state. Klinken and 
Barker argue that the focus on studying states ought to be on their strategies 
and relationships and less on their structures. They countered that societal 
forces also deploy tactics and techniques of rule towards their states (p.7). 
These strategies vary, and they can be In the form of formal (through laws, 
institutions, and policies) or informal (through personal relations and political 
culture). 
In sum, both the corporatist and state-in-society theories provide a very sound 
theoretical basis for this study. For the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
state-Islam dynamic Is characterised by corporatism, at least dunng the Suharto 
and Mahathir years. Both the Indonesian and Malaysian states attempted to 
contain and channel religious dialogue into formalised structures. Mahathir, for 
instance. Increased centralisation by giving more powers to federal-based 
Islamic Institutions to control Islam, such as JAKIM (Maznah, 2010). A similar 
thinking ran through Suharto's formation of MUl In which the Institution was 
promoted as the highest legitimate body to represent Muslim Interests, above 
the larger mass-based organisations NU and IVluhammadiyah/® Nevertheless, 
the theoretical premises found in the state-in-society approach, which points out 
the relations between the state and society are not conspicuously dichotomous, 
and that the state and society may influence one another in many different 
ways, provokes one to re-think the general assumptions made in corporatism, 
especially its close association with the strong state and co-optation. 
Building on the state-in-society approach, this study investigates the ways 
states and the official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia construct their authority 
vis-a-vis one another. This is in line with the approach's analysis of state and 
"practices" rather than their "images" (Migdal, 2001b; White, 2013). I contend 
that the framework of state capture depicts the way in which the official ulema 
influence the state and capitalise co-optation. Applying the concept "capture" is 
in line with Migdal's assertion that the state does not have a monopoly over 
rule-making. However, "co-optation" and "capture" are not a zero-sum game. 
The official ulema may be fulfilling their own interests and capturing the state 
while being co-opted. In addition, applying the concept "capture" does not 
render corporatism and the state-in-society models irrelevant. The use of 
"capture" is only meant to investigate the deeper processes societal actors use 
to influence the state. 
" The desire to mediate the difference between the two rival organisations is seen in the 
unspol^en arrangement where the chairmanship of MUl is rotated between the members of NU 
and Muhammadiyah. 
Defining state capture 
I mention in Chapter One that my reference to "capture" is in line with IVIigdal's 
approach of focussing on practices rather than images of states and societies. 
The concept "capture" covers the ways in which societal actors (in this case 
official ulema) construct their authority in relation to the state. I define "capture" 
as the processes in which groups or individuals regulate or control key decision-
making units in the state, which later can be used as avenues to influence laws, 
policies, decrees, regulation, and appointments. "Capture" is successful when 
firms can shape the rules of the game in their favour (Hellman, Jones, & 
Kaufmann, 2000, p. 5; Yakovlev, 2006).^" 
Stigler (1971) was probably the first to introduce the concept of capture (known 
as state capture or regulatory capture) in the field of political economy.^® In his 
seminal work The Theory of Economic Regulation, Stigler examines how state-
formed regulatory agencies serving the public's interest began to be drawn 
closer to industries they were supposed to control. These industries later 
shaped regulations, and applied pressure to repeal existing regulations, and set 
prices and rates in their favour.'® In other words, interests groups influenced the 
outcome of the regulatory process by providing financial or other support to 
politicians or regulators (Peltzman, Levine, & Noll, 1989). Scholars apply the 
concept to post-authoritarian cases. Frye (2002) applies "capture" to cases of 
business lobbying in Russia contending, "Powerful firms have hijacked the state 
74 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann distinguish state capture from influence and corruption They 
define influence as firm's capacity to have impact for the formation of basic rules but do not 
involve any payments; influence may be established through of constant interactions and 
meetings. On the other hand, they define corruption as private payments to public officials to 
distort the prescribed implementation of official rules and policies. 
According to Peltzman, Levine and Noll (1989), the concept was introduced in 1955 by 
Marver H Bernstein. 
For discussion of Stigler's work, see Etzioni, 2009. 
for their own narrow purposes at the expense of broader interests within 
society. Having captured the state, these influential firms extract benefits while 
paying little in return for their influence"(p.1020). Another work that has applied 
the concept, although not referring to the term capture specifically, is Ganev 
(2007). He examined the state of Bulgaria after the communist regime crumbled 
in 1989. Ganev argues that the end of the party state sparked off "competitive 
redistribution of information, institutional wherewithal, and logistical resources" 
(Ganev, 2007, p. 34)7^ 
In this study, capture exists when the official ulema act in a way that is contrary 
to the state's wishes and use the state's instruments to fulfil their own personal 
and material interests beyond what has been originally allocated as a result of 
co-optation. Capture occurs when ulema lobby for their own agenda different 
from the state's when they are originally co-opted to support the state's. I am 
also applying the concept to include both the tangible and intangible aspects of 
policy-making. Thus, state capture is not restricted to the ulema's ability to 
influence or shape policies, laws, monetary and business contracts through 
direct communication with state officials. It includes ways official ulema shape 
the religious discourse and public opinion which can then put pressure on the 
state to alter their policies. 
Although the concept of capture is often associated with crony capitalism, it is 
not necessarily corrupt or illegal. Capture may be beneficial for the community. 
" One arena where capture existed was in the control of l<ey information. After decentralization 
and diffusion of unions occurred in post-communist Bulgaria, there were claims that much key 
information was lost in the process. Ganev however argued that information was not lost, but 
was reappropriated by those who had access to it The group that had the advantage to 
monopol ise the information was the former communist party members. This Information was 
important to those who had plans to use it in the future (Ganev, 2007, p.54). 
For instance, a person capturing the state may use the powers given to him to 
keep the ruling elites' authoritarian power in check. A person who captures the 
state may also influence policies that bring economic good for the religious 
community. Also, capture should not be equated with the desire to deceive the 
state. In some instances, a person who captures the state has the genuine 
desire to develop his community with the belief his actions are sanctioned by 
religious values. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, several ideal-type measurements have been 
crafted to determine what constitutes successful capture and co-optation. The 
following five questions may serve as guides to determine the degree of 
capture. First, to what extent have the official ulema influenced state policies? 
Conversely, are official ulema legitimising state policies? Capture is deemed 
strong when the official ulema are able to change the initial policy positions of 
the state. One of the main challenges to measuring co-optation or capture is the 
difficulty attributing what or who triggers policy shifts. Furthermore, most of the 
discussions concerning state policies are undertaken under much secrecy and 
at the cabinet level. One way of bypassing this is to look at official ulema public 
statements, and see if there are significant government changes to comply with 
the ulema's requests. In contrast, co-optation is considered successful if the 
state is able to carry out their policies despite being urged by official ulema not 
to do so. 
Second, are official ulema able to affect power relations through influencing the 
appointment of state personnel, or are these appointments already determined 
by the state? Capture is deemed strong when the official ulema are able to 
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pressure the government to lobby members from the same organisations, 
families, friends, or cronies into important decision-making positions. In the 
same vein, official ulema can also pressure the government to appoint fellow 
ulema or allies to key positions within the religious bureaucracies. Co-optation is 
deemed strong when the state can resist official ulema requests to determine 
how appointments are carried out, or who should be appointed. 
Third, can the state religious bureaucracies and institutions enhance official 
ulema's authority to make religious, social and political pronouncements that 
affect policies in those areas, or do these platforms constrain their ability to 
make independent religious rulings? If the official ulema are able to make 
religious rulings that are generally followed by the state and society, then 
capture is deemed successful. In contrast, if these state institutions restrict the 
ability of official ulema to make autonomous religious judgment, then co-
optation remains strong. 
Fourth, to what extent do ulema seek to dominate discourse or counter the 
interests of the state, or are the opinions expressed "scripted" and determined 
by the state? Capture is deemed strong if official ulema can exclusively 
determine what Islam is and what is not. It also means that their opinions 
cannot be challenged by the other ulema and even state officials. In contrast, 
co-optation isdeemed strong when the official ulema only comply 
unquestioningly the positions and statements undertaken by the state. 
Fifth, to what extent do these state bureaucracies and institutions give the 
official ulema access to material and other resources that help them achieve 
other goals, apart from the material benefits already provided by the state for 
loyalty? One trait of co-optation is that official ulema legitimise and support the 
ideology of the state and they are rewarded for that. However, capture is 
deemed to be strong when the official ulema are able to set the terms and 
conditions on how much they are supposed to be rewarded. Capture is also 
deemed strong if they are able to use their positions of power to establish other 
networks than those originally intended by the state. These new networks have 
the potential to rival state ones. 
However, there are limits to the concept capture given the subjectivity of 
measuring intent. In political economy, measuring intent is clear: interest groups 
infiltrate institutions with the aim to change and reverse policies for their own 
gain. Measuring intent is not as clear-cut in the case of the ulema because the 
fact that they may have different views to the state does not automatically mean 
capture. One way to overcome this limitation is to consider ulema speaking 
against the basic parameters underlined by the state—its governing principles, 
the constitution, and ideology—as capture. For Indonesia, this parameter is 
Pancasila and for Malaysia, Rukunegara. I consider these acts capture because 
the ulema did not conform to what the state expected them to do: to explain 
government's policies to the people. 
Moreover, having ulema speaking against the government does not 
automatically constitute capture. In political economy, interest groups, business 
enterprises and policy makers also voice their disagreements with politicians, 
privately and publicly. To reiterate, the study only considers capture when ulema 
speak against the state with the explicit aim to monopolise the discourse or 
decision-making processes. These can be measured through their discourse 
and actions. For example, the ulema body can explicitly indicate in their media 
releases that the state includes their members in censorship boards. By doing 
so, they hope the state recognises their authority to define public morality. They 
could request the state to amend legislation to give ulema the authority to issue 
halal certificates. In another example, the ulema body demanded the 
government exclude rival groups or individuals from policy-mal<ing institutions. 
Another limitation related to measuring intent is whether ulema are motivated by 
personal interests or religious interests. For example, do the ulema join state 
institutions to gain prestige, and earn a stable income, or do they feel they could 
forward their Islamisation agenda by obtaining state power? There is certainly 
no way of ascertaining these questions, but I am inclined to believe that both 
elements are present. In truth, I would argue that the ulema are capturing the 
state out of religious conviction more than fulfilling personal interests. The 
generation of official ulema today are raised in a social milieu that is anti-West. 
They believe Westernisation erodes Islamic dogmas, values, and culture by 
promoting hedonism, materialism, and liberalism. Some ulema equated 
Westernisation to Christianisation. It is unsurprising that their discourse is 
interested in developing Islamic societies that challengesthe existing order by 
replacing with a pure Islamic one. The official ulema feel that the way to achieve 
this is to be part of state structures and Islamise them from within. 
Conclusion 
This chapter observes several key themes in the general literature on the 
ulema, and more specifically on MUl and Malaysian mufti. The chapter 
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concentrates on the general portrayal of the official ulema and their dealings 
with the state. The themes uncovered here are useful for the later parts of this 
study, and for answering the central questions of the study of the extent to 
which ulema capture the state while simultaneously being co-opted by it. 
Generally, Islamic studies scholars perceive the nexus between official ulema 
and co-optation as very strong. This perception is also dominant amongst 
Muslims. However, there have been works that challenge this perception. I hope 
to contribute to this body of work that challenges the premises of co-optation 
theory. One way of challenging co-optation theory is to apply interest-mediation 
models in the field of comparative politics. I contend that Migdal's state-in-
society approach is relevant to challenging the co-optation thesis, more so than 
the pluralist and corporatist models. The concept state capture, originally 
discussed in political economy is useful by way of extending Migdal's approach, 
especially in discussing societal actors' behaviour of capitalising even when co-
opted. It is hoped that this study can engage critically with these existing works, 
not only on the ulema in Southeast Asia, but also the broader Islamic world. 
More importantly, applying the concept capture is meant to question the 
conclusions of existing works on official ulema behaviour in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. As discussed, works on MUl are more developed than works on the 
Malaysian JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM. There are generally three conclusions 
made by existing works on MUl: MUl is more assertive towards the state now 
than in the New Order period; MUl has become more conservative since 2005; 
and MUl's fatwas are influential in shaping public behaviour. On the other hand, 
works on Malaysian official ulema are mostly limited to issues of co-optation 
and the fatwa-making processes. 
Chapter Three 
Official ulema institutions in 
contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia 
States build ulema institutions to issue fatwas or advise them on Islamic 
matters. In Indonesia, MUl (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council of 
Indonesia) functions as the country's national ulema institution, which issues 
fatwas through its Fatwa Commission. In Malaysia, the state formed the MKI 
(Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam or National Council for 
Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia), which hosts the JKF-MKI (Jawatankuasa 
Fatwa MKI or National Fatwa Committee) for similar purposes. It also formed 
the federal institutions JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or 
Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) and IKIM (Institut Kefahaman 
Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding) to support the 
JKF-MKI in co-ordinating fatwa discussion and research with negeri religious 
councils. In this study, as far as official ulema are concerned, the comparison is 
between the MUl and the JFK-MKI. Nonetheless, JAKIM and IKIM leaders will 
also be considered as institutions for Malaysian official ulema, given the 
significant supporting role they play for JKF-MKI. 
At face value, MUl and JKF-MKI look to be very different institutions. The 
amount of funding MUl receives from the Indonesian state is only a fraction of 
that which JKF-MKI gets from the Malaysian state, despite Indonesia's Muslim 
community being fourteen times bigger than its neighbour. In addition, MUl 
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members appoint their own leaders, while the Malaysian muftis are ex-officio 
members of the JKF-MKI with other appointments in the committee determined 
by Malay rulers. Ulema from ormas and civil society make up the majority of 
MUl membership, though state officials are also represented on its advisory 
board. In contrast, JKF-MKI consists of muftis, JAKIM officials, representatives 
from negeri religious councils, and academics. Overall, MUl's functions combine 
those of a religious bureaucracy and an NGO, whereas JKF-MKI is part of the 
state's structure assisted by a bureaucracy. 
Despite these differences, I will make the case for comparing MUl and JKF-MKI 
and why this comparison has merit. The main reason for the comparison is to 
understand capture and co-optation processes. Both institutions contain units 
actively involved in state capture, and they include units responsible for issuing 
fatwas, overseeing shariah economics, managing halal certification and 
determining public morality. Moreover, these two institutions have similar origins 
and functions: they were formed by authoritarian leaders as national ulema 
institutions to issue fatwas. In addition, their membership is made up of 
individuals with similar objectives. Ulema from both countries agreed to 
participate in these bodies in order to increase their influence within their 
respective states. The politicians in these states, in return, sought to advance 
their political and economic objectives through co-opting the ulema. 
This chapter begins by first describing MUl's origins, functions, structure, and 
relations with regional branches. Then, a similar discussion on JKF-MKI will 
follow. The chapter will then examine the functions of JAKIM and IKIM because 
79 
these federal institutions complement the JKF-MKI by acting as its public 
relations, administrative, and research arms/® At the end of the chapter, I 
discuss the reasons why MUl and JKF-MKI are comparable cases, and why this 
comparison is important to understand the co-optation/capture dynamics of the 
official ulema in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUl) 
In 1975, Suharto formed MUl as a religious advisory body and a national ulema 
institution. MUl was, however, not the first state-sponsored ulema institution in 
Indonesia. In 1958, President Sukarno established an ulema council in West 
Java (M. Crouch, 2009, p. 7). In 1965, the Aceh Ulama Council was formed, 
and its task was to explain government policies on development for the local 
people. In the 1970s, its roles included helping the Suharto government 
suppress GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Aceh Freedom Movement); 
developing national unity amongst Acehnese; and most importantly, supporting 
Pancasila (Feener, 2013, pp. 100-102). However, the authority of these councils 
was limited to their respective regions. MUl was the first ever nation-wide ulema 
institution in Indonesia, and it was made directly accountable to the president 
and Kemenag (Kementerian Agama or Religious Ministry). In fact, the Aceh 
Ulama Council was subsumed as its Aceh branch. 
In the following paragraphs, I describe contemporary MUl's functions, structure, 
Analysing these institutions' current organisational structure and functions is relevant to the 
discussion in the next chapter. In Chapter Four, I discuss the historical and political context that 
led to their formation or evolution. In a snapshot, contemporary official ulema institutions are by-
products of the Indonesian and Malaysian states' attempts to contain the rise of Islamic piety 
and PAS in their respective countries. 
and relations with its brandies. From this description, I demonstrate that Mi l l 's 
structure has not changed since the New Order period. However, after the fall of 
the New Order, significant differences exist in the ways ML)I appoints leaders 
and members and how its role has expanded. 
Functions 
Suharto claimed MUl was established to explain the activities and concepts of 
national and local development on behalf of the government.''® In 1975, at the 
opening of MUl's first MUNAS (Musyawarah Nasional or General Assembly), 
Suharto said 
[MUl's role is] To translate concepts and activities of national or local 
development for the people, give advice and opinions to the government 
concerning religious life, mediate between the government and the ulema and 
to discuss the problems related to the duties of the ulema (Moch Nur, 2005 p 
48) 
Given the roles Suharto had set out for MUl, the institution bears the traits of a 
"quango" (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation) similar to those 
found in Commonwealth countries, rather than a statutory board or an NGO.®° A 
quango is a body that carries out government functions and attains the status of 
"quasi-autonomous" bureaucracy (Heywood, 2002, p.368). It allows the 
government to call on its experience, expertise and specialist knowledge of 
outside advisors and reduce the burden of work for official government 
departments and agencies. A quango also receives funding from the 
government. 
I consider MUl a quango because it undertakes work not assigned to any other 
government agencies or statutory boards, and receives state-funding for the 
™ The state's co-optation strategies will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
MUl's resemblance of a quango is also pointed out by Lindsey, 2012c, p. 255. 
work it does, which currently amounts to US $300,000 (A$345, 300) a year.®''ln 
many other Muslim countries, the religious bureaucracy consists of ulema 
departments responsible for providing religious guidance or opinions to the 
masses. One example is MUlS (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore), which 
is a religious bureaucracy that oversees the office of Mufti. In Indonesia, the 
ulema council, which issues fatwas, is separate from the Kemenag (Religious 
Ministry). Since there is no duplicity in terms of the role played by MUl and 
Kemenag, it is fair to refer to MUl as a quango. During the Suharto period, MUl 
generally took orders from the state. The study admits, however, in the post-
Suharto period, there have been instances where MUl wanted to chart its own 
course (Lindsey, 2012c, p.256). Yet, MUl retains most of the functions assigned 
by the Suharto government. 
MUl's primary role in the post-New Order period is to discuss, research and 
issue fatwas and religious advisories.®^ The department within MUl responsible 
for issuing fatwas is the Komisi Fatwa (Fatwa Commission), which is headed by 
a Ketua who is assisted by five vice-heads.®^ The Fatwa Commission's current 
Head is Hasanuddin. Members of this commission—51 in all—exercise 
collective ijtihad (consensus) filling the role of a grand mufti found in many other 
Islamic countries. MUl issues fatwas only when the state or any MUl branch 
sends formal queries and most of its fatwas are issued during MUNAS. Figure 1 
demonstrates the number of fatwas issued by the MUl fatwa commission from 
Interview with Ichwan Sam, 3 December 2012. He mentioned tliat government fundina was 
RP 3 trillion a year. ^ 
Its role as translators of the state's national and development policies have ceased MUl is 
not the only organisation to issue fatwas. Ormas such as Persatuan Islam (Persis) NU and 
Muhammadiyah issue fatwas for their members (Gillespie, 2007). In fact, these ormas hope for 
broader influence via fatwas. However, MUl's role as a national body is reccqnised at the 
international level. JAKIM, for instance, has acknowledged MUl as Indonesia's national fatwa-
making body. 
" See Appendix 2# for the list of MUl Fatwa Commission members. 
1975 to 2011. The figure shows that the MUl Fatwa Commission has been more 
active in issuing fatwas during MUNAS after the fall of the New Order in 1998.®" 
Figure 1. MUl fatwa since 1975 
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Apart from issuing fatwas, IVIUI also releases religious advisories which take the 
form of advice (tausiyah), admonition (tazkirah), appeal (himbauan) and 
contribution to thought (himbauan pemikiran). There is another higher form of 
advice, an instruction (amanat), which is seen as a stronger directive to society 
than a fatwa (Kaptein, 2004; Moch Nur, 2005). MUl was more active issuing 
these advisories after the fall of the New Order in 1998. 
^ The quantity and quality of IVlUI's fatwas vary under one chairman to another. When Ibrahim 
Hosen was chairman of the Fatwa Commission (1980s), MUl was known for issuing 
controversial fatwas supporting the state (Feener, 2007, p. 163). Under the chairmanship of 
Hasan Basri (1985 to 1998), the Fatwa Commission issued fewer fatwas compared to the 
previous years. Hasan was known for not wanting to harm MUl's relations with Suharto. 
Interview with a DSN-MUl member, 12 August 2014. 
MUl undertakes many other functions as well as being a fatwa-making body. It 
now has 12 commissions and five institutions that oversee these different 
functions. A Head {Ketua), supported by a committee made up of five or six 
members, chairs each of these commissions and institutions. The 12 
commissions cover areas such as: Fatwa (Religious Legal Opinions); Ukhuwah 
Islamiyah (Islamic Brotherhood); Dakwah dan Pengembangan Masyarakat 
Islam (Preaching and Community Development); Pendidikan dan Pembinaan 
Seni Budaya (Education and Islamic Culture); Pengajian dan Penelitian 
(Research); Hukum dan Perundangan-undangan (Legal Research); 
Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Ummat (Muslim Community Economic 
Empowerment); Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Remaja dan Keluarga (Women's, 
Youth and Family Empowerment); Informatika dan IVledia Massa (Information 
and Mass Media); Pembinaan Seni Budaya Islam (Islamic and Culture 
Development), Kerukunan Antara Umat Beragama (Interfaith); and Hubungan 
Luar Negeri (Foreign Relations). The five institutions are: LPPOM-MUl 
(Lembaga Pengajian Pangan, Obat-Obatan, Minuman dan Kosmetika or The 
Assessment Institute for Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics); DSN-MUl (Dewan 
Shariah Nasional or National Sharia Board); Basyarnas (Badan Abritrase 
Shariah Nasional or National Abritration Body); Badan Penerbit MUl 
(Publications); and YDDP (Yayasan Dana Dakwah Pembangunan or Dakwah 
Development Foundation). 
The study will treat MUl leaders, as well as the ulema in the MUl Fatwa 
Commission, DSN-MUl and LPPOM-MUl as case studies. These commissions 
and institutions are selected because their functions parallel the Malaysian 
institutions the study will be covering. The study focuses on the Fatwa 
Commission because it is the most active body in MUl which carries out state 
capture. Some fatwas issued have a political slant seeking to influence the 
state's policies and regulations. The study also focuses on DSN-MUl, the 
institution responsible for managing shariah economics. It issues fatwas related 
to Islamic banking and finance and makes recommendations to the state on 
policies and regulations related to this sector. DSN-MUl is selected as a case 
because it is an important revenue-generating body for MUl. Furthermore, 
LPPOM-MUl oversees MUl's halal certification unit. It is responsible for issuing 
certificates and assessing food, cosmetics, and medical products against halal 
requirements. LPPOM-MUl also collaborates with international counterparts in 
Asia, the Middle East and Europe to push for an international halal-standard. 
Like the DSN-MUl, LPPOM-MUl is another income-generating body within MUl. 
Another reason why the study selects these two institutions is because they 
have spelt out their capture objectives in writing and reports. The origins, 
functions of DSN-MUl and LPPOM-MUl will be examined in Chapter Six, where 
I will discuss these institutions capture successes and failures. 
Structure 
MUl's leadership structure is stipulated in the Pedoman Penyelenggaraan 
Organisasi (MUl Organisation Implementation Guide). This document provides 
details on how MUl leaders are appointed, and what roles and duties they 
should play in their respective commissions and institutions. MUl is headed by a 
chairman and vice-chairman, and they are members of its highest executive 
body, the Dewan Pimpinan or Leadership Board. Their appointments are 
decided by a 15-member council.®® MUl secretaries and heads of commission 
Interview with Isa Anshary, Secretary MUl, 6 December 2012. 
are ex-officio members of this board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2010).®® MUl 
board members are not salaried bureaucrats like those in Kemenag. They 
receive an allowance from MUl and the rate depends on how regularly they 
attend its meetings and events.®'' On the other hand, general MUl members 
occupy at least one of the institution's 12 commissions and five institutions 
mentioned above. 
Above the Dewan Pimpinan Harian, MUl has a body of advisors made up of 
ulema, intellectuals, scholars, and politicians. This body, known as the Dewan 
Penasihat or Advisory Board, is a non-executive board.®® This body is made up 
of a chairman, eight vice-chairmen, four secretaries, and 56 members.®® Figure 
2 below maps out MUl's leadership and membership structure. 
See Appendix 3# MUl leadership board members. 
Interview with Ichwan Sam, 3 December 2012. This allowance includes the cost of petrol. 
Although the chairman and the vice-chairman are the organisation's highest authorities the 
ketua of the respective commissions occasionally make public appearances and issue 
statements on issues related to their commissions and expertise. Lately, the head of the DSN-
MUI and vice-chairman (since 2014), Ma'ruf Amin, appears to be the spokesperson of MUl 
even though he is no longer the ketua for the Fatwa Commission. The other person who often 
makes statements on behalf of MUl is Amidhan, who is also an MUl ketua. 
There were only 14 members in the 1975-1980 MUl Advisory Board and 23 in the 1980-1985 
Board (Departemen Penerangan Rl, 1985, pp.53-57). 
Figure 2. MUl Leadership Structure 
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Source: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2010) 
During the New Order, Suharto was the patron of MUl (Departement Agama Rl, 
1985, pp.53-55); and all other leadership appointments in MUl required his 
approval. Apart from ulema, other professionas to be appointed were 
ambiguous: pesantren kiais, and university professors; politicians and military 
personnel.®" The Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, and 
Minister of Education and Culture sat as the institution's advisory board 
members (Porter, 2002, p.79). During Hassan Basri's chairmanship, H.M 
Soedjono, former Indonesian Air Force general and Vice-Chairman of DPR, was 
a member of the MUl Leadership Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1984, p. 
172). 
Though state approval is no longer necessary post-New Order, politicians 
Interview with Imdadun Rahmat, NU Board member, 30 November 2012. 
continue to sit in MUl's Advisory Board alongside tiie ulenna. The 2010-2015 
Advisory Board and Leadership Board includes ulema such as Quraish Shihab, 
Said Aqil Siroj, and Hasyim Muzadi. It also includes politicians such as 
Suryadharma All (PPP politician), Yudo Paripurno (PPP), Chairunisa (Golkar 
politician) and Tolchah Hasan (PKB); entrepreneur Chairul Tanjung; and former 
military personnel Lt General (Retired) Azwar Anas. Ulema from 
Muhammadiyah, as well as other ormas such as Persis (Persatuan Islam 
Indonesia or Islamic Association Indonesia), Al-lrsyad Al-lslamiah, and DDII 
(Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Foundation) 
are also part of the Advisory Board too.®^ 
Decisions by the Leadership Board are discussed and decided in the two 
meetings that are regularly held: Rapat Pleno Dewan Pimpinan (Plenary Board 
Meeting) and the Rapat Pimpinan Harian (Meeting for leaders concerning day-
to-day affairs). The Rapat Pleno Dewan Pimpinan meets once in six months. 
Rapat Pimpinan Harian meetings, on the other hand, are held once a week. 
One of the Heads (from the eleven commissions) is rotated to chair the Rapat 
Pimpinan Harian (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2010). The two meetings are 
differentiated based on the kinds of issues discussed. The Rapat Pimpinan 
Harian discusses issues requiring short-term solutions. Decisions taken in these 
meetings must be in line with the general principles outlined during MUl's 
nation-wide congress, MUNAS (to be discussed later). 
' ' However, representatives from other ormas apart from NU and Muhammadiyah have also 
tal<en up leadership positions in central MUl. Hassan Bash, MUl's third chairman, was educated 
in Muhammadiyah schools and former Masyumi member. See Appendix 4# for a list of MUl 
chairmen. 
Centre-regional relations 
MUl has branches in the regions (provincial and district levels), and they 
function autonomously fronn central MUl. MUl branches issue their own fatwas, 
which at times, contradict those issued by central MUI.®^ Furthermore, not all 
provincial MUl branches have clear leadership structures. Some were 
established by the provincial governors (Moch Nur, 2012, pp. 169-170), while 
others were established by independent kiais (Mun'im, 2013, p. 103). According 
to one MUl member of the East Java branch, ulema got together to establish 
local MUl branches and their appointments were contingent on their 
connections with local government officials (Olle, 2009, p. 104). The closer they 
were to government officials, the higher the likelihood they would be appointed 
as MUl branch leaders. 
Although MUl and its branches function autonomously, Amirsyah Yambunan, 
MUl Vice-Secretary General, describes their relationship as "cooperative" and 
"coordinated."®^ Representatives from central and branch leadership boards, 
commissions and institutions conduct regular meetings together, such as dunng 
the MUNAS, Rapat Kerja Nasional dan Daerah (National and Provincial 
Meetings), and Ijtima' Ulama (Conference of Indonesian Ulama). MUNAS 
refers to MUl's major convention held once in five years. This meeting is a 
platform for MUl members to discuss the general direction the institution will be 
charting. Representatives from the regional MUl and representatives from 
Thus, fatwas or opinions issued by provincial and district MUl members do not necessarily 
reflect those of central MUl. Journalists sometimes do not see the difference. For example, 
international and local media held MUl's 2005 SIPILIS fatwa— that declares secularism, 
pluralism, and liberalism "deviant" ideologies—responsible for the attacks conducted by Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI) on Ahmadiyah followers (Anglionby, 2005; Rogers & Flipse, 2014). 
®^lnterview with Amirsyah Tambunan, 8 January 2013. The terms cooperative and coordinated 
were also used by Isa Anshary during an interview, 6 December 2012; and by Ma'ruf Amin, MUl 
Vice-Chairman, interview, 3 December 2012. 
ormas are also invited as observers. ML)I leaders as well as the chairs, 
managers, and secretaries from the district MUl branches attend the Rapat 
Kerja Nasional dan Daerah. The purpose of the Rapat Kerja Nasional dan 
Daerah is to develop joint programs based on the direction agreed during 
MUNAS. This meeting also allows for the evaluation of past programs 
conducted by MUl and its branches. 
The Ijtima Nasional is a meeting MUl hosts involving the other ormas. MUl rides 
on this meeting to present its vision to be a tenda besar (large tent) or "a 
clearing house for all Muslim organisations in Indonesia" (Syafiq, 2011, p. 7). So 
far, Ijtima' Ulema have been held four times: in 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. 
Between 750 to 1000 ulema from all over Indonesia attended these meetings. 
Representatives from MUl branches, ormas, Kemenag, pesantren leaders, 
university lecturers, and academics also attended these meetings.®'' While MUl 
officials often claim that such national meetings represent the interests of all 
Indonesian Muslims (Ma'ruf, 2012), most participants are MUl members. IffatuI 
Umniati's (2009) description of the attendance during the 2009 Ijtima Nasional 
shows that the Ijtima' Ulama is an all-MUl affair after all. For example, out of 
100 participants who participated in the commission on Golput (the act of 
Indonesians boycotting elections), 14 were central MUl members, 80 were 
representatives from MUl branches, and only six were representatives from 
ormas.®® Thus, opinions issued during the Ijtima Nasional are generally MUl's.®® 
According to Professor Nabilah Lubis, the forum went smoothly as the chairman did not 
dictate the flow of the sessions, but mainly suggested some guidelines. The participants have 
the freedom to express their views. See IffatuI Umniati, 2009, p. 71. 
The six participants are representatives from Muhammadiyah, LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam 
Indonesia or Indonesian Institute of Islamic Preachers), ICMI, Persis, PUI (Persatuan Ulema 
Indonesia or Ulema Organisation Indonesia). There were no NU representatives invited to 
attend (IffatuI Umniati, 2009, p.77). 
To sum up, MUl has evolved from its role accorded by Suharto—a body that 
explains government's activities and concepts of national or local development 
to the people—to one that tries to be a tenda besar for all Islamic organisations. 
It has also expanded its functions from a fatwa-making body to include other 
activities such as interfaith dialogue, shariah economics, and women's 
empowerment. During the New Order, Suharto wanted MUl to be influential but 
compliant to his wishes. He wanted it to reduce the influence and autonomy of 
NU and Muhammadiyah. In the post-New Order period, MUl not only wants to 
be the leading organisation within the Islamic community in Indonesia ahead of 
NU and Muhammadiyah, but also one that is autonomous from the state. 
Whether MUl is successful in playing this role will be explored in Chapter Six. 
Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ugama Islam 
(JKF-MKI) 
In 1968, the Malaysian federal government, based on the recommendation of 
the Council of Rulers, established the MKI as the highest Islamic body in the 
country. MKI's functions will be discussed shortly, but in essence, the Council of 
Rulers felt there was a need to have a federal institution that oversees the 
development and progress of Muslims in Malaysia, and to coordinate Islamic 
administration among all religious councils in Malaysia (Abdul Monir, 1998, 
^ MUl Secretary General, Ichwan Sam claims the Ijtima' Ulama is the meeting of all ulema in 
Indonesia. See http://www.halalmui.orq/newMUI/index.phD/main/detil Daqe/8/512 (Date 
Accessed: 10 September 2014). 
p. 138).®^ MKI is not an ulema institution because its membership comprises 
ulema, UMNO politicians and chief ministers including those of opposition 
controlled negeris, and other professionals. However, it oversees the country's 
highest fatwa-making body, the JKF-MKI, which is also known as the National 
Fatwa Committee.®® 
The study considers members of JKF-MKI as the core of Malaysia's official 
ulema. As I will elaborate later, half of the JKF-MKI members are muftis of the 
13 negeri. The others are nine individuals, mostly former academics, appointed 
by the Council of Rulers. To Improve comparability with MUl, the study will 
include JAKIM and IKIM leaders in addition to those from JKF-MKI. JAKIM acts 
as the secretariat to the JKF-MKI, while IKIM focuses on research. Their tasks 
are to propagate the committee's fatwas to the public through publications, the 
internet, and traditional media. JAKIM's and IKIM's functions will be discussed 
later. 
The following paragraphs will examine the functions of the MKI and the JKF-
MKI, and compare their similarities with MUl. Then, I discuss JKF-MKI's 
structure in order to understand how appointments are made. A discussion on 
the relationship between federal religious councils with their negeri counterparts 
will then follow. Earlier, the chapter pointed out MUl's relations with its branches 
are largely independent. I highlight how the JKF-MKI's relationship with the 
Although official sources say that MKI was the Council of Rulers' Initiative, there is a 
possibility that it is the Alliance government under Tunku Abdul Rahman that recommended it to 
the rulers. In 1968, the Alliances position was threatened by PAS. 
I shall refer to this body as the JKF-MKI in this study. 
negeri religious councils is well co-ordinated. This discussion on the Malaysian 
ulema will conclude with a description of JAKIM's and IKIM's role in the 
administration of Islam in the country. 
Functions 
MKI functions as the highest Islamic advisory body to the Council of Rulers on 
matters related to shariah. Its primary role is to discuss, consider, and 
administer Islamic issues referred by the Council of Rulers (Abdul Monir, 1998, 
p. 138). It also discusses issues raised by any negeri governments, negeri 
religious councils, or any members of the council (JAKIM, 2014a). MKI is also 
responsible for creating and developing other federal Islamic institutions, the 
major one being YADIM (Yayasan Dakwan Islamiyah Malaysia or Islamic 
Da'wah Foundation Malaysia). Formed in 1974, YADIM is responsible for co-
ordinating dakwah activities for the whole country. 
In 1970, the federal government, with the Council or Rulers' consent, 
established the JKF-MKI, to act as a fatwa-making body within the MKI. The 
committee convened its first meeting from 23 to 24 June 1970. Its primary role 
was to consider, decide, and issue fatwas on Islamic matters as requested by 
the Council of R u l e r s . T h e JKF-MKI can issue fatwas in two ways. The first is 
through Mesyuarat JKF-MKI (JKF-MKI Meetings). Fatwas issued through this 
The minor institutions MKI helped developed are INDAH (Institusi Dakwah dan Latihan Islam 
or Dakwah Institution and Training); Maktab Perguruan Islam Malaysia (Islamic Teachers 
Training College); Sekolah Menegah Agama di Sarawak (Sarawak, Religious Secondary 
School); Pusat Penyelidikan Islam (Islamic Research Centre); Maahad Tahfiz al-Quran Wal 
Qiraat (Quranic Centre); and LEPAI (Lembaga Penyelaras Pelajaran dan Pendidikan Agama 
Islam or Council for Standardisation of Islamic Teaching and Education). 
See JAKIM Website. Link: http://www.e-fatwa.aov.mv/iawatankuasa-fatwa-mailis-
kebanasaan-baqi-hal-ehwal-ugama-lslam-malavsia. (Date Accessed: 31 October 2014). 
forum are mainly in response to queries by the Council of Rulers. After these 
queries are discussed, they will be presented to the Council of Rulers. Once the 
rulers give their assent, the fatwas will be presented to the negeri religious 
councils. Members of the negeri councils cannot alter the wordings of fatwas 
issued through the Mesyuarat JKF-MKI; they can only recommend to their ruler 
whether the fatwas should be gazetted or not (JAKIM, 2014b). 
Abdul Monir (1998, p. 139) observed that the Mesyuarat JKF-MKI is rarely 
conducted compared to the second way JKF-MKI issues fatwas, the Muzakarah 
Fatwa Kebangsaan or National Fatwa Discussion. The JKF-MKI convenes this 
discussion at least six times in a year. The Council of Rulers however can 
initiate special sessions. This forum responds to public or NGOs queries that 
the JKF-MKI feels require fatwas. The members of this discussion can also 
initiate the topics to be discussed. Kelantan Mufti Mohamad Shukri remarked 
that, "We [muftis] adopted a more proactive approach. Even though we are not 
asked to issue fatwas, we will still discuss In the Fatwa Commission, or conduct 
research on the matter."''"^ Fatwas Issued through the Muzakarah Fatwa 
Kebangsaan will then be presented to the Council of Rulers through the MKI. 
Once the rulers' assent is given, the negeri religious councils will then discuss 
whether the fatwas require any amendments. Unlike fatwas issued through the 
Mesyuarat JKF-MKI, the negeri councils can choose whether to gazette fatwas 
Issued though the Muzakarah Fatwa Kebangsaan. 
Interview with Dato' Haji Mohamad Shul<ri Bin Mohamad, 7 April 2013. The Kelantan mufti 
suggested anecdotally UMNO leaders had once sought to persuade him to issue a fatwa 
against the use of Islamic labels for political parties. UMNO hoped to use the fatwa against 
PAS. 
Fatwas issued by the JKF-MKI are not binding to Muslims living in Federal Territories The 
Federal Territory has its own mufti, religious council MAIWP (Islamic Religious Council for 
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Figure 3. shows the number of fatwas issued by the committee annually from 
1970 to 2013. It depicts the committee becoming active issuing fatwas after 
Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981. 
Figure 3. Fatwas issued by JKF-IVIKI since 1970 to 2013 
Fatwa Issued by the JKF-MKI 
25 
20 
15 
10 
Source: This data is compiled from JAKIM's website. See Jakim (2013a). 
The committee became even more active after Abdullah Badawi became Prime 
Minister in 2003. The JKF-MKI fatwas increased from an average of six per 
year during Mahathir government to an average of 17 per year during the six 
years of the Abdullah Badawi government. There were 131 JKF-MKI fatwas 
during the 21 years of Mahathir's reign, and 104 fatwas issued during the six 
years of Abdullah Badawi's government. On average, the number of fatwas 
issued by the JKF-MKI tripled after Mahathir's retirement in 2003. 
Federal Territories or IVIajlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan) and religious department 
(JAWI). 
structure 
JKF-MKI is the fatwa-making committee under the MKI. Its membership is made 
up of ulema, whereas the MKI is made up of ulema, politicians and civil 
servants. MKI comprises a chairman, vice-chairman, and representatives from 
the negeri. The negeri representatives include chief ministers, Exco (Executive 
committee) members in-charge of Islamic matters, and representatives from 
religious councils and departments. The Council of Rulers also appoints five 
other members for a three-year term to the council. Since MKI's inception, the 
prime minister automatically sits as its chair. 
The Council of Rulers must approve all appointments to the JKF-MKI, though it 
is almost certain that all 14 Malaysian muftis—from 13 negeris and the Federal 
Territory—will be appointed as members. This is because the negeri muftis are 
themselves either appointed by their respective ruler or the Malaysian King, and 
hence they represent their respective negeris in the JKF-MKI. The other 
members of the JKF-MKI consist of a chairman, a secretary, nine Islamic 
"experts," and a representative from the legal profession (Arik Sanusi, 2010; 
Othman, 1981). The members of the committee then elect a chairman. The 
current chairman of the JKF-MKI is Tan Sri Dato' Abdul Shukor Haji Husin, the 
former Vice-Chancellor of USIM (Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia or Malaysian 
Islam and Science University). Though Abdul Shukor had occupied many 
important positions in JAKIM and IKIM, he has never been a negeri mufti. 
Bureaucrats, academics, economists and scientists fill the remaining eleven 
positions of the JKF-MKI. The JAKIM director automatically acts as the 
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committee's secretary. The current JKF-MKI's secretary is Othman Mustafa. 
The current committee includes ulema such as Ghazali Abdul Rahman (shariah 
expert); Abdul Hayei Shukur; Zakaria Stapa (Professor of Islamic Studies in 
DM); and Paizah Ismail. It also includes a chemist and an Islamic finance 
consultant (JAKIM, 2014b).''°^ These members are appointed to provide input 
on matters pertaining to shariah economics, halal-products, and medical-related 
issues. 
Federal-negeri relations 
Ulema from federal Islamic institutions JAKIM and IKIM conduct regular 
meetings with their counterparts from the negeri religious councils. These 
meetings normally concern fatwa research. For example, between 16 and 17 
May 2012, JAKIM hosted a dialogue between JKF-MKI and the various negeri 
fatwa departments. The objective of the discussion was to understand issues 
facing the negeri councils whether these issues require JKF-MKI's attention. 
Between 20 and 22 May 2012, JAKIM hosted the S"' Persidangan Mufti-Mufti 
Seluruh Malaysia (Conference of Malaysian Muftis) to discuss how negeri fatwa 
councils could be better co-ordinated (JAKIM, 2012b, p.25). All Malaysian 
muftis and deputy muftis attended the conference. 
However, in terms of fatwa enforcement, the negeri religious councils are more 
powerful than the federal institutions. When a negeri religious council (Majlis 
Agama Islam Negeri) issues a fatwa and the fatwa is published in the negeri 
gazette, it is legally binding on all Muslims living in that negeri (Mahamad 
' See Appendix 1# for JKF-MKI members. 
Naser, 2011, p. 100). For fatwas to be gazetted, they do not go through the 
legislative process; it is mainly at the Ruler's discretion. Unlike other legislation, 
in which bills have to be presented, debated, and passed through the negeri 
legislative assembly, the same does not apply to fatwas. Before 2004, fatwas 
passed had to undergo similar process as civil laws before they are gazetted 
(Martinez 2001, p. 478).^°'* In 2004, most negeri passed the Shariah Criminal 
Offences Act/Enactment, where muftis fatwas can carry the force of law without 
having to go the parliament or negeri legislative assemblies debate them (Liow, 
2009, p.128). For example, for the states of Terengganu and Selangor, fatwas 
are gazetted without the approval of the state legislature. A fatwa issued by the 
Jabatan Mufti (Department of Mufti) is discussed and amended by the Majlis 
Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Terengganu (Religious Council of 
Terengganu), and then gazetted (Jabatan Mufti Negeri Terengganu, 2013). 
According to Section 48 of Administration of the Religion of Islam for Selangor, 
the religious council will present fatwas to the Ruler for his assent. The Council 
is also makes recommendation to the Ruler if the fatwas are to be gazetted. 
Once the Ruler has given his assent, the Council will inform the negeri 
government to gazette the fatwas (Selangor Enactment, 2003). The Selangor 
Sultan, Sultan Syarafuddin Syah told Muslims not to criticise fatwas because 
they are passed by "learned" scholars, and the fatwas obtain his endorsement 
(Ruban, 2014). The ability of the official ulema to bypass the legislatures is yet 
another demonstration of how they can influence, shape and introduce religious 
enactments without the consent of the sitting government. 
According to Martinez, "The Jabatan Agama and the Sharia courts administer Islam in the 
state. The Menteri Besar, or Chief Minister, who is essentially a Federal Appointee in BN-
controlled states, has to present legislation on Islam to the state legislature and the sultan for 
enactment. The state legislatures have both Muslims and non-Muslims elected representatives" 
(Martinez, 2001, p. 478). 
With the exception of Johore and Kedah, gazetted fatwas are recognised in 
shariah courts and it is an offence to violate them (Hasnan, 2006). In Perak, 
Selangor, Malacca, Penang, and Terengganu, both the neger; shariah and civil 
courts recognise fatwas published in the government gazette (Hasnan, 2006, 
pp. 18-19).''°^ This binding nature of fatwas is unusual in the IVIuslim world. 
Fatwas are mainly religious opinions issued by Muslim scholars on matters that 
are not stated in the Quran or Sunnah. Muslims are generally free not to heed 
fatwas. 
Malaysian muftis play an important role in bridging Islamic institutions at the 
federal and negeri levels. The muftis' power base is at the negeri, but they also 
play an important role at the JKF-MKI. Their presence and participation at all-
levels of the fatwa-making process, both at the negeri and federal levels, helps 
synchronise and standardise religious council fatwas. As mentioned, muftis 
make up more than half of the JKF-MKI. Their role in fatwa-making processes 
at the negeri levels falls into three parts. First, the muftis are ex-officio members 
of their respective Majlis Agama Islam Negeri. The other members of this 
council include the chair, deputy Chair, legal advisor to the state, state financial 
officer and the state police chief.''"® Of all these appointments in the council. 
The religious council is the highest Islamic body for each negeri under the Malay rulers. In 
most negeris, the rulers have the discretion to appoint the members of the religious council and 
the deputy muftis. In negeris that do not have a ruler, such as Malacca, the mufti is appointed 
by the King based on recommendations by the Chief Minister. However, in Negeri Sembilan, the 
kerajaan negeri is more powerful than the Ruler in determining religious council appointments. 
The enactment states that the Ruler cannot reject the Chief Minister's recommendations 
(Zulkifli, 2008b, p. 16). For the Mufti of Federal Territory, the King appoints the members of the 
council based on recommendations by the minister in charge of religious affairs (Hasnan 2006 
p. 6). 
The chair and deputy chair of the religious council can be members of the legislative 
assembly of the negeri, prominent ulema, or civil servants. For the Religious council in Perak, 
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society regards the muftis as the most learned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh). Non-ulema fill some other appointments. 
Second, the muftis chair the shariah committees in their respective religious 
councils. These committees research and draft fatwas before they are 
discussed at the religious council. Based on the Selangor Enactment (2003), 
the mufti is the one who presents the committee's fatwas to the council for 
discussion before they are presented to the ruler. These shariah committees 
adopt different names in the various negerr. Jawatankuasa fatwa (Kedah and 
Terengganu), Jamaah Ulamak (Kelantan) Lujnah Fatwa (Johore), and 
Jawatankuasa Undang-undang Syarak (Federal Territory). Fatwas drafted by 
the shariah committees normally get passed by the religious councils (Hasnan, 
2006, p. 13). In the case of Terengganu, the shariah committee can even deliver 
fatwas on "minor" issues without having to go through the religious councils, 
and get gazetted (Hasnan, 2006, p. 13). 
Third, the muftis are assisted by their own team of administrators. These 
administrators work under the mufti departments (Jabatan mufti). These mufti 
departments function autonomously from the religious departments (Jabatan 
Agama Islam dan Adat Negeri or JAIN). The task of the mufti departments 
include responding to any religious queries from the public, conducting research 
on Islamic knowledge, and determining important dates in the Islamic 
Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Melayu Perak (MAIMP), the members are made up of the negeri 
governments, including Chief Minister Zamry Abdul Kadir, the state secretary Abdul Puhat Mat 
Nayan, and the state Finance officer Mohd Ghazali Jalal. The council also included members of 
the Perak legislative assembly and the director of the religious department (MAIAMP, 2012). 
calendar.^°^ Thus, while the rulers are the head of Islam of each negeri, and 
fatwas are passed collectively with other religious elites, the contents of fatwas 
are mostly based on inputs provided by the muftis. 
JAKIM and IKIM 
Mahathir substantially upgraded existing federal Islamic institutions as well as 
formed new ones when he was in power. The reasons why this happened will 
be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five, but suffice to say for now that 
Mahathir was responding to challenges from a Islamist PAS and the rise of 
dakwah groups (Mehden, 2013). Two such institutions that the study will focus 
on are JAKIM and IKIM. Even though they cannot exercise powers similar to 
those of the negeri religious councils—especially in the realms of fatwa and 
shariah courts—they support JKF-MKI's administrative, research, and public 
relations aspects. JAKIM and IKIM raise JKF-MKI ulema's public profile. 
The government established JAKIM on 1 January 1997. Before this, JAKIM was 
known as BAHEIS (Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam or the Islamic Affairs Division) in 
the Prime Minister's Office (Funston, 2006, p. 55). JAKIM serves as the 
secretariat for the MKI and its functions can be divided into the following areas: 
supporting the formulation and standardization of Islamic law; Islamic 
coordination and administration; coordination and development of Islamic 
education (JAKIM, 2014c). Other JAKIM roles include streamlining and 
standardising Islamic law throughout the country; streamlining fatwa and 
See Jabatan Mufti Terengganu Website. 
http://mufti.terenaaanu.qov.mv/inaxc2020/agensi/article.php?cid=38&aid=410fDate Accessed: 5 
September 2014). 
implanting connpliance; and building well-established Islamic thinking amongst 
the people {ummat) based on ASWJ {Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah or Sunni). 
The state entrusts JAKIM with the duty of addressing deviations of faith (akidah) 
that threaten national security; making Malaysia the hub of higher learning and 
research for al-Quran and hadith at the regional and international level; and 
developing and streamlining the Islamic education management of national 
religious schools.^"® JAKIM oversees rehabilitation centres for "deviant" Muslims 
and coordinates NGOs to monitor aberrant teachings such as Shias and 
Wahhabis (Mehden, 2013). JAKIM has its own fatwa research committees, 
duplicating the roles played by fatwa-committees in the negeri. The negeri fatwa 
committees may issue contradictory fatwas, and JAKIM's role is to standradise 
these fatwas. JAKIM also organises international seminars and conferences, 
publishes academic journals, and manages television and internet portals 
(JAKIM, 2011a, pp. 32-40; JAKIM 2012b). 
In addition, JAKIM enhances the prominence of the Malaysian muftis in both the 
new-media and traditional media. The fatwas issued jointly by the Jabatan 
Agama Islam Negeri and the JKF-MKI are published on JAKIM's website. 
JAKIM also co-ordinates dialogues among muftis which are separate from the 
Muzakarah JKF-MKI meetings (JAKIM, 2012b, pp.25-27). The muftis appear on 
dakwah programmes uploaded on the JAKIM TV portals. In 2014, the JAKIM 
website provided newspaper clippings on any commentaries the muftis or 
JAKIM officials provided. This webpage, called Senarai Fatwa ©Media (Fatwa 
These functions are quoted from JAKIM's website. See http://www.islam nnv mv/Pn/iakim-
functions. (Date Accessed: 31 October 2014) 
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Lists on Media), features clippings from Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian, Sinar 
Harian, Harian Metro, The Star and New Straits Times. The newspaper 
clippings put up on the webpage mainly report on the decisions made by the 
JKF-MKI. JAKIM also produces religious programs involving muftis and other 
official ulema for mainstream television channels, RTM 1, RTM 2 and Hikmah 
Channel. The popular programs involving the official ulema are Forum Perdana 
Ehwal Islam (a forum featuring three panellists) and Bicara Mufti (A Dialogue 
with muftis). 
JAKIM also has authority over Malaysia's big mosques—the National Mosque 
(Masjid Negara), Masjid Putrajaya, and Masjid Tunku Mizan Zainal Abidin. The 
National Mosque has a capacity of 15 000 people whereas Masjid Putrajaya 
and Masjid Tunku Mizan Zainal Abidin can house 15 000 and 20 000 people 
respectively. The National Mosque is symbolic because it hosts important state 
religious ceremonies—including the prayers for Eidulfitri and Eiduladha—which 
are also televised live.^°® The Malaysian King, Prime Minister, Cabinet 
ministers, and other dignitaries such as foreign ambassadors join these 
important ceremonies at the National Mosque. 
JAKIM also prepares Friday sermons to be read at the mosques it has authority 
over and these sermons will be televised live by the mainstream media. It is 
unlawful for an imam in these mosques not to read sermons issued by JAKIM. 
Although JAKIM's sermons mostly concern morality, some have a political angle 
Eidulfitri is marl<ed by the end of the month of Ramadhan. Fasting is the third pillar of Islam. 
Eiduladha is the celebration related to the Haj ritual, which is the fifth pillar of Islam. 
Interview with Azhar Tuarno, Deputy Director, Imam of National Mosque Malaysia 18 April 
2013. 
added to them. Ustaz Azhar Tuarno, Imam of the National Mosque, pointed out 
that he has received some complaints from the members of the public that the 
sermons favour UMNO. There is some truth in these complaints. To illustrate, 
on the 12 April 2013, JAKIM issued a Friday sermon entitled Menepati Janji, 
Membawa Harapan (Fulfilling Promises, Bringing Hope). The title (and the 
contents) of the sermon resembled UMNO's manifesto Janji Ditepati for the 
13th general elections which was held on 5 May 2013. 
Apart from JAKIM, the study focuses on IKIM because it hosts regular 
discussions with muftis and JAKIM o f f i c i a l s . E s t a b l i s h e d on 18 February 
1992, IKIM's main function is to develop better Islamic understanding through 
research, publications, and conferences. IKIM's vision is to be an institution of 
excellence in the planning and execution of organised programs and in raising 
Islamic awareness. Its aims are to promote the universal values of Islam among 
both Muslims and non-Muslims (IKIM, 2012). Mehden (2013), however, sees 
IKIM as an intellectual vehicle for the UMNO interpretation of Islam as it falls 
directly under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office. IKIM runs radio-
stations IKIM.fm, for example, which feature Islamic programs and "Islamic" 
entertainment. IKIM also facilitates discussions among official ulema towards 
standardising fatwas across the religious councils (IKIM, 2012). The Director for 
the Centre of the study of Shariah, Law and Politics for IKIM, Dr Wan Azhar 
Wan Ahmad, pointed out 
Another sermon on 29 November 2013 was given the title Virus Syiah (Shia Virus) This too 
has a political slant to it. Throughout the 2013 election campaign, UMNO members were 
accusing PAS of promoting Shiism (Norshahril, 2014, p. 363). 
Interview with Dr Wan Azhar Wan Ahmad, Director for the Study of Shariah Law and 
Politics, IKIM, 7 May 2013. 
Our task is to provide better understanding of religion. We do not liave the 
stature of the muftis. We are not the religious councils of each negeri. IKIM 
does not come up with fatwas... But we oversee the religious media— we have 
radio, newspapers, we can also call for a meeting of the muftis, organise 
conventions for all the religious council members. We wanted to standardise the 
fatwa for all states. Hence, IKIM has become a secretariat."' 
The creation of institutions such as JAKIM and IKIM to support the MKI shows 
how Malaysian official ulema institutions are better co-ordinated than 
Indonesia's. According to Marina Mahathir, a civil rights activist and a board 
member of SIS (Sisters in Islam) 
You have to look at the religious infrastructure in Indonesia and here 
(Malaysia). Because I do feel that [the religious infrastructure] in Malaysia is 
more pervasive and better funded. In Indonesia I think it is a pretty marginalised 
part of the bureaucracy. Now we [in Malaysia] are making fatwas on yoga. Our 
religious bureaucracy is far larger than theirs [in Indonesia]. And plus, the state 
religious departments in every state comes under the sultan."" 
Ratna Osman, SIS Executive Director, echoes Marina's point on the 
pervasiveness of Islamisation in Malaysia. Ratna remarked 
[With] JAKIM, JAIS (Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor or Selangor Islamic 
Religious Department), the state religious departments, there is an effort to 
penetrate the very personal details of your life they want to control. They also 
control what you eat, what you drink, even to the fact that water also has a halal 
logo. Canned fruits have to have a halal logo. It is a business."® 
The above discussion demonstrates how the role of JKF-MKI is reinforced by 
Mahathir's Islamisation drive of the 1980s and 1990s. As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, Mahathir undertook Islamisation to contain the growth of 
Islamic resurgence. JAKIM and IKIM, among the other institutions established 
by Mahathir, to co-opt the ulema to support UMNO. JAKIM provides the muftis 
with alternative platforms to influence the state's policies and society, apart from 
Interview with Dr Wan Azhar Wan Ahmad, 7 May 2013. 
Interview with Marina Mahathir, Board Member, Sisters in Islam, 7 February 2013. 
Interview with Ratna Osman, Executive Director, Sisters in Islam, 7 February 2013. 
the platforms available to them by the negeri religious councils. In addition, 
JAKIM and IKIM portray the JKF-MKI's fatwas as "consensus" among 
Malaysian muftis and act as advisors to the Malaysian King, the Council of 
Rulers, the Federal Government, and the federal courts (Arik Sanusi, 2010, p. 
77). They organise meetings and conferences to synchronise negeri religious 
council fatwas. JKF-MKI members and representatives from the negeri attend 
these meetings. In Islamic jurisprudence, a consensus on a religious issue is 
accepted as the third source of Islamic law after the Quran and Sunnah. 
Conclusion: Are MUl and MKI comparable? 
The core issues discussed in this chapter are the origins, structures and 
functions of contemporary official ulema institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The chapter has also described how leaders and members of these institutions 
are appointed. The discussion of the contemporary status of these institutions is 
relevant for the discussion in the next chapter, where the political and social 
context of their formation will be discussed. Suharto and Mahathir devised co-
optation strategies—which ulema institutions are part of—to manage the Islamic 
resurgence movement as well as religious cleavages in their societies. 
Undeniably, the official ulema institutions in the two countries have many 
differences. The preceding sections show that MUl and MKI (especially JKF-
MKI) have different origins, membership compositions, and levels of state-
funding. MKI was formed as a Malaysian government initiative with the support 
of the Council of Rulers. MUl, on the other hand, was solely the Suharto 
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government's brainchild. Politicians play an important part in the MKI, while in 
MUl, the ulema make up the majority of members. During the New Order 
period, politicians also occupied important positions in IVIUI though this is no 
longer the case in the post-New Order period. The IVIalaysian state also 
equipped JKF-MKI with effective supporting institutions JAKIM and IKIM, while 
MUl has to source most of its funds externally of the state. 
Despite these differences, I argue that MUl and MKI also have many similarities 
that mal<e the two institutions comparable. The aspects I am comparing will help 
answer the study's central questions on capture and co-optation dynamics. 
First, both MUl and MKI are Islamic institutions that host their country's national 
fatwa-making bodies. Unlike in many other Islamic countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Brunei, Indonesia does not have a grand mufti. 
While there are many muftis in Malaysia, fatwas at the national level are issued 
collectively by the JKF-MKI members. Thus, the fatwa bodies in MUl and MKI 
replace the role played by grand muftis in other Islamic countries. Comparing 
these fatwa-making bodies is useful because official ulema use them as 
vehicles to dominate religious debates. Fatwas serve as one of the important 
tools for state capture. 
Second, members of these two institutions claim to represent the various 
Islamic groups or communities of their respective countries. They also claim 
that opinions issued through these platforms signify the consensus of ulema in 
their respective countries. MUl ulema claim to represent their ormas. Indeed, 
they claim that MUl is a "big tent" representing all the major ormas in Indonesia. 
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According to MUl secretary, Isa Anshary, "MUl's chairman and vice-chairman 
are from NU and Muhammadiyah. So MUl is the umbrella organisation for all 
organisations in Indonesia. We serve as a platform for discussion. MUl is a 
platform on which ulema and intellectuals discuss i ssues .S im i la r l y , MKI has 
representation of the muftis from the various negeri. All 14 Malaysian muftis 
participate in the JKF-MKI. According to Kelantan mufti Mohammad Shukri, the 
JKF-MKI gives this single opinion that reduces the possibility of any tension 
within the religious community. He said, "We [in the MKI] don't want a small 
country such as Malaysia to have too many [different] opinions on a single 
i s s u e . H i s attitude is different from Islam's position, which holds that 
difference of opinion is a norm. 
Therefore, although representation is manifest differently in MUl and MKI, the 
ulema who participate in them would point out that their fatwas represent 
consensus of the various religious authorities in Indonesian and Malaysian 
society. How is this claim relevant in our analysis of capture and co-optation 
dynamics? The official ulema use the notion of "consensus" to deter rival ulema 
from claiming rights to religious authority. In Islamic jurisprudence, consensus 
among Muslim scholars (or ijtima') is the third source of Islamic law after the 
Quran and the prophet's Sunnah. Ulema will first find rulings from the Quran 
and Sunnah, and if no clear verses exist, they will quote from the majority 
opinions of past religious scholars. Also, with unity, they can make stronger 
Interview with Isa Anshary, 6 December 2012. 
Interview with Mohammad Shukri, 7 April 2013. Mohammad Shukri however commented that 
most of the local issues are discussed at the local level, and not many of these issues are 
brought to the JKF-MKI. In some instances, the JKF-MKI did adopt some of the issues raised by 
the negeri religious councils. For example, the Religious Council in Kelantan discussed whether 
marriage solemnization through video calls is permissible. This issue was taken up to the JKF-
MKI. 
demands on the state, which later translate into other capture objectives such 
as affecting distribution of resources, influencing appointments, and dominating 
the discourse. 
Third, both institutions were formed at around the same period and were later 
used for similar political purposes by their respective leaders. In Indonesia, 
Suharto declared his intention to form MUl in 1970, though it was only formed in 
1975 (Departemen Penerangan Rl, 1985, p.15). In Malaysia, the MKI was 
formed in 1968 and the JKF-IVIKI in 1970. MKI was formed under a relatively 
open government led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, while MUl under the 
authoritarian New Order regime. However, by the 1980s, both Indonesian and 
Malaysian states were using the two institutions for similar purposes. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, these institutions were made to suit Suharto's and 
Mahathir's authoritarian, industrialisation and Islamic agendas. 
Fourth, I will be comparing departments within MUl and MKI that carry out 
similar roles and functions. The study focusses on two to three departments 
within the two institutions that undertake comparable activities. One, I will 
compare the prominent leaders of the two institutions. For MUl, they are 
members of the Leadership Board while for JKF-MKI, they are muftis, JAKIM, 
and IKIM leaders. Two, the fatwa bodies within the two institutions will be 
examined. For MUl, I will focus on the Fatwa Commission; and for MKI the JKF-
MKI. Three, I will compare departments that oversee shariah economics and 
halal certification. Hence for MUl, I will examine DSN-MUl and LPPOM-MUl; 
and for MKI, JAKIM and IKIM. Four, I am comparing departments that help 
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fatwa research. The MUl Fatwa Commission undertakes most of its own 
research with the help of its research commission, in contrast, JAKIIVl and IKIIVI 
assisted the JKF-IVIKI and negeri religious departments for fatwa research, and 
in conducting seminars and conferences. The table below sums which the 
bodies within MUl and MKI are responsible for fatwa-making, fatwa research, 
shariah economics, halal certification. These bodies are selected so that 
aspects of comparisons are standardised. 
Table 1. Comparing MUl and MKI 
Aspects of Comparison MUl MKI 
Personalities Members of MUl 
Leadership Board 
Muftis and JAKIM 
leaders 
Fatwa-Making Body 
MUl Fatwa Commission 
JKF-MKI 
Fatwa-Research 
JAKIM and IKIM Shariah Economics DSN-MUl 
Halal certification LPPOM-MUl 
In short, comparing the two institutions would allow one to evaluate how official 
ulema used their state-bestowed privileged positions to full advantage. This 
core issue will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven where I examine their 
ability to capture their respective states. State capture exists at the local levels, 
and based on existing works, the further the social actors function from the 
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centre, the higher the degree of capture. This study examines capture in the 
states' capital cities. 
Ill 
Chapter Four 
The roots of state co-optation: Managing 
Islamic resurgence and religious cleavages 
From the 1970s, there was a rise in piety among Muslims in Indonesia and 
IVlalaysia. Scholars attributed this phenomenon to the Islamic resurgence 
movement, which strived to strengthen Islam in all aspects of life (Chandra, 
1987, p. 2). Suharto was already Indonesia's president then, and Malaysia was 
ruled by Abdul Razak Hussein (1971-1976) and Hussein Onn (1976-1981). By 
the time Mahathir was appointed as Malaysia's prime minister in 1981, the 
Islamic resurgence movement had grown greatly in size and influence. 
I contend that Suharto and Mahathir systematically co-opted ulema and Muslim 
intellectuals into state-sponsored institutions in order to contain and draw the 
Muslim resurgence movement to their political cause. The two leaders feared 
that the ulema and intellectuals were capable of attracting mass following and 
galvanising Islamic political parties to challenge the government. They were 
also concerned that the movement's demands, which included an Islamic state 
and shariah laws among other things, could create dangerous tensions in 
Indonesia's and Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. The 
movement was so vocal and organised that Suharto and Mahathir did concede 
to some aspects of their demands. They initiated major Islamic policies such as 
establishing Islamic banks, building mosques, elevating the status of Islamic 
courts, passing shariah-based statutes, and creating ulema institutions 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Another reason why Suharto and Mahathir co-opted the ulema and intellectuals 
was to manage religious divisions in their respective societies. Muslims in 
Indonesia were split between the traditionalists (represented mainly by NU) and 
modernists (represented largely by Muhammadiyah), with the former being 
more hostile towards Suharto's a g e n d a . T h u s , Suharto mainly designed his 
co-optation strategy to contain NU. On the other hand, Malaysia in the 1980s 
witnessed a growing number of ulema inclined to Islamist ideas (to be 
discussed shortly). These ulema either joined PAS or participated in dakwah 
(the call to spread the message of Islam), and their ideas challenged UMNO's 
ethnic-based Islam and ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The two leaders' 
co-optation strategies serve two purposes: to bridge differences in the 
community and to destabilise Islamic opposition by splitting them further. 
In the following sections, I first examine the origins of the Islamic resurgence 
movement, including the international and local factors that led to its 
emergence. This will be followed by a discussion on religious cleavages in both 
countries. An analysis of Islamic resurgence and religious cleavages is 
necessary as it is relevant for the discussion in the following chapter. I argue 
that these two factors contributed to the two leaders' contrasting motivations for 
co-optation, as well as the methods used to achieve it. Discussing the ideas 
promoted by the Muslim resurgence movement serves another important 
purpose. The ideas championed by the movement mirror the discourse of the 
contemporary official ulema, and the requests they are making today, which 
' The traditionalists are also represented by groups NahdIatuI Wathon and Washliyah. 
include promoting shariah economics, shariah consumption certification, 
shariah tourism, and shariah entertainment. 
Islamic Resurgence: An "Islamic" alternative to Westernisation 
To understand the origins of Islamic resurgence in the 1970s, it is necessary to 
appreciate the factors that gave rise to societal piety in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Azhar (2014, p. 35) describes the phenomenon as involving "many 
unconnected groups of Muslims determined to ensure particular types of Islamic 
identity and integrity are secured and enhanced in the midst of modern social 
life."^^® Other terms that have been used to describe the Islamic resurgence are: 
"re-flowering" of Islam (Nagata, 1984); dakwah movement (Zainah, 1987); 
Islamism (Ahmad Fauzi, 2008; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005); tarbiyah (Ismatu, 2007; 
Machmudi, 2008); Islamic re-awakening (Stark, 2004); and Islamic revivalism 
(Azhar, 2014; Hussin, 1993; Schwarz, 1999). The discourse promoted by the 
Muslim resurgence was largely conservative, and its outward form was dakwah 
organisations. 
However, the movement was not a homogenous entity with clear leadership 
and organisational structure. These dakwah groups were competing with one 
another and their approach to realise this grand Islamic alternative vision 
differed widely. Some pushed strongly for the establishment of an Islamic state, 
while others called for the formation of new Islamic institutions and mosques; 
revision of existing laws deemed "secular"; promotion of dakwah to raise 
personal piety and spirituality through; creation of business enterprises in the 
Azhar used the term Islamic revivalism to describe the phenomenon. 
name of Islam; or a combination of the foregoing. These ideas later penetrated 
the political parties, ormas, and campus societies. The study defines groups 
championing for Islamic state and shariah laws as the Islamist stream of the 
movement. Some scholars would use terms "fundamentalist" or "utopianist" 
(Shaharuddin, 2005). Liow (2009), however, argues that Islamists are 
differentiated from fundamentalists even though both groups desire to return to 
the "golden age" of Islam. He argues that Islamism is political in nature while 
fundamentalism is not necessarily so (p.6). The study applies the term 
"Islamism" to describe groups that desire for Islamic state and comprehensive 
implementation of shariah law. 
Global factors 
The Islamic resurgence movement resulted from a general sense of 
"victimhood" that originated in the following historical episodes: the fall of the 
Ottoman Caliphate in the 1920s; the first and second world wars; the creation of 
the state of Israel in 1948; and the invasions of superpowers into Muslim lands 
during the cold war (1945-1991). In 1923, the last Islamic caliphate, the 
Ottoman Empire, collapsed. The problems facing the Islamic world were 
exacerbated in 1948 when the state of Israel was created. The resurgence 
movement saw the creation of Israel as an encroachment on Jerusalem, Islam's 
third holiest city. In 1967, the Israeli army extended its control to include Golan 
Heights, Mount Sinai, and the West Bank in Palestine after defeating Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria in the Six Days War. Throughout the Cold War (1947-1991), 
the resurgence movement was never convinced that the United States and 
Soviet Union were earnest in resolving the problems of the Islamic world. In 
1979, they were incensed and outraged when the Soviet Union invaded 
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Afghanistan. This invasion triggered an exodus of Muslim j ihadi fighters, 
including those from Indonesia and Malaysia, to Afghanistan.''^" In 1990, the US 
invaded Iraq in the first Gulf War. This invasion further fanned the movement's 
anger towards the West. It follows then that perceptions of "Western 
conspiracy" towards Islam were constantly repeated in the resurgence 
movement's discourse throughout the Islamic world (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the Iranian revolution in 1979 gave the movement hope. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, a 77-year old Shia cleric, led a revolution that toppled 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah (King) of Iran and a staunch supporter of 
the US. The movement was inspired by the fact that an ulema could be the 
agent of change and social revolution. As the revolution unfolded, some 
Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims went to Iran to see first-hand the political 
developments in this country. During my fieldwork, Syeikh Abdul Halim, the 
patron of PUM (Persatuan Ulema Malaysia or Ulama Council of Malaysia), and 
former Terengganu mufti, shared his eyewitness accounts of the Iranian 
r e v o l u t i o n . H e went there to learn more about Shia dakwah programmes, and 
brought back Shia reading materials including the Shia Quranic exegesis Tafsir 
Tabataba-I. The Iranian revolution later inspired the ulema to take control of 
PAS in the 1980s. Yusof Rawa, who was president of the PAS at that time, 
acknowledged the significance of Iranian revolution to PAS's struggle from the 
1980s onwards. He saw the Iranian ulema as representing the grievances of his 
In fact, these experienced freedom fighters came bacl< to Southeast Asia and participated in 
terrorist networks such as the Jl (Jemaah Islamiah) in the 1990s. There is a vast amount of 
literature and field of study that examines the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia that this study 
does not seek to discuss. For instance, see (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005). 
Abdul Halim confesses that he continues to have ties with the Iranian leaders to this day 
particularly with the generation that together participated in the revolution Interview with the 
Syeikh Abdul Halim Abdul Kadir, Patron of the Persatuan Ulema Malaysia (PUM) and former 
mufti of Terengganu, 26 December 2012. 
people and wanted PAS ulema to ennulate their struggle (Liow, 2009, p. 
Azyumardi (2005, p.8) also states that since the revolution, a number of 
Indonesian students became interested to learn about Shiism even though they 
did not necessarily converted to the sect. They travelled to Iran and brought 
back reading materials on the sect. 
The Islamic resurgence movement struggled for the creation of an alternative 
Islamic political, social, and economic order based on the Quranic verse "Islam 
as a way of life" or "Islam as Ad-Deen " They hoped that their struggle would 
lead to the formation of an Islamic state, the establishment of Islamic banking 
and finance, the introduction of Islamic systems and institutions, and the 
promulgation of Islamic arts and culture.' '" The movement also called on 
Muslims to adopt an all-inclusive commitment to their faith. Their discourse was 
filled with anti-Western rhetoric, which later often led to exclusivist and anti-
pluralistic orientations, such as denying the rights of religious minorities to 
practise their faith freely. Their call for an alternative Islamic society was 
extended to aspects such as attire, hobbies, and habits. Many Muslim youths 
expressed their unhappiness with Western pop music, dancers, drama and 
films, which were regarded as "promoting decadent indulgences" (Chandra, 
1987, p. 4). 
Besides Iran, the resurgence movement in Indonesia and Malaysia also looked 
at how dakwah was organised in other Islamic countries in the Middle East. 
Indonesian and Malaysian dakwah groups established ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt; the Jamaat Tabligh (or Tabligh movement) in India; and 
A section of PAS members were accused as Shias (Norshahril, 2014, p. 363). 
These demands will be clearly showcased in Chapters Six and Seven as part of the capture 
aims by the official ulema. 
Jamaat Islami in Pakistan. The Muslim Brotherhood was the most widely 
followed and the dakwah groups in Indonesia and Malaysia copied aspects of 
its organisation, social welfare programs and other economic activities. They 
were also attracted to Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in building mosques, 
schools, and medical clinics (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005, p. 14). The writings of two 
Muslim Brotherhood's ideologue, Hassan Al-Banna (b.1906-d.1949) and Syed 
Qutb (b.1906-d.1966), were widely circulated among the resurgence circles 
especially in university campuses. The Muslim Brotherhood was so influential 
that Islamic study groups in Indonesia, also known as the Tarbiyah, modelled 
their movement after it. The Tarbiyah was interested in moulding the Muslim 
community back to the original Islamic sources, and "perfecting" the Muslims' 
individual character (Machmudi, 2008). These Tarbiyah groups later helped to 
establish a Islamist political party, the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or 
Prosperous Justice Party) (Bruinessen, 2013, p. 29). 
Local factors 
Local political and social developments in Indonesia and Malaysia also 
contributed to the rise of Islamic resurgence. First, the movement had to be 
understood as a post-colonial phenomenon. Citizens in both countries, 
especially the Muslims, wished to assert their identity, which was, to some 
degree, subjugated during the western colonial rule. According to Chandra 
(2002, p. 219), during the Islamic resurgence period, the dakwah groups called 
on Malaysians to establish a "unique" civilisation that rejected western 
domination and control. He also recalled how Muslims displayed their 
commitment towards Islam by sticking on their cars' windscreens labels that 
said the "Quran is the answer, Islam is the best, and Islam is all encompassing." 
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Second, citizens from both countries were recovering from major conflicts and 
facing several nation-building challenges. In the 1970s, Malaysia just 
recuperating from the bloody 13 May 1969 racial riots. The Malays and 
Bumiputeras (Indigenous comunities) continued to form a large part of the 
underclass. Comparably, Indonesia too was facing its own set of nation-
building challenges. The country was recovering from a leadership transition 
after a military coup in 1965. In addition, the Suharto government also had to 
deal with widespread rebellions and insurgents. Between the 1970s and 2005, 
the government was confronted with the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh 
Movement or GAM). Suharto was committed to reunite a diverse nation after all 
these conflicts that arose during Sukarno's rule (1949-1966).^^'' 
Third, Suharto's and Mahathir's industrialisation and foreign policies also 
contributed to the resurgence movement's anti-western sentiments and desire 
to create an Islamic alternative to the West. Both leaders wanted to strengthen 
their ties with the Asian economic powerhouses such as South Korea and 
Japan. In the 1980s, the economies of both countries shifted from agricultural 
and import-substitution to export-oriented. In the 1990s, Mahathir introduced the 
"Look East Policy" and was active in the Asian Values debate. 
Fourth, Islamic resurgence occurred within the context of Indonesia's and 
Malaysia's rapid economic growth and urbanisation. Both Suharto and Mahathir 
One of them was the Darul Islam Rebellion, which took place in different parts of Indonesia 
and in some instances was not related to one another. The rebellion in West Jawa was led by 
Kartosuwirjo, declaring West Jawa as an Islamic state. In South Sulawesi, an army rebel Kahar 
Muzakkar led a rebellion and joined the Darul Islam movement in 1951. In Aceh, there was the 
Darul Islam rebellion, which was separatist in nature. The Aceh Darul Islam movement was led 
by Daud Beureur'eh. 
brought immense economic progress to their respective countries. Under 
Suharto, Indonesia experienced significant reduction of poverty, and saw a 
marked improvement in infrastructure, health and medical services, which gave 
rise to the emergence of a strong middle class (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 5). 
For three decades (1965-1997), Indonesia's economy grew on average five per 
cent per annum. The same can be said about Mahathir's contribution to 
Malaysia's economy. Mahathir's industrialisation drive elevated Malaysia to be 
one of the Asia's emerging economies in the 1990s. Malaysia's GDP growth 
was at high levels of 9.5 per cent in 1995 and 8.2 per cent in 1996, before the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (Milne & Mauzy, 1999, p. 74). 
Indonesia's and Malaysia's economic growth resulted in the creation of new 
aspirations, habits and consumption patterns. It also led to rapid urbanisation 
and the expansion of the new middle-class. Workers and students from the 
villages migrated to the urban areas seeking employment and education 
respectively. Urbanisation uprooted these villagers, forcing them to leave their 
communities and adapt to modern social lifestyles. The adjustments these 
villagers had to make also created a sense of insecurity among them and they 
saw religion as a panacea to this spiritual emptiness. This explains why Islamic 
resurgence discourse had the greatest impact in the urban cities such as 
Jakarta, Bandung, and Kuala Lumpur. In Indonesia, the ITB (Bandung Institute 
of Technology) which is located in Bandung, became the centre for dakwah 
activities. ITB students later relocated their dakwah activities to the Salman 
Mosque after Suharto banned all forms of political activity on campuses 
(Schwarz, 1999, p. 174). According to Vatikiotis (1998, p. 129), places such as 
the Salman Mosque became the ground for the expression of "political 
dissatisfaction and frustration." Activities at the Salman Mosque included 
discussions of serious issues centring on Muslim development and Islam's 
place in it. The resurgence movement also utilised pop culture in their preaching 
to attract youths to join their ranks (Hefner, 2000, p. 123). Similarly in Malaysia, 
university campuses in Kuala Lumpur, such as UM (University of Malaya), UKM 
(National University of Malaysia), and MUM (International Islamic University of 
Malaysia), became the centre for dakwah activities. The cohort that graduated 
from these Indonesian and Malaysian universities are appointed in key positions 
in the state today. 
Dakwah groups and their ideologues 
The resurgence period saw the proliferation of dakwah groups and charismatic 
leaders. Those groups and leaders aligned to the state's ideology were invited 
to participate in state's co-optation institutions. Conversely, leaders and 
organisations who were hostile to the state's ideology were either pressured to 
conform or faced marginalisation or banning. In Malaysia, one such 
organisation that was banned was the Darul Arqam movement led by Ustaz 
Ashaari Muhammad (b.1937-d.2010). Ashaari's views were largely anti-West 
and he went so far as to call for Western philosophies such as communism, 
socialism, and capitalism to be countered and defeated (Ahmad Fauzi, 2005; 
Ashaari, 1990, p. 74).^^® For Darul Arqam members, the desire to live in an 
Islamic way of life extended to the realm of culture and family life. For instance, 
Darul Arqam women wore the niqab, a black dress or gown which covers the 
The differences in tlieology colour the state-Darul Arqam relations in the 1990s, which 
eventually led to the letter's banning. Although the Malaysian government portrayed the ideas 
and manners that Darul Arqam were striving for as antithetical to modern life, the government 
did not condemn Darul Arqam's underlying philosophy to create an Islamic alternative to the 
Western way of life. For an account of the ideological differences between the government and 
Darul Arqam, see Ahmad Fauzi, 2005. 
whole body except the eyes and hands (Camroax, 1996); while the men wore 
the jubbah (Arabic style garnnent) and pony-tailed skull cap (Norshahril, 2012a). 
At its peak, the movement had a membership as high as 10, 000 (Camroax, 
1996). In 1994, the government banned the movement and detained Ashaari.^^® 
After Ashaari was detained, the movement split into several smaller groups; 
some of its members went on to become notable university academics while 
others ventured into businesses (such as Rufaqa Corporation Sdn Bhd) or 
became recording artists, singers and musicians in Islamic boy bands such as 
Raihan and Rabbani. In June 2011, former women members of the movement 
formed the Obedient Wife's Club, which advocates that having more filial and 
devoted wives could reduce marriage problems, infidelity, and domestic 
violence. These splinter groups demonstrated how Ashaari's enthusiasm to 
create an "Islamic alternative" has remained strong among Darul Arqam's 
former members. 
Besides Ashaari, another key ideologue of the Malaysian resurgence movement 
was Professor Naquib Al-Attas. ABIM members considered Al-Attas as their 
mentor. Compared to Ashaari, Al-Attas had fewer followers. However, his 
writings remain influential to this day and continue to be read by undergraduate 
students. In the 1980s, Al-Attas was the Dean of the faculty of Arts in DM 
(Norshahril, 2012a; Zainah, 1987). It is during this period that he mentored 
campus dakwah leaders, and one of them was Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar was 
former president of ABIM who later became Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister. 
Although the Malaysian government portrayed the ideas and manners that Darul Arqam 
were striving for as antithetical to modem life, the government did not condemn Darul Arqam's 
underlying philosophy to create an Islamic altemative to the Western way of life For an account 
of the ideological differences between the government and Darul Arqam, see Ahmad Fauzi 
2005. 
Siddiq Fadhil, who became the ABIM president after Anwar concurred about Al-
Attas's role in mentoring dakwah leaders 
I have to admit that I benefitted much by studying under Professor Syed Naquib 
Al-Attas. A lot of new things I have learnt and they include the role of Islam in 
Malay history and Malay culture. I really became enlightened. The role of Islam 
is often belittled by the Orientalists because they wanted to highlight the role of 
the West. So Islam's role is seen as less important, even though Islam builds 
the Malay race, not the West. The West came later, but it did not build the 
Malay identity. Apart from this, there are other issues such as contemporary 
thought, secularism, and education. These things enlightened me. ' " 
Al-Attas often generously hosted students for discussions at his office or home. 
His most important contribution to the movement was his book Islam and 
Secularism. Published in 1978, the book called on Muslims to "de-westernise 
knowledge" (Al-Attas, 1978). In the book, Al-Attas portrayed the West as a 
"civilisation in decline, materialistic and this-worldly." Moreover, he regarded 
Western thought and philosophy as conflicting with Islamic thought. Being Al-
Attas's student, Siddiq's writings in the 1980s expressed the same distrust 
towards western institutions and knowledge. According to Siddiq, 
Under the Western secular laws, the world is getting less safe. It's about time 
the world accepts Islamic laws in order to recover peace and human 
civilisation ... Islamic laws not only punish, but they are educative in nature. 
Islamic laws are equipped with moral values, unlike secular laws, which are 
devoid of morality to the extent that there can be a situation where one's deed 
is legally right but morally wrong. The implementation of Islamic laws will 
facilitate a more substantive Islamisation process which forms the basis for 
human transformation- in building an ummat in realising Islamisation (Siddiq, 
1989, pp. 160-162). 
Al-Attas's ideas have been construed later by his students to promote the 
Islamisation of the economy through Islamic finances, banking, and insurance, 
as well as Islamisation of the state, law and education (Norshahril, 2012a). 
Interestingly, the current ABIM vice-president, Jufitri Johar, has said that the 
Interview with Dato' Dr Siddiq Fadzil President of Kolej Daral al-Hikmah, 24 April 2013. He 
was also the former president of ABIM from 1982 to 1991. 
organisation's current leaders continue to consult Al-Attas who conducts 
fortnightly lectures at the Mara Technological University (UTM).^^® 
While Al-Attas acted as the ideologue for Malaysian dakwah activism, 
Imaduddin Abdul Rahim was his counterpart in Indonesia. He was an 
engineering lecturer from the ITB. In the 1970s, Imaduddin came to Malaysia to 
teach at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Malaysian Technological University 
or UTM). This was where he was exposed to Muslim Brotherhood's teachings. 
He also conducted a series of small discussion groups on Malaysian campuses 
on how youths could lead an Islamic way of life and follow the teachings of the 
Quran. Imaduddin's presence in Malaysia facilitated the exchange of ideas 
between university students from the two countries. Imaduddin helped to 
establish a strong network between ABIM and the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam or Muslim Tertiary Students Association) in Indonesia. In return, ABIM 
organised many student exchange programs to universities in Jakarta and 
Bandung, where they learnt from the Indonesians how to transform ideas and 
thoughts in action. 
During this period, the Tarbiyah members in Indonesia felt they were making a 
new world and the Quran and Sunnah could provide the answers to Muslims 
predicament. They felt that Islam could make Indonesia a better place. The 
movement gained strength in the early 1980s in campuses, in the context of the 
state banning all form of political activities on campuses. Members of the 
movement would divide themselves into groups of five to ten people and 
conduct prayers, zikir (remembrance of good), and Quran recitation together. 
interview with Jufitri Johar, ABIM Vice -President. Email Interview 11 June 2013 
The movement later expanded, and the followers conducted meetings more 
frequently from house to house, in each of these meetings, an uiema will deliver 
a lecture (Ismatu, 2007, pp.131-132). 
In the mid-1980s, the state formed the LDK (Lembaga Dai<wah Kampus or 
Campus Dal<wah Body) to oversee Islamic societies in campuses such as 
Salam Ul (University Indonesia); Salman ITB (Bandung Technological Institute); 
and JS UGiVI (Gajah Mada University). The Tarbiyah movement was well 
organised that it dominated the body, which allowed its members to have closer 
access to the state. Modelling the organisation after the Islamic Brotherhood, 
the Tarbiyah laid down several l<ey tenets of the movement. It felt that only a 
return to the model the Prophet Muhammad and his disciples created would 
ensure Indonesian Muslims progress. Followers were encouraged to carry out 
religious rituals such as prayers, fasting, and Quranic recitation: to strengthen 
one's belief; to request the state to build institutions in line with Islamic 
principles; to build economic infrastructure in line with Islamic teachings, and to 
foster strong sense of Islamic brotherhood among members (Ismatu, 2007, 
p.139).The Tarbiyah movement was less strict compared to Muhammadiyah 
and Persis; and it allowed sufi rituals purists would consider innovations. One 
Tarbiyah activist, Muslikh Abdul Karim, said that he continued to practice the 
tahlilan (special prayers for the deceased) after joining the movement 
(Machmudi, 2008, pp.63-64). Unlil<e the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia 
or Muslim Tertiary Students Association) members who were active in engaging 
intellectual discourses, the Tarbiyah was more concerned about building a 
moral individual {muwassafat) (p.63), even though they also discussed works by 
Hassan Al-Banna, Syed Qutb, and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. 
In short, the Islamic resurgence movement has to be understood both as a 
global and local phenomenon. In grappling with the problems of their respective 
societies, resurgence groups looked to the organisations from the Middle East 
for inspiration. While the Iranian revolution generated the zeal for change, the 
Muslim Brotherhood became the model for dakwah organisation. Mahathir and 
Suharto co-opted the ulema and intellectuals to contain the movement. 
However, both leaders also considered the long-held religious cleavages in 
designing their co-optations strategies. 
Religious cleavages in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Social cleavages refer to divisions that can be formed along the lines of social 
class, religious beliefs, ethnicity, geography (rural-urban), or political ideologies. 
These cleavages form the foundations of political parties, institutions, and 
associations. Although extensive studies exist on religious cleavages in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, it is still necessary to discuss their key traits in this 
study because they factor in Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies. As 
shall be elaborated in Chapter Five, I argue that Suharto and Mahathir 
capitalised on existing religious cleavages in designing the most effective co-
optation technique. 
The traditionalist-modernist cleavage in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the main religious cleavage lies between the traditionalists and 
modernists (works that have discussed this include Azyumardi, 2005; Fealy & 
Barton, 1996; Noer, 1973; Suzaina, 1999).^^® Traditionalists maintained that 
Islam should closely follow the legal opinions and traditions inherited by 
scholars and savants of the past. They did not deny that texts can be 
reinterpreted, but believed that the gates of ijtihad (independent judgement) 
have closed, and that opinions of the four classical schools of jurisprudence 
Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafii be adhered to closely. This means that no 
ijtihad can be carried out after almost a millennium. In Indonesia, the largest 
traditionalist organisation was NU which was formed in 1926, with the smaller 
ones being NahdIatuI Wathon and Washliyah. Modernists, on the other hand, 
were more cosmopolitan in their religious outlook and placed greater emphasis 
on reasoning. They believed that the Quran and the Sunnah should be 
constantly interpreted and re-interpreted based on the present context, and not 
be bounded by the schools of jurisprudence. Indonesian modernists were 
closely associated with the Muhammadiyah, which was founded in 1912 
(Means, 2009, p. 59), and the smaller organisations such as Persia (Persatuan 
Islam Indonesia or Islamic Association Indonesia) and Al-lrsyad Al-lslamiah. 
However, on aspects related to doctrines and rituals, Muhammadiyah members 
are conservatives (Azyumardi, 2005, p. 15). They questioned prevalent religious 
practices associated with the traditionalists such as idol worship, mysticism and 
innovations (bid'ah), which were seen as deviating from Islam's monotheism. 
In today's context, the traditionalists and modernists have converged in many 
areas, including matters on religious rituals and jurisprudence (Barton, 1995). 
NU and Muhammadiyah members interviewed during fieldwork said that they 
The term traditionalism and modernism tiave been applied differently by some scholars who 
have used these terms to distinguish thought styles. See Noor Aisha, 2004. 
had overcome differences on rituals in prayers, gravesite visit, and communal 
feasting (selamatan).^^° Nevertheless, there continues to be clashes between 
NU and Muhammadiyah during times of political crisis. Bush (2009) reckons 
that the traditionalist and modernist cleavage continues to shape contemporary 
Indonesian Muslims' public behaviour today. Even when given the opportunity 
to ally themselves with modernist Muslims to combat militancy in the context of 
post-9/11, according to Bush, NU activists are unable to overcome their deep 
hostility towards the modernists (p. 13). Conversely, the modernists continue to 
harbour distrusts towards NU members. 
In fact, NU and Muhammadiyah leaders continue to disagree on the correct 
method of determining the important religious holidays and festivals in Islam. 
Muhammadiyah leaders relied solely of astronomical calculations (hilal) 
whereas NU members followed the traditional sighting of the crescent moon 
(ru'yah) method. In 2007, followers of the two organisations began their fasting 
(in the month of Ramadhan) and celebrated Eidulfitri (a day commemorating the 
end of fasting in Islam) on different days. Muhammadiyah members celebrated 
Eidulfitri to be on the 12 October while NU on the 11 October. In July 2012, 
Muhammadiyah boycotted the Istinbat meeting (a meeting with government 
officials along with NU to determine the date for Bid), because the government 
insisted on using the ru'yah method (Nadirsyah, 2012, p. 11). In 2013, 
Muhammadiyah followers began their fasting on 9 July, whereas the NU 
followers started theirs on the 8 July. 
These views were expressed by both NU and Muhammadiyah members in MUl Thev 
include Amirsyah, Ma'ruf Amin, Isa Anshary, and Al<bar Kurniawan. 
It is important to understand these contestations between NU and 
Muhammadiyah because Suharto favoured the modernists, and his policies 
were often directed at weakening the influence of the traditionalists. Ricklefs 
characterises Suharto's policies as a "modernist-led Islamisation" (Ricklefs, 
2012, pp. 185-186).''^^ This so-called modernist "favouritism" had a bearing on 
Suharto's choice of leaders for the Islamic institutions he created. Suharto, his 
ministers, and state officials also Intervened NU's internal affairs In order to 
weaken the organisation internally. Suharto's interference in NU's elections was 
evident in the 1984 MUNAS (Musyawarah Nasional or National Congress). 
During that MUNAS, NU was split into the "Cipete" and the pro-Khittah factions. 
The Cipete faction wanted NU to remain as a political party in PPP while the 
pro-Khittah faction, led by Abdurrahman Wahid, wanted NU to cease its 
involvement in PPP and return to the organisation's founding objectives as a 
non-political religious organisation. Consistent with his views that Islamic 
organisations should be politically compliant, Suharto lent his support to the pro-
Khittah faction. Abdurrahman's faction won the contest and NU left PPP. 
During the 1994 MUNAS, Suharto again exploited the internal divisions within 
NU for his government's gain. This time, Suharto wanted to topple Abdurahman 
Wahid for being overly critical of his presidency (Suzalna, 1999, pp. 308-
313)."^ He backed Abu Hasan, Chalid Mawardi, and Fahmi Syaifuddin, who 
were Abdurrahman Wahid's challengers for NU's leadership posts. The three 
This is not to suggest, however, that Suharto favoured all forms of modernism. He restricted 
the political role of former Masyumi members who had in the past struggled for a Islamist brand 
of modernism. 
Some members of the state however supported Abdurrahman Wahid's candidacy. Amongst 
those who supported Abdurrahman Wahid were State Secretary Moerdiono, Edy Sudrajat and 
Try Sutrisno (Suzaina, 1999, p. 309) 
challengers formed the Asal Bukan Gus Dur (Anyone except Gus Dur) camp 
(Fealy, 1996, p.261). Suharto's campaign failed, and Abdurrahman Wahid 
retained his position as NU chairman. Yet, Suharto continued to encourage Abu 
Hasan to stage a struggle for the leadership within NU (Barton, 2002, p. 210). 
Abdurrahman Wahid's loyalists admitted that Suharto acted as the dalang or 
shadow puppeteer in wanting to oust the NU Chairman from power (Suzaina, 
1999, pp. 318-319). 
The traditionalist-modernists cleavage is also played out in contemporary MUl. 
For example, representatives from NU and Muhammadiyah in MUl blame one 
another for the controversial 2005 SIPILIS fatwa. Liberal Indonesian scholars 
have condemned the fatwa as conservative and embarrassing to IVIUI. They 
regarded the fatwa as a step back for a progressive Islamic country such as 
Indonesia. When the fatwa was issued. Din Syamsuddin was concurrently 
Muhammadiyah Chairman and MUl Vice-Chairman. The fatwa, however, was 
signed and endorsed by NU leaders Sahal Mahfudz and Ichwan Sam. Back in 
2005, Sahal concurrently held the positions of NU's Rois Am Syuriyah 
(President) and MUl Chairman. Ichwan Sam, a senior NU leader, was MUl's 
Secretary General then. Muhammadiyah members felt that Din Syamsuddin 
should not be held accountable for the controversial fatwa, and that NU leaders 
in MUl should be held responsible instead. Abdul Mu'ti, secretary of 
Muhammadiyah Central Board, remarked "The ones who endorsed the fatwa in 
MUl are Kiai Sahal and Pak Ichwan Sam. It is not fair [to blame Din 
Syamsuddin]. Why only blame Muhammadiyah members? Ma'aruf Amin [key 
MUl leader] is also from NU.""^ On the other hand, Imdadun Rahmat, NU's 
vice-secretary general, said that NU should not be implicated for any of MUl's 
decisions, even though NU's leaders are represented in the institution."'' 
In brief, the traditionalist-modernist cleavage played an important role in 
Suharto's co-optation strategy. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Suharto 
sought to smooth over these cleavages by creating MUl and PPP, and later 
ICMI. Although it can be interpreted as a noble gesture on Suharto's part, the 
creation of these institutions was mainly to avert threats to his authority and to 
shape a community to suit his developmental goals. Ultimately, he was also 
motivated to weaken NU's influence. Moreover, Suharto sought to remove all 
sources of social tension. His ideal was order and harmony as well as regime 
control. 
The rise of Islamism in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, Islamic doctrinal contestations between traditionalists and 
modernists also occurred at everyday levels, and they centred around Malay 
rites and rituals (Norshahril, 2011). Malaysians commonly refer to the 
traditionalists as Kaum Tua (Old Camp) while the modernist Kaum Muda 
(Young Camp). Traditionalists were tolerant towards Malay customs or adat 
(traditions and cultural norms), and other religious rituals such as the maulid 
(celebration of Prophet's birthday), zikir (mass congregation that encompasses 
chanting), and ziarah l<ubur (visits to the graves of holy persons) while 
Interview with Abdul Mu'ti, Secretary Central Board Muhammadiyah, 7 January 2013. 
'^Interview with Imdadun Rahmat, 30 November 2012. 
modernists considered these as bid'ah or innovations. However, there was no 
mass movement or ormas comparable to NU and Muhammadiyah in IVIalaysia 
to represent traditionalists and modernists. Yet, there is one other significant 
differentiation between the two camps in Malaysia: traditionalists were closer to 
the royal courts, Malay aristocracy and conservative Malay elite (in UMNO) than 
modernists (Parish, 2004, p. 32);^^® even though the modernists were not anti-
royalty (Roff, 1994, p. 65). 
From the late 1970s, Malaysia witnessed a rise In Islamist ideas accentuating 
the traditionalist-modernist cleavage, and threatening UMNO's ethno-nationalist 
ideology. Ulema who returned to the country upon completing their studies In 
the Middle East and South Asia contributed to this hse. On religious matters, 
the Islamists perpetuated modernist discourse against bid'ah and Malay adat, 
but on the political front, they advocated for the formation of Islamic state and 
Implementation of shariah laws. PAS and dakwah groups became vehicles for 
Islamist ulema to realise these objectives. In 1978, Islamist ulema such as Hadi 
Awang, Fadzhil Noor, Mustafa Ali, Subky Latif, Nakhaie Ahmad and other ABIM 
activists joined PAS (Parish, 2004, pp. 329-443; Hussin, 1990, p.112; Liow, 
2009, p.35)."® They then led to the party abandoning Its original goals that 
shared many elements of UMNO's ethno-nationalism (Punston, 1980, p. 136). 
These categories are also not foreign in the discussion of the Indonesian Islamic orientation, 
particularly in Sumatera. One prominent Kaum Muda ulama is Syed Syeikh Al-Hadi who wrote 
Islam dan Akal (Islam and Rationalism) in the early 20'" century. The Kaum Muda in Malaya 
never succeeded in consolidating and aggregating their interests into a mass-based 
organisation like the modernist Muhammadiyah or Sarekat Islam in Indonesia. 
" PAS has always been UMNO's biggest rival since the elections in 1955. When PAS was 
formed in 1951, it did not start as a party of ulema. PAS's advocacy for an Islamic state began 
since the 1980s. While Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, PAS's third president (1956-1969) proposed 
Malaysia to be established as an Islamic state, govemed under the teachings of the Quran and 
the Sunnah of the Prophet, he was mainly looking for a Malay-Islamic unity with Indonesia 
Their disagreements for UMNO did not centre on religious grounds only, but 
also political. These ulema felt betrayed by UMNO for making the party a junior 
partner when they were part of the BN coalition (1974-1978). They were furious 
when UMNO allowed the Berjasa (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia or 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front) party to contest in the 1978 election under the BN 
coalition, a move they felt, was deliberately attempting to weaken PAS (Hussin, 
1990, p.111). Indeed, Berjasa won 11 seats that PAS considered as theirs. In 
1978, PAS left the BN coalition and in 1981, the ulema faction forced the then 
president Ash Muda to resign from the party. Ash was replaced by an Islamist 
ulema Yusuf Rawa, The ulema then amended the party's constitution that led to 
the formation of the Shura Council, its highest decision-making body. The 
Islamist ulema won key positions in the council. 
Throughout the 1980s, PAS continued championing an Islamic state and 
shariah laws but with limited success. In the 1982 elections, PAS only secured 
five parliamentary seats while in the 1986 election, it secured only one. 
However, in 1990, PAS struggle came to fruition. In that year, the party 
captured seven parliamentary seats (six more than the previous elections) and 
most importantly, became the government for Kelantan. In 1993, the party 
introduced the Kelantan Syariah Code (II) bill. The code included hudud 
offences such as robbery, unlawful sexual intercourse, intoxication, apostasy, 
and theft. The punishments to these offences include stoning, whipping and 
amputation. Offences not clearly stated in the Quran are deemed as takzir and 
the punishments for them include fines or jail (Parish, 2004, p. 501). The federal 
government rejected PAS's move because it was unconstitutional. 
As I will discuss furtlier in the following chapter, PAS's move towards Islamism, 
and its eventual success in capturing Kelantan, prompted Mahathir to intensify 
his Islamisation agenda. In fact, since the 1990 victory, PAS did not relent in 
pushing its agenda. In 2002, the PAS government in Terengganu wanted to 
introduce the Terengganu Syariah Criminal offences. In 2003, PAS issued the 
Dokumen Negara Islam (Islamic State Document) detailing its plan for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia and in 2014, some PAS members 
proposed a private members' bill in parliament to push for the implementation of 
shariah hudud laws. Thus, many of UMNO's policies in the late 1980s and 
1990s were aimed at thwarting PAS, including the empowerment of official 
ulema institutions and the religious bureaucracy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the significance of the Islamic resurgence period in 
understanding the origins and powers of present day religious institutions in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Islamic resurgence resulted from a combination of 
international and local factors, and was marked by a shift in outlook of Muslims 
particularly in urban centres such as Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. In general, 
there was a sense of "victimhood" and "hope" amongst global Muslims as well 
as those in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War 
politics further reinforced the sense of Muslim victimhood. On the flipside, in 
1979, the Iranian Revolution and the outreach by transnational movements 
such as Islamic Brotherhood, Tarbiyah, and Tabligh, among others, generated 
hope for an Islamic order that could be a viable alternative to the West, The 
resurgence period is the most exciting time for many Muslims. iVIany felt that the 
time was right for Islam to reinstate its role in the public sphere by defining the 
nature of institutions, governing systems, and social relations. 
This triggered the Muslim resurgent movement to Islamise the state and society 
in their respective countries. They demanded the introduction of shariah laws. 
Islamic institutions, Islamic codes and ethics, moral policing, and ultimately, an 
Islamic state. Initially, the impact of Islamic resurgence was far more prevalent 
in Malaysia compared to Indonesia, but by the mid-1980s, the rise in piety was 
equally strong in Indonesia. 
Although leaders in both countries undertook many common policies to respond 
to the resurgence, other political considerations shaped their contrasting co-
optation strategies. One is the religious cleavages that existed in their 
respective societies. I consider Suharto and Mahathir as modernists in their 
religious outlook, but the traditionalists form a major part of their respective 
societies. The traditionalists in Indonesia are more organised compared to 
Malaysia, and through NU, posed the greatest political challenge to Suharto. 
Apart from wanting to neutralise NU's political challenges, Suharto also 
genuinely wanted to reform the Muslims, and saw the modernists' worldview as 
being closer to his progressive outlook than the traditionalists are. The 
modernists too had been forthcoming in embracing Pancasila. While Mahathir 
can be considered a modernist, the political situation in Malaysia is different 
from Indonesia's. The traditionalists are tied to the royal courts and likely to 
support UMNO's ideals. Conversely, with some exaggeration, the modernists 
became more Islamist in their outlook and galvanised their support to PAS and 
the dakwah groups. In the next chapter, I shall discuss how these 
considerations affected Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies. MUl 
and MKI were by-products of their response to the regurgence movement. 
Chapter Five 
Co-opting Muslims: 
The contrasting approaches of 
Suharto and IVIahathir 
Suharto and Mahathir undertook several strategies to neutralise the Muslim 
resurgence movement. They introduced Islamisation policies; built or upgraded 
Islamic institutions; and most important of all, co-opted dissenting voices, 
potential challengers, and ulema into state-sponsored institutions. This chapter 
examines the contrasting ways Suharto and Mahathir co-opted potential threats, 
particularly the ulema, into their government structures. I categorise Suharto's 
co-optation strategy as "symbolic institutionalism" and Mahathir's as 
"substantive institutionalism," the essential differences of which are the degree 
institutions are empowered, the leaders' motivations, and their techniques of 
control. Understanding these differences is important for the overall argument of 
the study. Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies characterise ulema 
institutions that developed subsequently. These strategies continue to shape 
and constrain contemporary official ulema's capture objectives, long after the 
two leaders stepped down from high political office."^ 
I refer to Suharto's co-optation strategy as symbolic institutionalism because he 
was less interested in empowering the Islamic institutions than was Mahathir. 
He was reluctant to accord these institutions legal and enforcement powers. 
The official ulema capture of the state will be dealt separately in chapters Six and Seven. 
This explains why MUl's struggle after Suharto's downfall is to have its roles recognised, 
defined, and expanded in state law (to be discussed in Chapter Six). 
Suharto claimed that the reason he built Islamic institutions was to unite diverse 
Muslim groups in the country. However, Suharto's real motivations were to 
ensure Islamic groups legitimised his authority. He also formed these 
institutions to contain challenges from Islamic ormas, especially NU (NahdIatuI 
Ulama or Revival of Ulama), and from the mid-1980s, to counterbalance 
declining support from the military to the regime. Suharto invited representatives 
from different ormas to participate in these institutions, but his underlying hope 
was to have rival political and religious groups compete with one another. The 
pre-condition for membership in these institutions was to accept Pancasila as 
the ideology. As will be discussed shortly, the institutions formed under 
symbolic institutionalism were MUl (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Ulama Council 
of Indonesia), PPP (Parti Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development 
Party), and ICMI (ll<atan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesia 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals). 
In contrast, Mahathir's co-optation focussed on empowering ulema institutions 
with legal and enforcement powers. As discussed in Chapter Three, Mahathir 
upgraded federal religious institutions JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam 
Malaysia or Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) and IKIM (Institut 
Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding) 
which act as MKI's (National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia or 
Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam) administrative and research 
wings. Some of these federal institutions also oversee the lucrative halal 
certification and Islamic economics sectors. Mahathir's primary motivation for 
creating these institutions was to out-lslamise PAS (Parti Islam se-Malaysia or 
Islamic Party of Malaysia) and contain dakwah groups. He invited influential 
Islamic intellectuals and ulema willing to support UMNO's (United Malays 
National Organisation) ideology to these institutions. Table 2 sums up the 
differences between symbolic institutionalism and substantive institutionalism. 
Table 2. Key Differences: Symbolic institutionalism and substantive 
Institutionalism 
Degree of empowerment 
Motivations for control 
Techniques of control 
Suharto's Symbolic 
Institutionalism 
• No significant 
powers delegated to 
institutions 
• Poorly funded 
• Support Pancasila 
• Containing NU and 
Islamic parties 
• Inviting 
representatives from 
competing groups 
• Repressive towards 
hostile groups and 
few concessions to 
official ulema 
Mahathir's Substantive 
Institutionalism 
• Significant 
delegation of 
powers 
• Well-funded 
• Support 
Rukunegara 
• Out-lslamising PAS 
• Major concessions 
to official ulema 
Both leaders co-opt potential threats to their rule together with repression. 
Suharto mobilised the military to clamp down any dissidents (as in the 1984 
Tanjong Priok Affair, 1976 GAM rebellion in Aceh, and 1989 Lampung 
massacre). For the same reason, Mahathir applied the draconian ISA (Internal 
Security Act), which allowed detention without trial, against his political 
adversaries. In 1994, the ISA was applied to Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad (Darul 
Arqam leader), and in 2001, six Shia followers were detained for being deemed 
as posing security threats (Norshahril, 2014). In 1998, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs used the ISA against Deputy Prime IVIinister Anwar Ibrahim after he was 
sacked from the cabinet. 
However, Suharto was more repressive and brutal than Mahathir in clamping 
down on dissenting Islamic groups. This resulted in narrower spaces for overtly 
anti-government institutions in Indonesia than in Malaysia. During the New 
Order, the state limited outlets available to ulema to express different opinions. 
All disagreement had to be channelled through one of the institutions Suharto 
created. In these institutions, he drew together a wide range of ideas, which 
exacerbated internal conflicts. He capitalised on existing tensions between 
modernists and traditionalists by inviting them into the same institution. 
Moreover, he did not have to concede much to the ulema as he was able to 
keep these institutions under his control. Conversely, Malaysian ulema had the 
option of affiliating with strong, anti-government institutions, had Mahathir not 
yield to their Islamisation agenda. PAS became the most important vehicle for 
ulema's discontent with Mahathir's handling of Islamic affairs (Osman, 2003, p. 
135). Apart from PAS, there were other anti-government ulema institutions such 
as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Islamic Youth Movement of 
Malaysia) and PUM (Persatuan Ulama Malaysia or Ulama Association 
Malaysia). The presence of these alternative vehicles for ulema explained why 
Mahathir sought to empower official ulema institutions in order to attract 
influential ulema and intellectuals into them. 
This chapter demonstrates that Mahathir's co-optation strategy was geared to 
neutralise Islamism from the start, while that of Suharto began as an attempt to 
control Islamic groups and evolved into one that sought to neutralise them. By 
control, I am referring to the state expecting Islamic groups to conform to its 
wishes, and using coercion to achieve this goal. By neutralisation, I refer to the 
state's move to minimise society's ability to effect change. If placed on a 
spectrum, neutralisation falls between state control and state accepting 
society's wishes absolutely. In the 1970s, Suharto sought to control the ulema 
through PPP and MUl. By 1990, Suharto could only neutralise the societal 
demands, mainly because the undercurrents of democratisation had become 
stronger. The formation of ICMI is a case of neutralisation on the part of the 
state. For the case of Malaysia, Mahathir could only afford to neutralise the 
opposition. He could not control them as much as Suharto did the opposition in 
Indonesia in the early years of the New Order regime, because the demand for 
sharlah in Malaysia was strong in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, as will be 
discussed shortly, Mahathir had to fight on another front: Razaleigh Hamzah's 
challenge to his leadership in UMNO. 
The following sections discuss Suharto's and Mahathir's contrasting co-optation 
strategies. I begin with Suharto's motivations in creating PPP, MUl and later 
ICMI. Suharto created PPP and MUl to weaken NU's power base, and ICMI to 
counter the military. Suharto's technique of control was demonstrated in these 
institutions where he grouped traditionalists and modernists to play them off 
against each other. A discussion of Mahathir's motivation for undertaking 
massive Islamisation will then follow. He was interested in containing PAS and 
the growing Islamism in the country. He was also keen to align Islamic interests 
with his industrialisation agenda. Rather than weakening ulema, he 
strengthened them with powers to out-lslamise his challengers. 
Suharto's symbolic institutionalism: PPP, MUl and ICMI 
To reiterate some key definitions from Chapter One, co-option refers to a state's 
behaviour in "absorbing new elements into the leadership of policy-making or 
policy determining structure of organisation as means of averting threats to its 
stability or existence" (Selznick, 1948, p. 34). In most instances, these new 
elements receive rewards from the state and are accorded high social status, 
but do not challenge the basic tenets of the state's ideology. Suharto's symbolic 
institutionalism functioned as a form of co-optation instrument, and was 
reflected in three institutions: MUl, PPP, and ICMI.''^® Suharto was not 
interested in empowering these institutions and neither was he concerned about 
developing them as interest mediation institutions that represent their 
constituencies' requests to the state. MUl and ICMI functioned more like "talk-
shops" than institutions that had significant influence on state's policies. These 
institutions also played a legitimising role for the New Order regime, as well as 
in ensuring stability for the country. 
Although Suharto's narrative for forming these institutions was for national unity 
(Cribb, 2010, p. 71), his primary motivations were to control any form of ulema 
opposition to the state's ideology of Pancasila. Suharto also wanted to contain 
the public role of Islam and mould Islamic discourse so that it served his nation 
building and industrialisation agenda. Political and religious developments in the 
The PPP does not meet the criteria of Selznick's co-optation. It is a political party and the 
members of the party do not receive direct rewards by the state. However, I include PPP as a 
co-optation institution because the thinking underlying its formation mirrors MUl and ICMI. 
1970s and 1980s, however, explained the differences in Suharto's motivations 
in forming MUl, PPP and ICMI. Suharto formed MUl and RPR primarily to 
contain The formation of ICMI in 1990 has to be understood with respect 
to developments in the mid-1980s. During this period, Suharto also saw waning 
support of a section of the military linked to military commander Benny 
Moerdani, especially BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis or Indonesian Military 
Intelligence). Suharto formed ICMI as part of his efforts to shore up Muslim 
support to counter the military (Hefner, 2000, p. 158). 
Suharto's symbolic institutionalism was also different from Mahathir's 
substantive institutionalism in terms of its techniques of controlling dissenting 
actors. Suharto capitalised on religious cleavages between traditionalists and 
modernists, as well as divisions within the two groups that I have discussed in 
Chapter Four. He also sought to weaken the organisational bases of 
independent groups by playing against one another rival factions or 
personalities in institutions. Suharto carefully determined who should be 
included and excluded in these newly formed institutions. For instance, Suharto 
invited three diverse groups to join ICMI—the political reformists and activists, 
and regimists (pro-Golkar individuals)—knowing that these leaders had different 
views on many religious and political issues (Hefner, 2000, pp. 143-152). 
Similarly, Suharto allowed NU leaders sympathetic to his ideas to occupy the 
leaderships of MUl and RRR together with modernist ulema and politicians. This 
move sowed the splits within NU members in the early 1980s. 
Suharto favoured the modernists over the traditionalists. His preference for modernism is 
understandable because he grew up studying in a Muhammadiyah high school and graduated 
in 1939. See Ricklefs, 2012, p. 118. 
However, why were members of these existing ormas, or for that matter, state's 
critics, attracted to join IVIUI, PPP, and ICMI? The main attraction of these peak 
institutions was the official recognit ion they aroused to part icipants and 
opportunit ies for advancement . These institutions al lowed part icipants direct 
access to the President, ministers, and state officials, in addit ion, status and 
source of important networks were also attached to the pejabat or polit ical 
off ices. More importantly, Suharto's repressive tactics restricted alternative 
channels for opposit ion apart f rom those he created. The Suharto government 
disbanded, f ragmented, and counterbalanced opposit ion groups with new, 
state-control led structures. The state installed structural impediments, including 
co-optation institutions, to limit effective political participation and chal lenges to 
the state power. Suharto reordered power with him at the apex of the polit ical 
hierarchy. Porter (2002) states that 
The reordering of Islam's political, ideological and organisational existence 
involved a process that was at least two decades in the making... implementing 
exclusionary corporatism was part of Suharto's strategy to undermine the 
autonomy of Muslim parties and organisations and severely restrict and 
delineate their participation in the political system (p.49). 
In the fol lowing paragraphs, I examine how Suharto's symbol ic institutionalism 
underl ies PPP's, MUl's, and ICIVll's formation. Undeniably, many studies have 
examined Suharto's political motivat ions in forming PPP and ICMI (Azyumardi , 
2004b, p. 139-140; Hefner, 1993; Liddle, 1996; Porter, 2002; Ramage, 1995). 
Nevertheless, recapping these institutions' formation together with MUl 's would 
generate better understanding of Suharto's co-optat ion motivat ions and 
techniques from the 1970s to 1990s. 
PPP: Uniting Islamic Political Parties 
One of the earliest manifestations of Suharto's co-option of potential threats to 
his rule occurred in 1973 when he merged all Islamic political parties into the 
PPP. The motivation underlying PPP's formation differed from MUl and ICMI. 
Suharto formed PPP to restructure the country's political party system, while 
MUl and ICMI was formed to mediate diverse Islamic interests in the country. 
Nevertheless, the strategic thinking underlying PPP's formation was similar to 
that of MUl's and ICMI's: to streamline Islamic-based parties to support 
Pancasila rather than Islam; and to weaken Islamic parties' support base. PPP 
was to become one of the three parties Suharto allowed to participate in the 
1977 elections, the other two being PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or 
Indonesia Democratic Party), and Suharto's Golkar (Golongan Karyawan or The 
Party of Functional Groups). Between 1973 and 1984, PPP represented four 
Islamic based parties: NU, PSIl (Parti Sarekat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian 
Sarekat Islam Party), PERTI (Pergerakan Trabiyah Islamiyah or Islamic 
Tarbiyah Movement) and Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian 
Muslims P a r t y ) . E v e n though PPP ran as an opposition party to Golkar, the 
state financed its operational costs (H. Crouch, 1978, p. 271). 
In the 1971 elections. Islamic parties performed poorly, garnering only 27.2 per 
cent of the seats. These parties were not able to repeat their good performance 
in the 1955 elections in which they secured 43.5 per cent of the seats in the 
DPR (Hindley, 1972, p. 58). However, this declining support for Islamic parties 
did not erase Suharto's suspicion of their political comeback. Ali Moertopo, 
' NU withdrew from the PPP in 1984. 
Suharto's advisor, warned that with the communist and nationalist parties 
destroyed, Islamic parties would revive (Hefner, 2000, p. 100).^''^ Revival of 
Islamic parties would run counter to Suharto's preference for Islamic expression 
centred on promoting personal piety rather political or social issues. Moreover, 
he remained suspicious towards former Masyumi leaders. Masyumi was the 
largest Islamic political party formed during the Japanese occupation which 
Sukarno banned in 1960. Suharto remained suspicious of Islamic parties 
because he saw Masyumi's ideology remained strong. Masyumi leaders wanted 
the Suharto government to return to principles of the 1945 Jakarta Charter that 
called for an Islamic state. Suharto saw Masyumi's goals as incongruent with 
his principle of building an Indonesian identity as a multi-religious society 
(Liddle, 1996, p. 621). 
By merging all Islamic parties under PPP, Suharto hoped their influence would 
weaken, and one way of ensuring this was to undermine the party ideologically. 
He pressured PPP to change its ideology from Islam to Pancasila, but was 
unsuccessful in the 1970s because the party continued to stand for Islam. Only 
in 1984 that PPP finally relented and adopted Pancasila as its ideology. To 
weaken PPP further, Suharto passed two laws in the 1980s: limiting the use of 
Islamic symbols during elections (Law No 1/1985) and incorporating "aliran 
kepercayaan" {BeM) as one of the accepted "religions" to the existing five. This 
angered many party members in PPP and resulted in splits within the party. 
Some Muslims saw this move as a betrayal of Islamic interests (Sudirman 
1993, pp. 21-24). With PPP's adoption of Pancasila, Suharto's symbolic 
His warning came true. PPP performance in the 1977 elections improved Against all the 
restnctions imposed by the Suharto government, it secured 29 per cent of the 360 seats in the 
DPR. 
institutionalism achieved its objective. PPP could no longer use Islamic symbols 
and ideology as political capital against Golkar. 
Suharto formed PPP to weaken NU's support base and leadership. Through 
forcing its merger with the three other Islamic parties in PPP, Suharto hoped 
that NU would be constrained of its powers as the largest Islamic organisation 
in Indonesia. Of all the Islamic parties that participated in the 1971 elections, 
NU recorded an increase in the percentage of seats in the DPR. Compared to 
the 1955 elections, NU's share of Islamic party seats in 1971 increased from 45 
per cent to 58 per cent (Hindley, 1972, p. 58). Within PPP, Suharto further 
devised ways to marginalise NU leaders. Although in 1973 NU chairman, Idham 
Chalid, was made PPP's president, and senior NU clerics KH Masykur and KH 
Bisri Syamsuri were appointed as the party's Central Legal Council and chair of 
the Advisory council respectively, other NU leaders were installed into less 
important positions of influence in the party (Bush, 2009, pp. 66-67). Even top 
positions in the party's Jakarta branch were accorded to members of Parmusi, 
which was a smaller party than NU (Bush, 2009, p. 104). This move surprised 
many especially when NU was the largest component party within PPP and the 
largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Also, there was another reason why 
Suharto tolerated Idham Chalid as PPP's president. Idham was generally 
uncritical of Suharto's leadership (H. Crouch, 1978, p. 271); and Suharto knew 
that he could control Idham. 
Suharto's decision to sideline the traditionalists in politics was not only evident 
in PPP. In the 1971 General Elections, Suharto mobilised GUPPI (Gabungan 
Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam or Coalition for the improvement of Islamic 
education) to shore up support for Golkar. Formed on 2 March 1950, GUPPI 
was a coalition of traditionalist ulenna committed to reform religious education. 
GUPPI's mobilisation in 1971 generated competition between GUPPI and NU, 
whose constituents were traditionalist kiais and pesantren graduates (Heru, 
1992). IVIoreover, since 1973, Suharto did not appoint any NU minister, 
especially for the Minister of Religion portfolio that the state normally allocated 
for NU members. The last NU minister in Suharto's cabinet was KH Moh 
Dahlan, who became the Minister of Religion. In 1973, Mukti All, a modernist, 
replaced Moh Dahlan, a traditionalist, as the Minister of Religion. Since then, 
modernists had held the post until the end of the New Order. 
Abdurrahman Wahid and his supporters were alarmed at the regime's 
manipulation of NU due to its perceived opposition role. In 1984, Abdurrahman 
then NU's General Chairman, famously withdrew the organisation from PPP in 
1984. NU's formal withdrawal from politics took place after NU's 27th Congress 
in Sitobundo, East Java. The move, famously depicted as the Return to the 
Khittah 1926 or Kembali ke Khittah (Fealy, 2007), was to re-orientate NU back 
to its original objectives since its founding in 1926. 
MUl: Uniting Indonesian Ulema 
From the outset, Suharto's justification to from MUl was to unite the Indonesian 
ulema and to create a national body to issue fatwas (Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 
46). This ulema body would represent the Muslims in an inter-religious body 
that he intended to create later. During the inauguration of the MUl on 27 July 
1975, The Minister of Religious Affairs, Mukti Ali, echoed Suharto's views and 
remarked that 
Today is the day of the establishment of the Council of Indonesian Ulema; 
today in this place we have buried for ever the cleavage among Muslims; and 
today, in this very spot, we have also buried for ever the mutual distrust and 
suspicions between the ulema and the government (Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 
53). 
However, I argue that Suharto's motivations and techniques of co-optation 
underlying MUl was similar to that of his decision to contain Islamic political 
parties under PPP. Suharto sought to direct the religious opinion in MUl towards 
Pancasila and contain NU's political challenge, as well as to increase Islamic 
legitimacy for the New Order regime. 
There was also another plausible reason why Suharto formed MUl. He wanted 
to win over the Muslim electorate, many of whom were disappointed that 
Suharto had refused Masyumi's participation in the 1971 elections. Banned in 
1960 by Sukarno, Suharto forced Masyumi members to regroup under Parmusi, 
but they were made of junior members of the party. A section of the Muslim 
community was also disappointed with Suharto's decision to streamline all 
Islamic political parties in PPP. Thus, Suharto decided to form MUl as a 
demonstration that he was not sidelining Islamic interests. He was also keen to 
win over the Muslims support who had rejected Golkar during the 1971 
elections (Mohammad Atho, 1993, pp. 50-51). Nevertheless, Suharto was 
consistent in not allowing MUl to engage in politics, but to support state's 
policies and programs. 
Suharto first mooted the idea of the creation of MUl in 1970. He invited ulema 
from NU, Muhammadiyah, and other ormas to join MUl. These ulema were 
initially suspicious about Suharto's intentions and they took almost five years 
before joining MUl (Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 53). Hamka, who later became 
MUl's first chairman, was initially reluctant to accept the position because he 
feared that he could not exercise independent judgement, and was hesitant to 
work with non-ulema Suharto invited to join MUl (Nadirsyah, 2004, p. 149).^''^ 
Hamka later accepted the position after being persuaded by Mukti Ali, a 
Muhammadiyah member who became the minister of Religions Affairs in 1973. 
Several other ulema then agreed to follow Hamka's footsteps in joining MUl, 
even though they realised they would not be able to exercise independent 
judgement. There were several reasons for this. First, the poor performance of 
Islamic parties in the 1971 elections, and the formation of PPP in 1973, led to 
the ulema fearing that Islamic parties could no longer represent Muslims in the 
DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or Indonesian Legislative Assembly). Second, 
Suharto was repressive that there were no alternative channels to voice 
disagreements to state's policies apart from those determined by the state. In 
1973, the government submitted a bill on marriage to the DPR. The law would 
permit the marriage of Muslims and the People of the Book {ahli Kitab). Since 
public opposition towards the marriage bill was not voiced in the DPR, the 
ulema felt that pressuring the state through MUl would be the best option 
(Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 53). 
During the New Order period, only candidates approved by Suharto could be 
chairman of the institution. In 1975, Hamka was clearly Suharto's candidate for 
MUl's chairmanship. He was highly respectable ulema, anti-communist and 
modernist. However, in 1981, Hamka's initial fears that MUl members could not 
exercise independent judgement were realised. He stepped down as MUl 
When Hamka was appointed as the first Chairman of IVIUI, his close friends criticised him As 
narrated by Irfan (2013, p. 254), a cleric once said, "Hamka is no longer owned by the people 
He has sold himself for 1 million rupiahs (A$100] to accept the appointment [as MUl chairmanl' 
He now belongs to the palace. 
chairman after disagreements with the state. He was replaced by Syukri 
Ghozali, an NU ulema. Although Syukri came from a traditionalist background, 
he was closely aligned to the state and was a bureaucrat in the Department of 
Religious Affairs (now Kemenag) from 1955 to 1971 (Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 
56). His former appointments included being the Dean of the Jakarta State 
Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN). Syukri was a low-profile scholar and not 
deemed as a "trouble-maker" by Suharto and the religious officials in Kemenag 
(Mohammad Atho, 1993, p. 57). Syukri was only MUl's chairman for three years 
until he passed away in 1984. Hassan Basri, a Muhammadiyah and modernist 
oriented ulema, replaced him. He then became MUl chairman for the following 
14 years. Although Hassan was a member of Masyumi, he had to convince 
Suharto that he no longer upheld Islamist ideals before being appointed as MUl 
chairman. It turned out that he had good relations with Suharto,^"" stayed on as 
chairman to the end of the New Order period, and was only replaced in 1998 by 
AN Yafie, former Rois Syuriah of NU (Feener, 2007, p. 159). Although the 
chairmanship of MUl seemed to rotate between NU and Muhammadiyah 
(Nadirsyah, 2004), the modernists were in control of the organisation for most of 
the time during the New Order.^"® Throughout MUl's 23 years of existence 
under the New Order, it was only under an NU chairman for three years. 
Almost all of MUl's fatwas issued during the New Order were either neutral or 
supported the state's policies. Two examples of MUl's fatwas that supported the 
government's position were on oral divorce rules (husband's utterance of fa/aq); 
" " Interview with Nadratuzzaman Hosen, Secretary Fatwa Commission, IVIajelis Ulama 
Indonesia (IVIUI), 12 August 2014. 
"^Amirsyah, a vice-secretary from MUl, disputed this so called leadership rotation and claimed 
it is purely coincidental that the chairmanship was rotated between NU and Muhammadiyah. 
Interview with Amirsyah, 8 January 2013 
and the permissibility of the state lottery scheme SDSB (Sumbangan Olah Raga 
Berhadiah or Sports Contribution with Prizes) or Porkas. According to the Shafie 
School of jurisprudence, to which Indonesian Muslims generally adhere, if a 
husband uttered three talaqs to divorce his wife, the couple could not remarry 
until the wife married another man and divorced again. However, MUl issued a 
fatwa that considered the utterance of three talaqs by the husband as one. The 
reason why MUl Fatwa Commission issued this fatwa was that in 1974, the 
DPR passed the Marriage Law that considered the question of three talaqs as 
one was a "non-issue." Thus, MUl synchronised its fatwa with the state's 
position. In another example, MUl declared that the Porkas scheme did not 
constitute gambling (gambling is forbidden in Islam). In December 1985, the 
government introduced Porkas which was a football-gambling scheme. The 
general Muslims criticised the government; they felt that it was promoting un-
Islamic values. MUl did not consider the scheme as a form of gambling because 
the persons who engaged in it did not meet face to face. Later, MUl's Fatwa 
Commission chairman, Ibrahim Hosen, ordered MUl branches not to issue any 
fatwa concerning the scheme (Darul et al., 1995, p. 197). Many Indonesian 
Muslims felt the fatwa only confirmed that the institution was a state lackey. 
Most important, MUl was obliged to uphold Pancasila as its ideology. On the 21 
July 1975, during MUl's opening event. President Suharto reminded the 
attendees about the importance of Pancasila (Departemen Penerangan R.I, 
1975, p. 11).'"'® He also reminded them that MUl must not engage in politics and 
must support Golkar. Suharto remarked "MUl does not need to organise itself 
Speakers during this opening of MUl include Suharto (President), M Panggabean (Defence 
Minister), Amirmachmud (Home Affairs Minister), Mashuri (Information Minister) and Mukti All 
(Religious Minister). Most of the speakers emphasise the non-political nature of MUl its role as 
translator of government policies, and the adoption of Pancasila. See (Departmen Penerancan 
R.I, 1975). See also Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1979 
as a political organisation, because the political platform has already been filled 
by two political parties [PPP and PDI], plus one Golkar that we all belong to" 
(Departemen Penerangan R.I, 1975, p. 12). 
However, the MUl Fatwa Commission did not agree with the New Order 
government all the time. There were instances in which MUl rejected the 
demands of state officials and Kemenag. For example, in 1983 MUl issued a 
fatwa on the non-permissibility of tubectomy and abortion, which ran counter to 
the government's attitude of allowing those practices in order to encourage 
family planning (Kaptein, 2004, p. 121). The other well known example was 
when Hamka issued a fatwa that Muslims could neither extend Christmas 
greetings to Christians nor attend Christmas celebrations. This fatwa clashed 
with the state's position. On 2 September 1981, Kemenag issued circular 
allowing government officials to attend any celebrations organised by people of 
other faiths. However, disagreeing with the state invited serious consequences. 
For insisting not to alter his fatwa, Hamka had to resign as MUl's chairman. 
Overall, the state's strength was so overwhelming that ormas and civil society 
groups conceded to its demands. By 1984, NU, Muhammadiyah, MUl, and PPP 
had all accepted Pancasila as their ideology. Yet, another of Suharto's wishes 
came to fruition at around the same time. As mentioned, Suharto was keen to 
keep progressive Islamic discourses alive. By the mid-1980s, Indonesia's neo-
modernist Muslim intellectuals garner more influence and mass following. 
These intellectuals promoted ideas that contain elements of progressivism, 
traditionalism and modernism (Barton, 1995). They were inspired by Fazlur 
Rahman's writings. Fazlur was then a professor at the University of Chicago, 
and his writings called for a contextual reading of religious traditions, rather than 
their literal meanings. Nurcholis Madjid's famous quote "Yes to Islam, but No to 
Islamic parties," reflected this neo-modernist thinking. Nurcholis was a former 
Fazlur student. 
Despite having met his co-optation objectives by the mid-1980s, Suharto 
continued to rely on the use of military force on Islamic groups that challenged 
Pancasila. According to Aspinall, 
One key to the New Order's longevity and success was the way it combined 
violence (and the threat of violence) with co-optation and toleration. The regime 
did not merely prohibit threatening forms of political action and ideology, it also 
allowed a relatively wide variety of organisation and representation of societal 
interests-political parties, the societal organisations or Ormas, NGOs and the 
like- so long as they did not fundamentally challenge the regime and adapted to 
its rules (Aspinall, 2010, p. 121). 
In September 1984, the military opened fire on a group of Muslim protesters in 
the Tanjong Priok massacre. These protesters disagreed with the Suharto's 
move to force all organisations to adopt Pancasila. The riot was also triggered 
by the behaviour of some military guards who refused to remove their shoes 
upon entering a mosque compound in the area. The guards entered the 
mosque to remove an anti-government poster (Feillard & Madinier, 2011, p. 42). 
The massacre saw 24 protesters killed. In another incident, the army also swiftly 
responded when a small group of Muslim Islamists murdered a young infantry 
captain in the Sumatran province of Lampung in March 1989 (Schwarz, 1999, p. 
173). 
However, by the late 1980s, Suharto shifted tactics and began to "embrace" 
Islam. Suharto not only developed a new personal interest in Islam, but he also 
invested vast sums of money and resources to develop Islamic education. In 
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1990, Suharto performed the Haj ritual. Although the public attention given to 
Suharto's performance of the Haj has been interpreted as political gimmick, 
Ramage (1995, p. 63) observed that Suharto began to eschew Javanese 
mysticism and became more interested in learning about Islam. Suharto invited 
many religious teachers to the palace to learn more about I s l am .S i gn i f i c an t 
changes also happened in the realm of law. In 1989, the state enhanced the 
Religious Judicature Act, which expanded the authority of the Islamic courts' 
jurisdiction to include inheritance. With the passing of this law, decisions by the 
Islamic courts can be enforced by the police without being ratified by civil courts 
(Cammack, 1997, p. 143). Nevertheless, despite Suharto's concessions to uplift 
the profile of Islamic institutions in the public sphere, Cammack (1997, p. 144) 
cautions against thinking that Suharto had abandoned its historic policy of 
controlling Islamic laws and politics. Still, I would argue that by the 1990s, 
Suharto was shifting from the use of repressive to a full reliance on symbolic 
institutionalism. This shift coloured the relationship with the Muslims, which in 
1990, led to the formation of ICMI. 
ICMI: Uniting Indonesian intellectuals 
In 1990, Suharto formed ICMI to generate progressive intellectual discourse in 
Indonesian society. Its purpose was to prepare Indonesians for challenges in 
the 21®' century. ICMI draws its history from student activism that intensified in 
the 1980s. The students were eager to create an organisation at the national 
level. They had close contacts with prominent Muslim intellectuals and activists 
Suharto's move towards greater Islam affected the domestic fronts more than the 
international arena. Despite being the world's largest Islamic country, Indonesia under Suharto 
played down the religious factor in its foreign policy. This can be seen through Indonesia's 
participation In the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), its response towards complex 
issues such as the state of Palestine and the first Gulf War, the Moro problem in the Philippines, 
and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in the 1990s. See Perwita, 2007. 
who included Dr Imadudin Abdulrahim and Dr Dawam Raharjo. The students 
felt that such organisations would not be effective without state's sponsorship. 
Therefore, they went further to invite several ministers, including the rising star 
within the Suharto cabinet, Dr BJ Habibie, to provide leadership to oversee the 
organisation (Hefner, 1993, pp. 17-18). 
Nevertheless, I argue that Suharto's underlying motivation to form ICMI was 
similar to that of MUl and PPP, which was to neutralise challenges to the state's 
ideology. Liddle (1996) states that ICMI did not have a specific Islamic policy or 
legislated agenda that can be implemented (p. 615). Hefner (2000) describes 
ICMI as part of "regimist" Islam (pp. 151-152), which he defines as Muslim 
groups who are "untroubled by Suharto's authoritarian ways" (p. 19). Although 
cabinet members also participated in the institution, ICMI did not have any 
direct influence on government policies and directives. 
ICMI was however different from MUl and PPP in at least two aspects. First, 
ICMI did not serve as Suharto's vehicle in pitting the traditionalists and 
modernists against one another. Since the mid-1980s, the two cleavages have 
blurred. In fact, Suharto realised that the possibility of the two camps allying 
with one another is real, and that could potentially undermine his rule. Thus, 
ICMI served as his instrument to contain such possibility, ensuring Islamic 
discourse was in-sync with Pancasila and the state's other goals. The second 
difference was that ICMI was formed during a period when Suharto encouraged 
Islam to have a public role. Previously, Suharto preferred Islam to remain in the 
private sphere. This significant change in Suharto's attitude towards Islam 
resulted from the pressures from the growing Muslim middle class, who wanted 
to play an active role in the New Order regime's policy development (Liddle, 
1995, p.618). 
In essence, Suharto formed ICMI to prevent intellectuals and independent 
religious elite from forming alternative channels that challenged his rule (Hefner, 
2000, p. 142). By the 1980s, there was also the rise of Islamic intellectualism 
promoted by personalities such as Nurcholis Majid, Abdurrahman Wahid, M 
Dawam Raharjo, Djohan Effendy, Adi Sasono, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Ahmad 
Wahib and Amien Rais (Bahtiar, 1998, pp. 212-213; Barton, 1995, p. 5). 
Realising their influence in society, Suharto invited these intellectuals into ICMI, 
to control them, not so much to promote Islamic intellectualism. ICMI housed 
personalities with diverse backgrounds, mirroring his co-optation technique 
found in PPP and MUl. They include Muslim resurgents Imadudin Abdulrahim 
and Anwar Haryono (DDII leader), liberals Nurcholis Madjid and Dawam 
Raharjo, traditionalists Yusuf Hasyim and Ali Yafie, and modernists Amien Rais, 
Din Syamsuddin and M Amin Aziz. Nasir Tamara, a politician and activist who 
was ICMI member, said that the institution was created to prevent Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Muhammadiyah members, and NU members from dominating the 
discourse about Islam (Ramage, 1995, pp. 77-78). While several NU members 
participate in ICMI, Abdurrahman Wahid refused to j o i n . A b d u r r a h m a n joined 
another Muslim intellectual, Djohan Effendy, formed the Forum Demokrasi 
instead. 
' Interview with Rumadi, 3 December 2012. 
There were two other political considerations underlying Suharto's formation of 
ICMI. First, ICMI was intended to serve as Golkar's vehicle to shore up Muslims' 
support for the 1997 parliamentary elections; and the 1998 MPR (Majelis 
Permusyuaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly) session, which 
was responsible for electing the country's president and vice-president (Liddle, 
1995, p.625). ICMI also provided Suharto with new recruits for the party that 
was outside of the armed forces and the military. Suharto had to rely on the 
support of Muslim groups, including ICMI leaders, for the 1997 elections (Liddle, 
1996, p. 626). 
Second, and more importantly, Suharto was no longer receiving the full support 
of the military in order to retain power. The biggest threat from the military came 
from the defection of his strongest and most trusted ally, Benny Moedani, the 
former military chief. Benny, a Catholic, was responsible for not promoting 
Muslims into the higher ranks of the military. However, the main turning point 
that soured the relationship between Suharto and Benny was when Benny 
advised Suharto to name a successor in 1988. Benny later criticised Suharto as 
corrupt. In addition, Benny developed a bad relationship with General Prabowo 
Subianto, Suharto's son in law. Consequently, Suharto relegated Benny to a 
much less influential role in his Cabinet, as Minister of Defence. During the 
1988 elections, Suharto chose Sudharmono as vice-president instead of Benny, 
although the latter was the favourites based on seniority in the New Order 
regime. This move served as a turning point for Suharto-military relations that 
led him to court Islamic resurgence leaders. 
In sum, Suharto was keen to neutralise the demands of the Muslim resurgence 
leaders by grouping them into institutions headed by modernists. As a move to 
quell challenges to his presidency, Suharto sowed divisions and fragmented 
group interests by exploiting internal organisational rifts within NU and PPP, and 
between NU and Muhammadiyah. MUl was created as an alternative forum to 
weaken the power bases of NU and Muhammadiyah, At the same time, Suharto 
did not give MUl enough powers to manage Islam or replace the Kemenag in 
affairs such as managing tithe, endowments, religious education, and Haj. The 
function of MUl was to advise the government on Islamic matters.^''® Suharto's 
Islamic policies attempted to weaken the organisational bases of independent 
groups or politically demobilise, fragment and neutralize them with new, state 
controlled structures. 
Mahathir's substantive institutionalism: Centralisation of Islam 
Since the prime ministerships of Abdul Razak Hussein (1971-1976) and 
Hussein Onn (1976-1981), the Malaysian Islamic resurgence movement have 
questioned UMNO's commitment towards the betterment of Islam. From the 
1980s onwards, the movement became better organised, and continued to 
challenge the Mahathir government's Islamic legitimacy. There was significant 
pressure from dakwah groups to create a new Islamic order in Malaysia, whose 
slogan was "Islam is not capitalism, socialism, democracy, humanism or for that 
matter any other isms, Islam is Islam and Ad-Deen" (Shaharuddin, 2005, p. 
318). During this period, Mahathir also had to tackle several outstanding issues 
Interview with Professor Nasaruddin Umar, Vice-Minister of Religion, 7 December 2012 
related to the economy and ethnic unrest. Yet, one of the biggest challenge to 
Mahathir's government—besides internal divisions within UMNO in the 1980s— 
was the rise of Islamist ideas in society. Mahathir also never favoured the ulema 
to be involved in political parties, but the opposition party PAS demonstrated 
how ulema can shape the political scene in Malaysia. 
This section highlights Mahathir's co-optation strategy in dealing with the 
Islamic resurgence movement, particularly his methods for dealing with rising 
Islamist ideas. Since some of the issues discussed here—such as JAKIM's and 
IKIM's formation and the rise of Islamism in PAS in the 1980s—have been 
examined in Chapters Three and Four, I shall not repeat them here except to 
stress some key points. The section first provides an overview of Mahathir's 
Islamisation policies. This is to highlight the platforms he created to attract 
ulema to join the government. This will be followed by a discussion of 
Mahathir's motivations of co-optation, which were to build a progressive Islam 
community and to out-flank PAS Islamically. I will give more focus on the former 
rather than the latter because PAS internal politics had already been discussed 
in Chapter Four. The section concludes with a discussion of Mahathir's co-
optation technique. He invited "impactful" personalities to join UMNO or the 
religious bureaucracy in order to realise his objectives. 
While the section focuses on Mahathir's co-optation strategy, I acknowledge he 
also used coercive tactics to weaken his political rivals. Mahathir was not 
hesitant in using the ISA (Internal Security Act) against his political opponents. 
Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 85) point out that Mahathir's policies contained a 
combination of co-optation, institution-building, and coercion. While the same 
could also be said about Suharto, Mahathir was less coercive than Suharto. 
Mahathir did not mobilise the military to curtail resistance to his government. 
Mahathir's Islamisation policies: Creating platforms for co-optation 
As soon as assuming power in 1981, Mahathir expanded the role of Islam in the 
public sphere. He incorporated and appropriated Islam into the state's national 
vision, and making it his administration's philosophy (Hamayotsu, 2002). He did 
this in order to appease the Islamic resurgence movement which was at its 
peak in the 1980s. He built on traditional structures and institutions to co-opt the 
ulema into them. Mahathir invited both critics and sympathisers to UMNO's 
cause to join these institutions, encouraging them to reform the state "from 
within." As will be discussed shortly, these institutions were upgraded and 
granted more powers and responsibilities compared to those during the time of 
his predecessors. The Mahathir government delegated executive power on 
religious matters to the official ulema, in exchange for their loyalty and support 
for the state's ideology. Because of these reasons, I refer Mahathir's strategy 
as substantive Institutionalism. The study's reference to the term substantive 
institutionalism is similar to Hamayotsu's (2005, p. 51) "state co-optation" and 
"state-institutionalisation." 
As soon as he assumed power in 1981, he introduced several key policies to 
reflect his commitment to Islamisation. Mahathir set up the Islamic Bank and 
upgraded the Islamic Centre or Pusat Islam. He then undertook several policies 
to demonstrate the government's commitment to Islamic morality and piety. The 
government, for example, forbade the importation of non-halal meat and 
Muslims entering the Genting Highlands Casino (H. Crouch, 1996, p. 170). The 
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national television also aired the five daily prayer calls, which has been a 
practise common to many Middle Eastern countries. The Mahathir government 
also built massive mosques even when Malaysia already had the National 
Mosque. For example, in 1988, the state built the Masjid Sultan Salahuddin 
Abdul Aziz Shah (also known as Shah Alam Mosque). It was then the second 
largest mosque in Southeast Asia after Indonesia's Istiqial Mosque. 
The government undertook several policies that strengthened the official 
ulema's legal powers (Hussin, 1990; Kamarulnizam, 2002; Milne & Mauzy, 
1999). In 1984, the Mahathir government passed the Federal Territory 
Administration of Islamic Laws Enactment that created greater uniformity in the 
administration of Muslims laws. Previously, shariah laws were administered 
under separate legislatures in each negeri. This enactment also enlarged the 
functions of the shariah court. With the amendment, the Federal Territory then 
had three levels of shariah courts: Shariah Lower Court, Shariah High Court, 
and Shariah Appeal Court. By 1991, all the 13 negeri followed the Federal 
Territory by having three levels of court (Maznah et al., 2009, pp. 66-67). In 
1988, the state amended Article 121 (1A) of the Federal constitution to allow for 
an expansion and systemization of the Islamic judicial and legal systems. The 
state gave the shahah courts the authority to give separate jurisdiction over 
wide-ranging matters concerning Islam which civil courts could not challenge. 
The law also stated that it was compulsory for Malays and Muslims to notify the 
authorities that they were professing Islam (Maznah et al., 2009, p. 67). 
Furthermore, Mahathir centralised Islam by raising the status of the federal level 
Islamic bureaucracy, even though Islam is constitutionally a negeri matterJ®° 
Undeniably, centralisation of the Malaysian religious bureaucracy had its roots a 
decade before Mahathir's rule. During Tunku Abdul Rahman's reign (1957-
1970), major Islamic centralisation projects include the formation of the Tabung 
Haji (Haj Fund) in 1962 that acted as fund managers for Haj pilgrims. During 
Abdul Razak's government (1970-1976), Department of Education created a 
religious division within it, a move that contradicted the state's commitment that 
Islam is a matter for the negeri (Roff, 1998, pp. 220-221). Mahathir, however, 
pushed this centralisation agenda further, and at a larger scale. Without 
repeating what has been discussed in Chapter Three, except to reiterate some 
key points, Mahathir upgraded federal Islamic institutions JAKIM, IKIM and the 
JKF-MKI. JAKIM acted as the secretariat from JKF-MKI and helped the fatwa 
committee to socialise its fatwas to the masses. According to Liow (2009), 
"JAKIM has also been relied upon to enact and standardise laws and 
procedures and to coordinate their implementation with their respective state 
[negeri] religious authorities in all states across Malaysia" (p.49). JAKIM, and 
IKIM, also undertook fatwa research for the JKF-MKI. These institutions also 
organised many discussion forums for members of federal religious institutions 
and the negeri councils, particularly between members of their respective fatwa 
committees. 
The preceding paragraphs show the institutions Mahathir upgraded and formed 
as part of his Islamisation policies. He undertook these policies mainly in 
' See Appendix 5# for the role of Islam in the constitution. 
response to the Islamic resurgence movement. However, these policies serve 
two other related purposes. He wanted to ensure progressive Islamic discourse 
remained dominant in the country, and he sought to curb the rise of Islamist 
PAS. 
Building a progressive Islam and out-lslamising PAS 
Mahathir showed great interest in Islam very early in his political career. Mauzy 
and Milne (1983) posit that Mahathir saw Islam as providing the necessary 
moral values that respect discipline and work ethics which are essential for the 
community's progress (p. 618). His earlier writings, including his 1970 classic 
The Malay Dilemma, suggested that he desired the creation of strong capitalist 
class through strong state patronage (Shaharuddin, 1988, pp.141-148). By the 
time he became prime minister, Mahathir was explicit in pointing out the 
Muslims' need to create wealth. In 1986, he published The Challenge critical of 
Malay religious life which tends to focus too much "on acquiring merits in the 
hereafter" (Mahathir, 1986, p.76). He considered worldly progress as part of 
Islamic values. In The Challenge, Mahathir said, "In Islam there are no hermits 
and no religious order which reject the world. For the rejection of the world and 
its wealth does not necessarily effect or enhance adherence to spiritual values" 
(p. 109). For Mahathir, Muslims can achieve progress by calibrating the correct 
balance between the world and the hereafter. 
Thus, I argue that Mahathir formed JAKIM and other federal Islamic institutions 
not only to contain the Islamic resurgence movement. He wanted to make Islam 
suit his progressive Islam ideas. Mahathir envisioned Malaysia as reaching the 
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status of a developed country by 2020, and felt progressive Islamic values could 
contribute to realising this vision. Mahathir also considered the ways Islam 
could facilitate his industrialisation and developmental agenda, and this could 
be achieved by improving the religious education infrastructure. 
Early on during his leadership, Mahathir sought to improve the ulema's religious 
training. He wanted Malaysia to produce excellent Islamic scholars and 
intellectuals. In 1983, Mahathir set up the MUM and ISTAC (International 
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation). The former served as a full-fledged 
university while the latter was a research institute that also issued post-graduate 
degrees. The Prime Minister's Office directly funded these institutions and 
determined the key appointments in them. MUM and ISTAC produced many 
religious elites and ulema who later occupied the religious bureaucracy such as 
JAKIM, IKIM and the religious bureaucracy at the negeri level. The state 
formed these institutes of higher learning to rival Al-Azhar University in Egypt. 
The MUM is also co-funded by the QIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) 
(Liow, 2009, p. 54). 
Nevertheless, the rise of Islamist PAS in the 1980s caused Mahathir to redirect 
his attention away from developing a progressive and capitalistic Islamic 
society. In the previous chapter, I discussed the changes that happened within 
the PAS leadership which accentuated the ethno-nationalist-lslamist cleavage. 
In the following paragraphs, I highlight the reasons why Mahathir and UMNO 
felt threatened by these developments within PAS, and why he decided to co-
opt ulema, Islamic intellectuals, and "impactful" personalities into the religious 
bureaucracy and UMNO. 
First, PAS posed a direct ideological challenge to UMNO. Since the 1980s, the 
party have been championing for an Islamic state and shariah laws. PAS 
leaders began to openly attack UMNO's ethno-nationalist ideology ketuanan 
Melayu (Hussin, 1990, p. 118), even though they were once its supporters. They 
equated UMNO's ideology as communal and asabiyah (an Arab culture that 
prioritises one's own clan) and hence un-lslamic. Given these developments, 
UMNO stepped up its campaign to recruit ulema sympathetic to its ideology. 
This was indeed an arduous task for UMNO, given that during that period, many 
ulema were influenced by the dakwah movement, and attracted to Muslim 
Brotherhood-like ideas and Islamist disourse. UMNO did manage to recruit 
ulema, such as Mohd Yusof Nor and Abdul Hamid Othman, but they were the 
ones who joined the party out of pragmatic reasons and did not shed their 
Islamist orientation. Evidently, in July 1999, Mohd Yusof declared that hudud 
laws cannot be implemented because Malaysia is a multi-racial society. He, 
however, did not question the suitability of the law in the modern context (Saeed 
& Saeed, 2004, p. 137). Similarly, Abdul Hamid, a former cabinet minister, said 
that shariah laws can be implemented in Malaysia when the time is right (Saeed 
& Saeed, 2004, p. 137). What he meant was that it is possible that shariah laws 
will be implemented if there comes a day when Malaysia's population is 
dominantly Muslim. 
' ' ' Abdul Hamid's views differed from those of progressive Islamic scholars, who have argued 
that the secular state is in line with Islamic values that represents the ideal form of qove rnLce 
for the modern world (An-Naim, 2008). a^vc. na. roe 
Second, PAS had come to emblemise an Islamic party, in contrast to UMNO as 
a secular party. This dichotomy happened after charismatic ulema, who had 
mass following, took control of the PAS's leadership in the late 1970s. They 
include Nik Aziz, Abdul Hadi Awang, Nakha'ie Ahmad, and Fadhil Noor. These 
ulema shunned UMNO because they felt party had relegated Islam to the 
periphery of society (Parish, 2004, p. 349). PAS continued recruiting charismatic 
ulema including those who had previously appeared on mainstream media. By 
the 1990s, charismatic ulema such as Haron Din and Ismail Kamus also joined 
PAS, leaving UMNO with the less popular ulema to align with. This was the 
reason why Mahathir had to empower religious institutions, as a form of 
enticement to attract ulema into UMNO's fold. In Chapter Three, I have 
discussed Mahathir's policies of empowering and expanding of the official 
ulema institutions JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM. Mahathir had to make many 
concessions in order to gain their support and to cajole them that they could 
Islamise the state from "within" through these institutions. 
Third, there was a lack of trust between PAS and UMNO leaders. While it is 
natural for parties to disagree on policies and ideology, the relationship between 
PAS and UMNO was filled with intense dislike. There were constant personal 
attacks on one another's leaders, including the serious act of kafir-mengkafir 
(calling each other apostates). PAS felt betrayed by UMNO when between 1974 
to 1978, PAS was made a junior member within the BN coalition from. Some 
PAS leaders went to the extreme of calling their struggle against UMNO a jihad 
(holy war). This was evident during the 1986 Memali incident, which left 
fourteen people and four policemen dead. The incident began with a protest led 
by PAS ulema, Ustaz Ibrahim IVIahmood (widely known as Ibrahim Libya), who 
resisted police attempts to arrest him under the ISA and close down his 
religious schools. The government considered Ibrahim as preaching radical 
ideas in Kedah, Penang, and Perak (Liow, 2009, p. 152). PAS later 
controversially declared the protesters killed as shahid (death from holy war that 
is guaranteed paradise). The kafir-mengkafir became uncontrolled to the extent 
that PAS leaders refused to pray behind an UMNO imam, conduct rituals with 
UIVlNO's supporters, and join their communal feasts. There was also talk by 
PAS and UMNO leaders that their supporters be buried in separate cemetaries 
(Hussin, 1990, p.123). 
These institutions came to UMNO's defence from the PAS ouslaught. 
Competition between official ulema and PAS did not stop in the 1980s, but 
continued to the 1990s and 2000s. The two camps disagreed about the concept 
of Islamic state. In 2001, Mahathir declared that Malaysia was an Islamic state. 
This controversial call was followed up in 2002, when JAKIM reiterated that 
Malaysia is an Islamic state because of the following reasons (JAKIM, 2008, pp. 
120-123):^®^ Islam is the official religion of the state; Malaysia is headed by a 
Muslim, the Yang-Dipertuan Agong (King); the administration of Islam is under 
the state's jurisdiction; Malaysia is acknowledged internationally as an Islamic 
state by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); there are established 
^^ ^ This is based on my summary that I have written elsewhere. See Norshahril, 2010a, p. 75-
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Islamic institutions that oversee the administration of Islam and shariah laws; 
there are key Islamic institutions such as Islamic banking. 
Rejecting Mahathir's and JAKIM's claim, PAS responded by tabling its very own 
Islamic State Document in 2003. This document differed significantly from the 
memorandum the party issued earlier entitled PAS memorandum to the 
Malaysian People: The Understanding of Islamic State in the context of 15'^ 
Hijrah/2f' Century Democracy. The 2003 document stated the party's desire to 
implement hudud laws when it got to power. 
On the flipside, Mahathir's decision to empower official ulema institutions later 
served as a double-edge sword for his succesors. Co-optation of ulema into 
state-sponsored institutions developed Islamism from within the state. Liow 
(2004, pp. 190-199) observes that negeri governments under UMNO oversaw 
an Islamic administration promoting orthodoxy. In 2002, four UMNO lawmakers 
in PAS-governed Terengganu chose to abstain PAS's proposal for the 
Terangganu Syariah Offences Bill, instead of voting against the bill (Liow, 2004, 
p. 196). After the 2013 general elections, some UMNO ulema had spoken about 
the possibility of implementing hudud in Malaysia, and were willing to co-
operate with PAS to realise this objective. In 2014, a section of UMNO was 
neutral about PAS's proposal to table a private members' bill in parliament for 
the implementation of hudud in Kelantan. 
Co-opting ulema and influential Muslims into state-structures 
I now turn to Mahathir's co-optation technique. If Suharto used co-optation 
institutions to group traditionalists and modernists, Mahathir relied on "impactful" 
Islamic personalities to legitimise the Islamic institutions. Interestingly, Syed 
Naquib Al-Attas, whom I earlier referred to as Malaysia's ideologue for the 
Islamic resurgence movement, was made ISTAC's founding director. Having Al-
Attas as the founding head of ISTAC reflected Mahathir's success in co-opting 
important religious scholars into the government. Al-Attas was involved in all 
aspects of the founding of ISTAC, including designing the campus and writing 
up the curriculum. More importantly, Al-Attas's co-optation neutralised ABIM's 
challenge towards the state. The dakwah movement was also convinced of 
Mahathir's commitment to Islamise the state by inviting its leaders to participate 
it its institutions. 
The man who might have persuaded Al-Attas to be involved in developing 
ISTAC was his own protege, Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar himself was Mahathir's 
biggest co-optation "catch." The influential and charismatic ABIM leader could 
potentially have followed other ABIM leaders in joining PAS, although 
Mahathir's memoirs claim that Anwar had voluntarily joined UMNO (Mahathir, 
2012, p. 404). On 29 March 1982, Anwar joined UMNO and ran as a candidate 
in the elections the same year. His first appointment into government came 
immediately after winning a seat in the elections and the position he was first 
appointed to was expected: the Deputy Minister in-charge of Islamic Religious 
Affairs, which was under the Prime Minister's Office (Mauzy & Milne, 1983, p. 
636). With Anwar's co-optation, ABIM seemingly lost its direction and became 
pro-Mahathir (Ahmad Fauzi, 2008)/'®^ 
IVIahathir hoped that by co-opting Anwar Ibrahim, ABIM members, and ulema 
into UMNO and the religious bureaucracies, he could avert political challenges 
from within his own party, and contained the threats from the dakwah groups 
such as the Darul Arqam movement. In the 1980s, Mahathir was looking for 
political alliances to help ensure his political survival. In 1987, Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah, a Prince from Kelantan, who allied with Mahathir's former 
deputy Musa Hitam, challenged Mahathir's leadership of UMNO. The party split 
into two teams: Team A and Team B. During the party elections, Team A which 
was led by Mahathir and Ghafar Baba only won by a meagre 43 votes. Anwar 
Ibrahim was part of Mahathir's faction. Anwar's consolidation of power in UMNO 
boosted the party's Islamic image. At the same time, Anwar Ibrahim's entry into 
UMNO helped the party to contain the influence of the Darul Arqam. ABIM and 
Darul Arqam did not agree on many issues, especially on the religious front. 
ABIM was closer to a Islamist brand of Islam while Darul Arqam was more Sufi-
mystical in its orientation. 
When Anwar was sacked from the government in 1998, the organisation became anti-
government and to build the reform of the movement that challenged the authority of the party. 
This shows that Anwar Ibrahim's influence on the organisation remain very strong (Ahmad 
Fauzi, 2008). 
In the 1980s, Mahathir's relations with the Malay rulers also deteriorated. Malaysia faced two 
constitutional crises of 1983 and 1987. Mahathir wanted to weaken the role of the monarchy by 
pushing for an amendment in the constitution. Constitution Amendment Act 1983 mainly stated 
that if the King did not give his assent to bills within 15 days, which was a requirement in the 
constitution previously, the bills would be assumed to have been passed. The other significant 
change concerned the right to declare a state of emergency. Previously, the King had the sole 
authority to do so, but with the amendment, he could only make the declaration after consulting 
the Cabinet. 
Nevertheless, Mahathir was not as successful in recruiting "impactful" ulema 
because most went to PAS. Thus, Mahathir resorted to groom official ulema to 
support the state's ethno-nationalist ideology. The prominent ulema and Islamic 
intellectuals co-opted into UMNO included Yusuf Noor, the Dean of Faculty of 
Islamic Studies from the National University of Malaysia (UKM), and Zainal 
Abidin Kadir, the Director of Pusat Islam (Islamic Centre). As will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven, UMNO tried to recruit muftis and National Mosque imams to 
run as UMNO candidates during elections. Mahathir, nonetheless, focussed on 
expanding the ulema's role in the bureaucracy. By 1982, about 100 ulema were 
employed in the Department for Islamic Development in the Prime Minister's 
Office, while another 715 ulema were designated to the Ministry of Education 
(Norani, Zainah, & Zaitun, 2005, p. 90). The numbers are likely to be higher 
today. Mahathir's co-optation of ulema allowed them to be directly involved in 
the formulation of "Islamic" policies (Norshahril, 2014, p. 362). 
Conclusion 
I categorised Suharto's co-optation strategy as symbolic institutionalism while 
Mahathir's as substantive institutionalism to differentiate the extent the two 
leaders empower ulema institutions, their motivations for co-opting ulema and 
other influential Islamic personalities, and the techniques they applied to 
weaken challengers. Briefly, Suharto was less interested to empower ulema 
compared to Mahathir. Mahathir accorded ulema institutions with legal and 
enforcement powers which Suharto did not. Also, Suharto and Mahathir had 
different motivations for co-optation because they were responding to different 
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kinds of religious cleavages. In Indonesia, the main cleavage was between the 
traditionalists and modernists; while in Malaysia, between the ethno-nationalist 
and Islamists. In addition, Suharto's co-optation was contrasted with Mahathir's 
by the techniques they applied. Suharto drew participation from diverse 
interests into newly created institutions, while Mahathir developed and 
upgraded traditional Islamic institutions to be occupied by UMNO sympathisers. 
PPP, MUl and ICMI were examples of Suharto's co-optation instruments. 
Suharto formed PPP to weaken the influence all Islamic parties, especially 
traditionalist NU. In order to curb the traditionalist's influence over the party, 
Suharto ensured modernist-oriented leaders occupy most of its leadership 
positions. This policy was consistent with Suharto's cabinet appointments, 
which since 1973, denied traditionalist ulema from becoming the country's 
Religious Minister. Similarly, MUl functioned as Suharto's co-optation 
instrument. MUl members had to support Pancasila. Most of the fatwas they 
issued during the New Order were mostly either supportive or neutral towards 
the regime. Suharto also ensured the institution is controlled by modernist-
oriented ulema. Throughout the New Order period, NU only held the 
chairmanship of the institution for three years, under Syukri Ghozali (1981-
1984). Even then, Syukri was never a vocal critic of the state and served most 
of his career as a Kemenag bureaucrat. In the same vein, Suharto's symbolic 
institutionalism defined ICMI's formation in 1990. However, unlike PPP and 
MUl, which were aimed at containing the traditionalist, Suharto formed ICMI to 
neutralise neo-modernist Muslim intellectuals. By the time ICMI was formed, all 
Indonesian Muslims organisations and institutions had embraced Pancasila as 
their ideology. Suharto used ICMI as the state's channel to prevent Islamic 
intellectuals from challenging its authority, and as a counter to the military, 
which, by the late 1980s, were internally divided in supporting him. 
In contrast, Mahathir's co-optation strategy relied mostly on the upgrading of 
traditional Islamic institutions. He upgraded the shariah courts, the negeri 
religious councils, and most significantly, federal Islamic institutes JKF-MKI and 
JAKIM. Mahathir co-opted ulema or key political personalities into these 
institutions to counter PAS, which in the 1980s, was becoming more Islamist in 
outlook. He also sought to bring the religious discourse closer to his definition of 
"progressive" Islam. In order to achieve these objectives, Mahathir strengthened 
the authority of JAKIM, IKIM and JKF-MKI. Important activists from the Islamic 
resurgence, particularly members of ABIM, were also invited into UMNO or lead 
his co-optation institutions. Besides, Mahathir also developed Islamic 
universities (such as MUM and ISTAC) and Islamic banks as part of his 
Islamisation agenda. He invited key resurgent ideologue. Professor Syed 
Naquib Al-Attas, to be ISTAC's founding director. 
By focussing on the contrasting Suharto's and Mahathir's co-optation strategies, 
the countries' religious cleavages, and political developments during the Islamic 
resurgence period, the chapter sets up the discussion for Chapters Six and 
Seven, where I discuss official ulema's capture of their respective states. 
Understanding these co-optation strategies is also relevant to these chapters' 
discussion in the following ways. First, the policies undertaken by Suharto and 
Mahathir continue to shape politics in their respective countries t o d a y . i n fact, 
the post-Suharto period continues to manifest the remnants of corruption, 
money politics, and repression by elites, thuggish intimidation of opponents and 
elite intimidation just as when Suharto was in power (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 
3). Similarly, Mahathir's legacy in Malaysia is equally profound. The problems 
created during Mahathir's rule has hindered many reforms that his 
predecessors wish to make (Welsh & Chin, 2013), including tacking corruption, 
resolving ethnic and religious tensions, and mitigating abuse of power by the 
ruling elites. Even after formally retiring from politics, Mahathir have interfered, 
covertly and overtly, in the political process. He also contributed to Abdullah 
Badawi's downfall after the 2008 elections. 
Second, both states continue to apply these contrasting co-optation strategies 
in managing Islamic interests. In other words, the Indonesian state behaviour 
towards Muslim organisations still reflects elements of symbolic institutionalism, 
while the Malaysian state applies substantive institutionalism. Contemporary 
MUl continues to be occupied by personalities from diverse groups, and it is in 
the state's interest MUl remains as such. Liberals, conservatives, progressives, 
traditionalists, modernists, and Islamists occupy MUl's leadership positions. On 
the other hand, the Najib Abdul Razak government continues to strengthen 
Malaysian official ulema institutions by giving them more public role, funding, 
and access in policy-making. The Najib government, through JAKIM, took 
To quote the words of Suharto's biographer, Elson (2001), "No matter how many 
Indonesians may wish to forget him [Suharto], there is no escaping his profound and far 
reaching legacy. Indonesians must seek to understand and be reconciled with that legacy 
before they can move on" (p. x). 
significant policies to upgrade religious schools and sekolah pondoks (Islamic 
boarding schools) and invited ulema for dialogues. 
Third, these institutions continue to shape and constrain the official ulema's 
capture of their respective states. The laws and powers defined by Suharto and 
Mahathir conditioned the goals of the official ulema's capture of the state. For 
example, MUl's powers in the realm of law and fatwa remain limited compared 
to their Malaysian counterparts. The Malaysian state established JAKIM's role 
in halal certification, while MUl's role in halal certification remained 
marginalised. Thus, contemporary MUl streamlined their efforts to pressure the 
Indonesian state accord it with that role, which Malaysian ulema does not have 
to do. 
Chapter Six 
MUl: Aims, strategies and challenges 
of capture 
The justification Suharto gave for establishing iViUI was to unite Indonesian 
ulema. Its role was to issue national fatwas and translate government policies. 
However, throughout the New Order, MUl constituted a strong case of co-
optation. Suharto pressed MUl to adopt Pancasila and not to issue fatwas that 
differed from state wishes (Bramantyo, 2009; Hooker, 1997, p. 16). Bramantyo 
observed MUl's "main function was to coerce the population into accepting 
government programs that were problematic in respect to Islamic tradition, such 
as mandatory birth control or raising money through the sale of national lottery 
tickets" (2009). During the New Order, MUl was nicknamed Majelis "Ular" 
Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Snakes) for overtly supporting the state 
(Feillard, 2010, p. 172). "From its conception the religious scholars who formed 
MUl were corrupted by their undignified submission to Suharto's power, known 
more for its ruthlessness than for its justice" (Bramantyo, 2009). 
Recent works, nevertheless, have pointed to the changing behaviour of MUl 
ulema: from being co-opted to asserting themselves and making progress 
towards state capture (see for example Moch Nur, 2005, 2010; Nadirsyah, 
2004; Ricklefs, 2012; Wahiduddin, 2004).^ ®® These works suggest that MUl 
influenced President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's government more than it did 
^^ Moch Nur (2010), in MUl's magazine Mimbar Ulema, underscores MUl's increasing 
confidence to act independently during the post-Suharto period. Not only was MUl critical of 
Abdurrahman Wahid when he was president (1999 to 2001), it issued many religious advisories 
seen as political and undermining the government (Moch Nur, 2005). Today, MUl sees itself 
now as khadimu'l ummah (servants of the community). 
under previous regimes. Ricklefs (2012) goes so far as to suggest that in the 
post-Suharto era, government was becoming a tool of MUl (p.319). A clear 
example, Ricklefs notes, is Susilo's opening speech of MUl's 7th MUNAS in 
2005 
We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and 
fatwas from the MUl and ulema at any time, either directly to me or to the 
Minister of Religious Affairs or to other branches of government. We want to 
place MUl in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it 
becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the 
state and areas where the government or state should heed the fatwas from the 
MUl and ulema (Ricklefs, 2012, p. 287). 
Scholars have also accused MUl of promoting conservatism and aspiring to 
purify Indonesian Islam (M. Crouch, 2009, p.8; Feillard & Madinier, 2011, pp. 
256-259; Mohamad Abdun, 2014; Ricklefs, 2012; Riddell, 2001, pp. 300-302). 
They have accused MUl's fatwas of fanning hatred of religious minorities such 
as the Ahmadiyahs, Shias, and liberal Muslim groups. 
I do not dispute that post-Suharto MUl has gained leverage over the state or 
that it has become more conservative. Since the fall of the Suharto government, 
MUl members have been more vocal in expressing their opinions publicly, and 
their fatwas are becoming more conservative than those of the New Order 
period. Yet, I argue MUl's influence over the state and society remains marginal, 
and MUl ulema are struggling to meet most of their capture objectives. 
The chapter examines MUl's four capture objectives as case studies. MUl's 
first objective is to strengthen its authority in shariah economics. In 2008, the 
state accorded one of MUl's institutions, DSN-MUl, authority to determine 
fatwas on Islamic banking and finance. DSN-MUl could also appoint 
supervisors for shariah financial institutions. MUl now wants to build on this 
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recognition to have authority over other aspects of shariah economics, such as 
Islamic insurance and micro-finance. Its second objective concerns the right to 
halal certification. Through LPPOM-MUl, it wants to monopolise this lucrative 
sector denying other ormas and Kemenag access. LPPOM-MUl is keen to 
dominate this sector because it generates additional funding for the institution 
as well as for some of its leaders. Its third objective, and arguably its most 
important one, is to dominate the religious discourse in Indonesia. Members 
claim that MUl is the tenda besar (big tent) for all ormas, and they want all 
Indonesian Muslims and ormas to follow the Fatwa Commission's rulings. MUl 
leaders want to be the only group that can define what correct Islam is. Related 
to this is their desire that the state deny "deviant" groups such as Ahmadiyah, 
Shias, and liberal Muslims their right to practise their faith or espouse their 
views. Fourth, MUl wants the authority to pronounce definitely on public 
morality. It wants its members to sit on censorship boards, and decide what 
constitutes good Islamic values for the media industry MUl's primary 
motivations in striving for these objectives are not solely political or economics, 
but emerge out of members genuine belief that they are moving Indonesian 
Muslims towards the Islamic ideal. 
Besides analysing of MUl's objectives, the chapter highlights the strategies MUl 
members use to meet these four aims. Their strategies include lobbying state 
officials to affect policies in their favour. MUl's capture would be deemed 
successful if key state officials or cabinet ministers agree with its fatwas. In 
addition, how they frame, word and time the release of fatwas could also affect 
government policies. There have been instances when MUl leaders issued 
fatwas in times of crisis, and rode on anti-state public sentiments in order to 
change government attitudes on a matter. MUl was more successful when it 
had society backing its religious rulings. Moreover, how MUl members strike 
backdoor deals with key players in the business sector determines their capture 
success or failure. There have also been instances where MUl leaders colluded 
with prominent businessmen to monopolise Islamic and banking sectors. 
I suggest MUl has been successful in at least one aspect of its state capture: 
overseeing the shariah banking and financial sectors. However, it has been 
struggling to meet other objectives. The chapter concludes with an examination 
of MUl's current push for shariah tourism, which signals the institution's focus 
on Muslim conservatism and demonstrates its capture is a work in progress. 
MUl ulema have been struggling to meet their objectives because they do not 
have the three capture modalities their Malaysian counterparts have. There is 
no clear institutional and legal demarcation of authority between MUl and the 
state. Existing laws in Indonesia vaguely define MUl's role in the areas it 
assumes authority such as fatwas and moral censorship. MUl's uncertain 
responsibilities date back to Suharto's co-optation strategies. Suharto was not 
interested in empowering official ulema, and relied heavily on repressive tactics 
to ensure conformity to his policies. Thus, MUl directed much of its resources to 
revising existing legislation to have the state recognise and strengthen their 
institution. They also relied on societal conservatism to pressure the state to 
conform to their requests. The contemporary Indonesian state, however, 
continues to restrict MUl's capture. Politicians and Kemenag officials are 
determined to confine MUl's role to the religious sphere. In contrast, the 
Malaysian state recognised the roles of the official ulema in Malaysia, where the 
law clearly defines the statutory roles of JAKIM and MKI. 
Furthermore, MUl ulema have been unable to articulate their interests around 
the state's ideology, Pancasila. This results from the nature of the philosophy 
underlying Pancasila itself, which is religiously neutral. The adoption of 
Pancasila with its principles of religious tolerance restricted MUl's attempts to 
"Islamise" the state. For example, rival ormas have challenged MUl ulema's 
enforcing halal certification on all food products and banning all forms of 
immoral entertainment, as violating Pancasila's principles of religious neutrality 
and diversity. In contrast, the constitutional provision in Malaysia—that Islam is 
the religion of the federation—legitimated Malaysian ulema's conduct, to the 
extent that they could act autonomously. While the Malaysian constitution 
guarantees other faiths can practise freely, official ulema ignored them. 
Moreover, MUl is fragmented. Divisions between members have weakened the 
institution's ability to lobby politicians to incorporate their requests into existing 
laws and regulations.^" Divisions in MUl exist in ideological and personal 
forms. Ideological differences persist between the traditionalists and modernists 
and between the progressives and conservatives. Personal differences, from 
members competing for access to important networks, also divide MUl. 
Arguably, these internal differences have affected MUl's image and diminished 
the public's trust in it. The public questions MUl members' true intentions, and 
their competence in managing Islamic affairs. I now turn to MUl's four major 
objectives and assess each's degree of state capture. 
Slater (2010, p. 5) explains how collective mass actions is mobil ised in Southeast Asian and 
effects elite cohesion. Slater believes that the Indonesian state capacity and party strength is 
intermediate, compared to the Malaysian case which is strong for both variables (p.8). 
Expanding authority in sliariah economics 
The shariah banking and finance have grown to be the most lucrative sectors in 
Indonesia, even though the country is relatively a latecomer compared to 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While the Suharto government recognised 
Islamic banking in 1983, it was only in 1999 that Indonesia had its first Shariah 
bank: Bank Muamalat (Lindsay, 2012b, p.189). Since then, the number of 
shariah banks increased. In 2002, there were only two shariah banks, but in 
2010, there were ten (p. 192). The amount of assets linked to shariah banks 
also increased. In 2002, the sector's assets were Rp 7.7 trillion (A$760, 707, 
134) but in 2010, they reached Rp 90.4 trillion (A$8, 930, 899, 348) (Lindsey, 
2012b, p.192). 
In 2008, the DPR passed the Shariah Banking Law No 21/ 2008 that accorded 
MUi authority to issue fatwas related to the shariah economics sector. The law 
granted this authority specifically to one of MUl's institutions, the DSN-MUI. The 
state's endorsement of DSN-MUI's role in shariah economics reflects an aspect 
of successful capture: MUI ulema can shape shariah economic policies, 
influence appointments, and generate income for themselves. DSN-MUI seeks 
to build on this state-endorsement to consolidate and expand their authority in 
the sector. The following paragraphs will discuss DSN-MUi's roles and success 
in shariah economics. I will also explicate DSN-MUI's strategies for expansion 
and domination; as well as the challenges it faces in meeting capture 
objectives. 
DSN-MUI's roles 
MUl established the DSN-MUl on 10 February 1999 to issue fatwas on shariah 
economics.''®® Before 2008, not all DSN-MUI's fatwas had been incorporated 
into shariah banking directives (M Cholil, 2011, p. 108); but now, DSN-MUI's 
fatwas have regulatory force on matters pertaining to shariah banking, 
insurance (takaful), and finance. According to Article 26 of the Sharia Banking 
Law, all shariah-based businesses, products, and services must comply with 
DSN-MUl fatwas. This state recognition of DSN-MUI's fatwas is an achievement 
for the institution, because Suharto had denied MUl this role in the past. 
DSN-MUI's role is not limited to fatwas but also extends to supervision. Article 
32 of the Law specifies that all shariah banks must establish a DPS (Dewan 
Pengawas Shariah or Shariah Supervisory Boards) within them. Each DPS 
comprises of two to three DSN-MUl appointed representatives. DPS members 
act as shariah advisors to the institutions to which they have been appointed, 
and their task is to ensure all banking and financial operations are consistent 
with Islamic principles (M Cholil, 2011, pp. 98-99). Their role is to ensure that all 
banking transactions are free from riba or bank interest, which the Quran forbids 
(Sekretariat DSN-MUl, 2010, p. 1).''®® DSN-MUl requires conventional and 
commercial financial institutions with shariah departments to form DPS. 
Discussions on the formation of a MUl body overseeing the shariah economy began in 1990. 
The mission and vision of this body was to socialise shariah economy to the masses. The 
creation of this body was first mooted In a convention that questioned the permissibility of bank 
Interest In Islam. 
See Bank Indonesia, 2008; Sekretariat DSN-MUl, 2010. 
structurally, DSN-MUl functions like a "MUl" within MUI. DSN-MUI's leadership 
structure has two levels; the Management Board (Pleno) and the BPH-DSN 
(Badan Pelaksana Harian Dewan Syariah Naslonal or Executive Board). The 
Management Board has 37 members and its role is to chart the direction of the 
institution. The BPH-DSN has 21 members and takes charge of the day-to-day 
running of the institution and issuing fatwas (M Cholil, 2011, p. 85). As at 2011, 
DSN-MUl had delivered 75 f a t w a s . O n e has to contrast DSN-MUl fatwas to 
MUI Fatwa Commission ones. Fatwa Commission rulings are legally non-
binding. DSN-MUl publishes its fatwas in a separate book from the Fatwa 
Commission ones (DSN-MUl, 2012). Reflecting its intent to be a global player in 
shariah economics, DSN-MUl also published its fatwas in three languages-
Indonesian, English and Arabic. In contrast, the Fatwa Commission published 
its fatwa compilation in Bahasa Indonesia only. 
DSN-MUI's push to appropriate the shariah economics sector 
DSN-MUl members are generally satisfied with the state's endorsement of their 
authority over shariah economics (DSN-MUl, 2011, pp. vi-vii).^®'' During the 
2010 MUNAS, they did not make any further demands pertaining to the sector 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2 0 1 A s mentioned, DSN-MUl has authority to 
determine whether institutions meet the "shariah" standards. Financial 
institutions that meet the shariah standards will receive certificates from DSN-
This perspective I gathered during my interviews with MUI leaders. With the formalisation of 
DSN-MUI's role in 2008, Lindsey (2012c) admits that MUI has begun to accrue quasi-legislative 
powers that resemble those enjoyed by the state ulema councils and mufti elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, but that has not previously been available to any modern Indonesian fatwa-
producing body (p.254). 
The leaders who have given this endorsement include President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyon, 
Vice-President Boediono, former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani, and former Coordinating Minister 
for Economic Affairs Hatta Rajasa. 
This is different for other issues—such as the halal certification, pornography bills and 
religious deviance—where MUI requested the state to formally endorse its role. 
MUl. So far, DSN-MUl has issued shariah certificates to quite a few banks, for 
example BNI Shariah, Mandiri Bank Shariah, and HSBC. 
Financial institutions requihng DSN-IVIUI certificates need to undertake several 
steps. They must send representatives to explain the nature of the institution's 
financial transactions and source of capital to DPS officials. DSN-MUl requires 
these financial institutions to reveal who is managing the shariah compliant 
departments. The DPS members provide assistance to financial institutions 
once they meet their conditions. Aminudin Yakub, a member of DSN-MUl, 
noted that 
Based on the [2008 shariah banking] law, every enterprise or company that 
wants to adopt sharlah-oriented businesses has to form a Shariah Supen/isory 
Board (DPS). The task of these advisors [in DPS] is to determine whether every 
activity is shariah compliant. These advisors are tasked with providing opinions 
on ways to develop shariah-based products. These advisors act as a bridge 
between the enterprises and DSN-MUl.'®^ 
In the same vein, DSN-MUl members alone appoint shariah advisors in 
financial institutions, preventing those who are not in MUl from these 
positions."'®'* They see themselves as the only competent advisors on 
jurisprudential matters related to economics, including the ability to distinguish 
halal (permissible in Islam) transactions and un-lslamic investments 
(Muhammad Syafi'i, 2001, p. 34). DSN-MUI's role manifests two aspects of 
successful capture: its members have a monopoly over the discourse on 
shariah economics; and they can influence appointments of personnel in 
Interview with Aminudin Yakub, IVIember of Dewan Shariah National, 3 December 2012. 
^^ Some members of the ormas are also in MUl. 
financial institutions. According to Ma'ruf Amin, the VIce-Chairman of MUl who 
is also an active DSN-MUl member 
The problem is that institutions that have the authority to manage finances, both 
banks and non-banks, are not equipped with the authority in shariah. The 
Indonesian state is not a religious state and also not a secular state. For 
example. Bank Indonesia, which all this while has been authorised by the laws 
and mandated to manage the banking sector, does not have the authority to 
determine whether the operations or products carried out by Islamic financial 
institutions are in line with shariah principles (quoted in M Cholil, 2011, p. vi) 
Ma'ruf is implying that DSN-MUI's role is to complement the state's and the 
Indonesian Central Bank's incompetency in Islamic jurisprudence. M Cholil 
Nafis, a DSN-MUl member, echoes Ma'rufs views. He adds that DSN-MUl 
members have a role to equipping bank managers with fiqih muamalah or 
Islamic jurisprudence concerning trade because there are no other channels for 
bank personnel to learn about Islamic banking (M Cholil, 2011, p. 98). 
DSN-MUl members feel that they are persons of good character and high 
learning, giving them exclusive rights to determine appointments in shariah 
financial institutions. They claim that they will not appoint "immoral" persons. 
Aminudin characterises an immoral person as someone who has a poor record 
of accomplishment in the financial sector, has taken credit loans from banks, 
and has not paid those l o a n s . D S N - M U l members also judge a person's 
morality by the quality of his religious practices and rituals. Ichwan Sam, MUl's 
secretary general, said that 
If the person does not carry out his prayers, even though this may be a very 
small issue, it is reported [to the MUl leaders]. If the person is caught gambling 
in Singapore, then he will not be appointed into the DPS These moral 
standards apply for all the ulema in MUl. We as the leaders of MUl are not 
supposed to go to the cinemas. We are not allowed to eat and drink at cafes in 
Interview with Aminudin Yakub, 3 December 2012. 
the middle of the night. These actions are inappropriate for an alim [singular for 
ulema]. Morality is very important.^ ®® 
So far, no DSN-MUl member has ever been called up by the KPK (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Commission), and there 
have not been any reports related to DSN-MUl members' wrongdoings. The 
public's trust of DSN-MUl is stronger compared to its halal certification body, 
LPPOM-MUl, where there have been allegations of members' abuse of power 
and corruption (to be discussed later). However, one DSN-MUl member I 
interviewed cautions against optimism. He felt that the standard operating 
procedures regarding DPS appointments remain unclear.''®^ In other words, 
appointments into the DPS depends on personal ties and networks rather than 
merit. 
DSN-MUl has published many articles presenting their projections for shariah 
economics. Through these publications, DSN-MUl hopes to draw investment 
into the sector, raising demand for DSN-MUI's services. In 2011, DSN-MUl 
published the Direktori Shariah Indonesia (Sharia Directory of Indonesia) which 
exaggerated several projections of the Indonesian shariah banking and finance 
sectors. DSN-MUl forecast that by 2023, the Indonesian shariah financial sector 
will overtake other Islamic countries including Egypt and Turkey (DSN-MUl, 
2011, p. 17).^ ®® DSN-MUl is upbeat about Indonesia eventually taking over 
countries such as United Kingdom, Yemen, Syria and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) in Islamic banking. By 2023, DSN-MUl hopes that Indonesia will have 
Interview with Ichwan Sam, 7 December 2012. 
Interview with a member of Dewan Shariah Nasional, 12 August 2014. 
It projects the Egyptian Islamic financial industry in 2023 to be worth US$624 billion (A$718 
billion), followed by Turkey's US$581 billion (A$669 billion). Iran's assets in the Islamic financial 
industry will amount to US$581 billion (A$669 billion). 
overtaken its closest neighbour IVlalaysia, whose current asset-holding is the 
largest in Asia (DSN-MUl, 2011, p. 17). Current statistics, nevertheless, suggest 
that DSN-MUl will not achieve any of its forecasts. In fact, Indonesian Islamic 
banks have struggled to meet the earlier targets set by Bank Indonesia, to 
increase market share to five per cent by 2008 (Rifki, 2013, p. 127). 
DSN-MUl employs the language similar to that used by the Islamic resurgence 
movement of the 1970s to increase demand for its services. Its members 
repeatedly profess that Islam has its own systems and values as opposed to 
Western and secular values. They also claim that Islam endorses a universal 
economics system that can be found in shariah economics. To quote from the 
Direktori Shariah Indonesia, 
History shows that the development of Islamic financial industry requires a very 
long process to achieve its present state, which leads to the formation of Islamic 
banks, insurance and capital markets. This history began with the birth of Islam 
15 centuries ago. Islam recognises muamalah (trade) principles and bridges 
law of human relations to covers trade relations in a broad sense (DSN-MUl, 
2011, p.15). 
Slamet Effendy Yusuf, a MUl board member, also applied anti-Western 
reasoning to promote Islamic banks. According to Slamet, 
Shariah economy is something that Indonesia needs. The capitalistic system is 
very exploitative. When a person uses a credit card, they have to pay interest 
up to as much as 100 per cent. They [the Westerners] are exploiting the weak. 
If we use the credit card for one year, we have to pay interest... Shariah 
economy is not exploitative and not harmful to people. Shariah economics is 
anti-interest.''®® 
Thus, DSN-MUl endeavours to consolidate its dominance in the shariah 
economics sector. They claim to be competent in both theological and 
economics matters, morally upright supervising financial transactions, and 
Interview with Slamet Effendy Yusof, 5 December 2012. 
having the leadership qualities to drive Indonesian shariah economics forward. 
They use emotive language to market DSN-MUI's services distinct from the 
pitches of conventional financial institutions. 
Expanding shariah economics beyond banking and finance 
Since 2008, DSN-MUl has sought to expand their authority in shariah 
economics to other financial sectors. These sectors include insurance, pensions 
fund, venture capital, credit, commodities, pawnshop, capital markets, corporate 
and finance (DSN-MUl, 2011). After the shariah banking and finance sectors, 
the other most developed sectors DSN-MUl is managing is insurance. 
Currently, DSN-MUl appoints shariah supervisors in Islamic insurance 
companies. According to the D/reWor; Syariah Indonesia, Islamic insurance 
offers life protection and assistance schemes that follow the principle of tabarru, 
where insurers agree to donate part of contributions to help the needy. The 
directory indicates that these tabarru contracts do not contain gharar 
(deception), masyir (gambling), riba (usury), zulm (persecution), and risywah 
(bribery) (DSN-MUl, 2011, pp. 64-65). The directory also specifies that such 
immoral practices are prevalent in conventional insurance schemes. 
Nonetheless, the directory does not give any evidence on how these 
conventional insurance schemes contain such immoral practices. 
Are DSN-MUl members committed to bringing Muslims closer to Islam, or are 
they fulfilling personal interests? From the outset, they claim to act based on 
Islamic principles. They were building on this discourse calling for Islamic 
alternatives to conventional financial institutions and businesses. Yet, there are 
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also economic motivations underlying their projects. DSN-MUl members want a 
stake in the above-mentioned sectors so that they can generate additional 
funds for their institution, and for themselves, by increasing the number of 
patrons for the services they are offering. 
Recently, DSN-MUl wanted a role in the Haj and umrah sectors, which is 
currently overseen by the Kemenag (under the Haj Directorate General or Ditjen 
Haji). The Haj is the fifth pillar of Islam where Muslims undertake their 
pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The Haj is held annually on 
the twelfth month of the Islamic calendar, and on average, 200 000 Indonesians 
travel to Mecca. The umrah is a short-term pilgrimage to Mecca available to 
Muslims at any time of the year. DSN-MUl regulations dictate Muslims can only 
use funds kept in "interest-free" banks to finance Haj and umrah, implying 
Muslims can only use funds kept in shariah banks registered with DSN-MUl. 
Because of this, DSN-MUl wants the Kemenag to recognise DSN-MUI's role in 
the Haj and umrah sector and help develop the shariah-banking sector. 
According to Aminudin Yakub, 
The Haj is a religious obligation, hence based on the regulation and 
government order, Haj funds have to be managed by the shariah banks. The 
shariah banks also manage the zakat, the tithe. Right now, the market share for 
shariah banks is only four per cent. The main factor for this low figure is the lack 
of political will from the Indonesian government. In Malaysia, the government is 
supportive, and the government has rules and regulations that spurred the 
growth of the Islamic banks.'™ 
Though DSN-MUl has not issued a fatwa on the Haj and umrah, I consider 
DSN-MUI's insistence, that Indonesian Muslims can only use interest-free funds 
to finance the Haj and umrah, conservative. For a long time, most ulema in 
™ Interview with Aminudin Yakub, IVIember of Dewan Shariah National, 3 December 2012. 
Indonesia had no qualms about Muslims using funds deposited in conventional 
banks to finance their Haj and umrah. NU and Muhammadiyah ulema have also 
run banks based on the conventional system. The ulema in the Islamic w o r l d -
including those in Malaysia—generally allow Muslims to use funds from 
conventional banks for Haj and umrah. In Singapore, a majority of Muslims 
financed their Haj through funds deposited in the conventional banks. 
Personalised capture in DSN-MUl 
The D/reWor; Shariah Indonesia shows that DSN-MUI's venture into Islamic 
economics has given rise to a few powerful individuals. At least two DSN-MUl 
Pleno members dominate DPS appointments in established banks, and they 
are Syafi'i Antonio and Ma'ruf Amin.^''^ Syafi'i Antonio is the shariah supervisor 
of five banks, and of them is the BT Bank Syariah Mandiri PT, which is the 
biggest shariah bank in Indonesia. Syariah Mandiri PT owns a quarter of the 
market share of eleven biggest Islamic banks in Indonesia."^ Syafi'i also holds 
appointments in the Islamic Banking Committee at the Central Bank of 
Indonesia, Central Bank of Malaysia, and the Dubai based Global Shariah 
Board of al-Mawarid Finance and Insurance."^ In 2010, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Syafi'i as a member of KEN (Komite Ekonomi 
Nasional or National Economic Committee) which advises the Indonesian 
President on economic matters. Besides these appointments, Syafi'i is also a 
successful entrepreneur. He is CEO of the Islamic-based Tazkia Group and the 
Chairman of Tazkia University College of Islamic Economics. He also 
' ' ' Syafi'i Antonio (@Nio Gwan Chung), a Muslim convert, holds a Master's Degree in Syariah 
from Jordan University, Masters of Economics from International Islamic University of Malaysia, 
and PhD in micro finance from the University of Melbourne 
Global Capital Website, 2013. 
See Syafi'i Antonio Website, http://www.svafiiantonio.com/ (Date Accessed: 11 June 2014). 
Syafi'i also owns the Tazkia Travel and Tours. 
established the AlC (Andalusia Islamic Centre). Located in SentuI Bogor, AlC 
houses the STEI TAZKIA Campus, a mosque, a multi-purpose centre, the 
Andalusia Converts Centre, and the Andalusia Commercial Centre. The AlC is 
located on 25000 square meters of land in Jakarta (Edy Supriatna, 2011). 
Ma'ruf Amin has the highest number of appointments as shariah supervisor. He 
sits on the sharia supervisory committees of at least eight banks and insurance 
companies. Other senior MUl leaders supervise between one and three banks 
on average. Based on the the Direktori Shariah Indonesia, Hasanuddin (MUl 
Fatw/a Commission Chairman), Didin Hafidhuddin and Muhammad Gamawan 
Yasni only supervise one bank each."'* MUl Chairman Sahal Mahfudz (before 
he passed away on 24 January 2014) sat in only two financial institutions: the 
AJB Bumiputera 1912 and Bank HSBC Indonesia PT (DSN-MUl, 2011, p. 33). 
Din Syamsuddin, MUl's current chairman, is the shariah supervisor for Bank 
Syariah Bukopin PT and Bank Danamon. MUl secretary general, Ichwan Sam, 
supervises only three financial institutions in total: they are Bank Maybank 
Syariah, Asuransi Jiwa Syariah Al Amin, and Reasuransi Internasional 
Indonesia. The table below shows the list of financial institutions that appointed 
Syafi'i and Ma'ruf as shariah supervisors. 
' " Hasanuddin supervises Banl< Danamon while Didin Hafidhuddin and Muhammad Gamawan 
Yasni are supervisors for Bank BRI Shariah. 
Table 3. List of institutions in wl i ich Syafi'i Antonio and Ma'ruf Amin are 
DPS members"® 
DSN-MUl Member Syafi'i Antonio Ma'ruf Amin 
BT Bank Syariah Mandiri PT Bank BNI Shariah PT 
Indonesia EximBank Bank Muamalat Indonesia PT 
Financial 
Batasa Capital Bank Syariah Mega Indonesia PT 
Inst i tut ions 
Permodalan Nasional Madani MEGA Capital Investama 
(Persero) ESQ Leadership Centre 
PNM Techno Venture Syariah Ikatan Ahli Ekonomi Islam (lAEI) 
Golden Traders Indonesia Shariah 
(GTIS) 
Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah 
(MES) as Chairman of Board of 
Patron 
PT 
Source: DSN-MUl (2011). 
DPS members are paid by the banks and insurance companies they supervise, 
which raises questions about their objectivity in the way they approve financial 
transactions (Lindsey, 2012c, p. 266). In addition, very little information is 
available on how much they receive. MUl has not been forthcoming in providing 
this information and does not publish or publicly discuss their financial accounts 
(Lindsey, 2012c, p. 266). When asked about how much banks pay DPS 
members, my interviewees from DSN-MUl refused to disclose this information. 
DSN-MUI's venture into expanding shariah economics have accelerated Ma'ruf 
Amin's rise in the public domain. He has become the institution's spokesperson 
on shariah economics. He has been invited to speak in conferences and has 
' The ESQ Leadership Centre and lAEI are not financial institutions in the strictest sense. 
published many books on the subject. On 5 May 2012, Ma'ruf received an 
honorary doctorate {honoris causa) from UIN Syarif Hidayatullah for his 
contributions towards the country's development in Islamic banking and finance 
sectors. During the award ceremony, Professor Atho' Mudzar—who in 1993 
published his doctoral thesis critical of MUl—hailed Ma'ruf as the person who 
found a breakthrough in Islamic banking through the revitalisation of classical 
concepts (Ahmadie, 2012, p. 21). I consider Atho's words about Ma'ruf 
exaggerated considering Ma'ruf's views, including those spelled out in his book 
Era Baru Ekonomic Islam Indonesia (Ma'ruf, 2011), are mishmash of key ideas 
from other Islamic scholars. The lack of originality in Ma'rufs view is 
understandable; his past affiliations show that he was more a politician than an 
economist. Ma'ruf has been a former DPR member for three parties: NU, PPP 
and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party. In 1971, he 
was elected as NU's DPRD (Dewan Penwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Indonesian 
Regional Legislative Assembly) member for Jakarta at the age of 28 (Asrori, 
2013).^''® Later, Ma'ruf became a politician in PKB."^ While Ma'ruf was very 
active in politics, there is little indication that he received any formal training in 
economics. As his biography 70 Tahun Dr KH Ma'ruf Amin indicates, Ma'ruf's 
educational background was mainly in the religious sciences. He is a graduate 
Nevertheless, he did not run as a candidate in 1982. Ma'ruf later left PPP because he 
believed that NU had been sidelined, after PPP was led by Parmusi leader Jaelani Naro from 
1978 to 1989. 
During the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, Ma'ruf fell out with the NU and PKB leadership 
Abdurrahman Wahid denied Ma'ruf a senior PKB position. After this fallout Ma'ruf sought to re-
establish himself with MUl and became less active in NU (Asrori, 2013 p 27) Ma'ruf also 
clashed with Abdurrahman Wahid's pluralist values (Preston, 2012 p 170) Ma'ruf Amin 
threatened to leave NU if they did not declare Ahmadiyah deviant. ' Interview with Rumadi 
Ahmad, Program Coordinator, Wahid Institute, 3 December 2012. 
from pesantren Tebuireng in Jombang and Ibn Khaldun University (Asrori, 
2013).''^^ 
Ma'ruf's active involvement in DSN-MUl propelled him into the state's power 
structure during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government. He served as a 
member of the Wantimpres (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden or Presidential 
Advisory Council), which is an advisory body to the president separate from 
cabinet. Wantimpres members have a significant influence of policy-making, 
and they may be required to attend cabinet meetings or accompany the 
president on state and working visits (Butt & Lindsey, 2012, p. 38).'"'® Ma'ruf's 
appointment is a great recognition for a kiai who had not been very influential in 
the religious domain. He founded a relatively less known Pesantren An Nawawi 
Tanara which is located in Tangerang, Banten (West Java). 
On the other hand, the rise of the likes of Ma'ruf Amin and Syafi'i Antonio show 
elements of personalised capture. They are able to occupy important positions 
in the state and exploit business networks to become successful entrepreneurs. 
Personalised capture is a subset of institutional capture, which is reflected in 
MUl's ability to obtain state recognition on the shariah economics sector. The 
possibility for personalised capture attracts ulema to MUl, even though the 
institution's influence in the religious domain is questionable. Institutions such 
™ Ma'ruf also claims his authority through his genealogy. He is the grandson of famous Syeikh 
Nawawi al-Banten. 
See website "Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden," 2014. Since 2010, Ma'ruf Amin has served on 
the Inter-religious relations committee, but from 2007 to 2009, he served on the religious life 
committee. 
as MUl provide avenues for ulema to tap the state's resources or to propel 
themselves into the state power structures. 
Can DSN-IVIUI bui ld on its success? 
I consider DSN-MUl a case of successful capture. Yet, the institution continues 
to face several constraints in achieving dominant status in shariah economics. 
Certain provisions in the 2008 Sharia Banking Law illustrates that DSN-MUI's 
role is more limited than its members' would like.^®° According to Lindsey 
(2012a), the 2008 Law confirms that Indonesia's Central Bank—and not DSN-
MUl—has the final authority over Islamic banking in all aspects (Lindsey, 
2012a, p. 122). He says 
The 2008 Islamic Banking Law did not radically alter the existing laws intended 
to 'tidy up' inconsistencies, and it explicitly stated in art 69 that the 1992 
Banking Law, as amended by the 1998 Banking Amendment Law, continued to 
apply to the extent not inconsistent with the new Law (Lindsey, 2012a, p.116). 
Certain provisions in the law also indicate that DSN-MUl members do not have 
exclusive powers to determine shariah supervisory board appointments. Article 
32 Paragraph (2) of the Law stipulates that "a Sharia Supervisory Board as 
considered in paragraph (1) shall be appointed by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders on the recommendations of the Indonesian Ulema Council." This 
shows the banks have overriding powers to reject DSN-MUl recommendations 
even though this has not yet happened. 
The Blueprint for Islamic Banking in Indonesia, a document produced by the state in 2002 
indicates that DSN-MUI's role is mainly to do with to theological matters. The document remains 
the guide to state policy in Islamic economics. The blueprint shows that the state is less 
interested in islamic traditions or debates, but how the fatwa should be situated in accordance 
with state regulatory policies and standards (Lindsey, 2012a, p. 122). The passing of the 2008 
Shariah Banking Law only affirms this role. / a ^ ^uuu 
Moreover, DSN-MUl has not been effective in marketing the sector. Compared 
to conventional banl<s, the market share for Islamic banks remains low. In 2009, 
Islamic banks' market share stood at 2.6 per cent and in 2010, 3.2 per cent. As 
at February 2012, the percentage of those who patronise Islamic banks remain 
at four per cent (Rifki, 2013, p. 127)."'®^ This percentage is below the target set 
by Bank Indonesia, which was five per cent by the end of 2008. Furthermore, as 
at November 2009, Islamic banks' share of assets in relation to total banking 
assets was just 2.49 per cent (Rifki, 2013, p.98). Given Islamic banks' 
underachievement, DSN-MUl is unlikely to accomplish its goal as a leading 
institution in the international Islamic banking and finance sectors, and to 
overtake United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Malaysia by 2023. The low 
demand for Islamic banking services Is also seen in other institutions that MUl 
helps to setup or manage, such as the BAYARNAS (Badan Arbritese Shariah 
Nasional or Indonesian National Sharia Arbitration Board) and the BAMUl 
(Badan Arbritese Muamalat Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Arbitral Tribunal). 
In 1993, DSN-MUl created these institutions to resolve disputes over Islamic 
finance, Islamic banking and Islamic insurance and their services are available 
to both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, between 1997 and 2010, only 17 
cases were filed to both BAYARNAS and BAMUl (Lindsey, 2012c, p. 263). 
In March 2014, the media scrutinised DSN-MUI's shariah certification 
competency in the Golden Traders Indonesia Shariah (GTIS) scandal. DSN-
MUl issued a shariah certificate to GTIS, an investment company involved in 
Interview with Aminudin Yakub, Member of Dewan Sliariah National, 3 December 2012. 
gold trading. Ma'ruf Amin served as one of its DPS members. Tempo reported 
that GTIS founder, Michael Ong disappeared with an estimated of Rp 1 trillion 
(A$1 million) worth of i n ves tmen t . I t also reported that MUl owned ten per 
cent of the company shares (Tempo, "Nasabah GTIS Akan Demo ke Kantor 
MUl," 18 March 2014,). The media held Ma'ruf accountable for issuing a shariah 
certificate to GTIS. Although DSN-MUl issued certificates to companies based 
on compliance to Islamic principles, DPS members have a duty to monitor every 
banking transaction. They must ensure that every bank employee is a person of 
integrity and has a good record in finance.''®^ This is in line with Syafi'i Antonio's 
perception of a shariah bank: 
A shariah bank must reflect Islamic work ethics. Bank professionals must be 
persons with integrity and good Muslims. They must be skilful and 
professional.... They must also dress ethically as they work in institutions that 
bear the name of Islam. They must cover their aurat (modesty) and must be 
well-mannered (cited in Riza Yulistia, 2009, p. 99). 
DSN-MUl may have mistakenly issued a shariah certificate to Michael Ong; but 
the whole GTIS issue highlights the underlying problems of DSN-MUI's shariah 
certification. Nadratuzzaman Hosen, a MUl leader, says that GTIS owners 
capitalised on DSN-MUl certificates to attract Muslims to their scheme.''®" Yet, 
DSN-MUl was only involved in the pre-certification stage. MUl Chairman, Din 
Syamsuddin conceded that MUl cannot supervise shariah transactions (Tempo, 
"MUl Akui Kecolongan Soal Investasi Bodong GTIS," 19 March 2014,). Ma'ruf 
Amin later disclosed that DSN-MUl only conducted checks once every two 
years. His confession contradicted the image other members tried to portray: 
As a result, 80 affected investors protested at MUl's office in Jalan Proklamasi in Jakarta in 
March 2014. 
Refer to Aminuddin Yakub's views earlier on DSN-MUI's role in assessing investors' records 
of accomplishment. Interview with Aminudin Yakub, Member of Dewan Shariah National 3 
December 2012. 
Interview with Nadratuzzaman Hosen, MUl leader, 12 August 2014. 
that DPS actively monitors every banl<jng transaction. To be sure, the GTIS 
controversy dented DSN-MUI's credibility in supervising Islamic financial 
institutions. 
Generating income through halal certification 
As discussed in the previous paragraphs, MUl has been generally successful in 
dominating the shariah economics sector. MUl members hope to replicate this 
success in the halal certification sector. Halal certification is another source of 
income for MUl, apart from funds it receives from the state, and the income 
generated from shariah economics. Currently, MUl is the biggest institution in 
Indonesia issuing halal certificates for food and drinks, medicines, and 
cosmetics. The main institution within MUl responsible for halal certification is 
LPPOM-MUI. 
However, its aim to dominate halal certification has been restricted by 
Kemenag. Competition from NU, which also wanted to be involved in the sector, 
is likely to limit LPPOM-MUI's role. In fact, Kemenag has always been NU's 
stronghold. Between 2009 and 2014, the DPR debated the Halal Certification 
bill. LPPOM-MUI wanted exclusive authority over halal certification clearly 
defined in the revised law because its current role has been de jure rather than 
de facto. On the other hand, Kemenag insisted that halal certification fell under 
its authority and MUl's role only concerned fatwas.''®® 
This information is provided through my conversations with LPPOM-IVIUI members. 
Furthermore, a series of scandals involving LPPOM-MUI's members 
undermined its capture. The media questioned LPPOM-MUI's ability to manage 
halal certification, and the public began to suspect the behaviour of several 
LPPOM-MUl leaders. The media accused several LPPOM-MUl members of 
obtaining excessively high commissions from halal certification. Ironically, those 
LPPOM-MUl relied on to push for exclusive rights over halal certification 
questioned its integrity.^®® 
In the next section, I discuss LPPOM-MUI's history. An examination of LPPOM-
MUI's attempts to dominate halal certification follows. The section concludes 
with a description of the challenges LPPOM-MUl faces, particularly NU's 
attempts to rival LPPOM-MUl, and the impact of media coverage of the 
LPPOM-MUl scandals. 
History of LPPOM-MUl 
LPPOM-MUl was established on 6 January 1989 (Amirsyah, 2012). Its role was 
to audit food, cosmetics, and medical products and determine whether they are 
permissible for Muslims' consumption. The institution ensures that these 
products do not contain traces of pork or alcohol, which the Quran forbids. 
LPPOM-MUl members include scientists, researchers and marketing 
professionals, and they work closely with the MUl Fatwa Commission. The MUl 
ulema and LPPOM-MUl members work closely together with the former issuing 
fatwas determining which elements are halal; and the latter testing products 
Interview Nadratuzzaman Hosen, 12 August 2014. 
based on scientific methods. LPPOM-MUl owes its formation to a controversial 
article published in a student magazine of the Brawijaya University in Malang 
(Darul et al., 1995, p. 197). The article of February 1988, indicated that a 
sample of food products—such as powdered milk, noodles, bread, drinks, and 
detergents—contain traces of pork meat and fats.^®'' This finding sparked 
unhappiness within the Indonesian Muslim community. 
However, it was the 1999 Ajinamoto controversy that triggered LPPOM-MUI's 
push for more official recognition. Ajinamoto is a Japanese company that 
produces food seasoning and cooking oils. LPPOM-MUl auditors complained 
that there were traces of bactosoytone (pig enzyme) found in these products. 
Normally, these products contain poly peptone, a soybean enzyme.^ ®® On 16 
December 2000, MUl issued a fatwa declaring Ajinamoto products forbidden, 
and LPPOM-MUl threatened to retract the Ajinamoto halal certificate. MUl's 
fatwa ran counter with then President Abdurrahman Wahid's views, himself an 
Islamic scholar. Abdurrahman argued that Ajinamoto products were halal and 
told Indonesian Muslims not to overreact. There were also economic concerns 
underlying Abdurrahman's views: 4000 jobs would be lost if the Ajinamoto 
factory in Indonesia had to close. The closure of Ajinamoto could damage 
Indonesia's ties with other Japanese investors. In the end, though. 
Ichwan Sam recalled how the government forced MUl leaders to clarify the issue to the 
public. The government Invited senior leaders from MUl and they were made to come to a 
particular place, along with television crew, and they were asked to drink milk containing 
forbidden materials. The milk was clearly not halal, and hence they were just televised drinking 
the milk. This was a very disrespectful way to treat the ulema. In the end there were extensive 
talks with several parlies, departments from the Ministry, and MUl. This later led to the formation 
of halal certification body. Interview with Ichwan Sam, 3 December 2013. See also Darul et al 
1995, p. 197. 
Interview with Ichwan Sam, 3 December 2013. 
Abdurrahman relented and followed MUl's fatwa. As a result, Ajinamoto recalled 
3000 tonnes of Its products from Indonesia. 
Building on its "success" against the Abdurrahman government, LPPOM-MUl 
members now wanted to be recognised as a leading local and International 
body In halal certification. It Is currently a member institution of the WHF (World 
Halal Foundation), which has an office above MUl's in Jakarta. LPPOM-MUl 
also co-operates with 41 other halal certification bodies to standardise halal 
procedures internationally (LPPOM-MUl, 2012). Ma'ruf Amin claims that 
LPPOM-MUl is the most competent halal-certification institution in Indonesia 
because it has well-trained scientists carefully auditing the products.^®® 
Similarly, LPPOM-MUl director Lukmanul Hakim says that 
Since 1989, LPPOM-MUl has undergone many challenges in order to achieve 
its status, as a certification body that is widely acknowledged and reliable 
internationally. This is because the system adopted by LPPOM-MUl justification 
body is strict, logical and professional, and this began from examination of 
products by the auditors who possess knowledge that is relevant with food, 
medicine, and cosmetics and the experience of the fatwa, which was issued by 
the fatwa Council. 
Companies seeking halal certification for food, medical, and cosmetic products 
have to follow LPPOM-MUl procedures which can be divided into three broad 
areas: the pre-audit, audit, and post-audit process (Muhammad 
Nadratuzzaman, Undated),^®° Once all these auditing procedures are 
completed, LPPOM-MUl auditors present products that require certification at 
Interview with KH Ma'ruf AmIn, 3 December 2012. 
The pre-audit stage mainly refers to company preparation to provide the necessary 
information for their product. Dunng this stage, companies new to halal certification process 
would need to undergo some form of training to prepare the documents correctly The task of 
examining the content and ingredients of such products is carried out by the LPPOM-MUl 
"t 'S MU^f^trcZmSlo?"" ' - ported 
the weekly MUl Fatwa Commission meetings to obtain halal "endorsement" 
from the ulema. During these meetings, the auditors from LPPOM-MUl will 
present a list of products requiring halal certificates detailing all the ingredients 
in themJ®^ In truth, these presentations are somewhat futile. LPPOM-MUl has 
established a list of ingredients considered halal or haram (forbidden) so it is not 
necessary to present these products at the Fatwa Commission meetings. 
In one of such Fatwa Commission/LPPOM-MUl meetings I observed, out of 
more than 200 products tabled, only one product's status was debated. 
Furthermore, the ulema were more concerned with the wordings of fatwas than 
the scientific debates surrounding the ingredients of the product. My impression 
was that the ulema might not have the necessary expertise and the scientific 
knowledge to determine whether a product is halal or not. Undeniably, the same 
applies to the religious elites of the Catholic Church or Jewish organisations, 
who also rely on scientific reports before making theological judgements. 
Nonetheless, it is clear LPPOM-MUl ulema have overstated their role in the 
halal certification process because the auditors do most of the work. The 
ulema's involvement only lengthens the whole certification process. 
Dominating halal certification procedures 
LPPOM-MUl has made several requests to the state to be the only institution 
overseeing halal certification. It wants the state to accord it statutory recognition 
over halal certification rather than in a series of interconnected regulations 
(Lindsey, 2012c, p. 266). LPPOM-MUl also wants the state to make halal 
^^ ^ The meeting was chaired by the H Hasanuddin AF Head of Fatwa Commission. Interview 
with H Hasanuddin AF, 29 November 2012. 
certification mandatory for all food products in Indonesia. Before, the regulations 
governing halal certification were confusing. The Ministry of Agriculture 
regulates companies importing carcases, meat or offal into Indonesia to employ 
permanent staff to ensure that animal products are halal. This legislation 
indicates that "officers should be supervised by a halal agency body LPPOM-
MUI and the fatwa committee of the Central Branch of MUl." Moreover, Article 
30(2) Law 7/1996 states that LPPOM-MUl has the powers to issue halal 
labelling for food products. The regulations mentioned so far reflect the state's 
endorsement of LPPOM-MUI's rules in halal certification. However, LPPOM-
MUl is not a registered institution with KAN (Komite Akreditasi Nasional or 
National Accreditation Committee) under the Badan Standardisi Nasional (BSN 
or National Standardization Body). The fact that LPPOM-MUl is not under KAN 
contradicts Article 11(1) of government regulation No 69/1999, which indicates 
that KAN must accredit any inspection agency for halal food (Lindsey, 2012b, 
p. 135). 
Therefore, LPPOM-MUl has requested the state give it a clear mandate for 
halal certification. LPPOM-MUl made its request during the Ijtima' Ulama in 
2009. MUl established a committee to make recommendations on existing laws 
and regulations, and one of the issues raised was halal food certification. The 
committee requested the government conclude the Halal Certification Bill 
quickly. The Bill was initially put forward for enactment in 2009 (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, 2011a, p. 921).''®^ The committee recommended the govemment 
make halal certification mandatory for all food products. 
During the same Ijtima' Ulama, another sub-committee was convened 
recommending the government accord the authority to issue fatwas on food, 
cosmetics, and medical products to MUl only. The committee made several 
requests for halal certification to be solely their prerogative. It claimed LPPOM-
MUI is the only organisation with the experience, l<nowledge, networl<s, and 
expertise to carry out halal certification at domestic and international levels. It 
also requested more resources be given to LPPOM-MUl so that it could carry 
out auditing and observations on certified products, both in Indonesia and other 
parts of the world. It also called on the state to spell out the sanctions for 
violations of halal certification (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 201 la , pp. 921-922). 
The requests made during the 2009 Ijtima' Ulama were repeated by LPPOM-
MUl members over the years that followed. The committee made these 
demands because the state wanted to take-over some aspects of halal 
certification, and other ormas wanted to break MUl's monopoly over the process 
(to be discussed later). During the 2010 MUNAS, MUl members again 
demanded that the government and the DPR give LPPOM-MUl exclusive rights 
to halal certificates to LPPOM-MUl because they argued it is the most 
competent and credible institution dealing with shariah matters (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, 2011b, p. 135). 
Business groups and food organisations had objected to the enactment because the passing 
of the bill could have made halal certification mandatory. In fact, for a long time, the state has 
been reluctant to grant LPPOM-MUl exclusive monopoly. 
There is an economic dimension to LPPOIVl-MUrs push for dominant status in 
halal certification, especially given the potential income it could generate. 
Imdadun Rahmat, NU's Vice-Secretary General, said that 
Determining whether a certain food is halal has fallen within the domain of the 
market. This is because if a product is not labelled as halal it does not sell 
well... This is a marketing strategy. If the products do not carry halal labels, 
there is a risk that they will not sell.'®^ 
A senior LPPOM-MUl member confirmed financial gain underlying the 
disagreement between LPPOM-MUl and Kemenag on halal certification, though 
he blamed Kemenag. He stated that Kemenag was keen to be part of the 
process because the halal certification is quite lucrative. He added that while 
Kemenag agreed MUl should play a role in issuing fatwas during halal 
certification, Kemenag wanted to take over the most profitable part, issuing 
halal labels.^®" Each halal label contains a serial number and fees are charged 
to obtain this number. 
One of LPPOM-MUI's strategies to strengthen its grip on the sector was to 
generate demand for its halal certification through shaping Indonesian Muslims 
consumption patterns. During the 2010 MUNAS, LPPOM-MUl insisted that the 
public, government, businesses, hotels, the transportation sector (such as 
aeroplanes, submarines, rail, and bus industries), and hospitals prioritise halal-
certified caterers (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011b, p. 135). it also urged 
shariah banks generously finance companies doing businesses in food, 
cosmetics, and medical products that have been halal certified by LPPOM-MUl 
Interview with Imdadun Rahmat, 30 November 2012. 
I obtain this information based on my conversation with an anonymous LPPOM-MUl 
member. 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 916-920).''®® In 2013, LPPOM-MUl issued 
a statement stating most medicines circulating in the country were haram and 
that the government must ensure Muslims consume halal-certified medicines 
{The Jakarta Post, "Doctors, clerics in medical disputes," 13 December 2013). 
This angered the IDI (Indonesian Doctors Association). These LPPOM-MUl 
dictates for Muslims to only use or consume halal-certified products 
demonstrate how LPPOM-MUl sought to expand its role in halal certification 
through shaping Muslims consumption behaviour. LPPOM-MUl adopted the 
most conservative positions regarding consumption prioritizing the contents and 
ingredients of medicines instead of their ability to heal. However, many 
Indonesian Muslims disregard LPPOM-MUI's statement. 
The tussle between Kemenag and LPPOM-MUl 
LPPOM-MUI's quest for dominance in halal certification has been impeded by 
challenges posed by Kemenag and rival ormas. Politicians in Kemenag 
emphasise that no organisation should have monopoly over halal certification. 
They also suggest the role of MUl and other ormas should be restricted to 
theological domains.^ ®® The former Vice-Minister of Religion (Wakil Menteri 
The recommendation stated that, "The government and DPR should only give halal 
certification rights to a body (LPPOM-MUl) that is competent and has credibility in shariah" 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011b, p. 135). Dr Ali Mustafa Ya'qub and Asrorun Ni'am Sholeh 
signed this recommendation. 
The state has been consistent with this view. In 1997, discussions on halal certification 
methods involved many ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Religion, Ministry of Food, Ministry of Trade and Industry, the manufacturing sector and MUl. At 
that meeting, MUl's representative walked out. The state official wanted to be involved in halal 
certification, but MUl was adamant that the procedures for halal certification should all belong to 
LPPOM-MUl solely. MUl officials reiterated that only LPPOM Director, MUl's Fatwa 
Commission, and MUl's Chairman could sign halal certificates (Wahyuni, 1997). 
Agama), Dr Nasaruddin Umar, affirmed that only the state should issue halal 
labels.''®^ According to Nasaruddin, 
Sharia laws fall within the domain of MUl, whereas positive laws fall within the 
domain of the government. For example, to determine whether a product is 
halal or not falls under the domain of MUl. But for regulation and certification, 
the laws fall within the domain of the government. The government only acts on 
the advice of MUl. If MUl says this is not permissible (haram), the government 
will say it [the product] has to be withdrawn. Indonesia is not an Islamic state, 
but a religious state. 
During our interview, Nasaruddin reiterated IVIUI religious opinions were not 
legally binding and suggested MUl is only one of the many institutions 
registered under Kemenag providing religious opinions to the state and 
importantly. MUl does not have monopoly status over religion. In other words, 
the state has the authority to accept or reject MUl's fatwa. In March 2014, 
Suryadharma AN, the then Religious Minister, said that MUl should not have a 
monopoly over halal certification. He argued that the state should have authority 
over halal certificates in order to avoid "jealousy" from other ormas (Sihalolo, 
2014). Suryadharma then proposed the setting up of BPN2H (Badan Nasional 
Produk Halal or National Body of Halal Products)—a body directly answerable 
to the president and the religious minister—to replace MUl (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 2014). The draft Halal Certification Bill indicates 
that BPN2H has the authority to issue halal certificates that contain registration 
numbers. 
However, MUl and LPPOM-MUl leaders insisted that their role in the sector 
should be retained. Responding to Suryadharma's comments, Ma'ruf Amin said 
' ' ' I n temew with Nasaruddin Umar, Vice-Minister of Religion Indonesia, 7 December 2012 
From the interview, it sounded that this is already the law, but in fact the DPR was still 
discussing the issue. ' 
Interview with Nasaruddin Umar, 7 December 2012. 
that MUl represents all Islamic organisations. According to Ma'ruf, "MUl is not a 
civil organisation. It is not the same as NU, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic 
groups. MUl is a union of a sort, representing a number of civil organisations" 
(Sihalolo, 2014). Similarly, Lukmanul Hakim, from LPPOM-MUl, quickly chided 
the state for trying to be a "superpower" in halal certification (Tempo, "MUl 
Ngotot Jadi Pelaksana Sertifikasi Produk Halal," 26 November 2013). 
Kemenag reacted to the stalemate by allowing more competition against MUl. 
In February 2012, Kemenag did not prevent NU from setting up its own halal 
certification body, the BHNU (Badan Halal NahdIatuI Ulama or NahdIatuI Ulama 
Halal Body). The head of the BHNU, Maksum Mahfudh, said that NU did not 
set up an alternative halal certification body to confuse the community. He 
added that. 
From the very beginning BHNU was set up in order to accommodate the 
demands of the community, namely the producers and consumers who are NU 
members. For those who are not NU members but trust our halal labels, we are 
ready to accommodate as well {Duta Masyarakat, "BHNU: Kami ada karena 
Permintaan Umat," 20 February 2012). 
NU's move has invited criticism from MUl members. They pointed out the 
possibility of a conflict of interest in a case in which BHNU certifies a product 
halal that LPPOM-MUl does not. LPPOM-MUl members claim that too many 
halal certification bodies may lead to complications and confusion. 
While welcoming NU's setting up of a halal certification body, Amidhan remarked that MUl 
already represents other organisations. Members of MUl include those from NU and 
Muhammadiyah (Duta Masyarakat dan Jurnas, "MUl sambut hangat BHNU," 7 February 2012). 
According to Amidhan, MUl is doing this because it is MUl's role, he is assuming the law clearly 
defines MUl's role. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has shown the strategies adopted 
by politicians from Kemenag to dilute LPPOM-MUI's role. Kemenag has been 
consistent saying MUl's role should be restricted to issuing fatwas, and not the 
labelling process. It suggested that other ormas could also issue fatwas on halal 
products. It did not stop NU, or any other organisations, from carrying out halal 
certification to warn MUl that its non-compliance with the state's proposal could 
result in MUl's halal certification being transferred to other ormas. 
Nevertheless, there were other internal factors hampering LPPOM-MUI's quest 
for monopoly over halal certification. Since 2009, LPPOM-MUl has developed a 
reputation for being incompetent managing halal standards. There have been 
repeated failures in preventing manufacturers from duplicating LPPOM-MUl 
halal labels. There have been complains of meats carrying LPPOM-MUl halal 
labels contain pork. Amidhan, an LPPOM-MUl leader, admitted that they might 
have been conned into issuing halal certificates for dried beef products 
(dengdeng) which were essentially pork {The Jakarta Post, "Official Agency 
finds pork in halal certified products," 17 April 2009). This shows LPPOM-MUl 
auditing department's serious ineptitude. 
There have also been complaints most halal certified products in the market 
lack official LPPOM-MUl approval. On 10 February 2011, The Jakarta Post 
reported that only 36 per cent of the products registered with the Food and Drug 
Monitoring Agency (BPOM) had official MUl halal certificates (The Jakarta Post, 
"Most Halal products lack official approval," 10 February 2011). The remaining 
64 per cent of the halal certified products carry labels that manufacturers have 
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duplicated. This shows that manufacturers can easily copy MUi's halal labels 
adding to MUl's list of failures. 
In December 2012, LPPOM-MUI's incompetency was again reflected when a 
local shoe company Kickers faked halal certificates (The Jakarta Post, "Local 
Kickers distributor apologize for 'halal' label," 26 December 2012). LPPOM-
MUI's halal label was on Kickers shoes containing pigskin (with the label "pig 
skin lining"). The shoes were found in a shop located in Sogo Plaza in Senayan, 
right in the heart of Jakarta (Mokhammad Kaiyis, 2012), a stone's throw from 
LPPOM-MUI's office. These incidences further demonstrate LPPOM-MUI's 
incompetency. 
Recently, there have been media reports that accuse LPPOM-MUl members of 
accepting bribes. In 2009, an investigation by Transparency International 
Indonesia revealed the quasi-systematic bribery that goes on in the organisation 
(Feillard & Madinier, 2011, p. 259). There was, however, no follow-up to this 
allegation. In February 2014, Tempo ran a series of articles detailing bribery 
linked to Amidhan and Lukmanul Hakim. Tempo reported that the two received 
bribes from a halal certification dealer based in Australia (Tempo, "The High 
Cost of Halal Labels," 25 February 2014). Tempo accused Amidhan of profiting 
from the halal certification in Australia because there were unaccounted for 
deposits recorded in his bank accounts. These transactions include A$3000 
transferred to his bank account in Australia on March 2013 and another transfer 
worth A$10 000. Officially, halal certification authorisation overseas involves no 
fees, though officials involved can receive payments for transportation and 
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accommodation costs. The AHFS (Australian Halal Food Services) made these 
bank transfers to Amidhan. The AHFS feared that LPPOM-MUl would revoke its 
right to issue certificates (Kartika & Hidayat, 2014). By bribing Amidhan, AHFS 
officials hoped LPPOM-MUl would not revoke their license. Although LPPOM-
MUl revoked AHFS's right to issue certificates, LPPOM-MUl allowed AHFS 
owners to re-group under a new name, Halal Certification Council. 
According to El-Moueldy, the president of the Halal Certification Authority 
(another halal certification body based in Sydney), bribery is the fastest way for 
an overseas company of obtaining certification rights from LPPOM-MUl. In 
2006, Moueldy led a delegation representing six Australian corporations to 
Jakarta to discuss joint co-operation over halal licensing in Australia. Between 2 
and 8 April 2006, and seven LPPOM-MUl assessors came to Australia to 
conduct assessments on corporations to determine whether they followed the 
halal guidelines. These assessors requested A$300 per diem for every person, 
and their visits were in the following order: to Perth, Melbourne, Sydney and 
Queensland. Moueldy recalled that at the end of the trip, he had to pay A$26 
000 to five of the officials (Ma'ruf Amin and Ichwan Sam had returned earlier), 
more than double what was originally agreed. He said that Amidhan received 
the highest payment compared to the other delegates (Tempo, "Praktek Haram 
Untuk Label Halal," 2014). 
While officials are entitled to per diems, the crux of the problem is that there are 
no guidelines onto how much MUl representative can receive for undertaking 
overseas trips. Furthermore, there is an over-reliance on people-to-people ties 
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rather than procedures and standards in halal certification. The weaknesses in 
setting up clear procedures and standards allows for bribery, especially when 
an institution wants to expedite the halal certification process. 
LPPOM-MUl members did not make any substantive clarification when refuting 
Tempo's allegations. Instead, Amidhan and Lukmanul Hakim attacked El-
Moueldy and the owners of Tempo. The March 2014 edition of Suara Islam 
defended MUl members carrying this headline: "Smear Campaigns towards 
MUl is an Attack on Islam" (Suara Islam, "Tempo Anti Islam: Membusukkan MUl 
Menyerang Islam," 14-28 March 2014). Amidhan refuted all allegations, claiming 
that Moueldy had slandered him {Tempo, "Amidhan Shahberah: I can Accept 
Gratuity," 2014). Amidhan claimed he had the right to receive a gratuity because 
he was no longer a civil servant.^"" Tellingly, MUl chairman. Din Syamsuddin did 
not issue a statement defending Amidhan throughout the controversy. In the 
same vein, some MUl leaders I spoke to decline to defend those members 
involved in the scandal. 
The end for LPPOM? 
In this study, I argue that MUl relies on societal conservatism to add political 
force to its lobbying the state for MUl's dominance over aspects of Muslim 
affairs. The LPPOM-MUl scandals, however, have dented its appeals for sole 
authority over halal certification. LPPOM-MUI's striving for a monopoly over 
halal certification, so far, has not waned. LPPOM-MUl leaders continue to lobby 
™ Amidhan had been a former director-general for the Haj affairs in KEMENAG before he 
retired in 1996 to join IMUI. 
Conversations with senior MUl member. 
politicians from all sides of the political spectrum to support their aims. In 2012, 
a MUl board member, Amidhan, along with LPPOM-MUl director, Lukmanul 
Hal<im, went to PKS to garner support for the passing of the long overdue Halal 
Certification Bill. Amidhan said, "It would be better that the new bill would not 
allow any other body other than MUl to issue halal certificates. If the 
government wants to participate in halal certification, they should participate in 
post-certification process" (Republika dan Pelita, "MUl Tetap Menginginkan 
Wewenang Sertifikasi Halal," 14 February 2012). On 3 April 2013, The 
Republika reported that Ma'ruf Amin, Amidhan and Umar Shihab sought an 
audience with President Yudhoyono to expedite the Halal Certification Bill in the 
DPR {Republika Online, "Temui SBY, MUl Perjuangkan RUU Jaminan Produk 
Halal," 3 April 2013). Although President Yudhoyono gave this authority to 
LPPOM-MUl solely, the final decision rested with DRP members. In the DPR, 
LPPOM-MUl also sought the support of the PKS and PAN (Partai Amanat 
Nasional or Indonesian National Mandate Party (PAN). LPPOM-MUl also 
extended their campaign for halal certification monopoly status to the public. It 
reminded the public of its contributions to the 1999 Ajinamoto case. Lukmanul 
Hakim said Indonesians must not forget LPPOM-MUI's role in protecting the 
Muslim community during the 1988 food crisis (Febrianindya, 2012). 
Two rounds of discussion regarding the halal certification bill have been held in 
two separate DRP sessions (2004-2009 and 2009-2014). It was only in 
September 2014, during the final days of the 2009-2014 session, that the bill 
was passed. MUi's role was expanded from the original bill. The law states that 
MUl has authority to accredit halal supervisory bodies (Hukum Online.com, 
2014). However, the law affirmed that BPJPH (Badan Penyelengara Jaminan 
Produk Halal or Halal Accreditation Body), a body that answers directly to 
Kemenag, has the authority to determine halal standards, issue halal 
certificates, and revoke certificates. MUl's role is restricted to issuing fatwas. 
MUl is again denied the lucrative part of the whole process, which it has always 
wanted: issuing halal labels. 
Despite its failings on the domestic front, LPPPOM-MUl could still rely on 
international markets to generate income from halal certification. It has been 
active certifying products manufactured in C h i n a . T h e r e are a number of 
international companies exporting their products to Indonesia and other parts of 
the Muslim world, requesting LPPOM-MUI's assistance. LPPOM-MUl, however, 
faces strong competition from ulema institutions in Malaysia (JAKIM) and 
Singapore (MUlS). Both JAKIM and MUlS are ahead of MUl in the halal 
certification business. On the 16 August 2004, the Malaysian government 
launched the MIHAS (Malaysia International Halal Showcase). In his address 
during the launch entitled, "Window to the Global Halal Network" the Prime 
Minister then, Abdullah Badawi, pointed out the government's priority was to 
established a global halal network (Fischer, 2008, p. 223). In September 2014, 
Singapore's MUlS (through Warees Halal) signed a landmark deal with a 
Japanese in-flight catering company, TFK Corporation, which certifies its 
catering in Narita Airport in Tokyo (Norhaiza, 2014).^°^ 
I made this observation during my attendance in one of the fatwa meetings for halal 
certification. 
203 l p p o m - M U I officials said that there was strong competition between the three countries. 
They constantly pointed out how the halal standards administered by JAKIM in Malaysia were 
too "lenient" and "not meticulous" by LPPOM-MUI's standards. LPPOM-MUI sees Malaysia's 
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All in all, LPPOM-MUI's capture does not match the success of DSN-MUI. While 
it has made inroads securing important business deals with international 
companies, it continues to struggle to monopolise halal certification in 
Indonesia. LPPOM-MUI's image has been hit by recent scandals involving its 
leaders, though the institution has not collapsed. These scandals only provide 
excuses for the state to deny LPPOM-MUIs claim for monopoly in the halal 
certification process. LPPOM-MUl authors its own low public trust which limits 
capture. 
Dominating the religious discourse 
Scholars and Indonesian activists often point to MUl's 2005 SIPILIS fatwa— 
referring to secularism, pluralism, and liberalism as deviant ideologies—as an 
example of MUl's attempt to situate itself as the judges of religious piety (see for 
instance Gillespie, 2007).^°" I agree MUl wishes to have the final word on 
religion. Through issuing this fatwa, the members of the MUl Fatwa 
Commission wanted to stamp their authority on judgements of "correct" Islam. 
As shall be described in this section, MUl members have requested the Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono government ban the Ahmadiyah sect and restrict Shiism. 
They have also urged Indonesian Muslims to be beware of liberal Islam, who 
they see as promoting Western values. In the following paragraphs, I discuss 
how MUl sought to dominate the religious discourse in Indonesia. I argue that 
national halal certification body, JAKIM, as a rival in striving to be the leading halal certification 
body in the world. 
The activists I interviewed during fieldwork pointed this out. 
MUl has made inroads in getting the state to ban the Ahmadiyah, but has been 
struggling to restrict Shias and liberal Islam. MUl's failures result from internal 
fragmentation and its inability to mobilise a Muslim majority to support their 
cause. 
Restricting the Ahmadiyah 
Followers of the Ahmadiyah sect have peacefully co-existed with other 
Indonesians for decades. Their presence in Indonesia was noted as early as 
1925 and their numbers have grown exponentially since then. In 2008, 
Kemenag estimated there were 50,000 to 80,000 Ahmadiyah followers in 
Indonesia (M. Crouch, 2009, p. 5). The Ahmadiyah population is too small 
compared to the 240 million Muslims living in Indonesia for one to consider 
them a threat to mainstream lslam.^°® Nevertheless, between 2004 and 2014, 
MUl members were calling the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government to ban 
the Ahmadiyah. While the state did not heed MUl's requests, MUl made inroads 
thwarting Ahmadiyah followers from spreading their faith. One reason why MUl 
was successful in getting Ahamdiyah restricted was MUl members unity. MUl 
was also able to garner the support of other radical Islamic groups, Bakorpakem 
(The Coordinating Board for monitoring mystical beliefs in society or Badan 
Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat), and several cabinet 
ministers.^®® 
The early followers of the sect originated from India In the mid-1800s. Its founder, Mirza 
Gulam Ahmad, was an Islamic reformist and missionary. Resulting from a split in 1880, the 
Ahmadiyahs divided into two groups: the Lahore group and the Qadiani group. The former was 
founded by Muhammad All Lohor and considered a moderate group. This group sees Gulam 
Ahmad as a reformer, and not a prophet. Mainstream Islam holds that the last Prophet is 
Muhammad who died in 632. The Qadiani group is deemed more controversial than the Lahore 
praup because the group sees Gulam Ahmad as a prophet (M. Crouch, 2009, p. 4). 
The Suharto government established the Bakorpakem in 1994 and allowed officials from the 
Attorney General's Office (Kejaksaan Agung), Indonesian military. National Police, KEMENAG 
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On 1 June 2008, about 400 radical Muslims attacked an AKKBB (Aliansi 
Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or Nationalist 
Alliance for Religious Freedom and Belief) march. The demonstration took 
place around MONAS (National Monument) in Jakarta. The AKKBB, which 
included representatives from 70 organisation, was endorsing the rights of 
religious minorities, especially the Ahmadiyahs, to practise their religions freely 
in line with the principles of Pancasila (M. Crouch, 2009, p. 12). The groups 
which conducted the attack on AKKBB included HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or 
The Liberation Party of Indonesia), FPI, and FUl (Forum Umat Islam or Islamic 
Forum), LIPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam or Islamic Research 
and Study Institute) and KLI (Komando Laskar Islam or Islamic Para-military 
Command). The attack left 70 AKKBB protesters injured. 
Scholars, human rights activists, and journalists have linked MUl's 2005 fatwa 
to the radical Muslim group violence towards the Ahmadiyah, including the 
attack in 2008 (Abdul Khalik, 2008; M. Crouch, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 
"Indonesia: Reverse Ban on Ahmadiyah Sect," 11 June 2008). During the 
Seventh MUl MUNAS held between 26 and 29 July 2005, MUl declared 
Ahmadiyah a deviant sect and called on the state to ban it. Nevertheless, to link 
this fatwa to the violence is far fetched because MUl's position towards 
Ahmadiyah has been consistent for decades, since the 1980s. On 1 June 1980, 
and Home Ministry to head the body. The state gave the Bakorpakem the task of mediating 
between different groups in the conflict. The state placed this co-ordinating board under the 
attorney general and included representatives from ormas and MUl. 
MUl issued a fatwa declaring the Ahmadiyah Qadiani d e v i a n t . M U l Chairman, 
Professor Hamka, and Secretary Dr H Kafrawi signed the fatwa. The fatwa 
states that: 
Based on the data and facts seen in nine bool<s about the Ahmadiyah, the 
Majelis Ulema Indonesia declares that the Ahmadiyah sect is out of the fold of 
Islam. In handling the Ahmadiyah issue, MUl needs to work closely with the 
state (IVIajelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, p. 40) 
The state, however, did not act on the fatwa although Alamsjah Prawiranegara, 
as the Minister of Religious Affairs, agreed with it. Four years after issuing it, 
MUl stepped up its efforts to have the Ministry of Justice ban Ahmadiyah. On 7 
March 1984, MUl issued a statement during MUl Rapat Kerja Nasional 
(National Working Convention) urging all Muslims to pressure the state to ban 
Ahmadiyah.^"® The statement also called on all district MUls to explain to 
Indonesian Muslims the nature of Ahmadiyah's deviancy. The statement also 
urged those who had converted to Ahmadiyah to return to the true Islamic 
teachings. MUl also advised Muslims to be vigilant and not be easily influenced 
by deviant groups such as Ahmadiyah (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 40-
41). In the 1980s, MUl members stood united on the Ahmadiyah issue. 
However, the Suharto government continued to ignore MUl's appeals (Ismatu, 
2010, p. 300). Far from banning the group, in 2003, the Home Affairs Ministry 
recognised Ahmadiyah's right to exist. 
This can be generalised to the attitude of IVIuslims in the Southeast Asian region as a whole. 
Ahmadiyah has never been seen as part of the mainstream. This fatwa only refers to Ahmaiyah 
Qadiani as deviant, and does not mention the Lahore group. 
The statement suggests the government's inaction towards the Ahmadiyah has led to 
uneasiness amongst Indonesian Muslims (Majelis tJlama Indonesia, 2011a, p. 41). The 
statement also indicated that the ideas promoted by the Ahmadiyah followers were threatening 
the sanctity of Islamic rituals and posed security problems. Hence, MUl urged the state to 
retract its seemingly neutral attitude towards the Ahmadiyah. 
The 2005 Ahmadiyah fatwa only restated the Fatwa Commission's 1980 one. 
The only difference was that the 2005 fatwa conflated the Qadiyani and Lahore 
Ahmadiyahs as one. Also, MUl's demands for the state to ban the sect were 
stronger than those of the 1984 statement. The 2005 fatwa, signed by Ma'ruf 
Amin, and the Fatwa Commission Chairman, Hasanuddin, demanded, "The 
state must {berkewajiban) stop all attempts to spread Ahmadiyah teachings 
throughout Indonesia, freeze all organisations associated with the sect, and 
close all the places where their activities are conducted" (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 98-99). 
The coincidence of the issue of the fatwa and violent attacks on Ahmadiyah led 
some scholars to assume MUl's fatwa wielded significant influence on the 
Indonesian state and Muslims (Olle, 2005, p. 106). Preston (2012) states MUl 
influenced greatly the state's treatment of Ahmadiyah. In discussing Indonesian 
Islam post-Suharto, Preston attributes "the rise of MUl" and MUl becoming 
"politically relevant" (p.167). Preston describes MUl as supporting the 
conservative agenda during the relatively weak political leaderships under 
presidents Megawati and Susilo. Similarly, Efendi (2011) argues that MUl has 
affected the government's decision on the Ahmadiyah controversy because the 
state has allowed MUl into the negotiating party to determine and supervise the 
activities of the Ahmadiyah group. 
I consider Preston's and Efendi's arguments for MUl's rise overstated, but it is 
true MUl members have been lobbying politicians, and galvanising other radical 
Islamic groups, to pressure the state to ban Ahmadiyah. Since the 2005 fatwa, 
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MUl leaders have not softened their denigration of Ahmadiyah. On the 6 
November 2007, MUl issued the "Guide for identifying Deviant Belief Streams" 
or Pedoman Identifikasi Aliran Sesat. The guide provides 10 criteria that can 
help distinguish deviant sects from the correct Islam. Moch Nur (2012, pp. 172-
173) sums up these 10 criteria as follows: rejecting the pillars of faith and pillars 
of Islam; believing and/or following a belief as incompatible with shariah; 
believing that there is revelation after the Quran; rejecting the authenticity 
and/or the truth of the contents of the Quran; interpreting the Quran without 
relying on the correct principles of translation; rejecting the Prophetic tradition 
as a source of Islamic teachings; disrespecting, disgracing and/or downgrading 
the prophets and messengers of God; rejecting Muhammad as the final 
prophet; changing the principles of devotion established by shariah; and 
accusing other Muslims of lack of belief not based on shariah. 
In 2008, an agreement between the state and Ahmadiyah was reached to 
resolve the conflict. On the 14 January 2008, senior members of the 
Bakorpakem and representatives from Ahmadiyah signed a 12-point 
agreement. The agreement guaranteed the Ahmadiyah group would not face 
any legal challenges or be disbanded but they must accept Prophet Muhammad 
as the last prophet. Among the state leaders who participated in the signing of 
the agreement were the Religious Affairs Minister Maftuh Basyuni, Home Affairs 
Minister Mardiyanto and Attorney General Hendarman Supanji (Human Rights 
Watch, "Indonesia: Reverse Ban on Ahmadiyah Sect," 11 June 2008). Following 
the agreement, Kemenag and Home Affairs Ministry then issued an SKB (Surat 
Keputusan Bersama or Joint Ministerial Decree) that restricted Ahmadiyahs 
from spreading their faith to others, though they were allowed to practice 
privately (Platzdasch, 2013, p. 231). Bakorpakem gave the Ahmadiyahs three 
months to demonstrate their commitment to the 12-point agreement and SKB, 
and the police would closely monitor Ahmadiyah followers ensuring the 
agreement was honoured (Preston, 2012). Three months later, the Bakorpakem 
recommended that the president dissolve Ahmadiyah for violating the 12-point 
agreement. Nevertheless, the president refused to ban Ahmadiyah, even 
though he had the powers to do so under the Blasphemy Law Nol/1965. 
To what extent did MUl's fatwa on the Ahmadiyahs—issued in the 1980s and 
again reiterated in 2005—influence the state's decision? On one hand, the 
Kemenag heeded MUl's fatwas by not recognising Ahmadiyahs as Muslims. 
The state has also moved to restrict Ahmadiyah from proselytisation activities. 
Moreover, MUl representatives were also included as part of the negotiating 
party in formulating the 12-point agreement between Bakorpakem and 
Ahmadiyah, a recognition of its role in the crisis. MUl through Bakorpakem were 
making great strides in asking the state to ban Ahmadiyah so much so that 
Widodo Adi Sucipto, the then Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs, said that the decree for Ahmadiyah's banning was drafted by 
Kemenag, Home Ministry, and Attorney General's Office (Desy, 2008). 
Yet, the state's move noted in the previous paragraphs was not in response to 
MUl's fatwa because other radical groups such as the HTI, FUl and DDII were 
also making the same demands (Platzdasch, 2013, pp. 225-226). Furthermore, 
Muslims in Indonesia, and in other parts of the Muslim world, generally doubted 
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Ahmadiyah, whom they considered not part of mainstream Islam. Their attitude 
towards Ahmadiyah was different from their attitude towards the Shias, where 
Muslims around the world are divided about the sect's status in Islam 
(discussed below). IVlUI's position also found sympathisers within the cabinet, 
and they include Suryadharma (Ali Religious Minister), Gamawan Fauzi (Home 
Affairs Minister), and Sudi Silalahi (State Secretary). It was much easier for 
MUl, and the other radical groups, to demand the state disband Ahmadiyah on 
religious grounds.^"® MUl ulema were nearly able to control the Ahmadiyah 
issue because conservative public sentiment was generally unsympathetic 
towards the Ahmadiyahs. 
There were several reasons why President Yudhoyono did not ban the 
Ahmadis. The Wantimpres did not support the banning of Ahmadiyah and its 
members argued that the ban was unconstitutional and went against the 
principles of Pancasila that respects freedom of religion. Wantimpres's 
collective decision not to ban Ahmadiyah clearly marginalised one of its 
members' views, Ma'ruf Amin, who had been highly critical of the state's 
inaction on the Ahmadiyah (Olle, 2005, p.106). Ma'ruf was the only MUl 
representative in the Wantimpres. Apart from the Wantimpres's decision, other 
considerations prevented President Yudhoyono from banning them outright. 
Pressures from human rights groups; international NGOs; the president's desire 
to maintain the status quo; and his indecisiveness, also worl<ed against a ban 
on Ahmadiyah. 
In fact, many progressive Muslims in Indonesia argue for Ahmadiyah's right to practice their 
faith based on the principle of religious freedom. Seldom do they make the case that 
Ahmadiyahs are part of Islam. 
Nevertheless, President Yudhoyono's failure to condemn IVIUI and other radical 
groups outright did not deter violence towards the Ahmadiyahs. Since the 
MONAS incident, there have been other significant attacks on Ahmadiyahs in 
Indonesia: 2008 in South Sumatra; 2011 in East Java and Banten, West Java. 
In the 2011 Banten attacks, disturbing video footage showed attacks killing at 
least three followers and severely injuring five others. The attacks were carried 
out following MUl Banten fatwa on Ahmadiyah (Moch Nur, 2012, pp.178-182). 
Declaring Shias as deviants 
While IVIUI has some influence restricting the Ahmadiyahs from any form of 
proselytisation, the Shia controversy demonstrates the bounds of MUl's 
influence. A similar MUl demand for the state to restrict Shiism fell on deaf ears. 
The Shia controversy began on 29 December 2011, where a mob of local 
villagers and radical Islamic groups torched several houses, hamlets, and 
madrasahs in Sampang (Madura, East Java). The mob burnt a religious teacher 
and Shia, Tajul Muluk's house and pesantren. Some commentators regarded 
the controversy as a family dispute between two brothers. 
Civil rights activists, by contrast, thought that religious mistrust among Sunnis 
and Shias triggered the conflict (Platzdasch, 2014, p. 3). International human 
rights groups linked East Java MUl's fatwa to the subsequent violence on Shias 
and Tajul's arrest {Human Rights Watch, "In Religion's Name," 28 February 
" " Roisul Hukama was outraged that a woman he wanted to wed was persuaded by Taiul to 
become a Shia. The East Java government called on East Java MUl representatives to act as a 
mediator, and advised Tajul not to continue proselytising. 
2013; Amnesty International, "Indonesia: Release Tajul Muluk and resolve 
situation of evicted Shi'a community in East Java," 17 June 2014). On 1 
January 2012, East Java MUl issued a fatwa pronouncing Tajul's teachings as 
Shia and deviant. East Java MUl also led the Gerakan Umat Islam Bersatu 
(Movement of United Muslims)—an alliance made up of 40 anti-Shia groups in 
East Java—to pressure the East Java government to ban Shiism. 
The East Java government later bowed to pressure from these radical groups. 
On the 12 July 2012, the East Java police charged and jailed Tajul for two years 
for blasphemy. Tajul's arrest did not prevent further attacks on Shias. On 26 
August 2012, a mob attacked Tajul's followers in Sampang. The mob targeted 
Shia students who returned to the village during a holiday. The attack claimed 
two fatalities and burned down thirty-five houses. Two hundred and twenty 
Shias evacuated their villages and temporarily stayed at a nearby tennis 
stadium in Sidoarjo, some 100 kilometres away. The then Religious Minister 
Suryadharma All said solving the violence towards Shias involves converting 
them back to Sunni Islam (Aritonang, 2012). 
The ulema from central MUl regarded the Shia issue as a local one and felt that 
East Java MUl had the right to declare Shias deviant.^"'^ In 1984, the central 
MUl fatwa commission issued a ruling critical of Shiism but did not call for the 
sect's banning. The fatwa, signed by Ibrahim Hosen and Musytari Yusuf 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 46-47), urged Muslims to understand the 
differences between Sunnis and Shias, and to be vigilant so that Shia teachings 
This is what I gathered from conversations with MUl leaders at the MUl office. 
did not become widespread in Indonesia. During tiie New Order period, tiiere 
was no reported violence against Shias. 
Some contemporary MUl members have spoken against the sect. The so-called 
"anti-Shia" camp in MUl had openly requested the state ban Shias. Ma'ruf Amin 
is one of MUl leaders who publicly stated he did not agree with Shia teachings. 
Ma'ruf neither condemned the East Java MUl fatwa, nor called for the fatwa to 
be retracted. He did not rule out the Shia issue being raised at the MUl Fatwa 
Commission in the future (Antara, "MUl: Syiah jangan diperlakukan kasar," 16 
January 2012).^^^ In 2013, Ma'ruf, Ichwan Sam, and two other MUl leaders, 
Amirsyah and Yunahar llyas, published Mengenal dan Mewaspadai 
Penyimpangan Syi'ah di Indonesia (Identifying and Beware of Shia's Deviance 
in Indonesia). The book was written in a rather alarmist tone. The writers' 
attitude to Shiism was more conservative than MUl's 1984 fatwa (Ma'ruf, 
Yunahar, Ichwan, & Amirsyah, 2013). The book listed websites associated with 
Shiism and international organisations sympathetic to Shia teachings, warning 
Indonesian Muslims to avoid them. Although several central MUl leaders wrote 
the book it referred mainly to fatwas issued by MUl branches in Aceh (2009) 
and East Java (2012) (p.102-130). These provincial MUls issued fatwas 
condemning Shias of engaging in deviant and dangerous activities. 
The authors chose to include provincial MUl fatwas was because the central 
commission had not issued a fatwa declaring Shias deviant. On the contrary, 
some MUl leaders, including those from the Leadership Board, had publicly 
Interview with IVIaaruf Amin, 3 December 2012 
approved Shiism as a mainstream Islamic religion. These differences resulted in 
name-calling among MUl leaders. For instance, Cholil Ridwan accused his 
fellow MUl board member, Umar Shihab, of being a Shia sympathiser (Voice of 
Al-lslam, "Ustadz Cholil Ridwan Akui Umar Shihab Pembela Utama Syiah di 
Forum Internal MUl," 9 April 2012).^" In 2014, Ma'ruf Amin admitted that the 
MUl Fatwa Commission had not issued a sterner fatwa than the 1984 one 
because MUl is occupied by "SUSI"—Sunnis sympathetic to Shiism (Shodiq, 
2014). To be sure, the anti-Shia camp faced strong resistance from 
progressives within the institution such as Din Syamsuddin and the late Sahal 
Mahfuz. The anti-Shia camp did have an alternative power base to ban Shiism, 
however, as it had supporters within President Yudhoyono's Cabinet. One of 
them was Suryadharma Ali. The Jakarta Post reported that Suryadharma had 
supported the forced conversion of Shias to Sunnis in Sampang (Aritonang, 
2013). 
Mill's internal fragmentation on the Shia issue 
Scholars and journalists tend to exaggerate MUl's influence and pay little 
attention to the dynamics within central MUl. They also fail to address the 
complex relationship between central MUl and MUl branches in the provinces. 
One example is the attention given to MUl's 2005 SIPILIS fatwa. In issuing this 
fatwa, scholars and journalists held MUl responsible for triggering the attacks on 
minority groups such as liberals, Ahmadiyahs and Shias. Chiara Formichi, an 
Indonesian studies expert based in the University of Hong Kong, said 
Many scholars and observers have pointed to the increased weight carried by 
MUl's 'advice' since 2005, and its role in shaping a well delimited form of 
Umar's brother, the prominent exegete and ulema Quraish Shihab, has written books 
defending Shiism. 
'acceptable Muslim behaviour' moulded on a Sunni paradigm has become 
evident with the anti-Ahmadiyyah attacks first, and the anti-Shi'a violence now. 
Ahmad Suaedy, from the Wahid Institute, expressed the same view of MUl's 
2005 fatwa. He remarked 
President Yudhoyono opened the 2005 MUNAS. MUl issued eleven fatwas in 
all and this included the fatwa on anti-pluralism, secularism and liberalism, 
known as SIPILIS. In 2008, three ministers issued the Ministerial Decree on 
Ahmadiyah. All these decrees were based on the MUl fatwa that led to 
intolerance and anti-Ahmadiyah.^^^ 
In reality, MUl is fragmented. The writings of MUl leaders, such as the late 
Sahal Mahfuz, and members of the MUl advisory board, such as Nasaruddin 
Umar, Quraish Shihab, and Azyumardi Azra, suggest their appreciation of 
religious freedom and diversity. During my interview with Nasaruddin Umar, he 
agreed society should not blame MUl for issuing conservative fatwas, these 
hard-line fatwas come from only a segment within the institution. He suggested 
analysts should attribute conservative views to specific individuals in MUI.^^® In 
2012-2013, I noticed these differences in many of my interactions with MUl 
ulema. Some confided in me they disagreed with other members, including on 
the Shia issue. 
See interview with Chiara Formichi. http://liveencnunters.net/7paqe id=5705 (Date 
Accessed 2 October 2014). The same can also be said of the contradictory positions taken bv 
NU Pusat and NU Sampang: NU Sampang has declared Shias deviant but this does not 
represent the views of central NU. For example, the Vice-Secretary General' of NU Hanief Saha 
Ghafur disagreed with Shias being deemed deviant. He was quoted in the media "Shia is not 
worse than the Jews" (Afrilia, 2012). 
' Interview with Ahmad Suaedy, Coordinator Abdurrahman Wahid Centre for Inter-Faith 
Dialogue and Peace-Universitas Indonesia (AWCentre-UI), 4 January 2013 
Interview with Nasaruddin Umar, VIce-Minister of Religion, 7 December 2012 
Furthermore, there are ulema and Muslim intellectuals—both within and outside 
MUI—who are sympathetic towards Shiism. The current MUl Chairman, Din 
Syamsuddin, has condemned any form of discrimination against Shias 
(Kompas, "Din: Muhammadiyah Keberatan Fatwa Sesat Syiah," 7 September 
2012). NU General Chairman, Said Aqll SIroj, even said that the religious 
orientation of majority Indonesian Muslims carries a strong Shia Influence.^^^ 
According to Said Aqil, who sits in MUl's Advisory Board, 
Culturally, there is a significant Shia influence in our religious practices. These 
include the community's attitude towards our religious leaders and the 
celebration of the prophet's birthday. Our religious rituals such as the berzanji 
(chanting) do not include praises to the three caliphs- Abu Bakar, Umar and 
Uthman [a common practice in many Shia circles]... many of the rituals include 
praises to the family members of the Prophet [essentially a practice In Shiism]. 
Shia Muslims carry out rituals such as kissing the hands of the family members 
of the prophet, and visiting the graves of pious Muslims. In fact, we have 
adopted many words of the Persian language.^'® 
The Shia-sympathetic views of these ulema weaken the authority of the anti-
Shia camp in MUI. As Mun'im (2013) has pointed out, controversial fatwas 
issued by MUI only invites criticism from progressives. It also provokes effective 
counter discourses more powerful than those promoted by MUI ulema. 
Silencing liberal Muslims 
Some MUI members have also attempted to prevent liberal Muslims from 
speaking on Islamic matters. They consider liberal thinkers as not having the 
authority, knowledge, and skills to speak on Islamic matters. One case occurred 
In November 2007, in which MUI was rumoured to have persuaded Kemenag to 
cancel a talk by Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, an Egyptian born scholar. He was 
scheduled to speak in a seminar in Malang (East Java) and at the Annual 
Interview with Said Aqil SIroj, 2 March 2013. 
' Ibid. 
Conference on Islamic Studies in Riau. Islamic scholars in Egypt regarded Abu 
Zayd as a liberal, based on his method of interpreting the Quran. In the 1990s, 
the Egyptian courts had declared Abu Zayd an apostate and he had to spend 
the rest of his life living in exile in the Netherlands. 
Later, Kemenag, by order of the Religious Minister Maftuh Basyuni, cancelled 
Abu Zayd's talk in Malang. Earlier, the Riau government barred him from 
attending the scheduled conference in Riau after the province's ML)I branch 
argued he should not attend {The Jakarta Post, "Ministry was told to keep me 
out, says Egyptian scholar," 27 November 2007). Abu Zayd later accused the 
Indonesian religious minister as having caved in to MUl's pressure. Abu Zayd 
said he had received an SMS stating that MUl had pressured the Kemenag to 
cancel his talks {The Jakarta Post, "Ministry was told to keep me out, says 
Egyptian scholar," 27 November 2007). 
However, he did not say whether it was the MUl in East Java or central MUl that 
pressured the Kemenag. Central MUl did not issue any official statement about 
Abu Zayd's banning. In contrast, Din Syamsuddin, under his capacity as 
Muhammadiyah chairman (he was the MUl Vice-Chairman then), expressed his 
concern over Kemenag's decision to ban Abu Zayd. The Jakarta Post quoted 
Din as saying, "His visit should have been used for tabayyun (clarification) with 
Abu Zayd to find the truth about his Islamic thoughts" (Muhammad Nafik, 2007). 
Hence, there is no evidence to show it was central MUl who rejected Abu 
Zayd's presence in Indonesia. 
It is possible that the Kemenag decided to ban Abu Zayd's talk because the 
organisers had already circulated the details about it to the public. Kemenag 
feared this may invite radical groups to create another controversy. Had there 
been less publicity for Abu Zayd's talks, Kemenag might have allowed it. For 
instance, Kemenag did not prevent the equally controversial Islamic studies 
professor, Professor Amina Wadud, from speaking at the International 
Conference, Debating Progressive Islam: A Global Perspective organised by 
UIN Jakarta. The conference was held between 25 and 27 July 2009 but was 
not well-publicised (Irma, 2009). Amina is a prominent gender rights activist 
who, similar to Abu Zayd, had applied the hermeneutical approach in her study 
of Islamic texts. In 2004, Amina invited condemnation from conservative Islamic 
scholars around the world for leading Friday prayers in which men participated. 
Conservative Muslims are adamant that only men can lead Friday prayers. 
While it remains unclear to what extent MUl was involved in Abu Zayd's 
banning, it is obvious that MUl members oppose liberal Muslim groups in 
Indonesia. The 2005 SIPILIS fatwa condemned liberal Muslims and one of the 
groups targeted was JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal or Liberal Islam Network). 
Concerned liberal Muslims understand religious texts (namely the Quran and 
the Sunnah) through reason, MUl members accuse them of only accepting 
religious doctrines that parallel their thinking. Related, they regard liberals as 
being similar to the secularists who separate worldly matters from religion 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 91-92). Yet, ormas leaders challenge 
hard-line members of MUl by saying that if one continues to cite religious 
traditions and text, then tlie person cannot be a liberal. Said Aqil Siraj, for 
instance, has disagreed with MUl's SIPILIS fatwa. He said 
As long as the person quotes a verse from the Quran, the person is not liberal 
Islam. Maybe, there are only differences in terms of interpretations. As long as 
when he thinks and writes and he refers to the Quran that is not liberal. 
Indonesians are not liberal. 
Thus, the SIPILIS fatwa indicates the Fatwa Commission's rejection of Islamic 
liberal thoughts. However, MUl has not been able to prevent the liberal Islam 
thinkers from speaking in the religious domain. Unlike the Malaysian case which 
I discuss later, MUl seems to be concerned if the talks by liberal Muslims are 
well publicised and this may provoke unrest. This is not the case in Malaysia, 
where official ulema closely monitor liberals even though talks are not open to 
public. Ironically, members of MUl's advisory board include progressives 
Quraish Shihab, Said Aqil Siroj, Bachtiar Effendi, and Azyumardi Azra. 
Moralising media and entertainment 
MUl has always wanted to control the way people think and how they behave in 
public. It wants the state to curb pornography from being widespread in society, 
and yearns the media and entertainment industry conform to Islamic principles. 
It also has requested the state to formalise its role as a moral "watchdog." In 
2001, the MUl Fatwa Commission issued a ruling warning Muslims of the 
dangers of pornography and "porno-action," which it collective defines as "erotic 
behaviours" in the form of "paintings, images, writings, voices advertisements 
and speeches" (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 416-417). The 2001 fatwa 
' Interview with Said Aqil Siroj, 2 March 2013. 
also refers to other "sexually suggestive" acts or "tight-fitting" clothing as 
pornography and porno-action as (pp. 416-417). The fatwa forbids images of 
men and women dressing immodestly according to Islamic standards (not 
covering their aurat) from being c i r c u l a t ed .O the r behaviours it classifies as 
pornography and porno-action include: khalwat (un-married couple caught for 
being in a secluded place); filming sexual intercourse; and encouraging 
unmarried couples to have intercourse (p.417). Since the 2001 fatwa, MUl 
lobbied the DPR to pass anti-pornography bill. It intensified it campaign in 2006, 
after the American adult-magazine. Playboy, planned to sell its Indonesian 
version. In 2008, the DPR eventually passed the anti-pornography bill; but is 
this enough to satisfy MUl's requests? 
Arguably, MUl felt the fatwa was not sufficient, as its ultimate goal is to have 
authority in monitoring public morality. It wants the state to accord it authority to 
censor films, publications, songs, and clothing. The following paragraphs 
suggest that MUl's attempt to obtain state recognition as moral "gatekeepers" 
has met with mixed outcomes. On the one hand, it was successful in getting the 
DPR to pass the Law of Pornography and Porno-action in 2008. Since then, 
some ministries, media companies, and international artists have voluntarily 
consulted MUl whether their proposals—for concerts and television p rog rams-
meet Islamic requirements. On the other hand, MUl faced two setbacks. First, 
the state did not incorporate most of MUl's requests into the 2008 Pornography 
Law. Second, the state ignored MUl's requests to have a role in censoring 
It specifies tinat men must cover ttieir bodies at least between the navel and their knees; 
while women must cover their bodies except for their face and palms. 
textbooks, films, arts, and entertainment. These setbacks, however, do not 
prevent MUl from targeting artists and models for defying its moral standards. 
The section will first examine MUl's contribution that leads to the passing of the 
2008 anti-pornography bill. While the final bill incorporated several provisions 
from MUl's 2001 fatwa, it was not as stringent as what MUl had hoped for. It 
dropped the word "porno-action" and excluded the most important part of MUl's 
request: a definition of its role. This will be followed by a discussion on MUl's 
attempt to determine "moral entertainment." MUl members have publicly 
criticised artists (local and international) and models they see as promoting 
porno-action, and expect these artists or models to consult them before having 
any concerts or participating in beauty pageants. The section will close with an 
examination of MUl's strategy to assert its role. It attempts to apply Pancasila to 
its struggle have been futile. 
MUl's contribution to the Anti-Pornography Bill 2008 
In 2008, the DPR passed the Anti-Pornography Law (No 44/ 2008). The main 
reasons for the passing of the law were to educate and raise the moral 
standards of the community, to set legal guarantees to protect women and 
children, and to protect "commercialisation" of the sex industry (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, 2008). The law outlines sanctions for those propagating 
pomography.^^^ In line with MUl's fatwa. Article 17 of the law indicates that the 
state has the right to prevent the making, distribution, and the usage of 
' As at 2014, only one person has been charged under the law. In 2009, Indonesian Playboy 
editor, Erwin Arnada was to sentenced two years imprisonment for violating public morality The 
magazine was also discontinued (Moch Nur, 2013, p.76). 
pornographic materials in public (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2008, p.5). The 
law also forbids displaying nude images in public and downloading pornography 
from the internet. The law broadly mentions that the state, social institutions, 
educational institutions, religious institutions, families and the community should 
be involved in curbing pornography. 
Before the law was passed, MUl was active in lobbying the DPR to conclude 
the law. It also rallied other radical Islamic groups to support its cause. In 2002, 
MUl established Anti-Pornography Community Alliance in order to eradicate 
pornography {Antara, "Anti-Pornography Alliance Established," 7 May 2002). 
The DPR ignored the alliance's demands. Unimpressed by the state's and 
DPR's inaction, in February 2006, Ma'ruf Amin gave the DPR up to June that 
same year to conclude the bill (Antara, "MUl sets deadline for passage of 
pornography, porno-action bill," 18 February 2006). On Sunday 26 March 2006, 
MUl held a rally at MONAS in protest of the state's inaction. The rally was 
participated by Hizbut Tahrir, DDII, and MMI (Antara, "Thousands Hold Rally to 
support RUU APP be passed soon," 26 March 2006).^^^ While the state asked 
MUl to help draft the anti-pornography bill, it delayed MUl's repeated requests 
for the anti-pornography bill be concluded. 
in 2008, MUl could claim victory when the state passed the bill.^^^ All the while, 
MUl not only face rejection from the state, but also stiff opposition from several 
^^^ These radical groups were not the only ones who pushed the state to pass the anti-
pornography bill. The struggles was also joined by other influential ulema, one of them was 
popular preacher Aa Gym. See Hoesterey, 2013. 
The proponents of the bill include the conservative members of the DPR, such as the PKS. 
Central MUl's efforts to get the bill passed mirrors the efforts of provincial MUls, which 
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political parties and cultural activists. Members of the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia-Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and PDS 
(Partai Damai Sejahtera or Prosperous Peace Party) were against the bill. 
These parties boycotted the DPR during the voting of the bill (Abdur, 2010, p. 
121). Also absent during the vote were regional leaders from Bali, North 
Sumatra, Southeast Sulawesi and Papua, who felt that the bill threatened their 
culture and traditions. In these societies, where Hinduism is a dominant religion, 
it is common and acceptable for paintings, sculptures, and carvings to depict 
nudity. 
However, MUl was not happy that the law was to cut to only 45 clauses, half of 
what was originally tabled in the DPR. The law only sought to prevent 
pornography strictly, and excluded MUl's depiction of porno-action such as 
clothing, kissing or close-proximity of non-married couples (Moch Nur, 2013, 
p.75-76). The law also make several exceptions to tourists, who can continue to 
wear swimsuits or revealing clothing when they are in Indonesia (Gelling, 2008). 
Most importantly, the law denied MUl's demands for a role to define public 
morality. The law also did not point out what role MUl will play in curbing 
pornography. Articles 20 to 22 of the law invite the society to help mitigate the 
spread of pornography and report to the authorities if they came across any 
violation of the law. It does not spell out any religious organisation's role 
(Dewan Perwakllan Rakyat, 2008, p.5). Ma'ruf Amin clearly voiced his 
sponsored shariah-based ordinances. These provincial MUls were supported by HTI MM! 
(Majelis IVIujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahidin Council), and FPI (Front Pembela'klam 
or Defenders'Front of Islam) (Abdur, 2010, p. 123). f-emoeia isiam 
disappointments after MUl's failure to influence the state's decision on this law. 
He remarl<ed that 
MUl has never compromised on its position. In a plural country like Indonesia, 
all parties should not only think about their own interests. MUl will continue to 
give advice to the ummat. Whether the state will enforce our position is not 
within our powers. One example is the Pornographic Bill. Until today, the 
outcome of the Bill is different from our attitude (Ma'ruf, 2012, p. 72). 
MUl indirectly expressed their hopes in the law during the 2009 Ijtima' Ulama. 
MUl felt that the state gave in to civil society groups who complained that the 
law infringes freedom of choice and expression. It was also upset that many of 
the contents of its fatwa were excluded from the final bill. It is not surprising that 
MUl has urged the state to revise the law, detailing the roles to the various state 
departments, such as the National Education Department, the Health 
Department, the Trade Department, the Industrial Department, Social 
Department, the Communication and Information Department, and Kemenag, 
will play (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 922-924). MUl also reminded the 
state that the laws have to consider the spirit of sharia, ethics, and Islam. MUl 
wants its role in the new law to be as follows: to lead a research committee that 
censors reading materials and to be part of a select committee to recommend 
ways to restrict the distribution of pornographic materials (pp.922-924). 
During the 2009 congress, MUl also wanted the state to recognise it as a body 
that supervises school textbooks, health products, and clothing, ensuring that 
they do not contain pornography or porno-action (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 
2011a, pp. 922-925). Without providing any examples, MUl claimed that 
pornographic and porno-action materials are widespread in Indonesia's 
education and the health sectors, MUl requested the state consult It before 
deciding whether reading materials In schools are appropriate for students, 
lecturers, and undergraduates. It also wanted a role in determining the 
standards for morality, which it argued, are currently not in place in the 
education sector. Related, MUl wanted a role in monitoring and filtering 
information and electronic contents in the new media; and regulating all 
products and imports that contain photographic elements from inundating the 
Indonesian market (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011a, pp. 922-925). These 
requests demonstrate that MUl desired its role be formalised in the 2008 law. It 
also wanted the state to be more stringent and committed in battling immoral 
acts in Indonesian society. 
MUl's quest to "moralise" entertainment 
Even before the 2008 law was passed, MUl had always wanted to be a morality 
watchdog. MUl members were quick to criticise artists or models for not 
meeting what they see as Islamic requirements. They also demand public to 
consult them on what Islamic entertainment is, and they want the public to 
recognise MUl's authority in determining what forms of dance, song, and 
clothing are suitable for public viewing. In 2003, MUl leaders criticised 
Indonesia's famous "dangdut" singer Inul Daratista for the way she danced and 
gyrated.^^" They saw her dance moves as not fit for public consumption. 
Amidhan characterised Inul's dance moves as pornography, and he later cited 
an unsubstantiated report that a man raped a girl after watching Inul danced 
(The Jakarta Post, "'Dangdut' Singer Inul is too hot for many Indonesia?" 22 
224 Dangdut is a form of Indonesian music genre that combines Arabic, Indian, and traditional 
Indonesian music instruments. 
February 2003). In 2005, MUl reproved model Artia Sari Devi for participating in 
the Miss Universe competition. Ma'ruf Amin declared wearing swimsuits during 
the competition constituted pornography. Ma'ruf said that "This kind of pageant 
violates religious values, especially Islam, and Indonesia is known as a religious 
society, so one should not go into any activities that are not in line with religious 
values" {Reuters, "Miss Indonesia and her 'Swimsuit problem'," 20 May 2005). 
In 2013, the Miss World issue resurfaced when the beauty contest was 
scheduled to take place in Jakarta. Ma'ruf Amin, and several other MUl leaders 
came out publicly to oppose the competition. However, this time, MUl leaders 
were embarrassed by one of its member, Syarif Rahmat, who appeared in an 
advertisement for Miss World. Ma'ruf and a few other MUl leaders were quick to 
denounce that Syarif's behaviour did not represent the views of MUl (Republika, 
"Pengurus MUl di Iklan 'Miss World' tidak bawa organisasi," 26 August 2013). 
They insisted that the competition be banned in Indonesia. Syarif on the other 
hand was quick to say that the media misrepresented him in the advertisement. 
Syarif believed that there could be no stopping of the Miss World competition 
from being organised; hence, the best way is to advice the masses to exercise 
caution. 
MUl's attempts to moralise entertainment transcends their public criticisms 
towards local artists. It wants to play a bigger role in the country's censorship 
boards. Currently, has a member who sits in Indonesia's film censorship board, 
LSF (Lembaga Sensor Film or Film Censorship Board). Other religious 
communities are also represented in the board: PGI (Persekutuan Gereja-
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Gereja Indonesia or Communion of Churches Indonesia); KWI (Konferensi 
Walinegara Indonesia or Bishops Conference Indonesia); PHDI (Parisada 
Hindu Dharma or Indonesian Hinduism Society); Walubl (Perwalian Umat 
Buddha Indonesia or Federation of Buddhist Representatives). Nevertheless, 
MUl's influence in this board is limited. In 2010, Ma'ruf Amin spoke about 
recalling its representative because the other board members have 
marginalised MUl's representative. Ma'ruf Amin admitted that MUl has been 
ineffective in pressuring the Indonesian Censorship Board to ban a number of 
horror and "pornographic" movies (Elin Yunita & Aries, 2010). Being 
unsuccessful in this board does not prevent MUl members from publicly 
critiquing film directors. In 2011, MUl leader Cholll Ridwan criticised Hanung 
Bramantyo for his film Tanda Tanya (Question Mark). Cholil said that Hanung 
was insensitive towards Islamic faith and for promoting pluralism (Hoesterey & 
Clark, 2012, p.222). These criticisms did not stop the film from its release. In 
fact, Tanda Tanya was nominated for nine awards duhng the 2011 Indonesian 
Film Festival. 
MUl does not only target the local entertainment scene but also wants Islamic 
moral standards to apply to international artists having concerts in Indonesia. 
On 3 June 2012, American pop artist. Lady Gaga was scheduled to make her 
debut concert in Indonesia. MUl vehemently rejected the concert. The reasons 
for MUl's objections will be discussed shortly, but upon the advice by the 
National Police, the organisers cancelled the concert even though more than 50 
000 tickets had been sold. However, the extent in which MUl's protest 
contributed to the National Police's decision remains questionable. On the one 
hand, the National Police refused a permit for the concert and suggested 
organisers seek recommendations from MUl first before it can issue any permit 
{The Jakarta Post, "IVIUI rejects 'pornography icon' Gaga," 22 IVlay 2012). 
However, this is by no means the police's recognition of MUl 's authority. First, 
the National Police wanted MUl's endorsement to come together with 
Kemenag's. Second, the police also wanted recommendations from the 
Tourism Ministry, Home Affairs Ministry, Director General for Immigration (for 
visa purposes). Manpower and Transmigration Ministry, and Bung Karno 
Stadium's management. Third, radical Islamic groups, particularly the FPI, were 
already planning to sabotage the concert had It carried on. They were even 
planning to stop Lady Gaga from getting off the plane (BBC, "Lady Gaga 
'devastated' as Indonesia concert cancelled," 28 May 2012). These show there 
were other considerations resulting in Lady Gaga's concert being called off. 
Nevertheless, six months after the Lady Gaga controversy, MUl got what it 
hoped when Jennifer Lopez's management team came to MUl discussing her 
debut concert in Jakarta. The concert was held on 30 November 2012. That 
time, MUl gave its consent because Lopez's management assured MUl that 
she would dress appropriately. Isa Anshary, the Chief Secretary for MUl, 
pointed out 
We have given permission for Jennifer Lopez to have her concert in Jakarta. 
We allowed Jennifer Lopez to perform because her dressing meets our moral 
requirements. For the case of Lady Gaga, even the Christians are not happy 
[with her dressing]. We [in MUl] said that It is important for MUl to give guidance 
that the artist's dressing must be moral. We are from the East, and we should 
not be like the Westl^^^ 
^^ ^ Interview with Isa Anshary, 6 December 2012 
Jennifer Lopez's management team would not want a repeat of the Lady Gaga 
controversy, which was still fresh on everybody's mind. However, so far, there 
were no reports about other foreign artists—as well as local ones—coming to 
MUl seeking its approval. Many foreign artists held their concerts in Indonesia, 
including Hollywood, Bollywood and those from Asia, and they did not trigger 
the sort of controversy equal to Lady Gaga. 
The battle for Pancasila in defining morality 
What are the strategies deployed by MUl in asserting its role in public morality? 
MUl used Pancasila to get the state to hear its request. Having social actors 
apply state's ideology in making demands is not peculiar to the Indonesian 
case. In the next chapter, I discuss how the Malaysian ulema effectively used 
the state's ideology Rukunegara to defend their authority. They claim to uphold 
the sanctity of Malay rulers, Islam, and Malay supremacy, while concurrently 
defending their own positions. Pancasila, however, does not have the same 
effect on MUl. Because Pancasila stands for neutrality towards all faiths, MUl 
cannot use it to determine public morality based on religious arguments. 
Cirrus 2006, in the midst of the anti-pornography bill controversy, there was an 
upsurge of discussion to revive Pancasila. Civil groups that were critical of 
Suharto for forcing all groups to adopt Pancasila, were then using it prevent the 
passing of the bill. They felt that the bill contradicted the essence of Pancasila, 
which promotes plurality (The Jakarta Post, 'Put Pancasila back on pedestal," 1 
June 2006). Balinese activists were also unhappy that the bill could threaten 
their culture. Bali has many paintings in caves and sculptures that portray 
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sexual overtones (Gelling, 2008). According to Gusti Ngurah Hatta, the bill was 
a threat to Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) (Wayan, 
2006). There were also groups from the East Nusa Tenggara that rejected the 
anti-pornography bill because it contradicted the Pancasila and the constitution 
{The Jakarta Post, "SBY advised not to sign porn bill," 28 November 2008). 
MUl also sought to use Pancasila for its political gains. After the fall of the New 
Order, it was quick to denounce Pancasila, but to only embrace it again during 
the Lady Gaga controversy. After the fall of the New Order, some members 
favoured for Pancasila to be dropped in favour of Islam (Syafiq, 2011, p. 6). 
"Islam is bigger than Pancasila" said MUl secretary Isa Anshary.^^® In 2006, 
MUl led a protest in response to the Yudhoyono government's proposal that all 
Islamic groups to adopt Pancasila or be banned. The state made this threat to 
groups that had been pushing for more shariah by-laws and the anti-
pornography bill to be passed (The Jakarta Post, "Hard-line groups reject 
Pancasila as sole ideology," 22 June 2006). 
Ironically, there have been attempts by some MUl members to use Pancasila to 
demand for Lady Gaga's banning. They invoked point number two which states 
that Indonesia should be "Just and civilised humanity." Umar Shihab, the head 
for Ukhuwah Commission in MUl, states that Lady Gaga violates the principles 
Interview with Isa Anshary, 31 October 2012. The selective use of Pancasila itself has raised 
divisions within MUl. Slamet Effendy, for instance, contends that MUl has not abandoned 
Pancasila ideology for sharia, but have contrasting perspective on public morality from other 
members Slamet also spoke about the merits of Lady Gaga. He said that Indonesian should 
emulate Lady Gaga on how to be a good singer, composer, and dancer (NU Online, 2012). 
Because of these disagreements between Lady Gaga and Pancasila, MUl has not officially 
issued any fatwa on the American artist (Rachman & Primanita, 2012). Interview with Slamet 
Effendy Yusof, 5 December 2012. 
of the nation in Pancasila, UUD 45, and pornographic laws (Eko, 2012). 
Aminudin Yakub, says that Lady Gaga will destroy the morals of the nation's 
youth. Another MUl nnember, Asrorun Niam, says that "Lady Gaga is at odds 
with the nation's belief in the one and only God and debases religion" {The 
Jakarta Post, "MUl rejects 'pornography icon' Gaga," 22 May 2012). While not 
mentioning Pancasila specifically, Slamet Effendy implies its "Just and Civilised 
Humanity" tenet in agreeing with Lady Gaga's banning. He said 
I have my own views of Lady Gaga. MUl forbids Lady Gaga because the she 
worshiped the devil. Furthermore, the idea of lesbianism is something that we 
disagree on. I will not agree on lesbianism, because it degrades the values of 
humanity. There were disagreements within MUl; some of us feel we need to 
look at beyond the literal aspects. 
MUl's "flip-flopping" on Pancasila demonstrate it is a pragmatic institution, even 
though there is no questioning that it seeks to develop more shariah in 
Indonesian society today. Its applying to Pancasila has not had a great effect in 
its push to moralise the entertainment and media industry. This is because 
contemporary Indonesians have come to interpret Pancasila as symbolising 
plural values rather than narrow interests of certain groups. 
To sum up, MUl's attempt to moralise the media and entertainment industry has 
been mixed. While the state eventually passed the anti-pornography bill in 
2008, most of MUl's demands, including a clear definition of its role, are not 
met. The Yudhoyono government's stand on MUl was similar to Suharto's, 
which was to keep MUl's role marginal. I make this argument even though since 
2005, Yudhoyono had called on MUl to play a greater role in the public sphere. 
His call was mainly a lip service to the institution that was not match with 
significant action. Nevertheless, MUl's success is determine by its ability to 
forge alliance with radical Islamic groups such as the FPI. Media and 
entertainment players were more fearful of these radical groups than MUl and 
they went to MUl only to seek refuge so that these radical groups would not 
harm them. 
Towards a halal-certified society: MUl's capture in progress? 
On 8 January 2013, during a celebration for the 24th anniversary of LPPOM-
MUI, Ma'ruf Amin delivered a keynote address highlighting MUl's latest project: 
sharia tourism.^^^ Sharia tourism, he argues, is one that Is oriented towards the 
welfare of the public, which emphasises renewal, refreshment, and recreation. 
MUl's sharia tourism project promotes "moral" tour packages that refrain tourists 
from pornography, porno-action, unlawful sex, drugs, gambling, and 
consumption of alcohol. Ma'ruf added that sharia tourism is universal and 
inclusive and respects the social and cultural norms of the locals. During the 
celebration, MUl distributed the Kriteria dan Panduan Pariwisata Syariah 
(Criteria and Guide for Sharia Tourism) document to attendees. The document 
states that all companies and industries In sharia tourism should utilise MUl's 
services. 
MUl members say that participating agencies in sharlah tourism must patronise 
its services. Shariah hotels must be certified by MUl and they must provide 
facilities for ablution, prayers, halal food, and cleanliness. One such hotel is the 
attended this event and took notes of Ma'ruf's speech. 
Sofyan Hotel Betawi Hotel in Jakarta that adapted to become shariah compliant 
in 1994. Couples who checked into shariah compliant hotels must show 
marriage certificates. In shariah compliant hotels, there must be no pictures 
depicting humans and animals hung on the walls of the hotel. Moreover, in 
shariah compliant hotels, a prayer mat and Quran is provided in each room, the 
restaurants in the hotel does not sell liquor, and the restaurants only provide 
halal certified food and drinks (Zubaidah, 2014). Between 2012 and 2013, the 
hotel recorded a significant twenty per cent jump in profits. The demand for 
such hotels and shahah tourism in general, mainly comes from the Middle 
Eastern and Southeast Asian countries. 
Moreover, restaurants and cafes in shariah hotels must ensure that food served 
is halal and must obtain halal certificates from LPPOM-MUl (Kreatif & DSN-
MUI, 2012). Spa, sauna, and massage parlours located in such hotels must be 
equipped with proper prayer facilities. MUl members call for a sharia code to be 
included for tour guides. A shariah oriented tour guide should be a man of good 
faith, good communicating trustworthy, and responsible reflect Islamic ethics 
and dress (Kreatif & DSN-MUl, 2012, pp. 8-16). In 2014, when Joko Widodo 
(Jokowi) was still Jakarta governor, he considered a gubernatorial decree on 
halal certification. Right now, only 315 food outlets of 8000 have been certified 
halal, and Jokowi intended to expand it (Zubaidah, 2014). 
The sharia tourism clearly reflects the direction in which MUl's push for state 
capture is heading to for the years to come. MUl will continue to ride on the 
general rise in piety and conservatism amongst the Indonesian Muslims, which 
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gained began since the Islamic resurgence period in the 1970s, and gained 
momentum in the 1990s. In the past, Suharto has denied MUl the authority to 
affect laws and regulations. Generally, the contemporary government continues 
Suharto's attitude towards MUl. Thus, MUl relies on societal support to lobby its 
requests to the state. One of the ways MUl tried to do this is to generate the 
community to patronise its halal certification business. One can observe this 
trend in shariah banking and finance; food, cosmetics, and medicine; and lately 
shariah tourism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the challenges faced by MUl in fulfilling its aims of 
capture. Based on the measurements of successful capture as pointed in 
Chapter One, MUl has been relatively successful in placing its members as 
advisors in shariah banks, which could in turn lobby the state to support its 
Islamic banking policies. Through the DSN-MUl, MUl is able to issue fatwa on 
Islamic banking that may have a significant impact on the shariah banking laws, 
although the state does not necessarily have to accept all fatwas. Its attempts to 
replicate these successes into other spheres are limited. The state continues to 
neutralise MUl's influence by merging them with rival ormas, or to exclude them 
from important decision-making position. MUl's failure also results from its 
internal fragmentation. The lure of personal rent seeking gains, overlapping 
loyalties with other ormas, as well as different religious orientation the 
exacerbated this fragmentation. 
Apart from its internal fragmentation, the existence of other ormas and NGOs 
diluted MUl's influence in the religious public sphere. At times, rival ormas and 
the state conducted smear campaign towards MUl, and exposed rent-seeking 
activities by MUl leaders in halal certification. Contrary to scholars and reporters 
who constantly highlight MUl's fatwa as having a huge influence on the public, 
its fatwa have also been the subject of ridicule by other progressive ulema. 
Ma'ruf Amin also admits the negative response on MUl fatwa (IffatuI Umniati, 
2009). The diversity of opinion by MUl members in the public domain only seek 
to confuse matters. There are many attempts to quell this fragmentation, and 
many MUl members often raise the idea of standardisation of fatwa. 
Nevertheless, until this fragmentation is resolved, the state and other ormas will 
continue to exploit MUl. Despite these challenges faced by MUl, it is likely to 
continue in its capture of the state, and these attempts, as mentioned in this 
chapter, include monopolising halal certification, determining deviance, 
becoming a watchdog for censorship, defining the Pancasila, and lately 
introducing shariah tourism. 
Chapter Seven 
JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM: 
Aims, strategies and challenges of capture 
Since taking power in 1981, Mahathir undertook a major Islamisation program 
for Malaysia. He empowered and upgraded ulema institutions, some of which 
were formed by his predecessors Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970), Abdul 
Razak Hussin (1970-1976), and Hussein Onn (1976-1981). He strengthened 
the JKF-MKI (Jawatankuasa Fatwa Kebangsaan MKI or National Fatwa 
Committee), expanded the role of JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or 
Department of Islamic Development Malaysia), and created IKIM (Institut 
Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding). 
Mahathir co-opted ulema into these institutions to shore up support for UMNO 
(United Malays National Organisation), to support his development policies, and 
most importantly, to counter the opposition party PAS (Islamic Party of 
Malaysia). 
Scholars have discussed extensively Malaysia's Islamisation and ulema co-
optation under Mahathir's authoritarian rule (Hamayotsu, 2005; Maznah, 2013, 
p.110-118; Rais, 1995; Syed Husin, 2008). According to Syed Hussin, "The 
religious functionaries from the mufti and the kadi right down to the imam...have 
become government servants and paid monthly salaries... and can be 
promoted or demoted, depending on [political] circumstances" (2008, pp. 66-
67). The perception of ulema co-optation remains strong even after Mahathir's 
retirement in 2003.^^® "With the exception of a very few, the official ulema are 
co-opted by the state. If they ever go against the government, they will be called 
up by the bosses!" said Dato' Siddiq Fadhil, former ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia or Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) president.^^® Similarly, Fauzi 
Deraman, an Islamic Studies professor at UM (Universiti Malaya), said "It is true 
that official ulema are close to the government...The official ulema want to 
protect their positions, so they have to say 'yes' to the government. 
Scholars observe yet another trend regarding the behaviour of Malaysian official 
ulema. They point to ulema becoming increasingly conservative in their thinking 
(Alatas, 2014; Parish, 2005; Martinez, 2001; Norani et al., 2005). Malaysian 
academic Parish (2005) goes so far as to label contemporary official ulema in 
Malaysia as "religio-fascists" for raiding night-clubs and harassing religious 
minorities. Similarly, Alatas (2014) charactehses them as "Salafis" for their 
persecution of the Malaysian Shia community. He argues that extremist ideas 
from the Middle East have influenced official ulema's way of thinking and 
behaviour. 
I generally concur with these scholars' observations on the ulema's loyalty to 
the government as well as their conservatism. The ulema's defence of UMNO 
leaders, the party's ideology and its policies on the one hand; and the Malay 
rulers' position as the country's custodians of Islam on the other; reflect strong 
state co-optation. To illustrate, ulema have prominently defended UMNO's 
Interview with Nasruddin Tantawi, 10 February 2013; Email Interview with Jufitri Johar 11 
June 2013. 
Interview with Siddiq Fadhil, 24 April 2013. 
Interview with Fauzi Deraman, 6 February 2013. 
ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy), Rukunegara (especially on loyalty to the 
King), Wawasan 2020, Islam Hadhari (Civilisation Islam) and Islam Wasatiyah 
(Moderate Islam) in their sermons, writings, and discourse. They have also 
described groups critical of Malay rulers as "un-lslamic." On the other hand, 
ulema's conservatism is reflected in their recent fatwas on issues such as 
proscribing conversion out of Islam, banning the rightful use of the term "Allah" 
by non-Muslims, and enjoining the conversion of minors to Islam by single 
parent (all these issues will be discussed later in this chapter). 
However, I argue that the Malaysian official ulema are not passive actors 
abiding UMNO's instructions at all times. By entering into state-sponsored 
institutions, they work closely with state officials and politicians. They can have 
frequent contact with the Prime Minister, cabinet members, and senior 
bureaucrats that other ulema were denied access to. In addition, they use state 
platforms to launch their capture initiatives. Furthermore, some ulema stand out 
from others in terms of their ability to influence the state. In this chapter, I 
examine closely the authority Perak Mufti, Harussani Zakaria, particularly his 
ability to prolong his stay in office, to withstand criticisms from UMNO, and wield 
influence beyond the religious domain. Some Malaysians jokingly called him the 
"Malaysian Pope." Emphasising Harussani's role allows one to explore the 
internal dynamics within the official ulema class. 
There are five capture objectives of Malaysian official ulema. First, they want to 
dominate the religious discourse by having exclusive rights to determine who 
can speak on Islamic matters, to define what constitutes the "correct" Islam, and 
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to render their opinions uncliallengeable. They have silenced liberal groups and 
those not conforming to orthodox Sunni Islam. Second, they seek to sustain the 
existing power structures so that they can continue affecting government 
policies. I contend that contemporary official ulema supported the Malay rulers 
and UMNO partly because they have to, but more so because they want to 
preserve the status quo. Supporting UMNO guarantees their edge over PAS, 
their main rival in the Islamic sphere. Third, the ulema aim to act autonomously 
from the state. Under the Mahathir government, they had to conform to the 
state's wants. Under the Abdullah Badawi government, and especially after the 
2008 elections, they have been able to defy the state, ignore its instructions, 
and even issue fatwas that contradict the government's wishes. There were 
instances in which the ulema sided with the rulers and the opposition in mal<ing 
their requests to the state. 
Fourth, the official ulema hope to enhance their authority beyond state 
platforms, such as the bureaucracies, mosques, and madrasahs In fact as the 
chapter will illustrate, the powers of the official ulema are no longer restricted to 
the religious domain. The community has been soliciting ulema's views on 
many issues; including on political controversies, economic policies, and Malay 
cultural life. Fifth, the official ulema desire to affect the distribution of resources. 
They want to be key players in the halal certification and Islamic banking 
sectors, on top of the being high-ranking bureaucrats. In pursuing this last 
objective, the ulema wish to expand both institutionalised capture and 
personalised capture. Institutionalised capture means requesting greater state 
recognition of ulema institutions for their roles in administering shariah banking 
and halal certification. Personalised capture refers to ulema obtaining private 
gains from heading these lucrative sectors. 
The chapter also demonstrates Malaysian official ulema are more successful 
than their Indonesian counterparts in meeting their objectives. The Malaysian 
ulema's ability to capitalise on three capture modalities—a clear institutional 
role, coherent ideology, and organisational unity—contributes to their relative 
success. Malaysian laws and enactments clearly define the ulema's authority in 
fatwa, shariah economics, halal certification, and moral policing. Fatwas passed 
by the negeri religious councils are binding, and those violating them could face 
a fine or jail sentence. Yet, the federal and negeri religious institutions work 
closely with the aim of standardising fatwas and religious administration for the 
whole country. More importantly, the first modality allows official ulema to act 
autonomously from societal pressure because the law allows them to do so. For 
example, they can mobilise the religious police to arrest groups deemed 
"deviant" or "immoral." Their actions are also legitimate because they are 
backed by the Malay rulers, who the constitution defines as the custodians of 
Islam and the Malays. The ulema can easily disregard criticisms from liberal 
groups and intellectuals, and even curb them from speaking on Islamic matters. 
Malaysian official ulema have been effectively articulating their requests for 
greater power using state's and UMNO's ideology Rukunegara and ketuanan 
Melayu. While this is the least important capture modality compared to the other 
two, the ulema preserve existing power structures by supporting those 
ideologies. By supporting these ideologies, the ulema formed a durable alliance 
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with UMNO and Malay rulers. The ulema treated every challenge to their 
authority—by the opposition and civil society—as a threat to Islam and the 
constitution. 
Furthermore, the ulema have been able to demonstrate greater cohesion when 
responding to challenges from PAS, civil society, and lately, even UMNO 
leaders who wanted to moderate their views on Islamic matters. While the 
ulema have their differences, as shown in the different fatwas passed at the 
negeri councils, they rarely expressed their disagreements publicly. 
The following sections examine the extent Malaysian official ulema can meet 
their capture objectives applying the three mentioned modalities. The 
discussion will be organised in the following matter: the official ulema's desire to 
dominate religious discourses; to sustain power in the institutions to continue 
affecting policies; to be able to act independently of the state; to assert authority 
beyond those specified by the state; and to affect distribution of resources. 
Within these sections, I discuss ulema's strategies to achieve these objectives. 
Dominating Islamic discourses 
Malaysian official ulema seek to dominate Islamic debates by rejecting the 
rights of certain groups to speak on religious matters. They were also intolerant 
of individuals who challenge their fatwas.^^^ In Islamic jurisprudence, fatwas are 
usually regarded as advisories and non-binding. Nevertheless, the Malaysian 
ulema have imposed sanctions for fatwas violators, in some instances, labelling 
them "deviants." I argue the ulema have been successful in dominating religious 
discourse, which is reflected in three aspects: their ability to limit who can speak 
on Islamic matters; their authority to define what constitutes as Ahlus Sunnah 
Wal Jamaah (Sunni or ASWJ); and their authority to declare groups as 
"deviant." 
Limiting who can speal< on Islam 
The Malaysian official ulema consider their views theologically sounder than 
those of other ulema and Muslim intellectuals. They continue to hold this 
assumption even though there are many other scholars, activists, and 
intellectuals who articulate their views with reference to Quranic texts and 
Islamic traditions. The ulema used labels such as "liberal"; "pluralist" or 
"orientalist" to silence those whom they regard as non-ulema, and these labels 
feature in their sermons and writings."^ For example, on 9 March 2012, JAKIM 
issued a sermon cautioning Malaysian Muslims about ideologies that 
threatened the Muslim faith, including capitalism, materialism, liberalism, 
pluralism, communism, Punks, homosexuality, Shiism, and free sex (JAKIM, 
2012a). The ulema see these ideologies as contradicting Islamic principles. The 
following paragraphs discuss how the official ulema use such labels to suppress 
Their quest for monopoly in the religious domain is akin to religious traditionalism and 
authoritarianism defined by scholars of sociology of religion Abou El FadI 2001' Noor Aisha 
2004; Towler, 1984. 
Malaysian academic. Parish A Noor is one person who is often labelled as liberal and has no 
authority to speak on Islam. In a blog post, he lamented how the line "You are not qualified to 
about Islam" is used repeatedly to restrict the public discourse to the conservative arouos 
(Parish, 2009). 
and delegitimise civil society groups that are active in promoting progressive 
Islamic interpretations. The groups that will be discussed in detail here are SIS 
(Sisters in Islam) and IRF (Islamic Renaissance Front) members. 
The official ulema have denounced SIS members as promoters of "liberal" 
Islam. Founded in 1987, SIS has advocated against discriminatory practices 
towards women. SIS members include academics, professionals, journalists 
and lawyers.^^^ They promote contextual, hermeneutical readings of Islamic 
texts. In the past, they have criticised conservative groups for perceived gender 
biased interpretations of the Quran. For example, they rejected the view that 
women's eyewitness testimony in criminal investigations was less credible than 
men's, and that "two women's eye-witness accounts equal to one man's" and 
"four adult male eye-witnesses are required to prove a rape crime" (Rose, 1995, 
p.44). 
For their critical views, SIS members had on many occasions clashed with 
official ulema. According to Ratna Osman, SIS Executive Director, the official 
ulema do not like SIS because the organisation always contests their rulings. 
Ratna also revealed that the ulema had warned SIS not to speak on Islam 
matters because they do not have any Islamic "credentials."^^" She felt the 
ulema could not tolerate criticism of their rulings. Ratna explained 
In Selangor, they gazetted a fatwa declaring smoking impermissible Can the 
state enforce that fatwa? [Likewise] A Muslims male who has reached puberty 
but does not perform prayers should be detained. How can the state implement 
233 Prominent members of the organisation include Norani Othman, Zainah Anwar and the 
daughter of former Prime IVIinister Mahathir Mohamad, Marina Mahathir 
Interview with Ratna Osman, 7 February 2013 
that? SIS is saying ttiat there are better interpretations and opinions in the 
IVIuslim world compared to theirs. They don't like us because we question 
them.235 
The official ulema were not the only ones critical of SIS; ulema from PUM and 
PAS had also joined the official ulema in restricting SIS's influence in the 
religious domain. Ratna recalled that in 2009, the official ulema, PAS Youth and 
PUM organised a protest against SIS for coordinating The Global Musawah 
programme. The program's objective was to create public awareness on gender 
equality, justice, and dignity for women. The protestors argued that SIS was 
promoting "dangerous" ideas because in Islam, men are leaders and women 
followers.^^® 
In 2010, SIS leaders were confronted by the Perak mufti, Harussani Zakaria, 
concerning the caning of three Muslim women. The Federal Territory Shariah 
Court found the three women guilty of adultery, and on 9 February 2010, they 
received six strokes of the cane {Utusan Malaysia, "Harussani bidas Sisters In 
Islam," 19 February 2010). SIS members protested against the sentence 
because it contradicted Section 289 of the Penal Code, which bans caning of 
women. Moreover, SIS members argue for consistency in law enforcement. At 
that point in time, the much reported Kartika Sari case, who was appealing 
against a similar sentence, was yet to be concluded.^^^ The Pahang Shariah 
in July 2008, Pahang religious officials arrested Kartika Sari Dewi, a 32 year-old, 
Malay/Muslim fashion model, for drinking alcohol at a nightclub. Under the Pahang religious 
law, it is an offence for a IVIuslim to consume alcohol in public. Those caught consuming alcohol 
in public will be liable for a fine, jail, and/or caning. The Pahang Shariah Court sentenced 
Kartika to six strokes of the cane and a fine of RM 5000 (A$1733), which was not carried out by 
the time the three Muslim women were canned. In fact, the Pahang religious authorities did not 
cane Kartika after all because on 1 April 2010, the Pahang Ruler, Sultan Ahmad Shah, 
pardoned Kartika and directed her to carry out community work instead. 
Court had sentenced Kartika to be caned for drinking beer in 2009. Harussani 
criticised SIS for protesting against the caning of the three women, arguing that 
the Quran and shariah laws permit caning of adulterers. Harussani then labelled 
SIS "Westerners" and "Orientalists" for opposing God's law. According to 
Harussani, 
These people do not understand Islamic laws; they go against and hate Islamic 
law because the Orientalist West who goes against Islam influences them. If 
you want to consider six strokes of the cane, it is too lenient when the original 
punishment is 100 lashes to those to commit adultery and 80 lashes for taking 
alcohol {Utusan Malaysia, "Harussani bidas Sisters In Islam," 2010, 19 
February). 
ABIM's women members supported Harussani's criticisms of SIS. Fadhlina 
Sidek, the Vice-President of its Woman's Wing, called on the public to ignore 
SIS for rejecting islamic law {Berita Minggu, "NGO tak patut persoal hukuman 
syariah," 21 February 2010). This shows that some Muslim women supported 
the official ulema against a group that struggles for their rights. 
Most recently, in July 2014, MAIS (Majlis Agama Islam Selangor or Selangor 
Islamic Religious Council) gazetted a fatwa declaring SIS "deviant." The council 
sees SIS as promoting liberal Islam and pluralistic thinking. The Selangor Chief 
Minister, Azmin Ali, called for dialogue between MAIS and SIS, though he 
reiterated that he has no authority over fatwas and that the fatwa should be 
respected (Anisah, 2014). The MAIS fatwa was supported by PAS Youth 
{Utusan Malaysia, "Dewan Pemuda Pas Pusat mahu Sis diharamkan segera, 7 
November 2014). Interestingly, the official ulema were critical towards SIS even 
though one of its board members is Datin Paduka Marina, Mahathir's daughter. 
The official ulema's approach towards SIS demonstrates that political 
258 
connections play a minimal role in ulema's decision. They target groups that 
challenge their rulings. 
Besides SIS, the official ulema have also considered the IRF (Islamic 
Renaissance Front) a "liberal" organisation. IRF is an NGO that promotes 
progressive, reformist and inclusive Islamic discourses. It runs a website 
(irffront.net) that features articles—both in English and in Malay—on Islamic 
legal reforms, reformist thought and Islamic intellectualism. The IRF was 
launched in 2009 by internationally renowned reformist thinker Tariq Ramadan. 
Based on its website, IRF's vision is to promote ideas of Islamic reform and 
renewal, to revitalise Malaysian Muslim intellectual discourse, and to help 
establish an inclusive and just Malaysian nation (Islamic Renaissance Front, 
2014). 
Overall, the official ulema treated the IRF more favourably than SIS. Farouk 
Musa, IRF's director, said that the official ulema have neither intimidated him 
nor called him up for questioning, even though IRF is also promoting discourses 
such as gender equality and human rights. One possible explanation for the 
official ulema's differential treatment towards the IRF is that IRF's commentaries 
apply views of modernist Egyptian jurists Muhammad Abduh (b.1849-d.1905). 
Malaysian ulema generally considered Muhammad Abduh's ideas as 
mainstream. IRF also referred to mainstream Southeast Asian ulema. 
According to Farouk 
And from Imam Abduh, there is a lineage, of all the mujadid or reformers like 
Rashid Rida, Al-Marawi, and of course in the far east, Kiai Hassan Bandung, 
Prof Hasbi As-Siddiqui, Isa Anshori, Prof Hamka, a few others, Syed Syeikh Al-
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Hadi, Syeikh Ibrahim AB, and like Zaba himself and all these are reformers, in 
Malaysia and Singapore.""® 
The other reason why the ulema did not intimidate IRF leaders is that the 
organisation is led by men. There remains a gender bias within the ulema's 
discourse that men are natural leaders and women caregivers. The ulema were 
less favourable of SIS because they are led by women. 
Yet, there were instances where the official ulema tried to stop IRF's events. So 
far, the IRF had to cancel two events because JAKIM did not approve them. On 
19 September 2011, IRF called off "The Future of Islamic Feminism" forum 
because JAKIM considered the speakers "liberal" Muslims. Farouk recalled 
The religious authorities wanted to impose their authority [by stopping the 
event] because we invited Zainah Anwar and Parish Noor. It was cancelled 
even though it was at ISTAC and co-organised by the Post-Graduate Centre for 
International Islamic University Malaysia.""® 
JAKIM also wanted the organisers to drop Dr Mohd Ash as a panellist, and 
requested one of its own ulema to replace the former Perlis mufti. This shows 
that JAKIM tries to micro-manage religious events even though they are 
organised by NGOs. 
Three years later, JAKIM stopped another IRF forum. On 18 October 2014, the 
IRF and GMM (Global Movement of Moderates Foundation) organised a 
discussion "Religious Fundamentalism Threat in This Century." The organisers 
J^® Interview with Dr Farouk Musa, Director of Islamic Renaissance Front, 7 February 2013 
n f Z : H X " ° T ^ n f l ? ^ liberal-oriented by Muslims in o.h^r parts 
of the world (Norshahril, 2012b). 
Interview with Dr Farouk Musa, 7 February 2013 
invited Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, an Indonesian liberal intellectual, to be one of the 
speakers. JAKIM director-general, Datuk Othman Mustafa intervened, declaring 
the talk contravened JKF-MKI's ruling. He said that only the ASWJ or Ahli 
Sunnah Wal Jamaah sect is allowed to be practised in Malaysia. JAKIM banned 
Ulil Abshar from speaking, claiming he was a liberal Muslim and Ahmadiyah 
Qadiani sympathiser. Bernama reported that JAKIM advised the Home Affairs 
Ministry to stop the forum (Bernama, "Roundtable Discussion On Religious 
Fundamentalism Islamism Should Be Stopped—Jakim," 9 October 2014).^"° 
JAKIM also targets Individuals who gave alternative viewpoints from the 
ulema's. In 2004, JAKIM directed Astora Jabat, a liberal-minded columnist for 
Utusan Malaysia, to stop writing on Islamic matters. Before that, Utusan 
Malaysia published Astora's column regularly. His articles dealt with Islam and 
normally adopted a progressive slant. In 2003, the Perak Religious Council 
issued a fatwa against Astora. The fatwa declared Astora an apostate for 
questioning the Islamic belief about "punishment of the grave" after a person's 
death. Astora pointed out the conflicting hadlth on the belief and JAKIM warned 
Astora for traducing ulema's authority. It also charactehsed his writings as 
divisive. Later, JAKIM Director General, Mustafa Abdul Rahman, accused 
Astora of being disrespectful to Malaysian sharlah laws and muftis (Rozi, 2004). 
After the controversy, Utusan Malaysia discontinued Astora's columns. 
In short, official ulema consider themselves to be the most authoritative to 
speak on Islam. Not only do they seek to silence groups who promote feminism 
' The banning of non-ASWJ sects will be discussed later. 
and liberalism, they also tried to restrict ulema who disagree with them from 
speaking. They use platforms such as Friday sermons, fatwa meetings, and 
mainstream media to warn Muslims of the groups' "threats." In June 2012, 
Perak Mufti Harussani Zakaria advised Nik Aziz (PAS Spiritual leader) not to 
criticise any Malaysian mufti. Harussani was unhappy when Nik Aziz reminded 
him not side with UMNO. Harussani counselled Nik Aziz that muftis are learned 
persons of religion and should never be questioned {Utusan Malaysia, "Nik Aziz 
kurang sopan tegur mufti," 2 June 2012). 
Defining ASWJ 
Official ulema also claimed they have sole authority to define "truth" and 
"deviance," even though these have been contested arenas in theology 
throughout Islamic history (Fazlur, 2000). They sought to monopolise the 
religious discourse by assuming authority to give the "correct" definition of 
ASWJ, which is the only allowed sect in Malaysia. The ASWJ teachings said 
that after the demise of the Prophet Muhammad, the Caliphs were Abu Bakar, 
Umar, Usman and lastly Ali. This is different from Shia belief, which insisted that 
AN was the rightful caliph after Muhammad's death, not Abu Bakar. Moreover, 
the official ulema portray Shiism's rise in Malaysian as threatening ASWJ, 
although Shias make up only ten per cent of Muslim population in the world, 
and probably, less than one per cent in Malaysia. 
On 9 March 2012, JAKIM issued a Friday sermon entitled Ancaman Akidah 
Umat Islam (The Threat to the Islamic Faith). The sermon wams Muslims about 
the Shia threat in Malaysia. The official ulema's condemnation of Shiism began 
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in the 1980s and intensified under the Najib government. In 1987, seven Shia 
followers were detained for spreading deviant teachings. In 2001, the Home 
Affairs Ministry placed six Shia followers under the ISA for threatening national 
security. In December 2010, Selangor religious officials (JAIS) detained 200 
members of the Lovers of The Prophet's Household, a pro-Shia group. On 8 
March 2014, JAIPK (Jabatan Agama Islam Perak or Perak Religious 
Department) officials arrested 114 Muslims for attending a ceremony affiliated 
to Shiism (Alatas, 2014). 
The JKF-MKI has issued fatwas declaring the Shias deviant, and many of the 
negeri religious councils have gazetted the fatwa. As early as 1984, the JKF-
MKI had discussed the status of Shia; but it was only in 1996 that the committee 
released a fatwa against the sect (JAKIM, 2013a). Before 1984, JKF-MKI 
allowed the Shia denominations Zaidiyyah and Jafarriyyah to practise their faith. 
In 1996, the JKF-MKI issued a fatwa prohibiting the publication, broadcasting or 
distribution of books, leaflets, films, videos, and other products relating to the 
teachings of Islam that contradicted to Sunni Islam. The religious councils of 
Federal Territory (1997), Melaka (1997), and Pulau Pinang (1997) accepted and 
gazetted the fatwa; the Kelantan and Perlis religious councils endorsed the 
fatwa but did not gazette it. Recently, Pahang and Kedah religious councils 
have indicated that they would issue the fatwa on the sect (JAKIM, 2013a). 
During the 2013 election campaign, UMNO leaders sought to use the Shia 
fatwa to discredit PAS leaders, whom they labelled as Shia sympathisers. 
UMNO politician Mukhriz Mahathir, son of the former Prime Minister, accused 
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Mohamad Sabu, PAS Deputy President, of being a Shia (New Straits Times, 
"PAS must clarify stand on Shia," 18 May 2013). Yet, Mukhriz's use of the Shia 
fatwa contradicted other UMNO leaders' more inclusive attitude. The fatwa also 
challenged The Amman l\/lessage, to which former Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi, and former religious minister Abdul Hamid Othman, are signatories. In 
2005, Jordanian King, Abdullah Hussein, initiated The Amman Message to 
define what Islam is and what it is not. The declaration affirmed Shias as 
mainstream. Other signatories of the declaration include internationally 
renowned ulema and political leaders from 84 countries—such as the prominent 
Sunni ulema Yusof Al-Qardawi. Moreover, the fatwa was at odds with the fact 
that Malaysia has strong diplomatic ties with Iran, a Shia state. In 2013, 
Mahathir received former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in Putrajaya. 
During the meeting, both Mahathir and Khatami called on the OIC to end the 
Sunni/Shia divide. Hence, the official ulema's position contradicted Mahathir's 
views. 
As mentioned above, the ulema's harassment of Shias increased under the 
Najib government. The government, it should be noted, is poweriess to prevent 
the arrests made by JAIS or JAIPK officials because Islam is a negeri matter. 
However, the government made little effort to persuade JKF-MKI to moderate 
its fatwa, something which may have softened negeri fatwas. Conversely, 
JAKIM and JFK-MKI have been pushing the state to restrict Shiism: through 
fatwas, campaigns and sermons. JAKIM also commissioned a frequently asked 
questions (FAQ) book on Shia entitled Soal Jawab Isu Syiah di Malaysia (Mohd 
Aizam, 2013). The book highlights the history of Shiism, its differences with 
ASWJ, and its spread to the Malay world. The anti-ShIa fatwa, and JAKIM's 
campaign that followed, affect Malaysia's standing as a "moderate" Islamic 
state, which is an image the government has strived to portray since 9/11. In 
July 2010, Najib called for the hatred between Sunnis and Shias to stop. He 
remarked, "The simplest analogy I would use is that both the Shia and Sunni 
are on the same highway. The only difference is that they are on different lanes. 
Even the destination is the same" (Sipalan, 2014). Furthermore, the ulema's 
behaviour impedes the Prime Minister's avowed ambition to create an inclusive 
society. Foreign visitors who came to study about Malaysia's so-called 
"inclusiveness" or "moderation" were upset with what they saw. According to 
Marina Mahathir, 
Iranians came here [to Malaysia] to talk to IKIM officials. They were left 
shocked. The IKIM ulema are not at all moderate...It does not reflect the 
government's promotion of moderate Islam.^ '*^ 
The Shias are not the only group denounced by the official ulema. Some Sufi 
orders are described as deviating from ASWJ, even though their practises are 
found in other predominantly Sunni societies. In 2000, the JKF-MKI declared 
the Tariqat Naqsyabandiah Al-Aliyyah to be outside ASWJ teachings, and the 
MAIWP (Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan or Islamic Religious Council 
for Federal Territories) and MAIM (Majlis Agama Islam Melaka or The Islamic 
Religious Council of Malacca) gazetted the fatwa (JAKIM, 2 0 1 I n 
countries such as Singapore where Sunni Islam is practised, the country's 
official ulema tolerated the sect and it has a wide following. The Malaysian 
ulema's decision to ban Tariqat Naqsyabandiah Al-Aliyyah on the grounds of 
Interview with Marina IVIahathir, 7 February 2013. 
See fatwa Tariqat Naqsyabandiah Al-Aliyyah Pimpinan Syiekh Nazim issued 20 November 
2002. 
faith is not an isolated case. The JKF-IVIKI issued more fatwas on faith under 
the Abdullah Badawi government than under previous governments. The chart 
below (Figure 4) maps how the number of fatwa on faith increased by three-fold 
since Abdullah Badawi took over in 2003. 
Figure 4. Fatwa concerning Islamic faith issued by JKF-MKI 
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Source; This data Is compiled from JAKIM's website (JAKIM, 2013a). 
Treating fatwas as unchallengeable 
The negeri laws stipulate that anyone who violated a gazetted fatwa can be 
fined or jailed or both. For instance, in Selangor, those found violating a 
gazetted fatwa faced fines of up to RM3000 (A$1060) or jail for up to two years 
(Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor), 1995). In Sabah, a person who 
questions a gazetted fatwa issued by the mufti could be fined up to RM 1000 
(A$348) or jailed for six months or both (Syariah Criminal Offences (Sabah), 
1995). Based on the Penang Shariah Enactment, those sentenced to jail would 
be placed in the same prison with those who committed criminal offences 
(Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Negeri Pulau Pinang, 2012). 
Although sanctions only apply to those who violate fatwas published in the 
negeri gazette, there have been instances where official ulema acted beyond 
the laws' remit. In March 2014, prominent Malaysian laureate, Kassim Ahmad, 
was arrested by JAWI officials (Jabatan Agama Wilayah Persekutuan or 
Religious Department for Federal Territories) for insulting Islam and violating a 
fatwa. On 16 February 2014, Kassim spoke during a public forum organised by 
the Perdana Leadership Foundation in Putrajaya. In his speech, he made 
references to his 1986 book Hadis: Satu Penilaian Semula (Hadith: A 
Revaluation), which was declared haram by the religious councils of Penang (in 
1986), Terengganu (in 1995), Sabah (gazetted in 1986), and Malacca (gazetted 
in 1986). The fatwas these councils passed consider Kassim to have insulted 
the Prophet and warned him not to repeat his views in public. 
Ironically, the MAIWP and JKF-MKI did not issue any fatwa against the book. 
Therefore, JAW! arrested Kassim based on the fatwas gazetted by the Penang, 
Terengganu, Sabah and Malacca religious councils. Kassim's arrest was also 
controversial because it took place in Kedah when the alleged offence was 
carried out in Putrajaya. This shows that JAWI officials had exceeded their 
authority because their powers are restricted to the Federal Territories. Kassim 
was later charged under Section 7(b) and Section 9 of the Federal Territory 
Shariah offences Act {Bernama, "Scholar Kassim Ahmad to be charged in court 
today for insulting Islam," 27 March 2014). 
The official ulema's attempt to consolidate their authority in fatwa-making was 
also demonstrated in Kedah. Recently, the Kedah government strengthened the 
powers of the MAIK (Majlis Agama Islam Kedah or Islamic Religious Council of 
Kedah). On 17 April 2012, the Kedah legislature (under the PAS government) 
amended the Mufti and Fatwa Enactment (Rang Undang-Undang Mufti dan 
Fatwa) which now states that fatwas issued by the Kedah mufti and the MAIK 
cannot be challenged {Bernama, "Koh cabar Lim Guan Eng tentang 
pendiriannya mengenai isu Kedah," 21 April 2012). The amendment means that 
a Muslim residing in Kedah cannot challenge any MAIK fatwa even if the Kedah 
Sultan has not given his assent to their gazetting. GERAKAN (Malaysian 
People's Movement Party) veteran leader, Koh Tsu Koon, and Perils Mufti Dr 
Juanda Jaya, had criticised this amendment, which is another step towards 
authoritarianism in the religious discourse. Apart from Juanda, other muftis 
remain silent on the amendment. Even after UMNO regained control of Kedah 
in 2013, there was no indication that the negeri government would rescind the 
law. 
Moreover, the official ulema have stepped up their criticisms of opposition 
politicians who challenged JKF-MKI fatwas. They regarded Muslims who 
violated JKF-MKI's fatwas as being "disrespectful" to the ulema and Islam. In 
February 2014, Harussani (Mufti of Peral<), Abdul Rahman Osman (Mufti of 
Pahang), and Nooh Gadut (Advisor to Islamic Religious Council of Johore) 
criticised Anwar Ibrahim for speaking at a church gathering in Kajang, Selangor 
(Berita Harian, "Dua mufti lagi kecam Anwar," 19 February 2014). During the 
gathering, Anwar questioned the federal government's decision to allow Sabah 
and Sarawak Christians to use the term "Allah" but denying those from the 
Peninsular the same rights. Although Anwar was critical of the government, 
Nooh Gadut characterised Anwar's speech as defying the fatwa agreed by the 
14 Malaysian muftis. He also chastised Anwar for violating the decision made 
by the JKF-MKI In 1986.^''^ Nevertheless, the JAKIM website states that it was 
on 5 May 2008, and not 1986, that JKF-MKI Issued the fatwa. Even so, the 
1986 decision was a Cabinet's decision and not JKF-MKI's. So far, only five 
negeri have gazetted the 2008 fatwa: Selangor, Perak, Kedah, Johore, Pulau 
Pinang and Sabah. 
The official ulema now used fatwa as their vehicle to dominate the discourse. 
Lately, there has been a movement to treat all fatwas, including those Issued by 
the JKF-MKI, as unchallengeable and binding, even though the law specifically 
states that only gazetted negeri fatwas have such standing. The 1996 Shia 
fatwa shows that the government has no authority to influence the ulema's 
decision. While most of the fatwas issued by the JKF-MKI were either neutral or 
supportive of the state's policies. Individuals and groups closely aligned to 
UMNO leaders—such as SIS and Kassim Ahmad—have also been targeted. 
Thus, the assumption made by scholars that official ulema are synonymous with 
UMNO lackeys is not accurate. 
^^  This cabinet decision not only restricted the non-IVIuslims from using the term "Allah," but 
also other terms such as Kaabah (a cube-lil<e structure in Mecca which indicates the direction 
IVIuslims pray to) solat (Prayers), and Baitullah (House of Allah). 
Sustaining power to affect policies and other appointments 
One of the trade-offs of co-optation is ttie requirement to support the state's 
ideology and policies. As will be discussed shortly, UMNO politicians expect 
official ulema to defend the party and the state ideology.^"" Yet, by defending 
UMNO, as well as the Malay rulers, the official ulema are able to prolong their 
stay in office, which then increases their clout. I suggest that by prolonging their 
stay in the religious institutions, official ulema have a greater chance to promote 
their conservative views in the state's policy-making circles. They have also 
used their closeness to Malay rulers to provide them protection from UMNO's 
criticisms. Also, an important factor for ulema's capture is their duration in office. 
The older ulema are able to keep the younger ones at bay. Some have stayed 
in their positions long enough to be able to interpret the state's ideology to suit 
their own agenda. The following sections examine how the official ulema 
consolidated their authority through defending UMNO's policies and the position 
of the Malay rulers as the country's custodians of Islam. These sections also 
demonstrate how the ulema have been able to influence the state more 
successfully since Mahathir's retirement. 
Supporting UMNO's ideology 
Throughout the premierships of Mahathir Mohammad (1981-2003) and 
Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009), Malaysian muftis and JAKIM officials were active 
244 Interview with Azhar Tuarno, 18 April 2013. 
in supporting and promoting UMNO's ideology, policies, and slogans. Two such 
slogans are Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020) and Islam Hadhari (Civilisation 
Islam). Wawasan 2020 manifests Mahathir's vision for Malaysia to be a 
developed country by year 2020. The slogan was first coined in 1991, but it 
continues to feature in contemporary official ulema publications and sermons. 
On the one hand, UMNO leaders expected the ulema to promote the concept 
by virtue of their position as civil servants. According to Azhar Tuarno, imam of 
Masjid Negara, 
JAKIM officials are civil servants and must represent the views of the ruling 
party. They implement government policies as long as they do not contradict 
Islam. If they are not satisfied [with the government's policies] they can leave 
JAKIM. Whether you are happy or otherwise, as long as the laws are not 
contradictory to God's laws, we can enforce them. If you are not satisfied [with 
the government], there is always an election, and you can express your 
unhappiness in the election. As such, whoever is In the civil service, he must 
act in accordance to the Constitution.^"^ 
In September 2011, Jamil Khir, a minister in the Prime Minister's Office, made it 
clear that official ulema must support the state (UMNO's) ideology. During a 
congress attended by state officials, JKF-MKI members, and negeri ulema, 
Jamil said, "The official ulema need to strengthen and improve the 
administration of the Majlis Agama Islam [Islamic Religious Councils]. If the 
state has Wawasan 2020 as its vision, we need to transform our religious 
institutions to parallel the state's vision" (Bernama, "Kongres Majlis Agama 
Islam Negeri Angkat Martabat Islam—Jamil Khir," 15 September 2011). 
Following Jamil's call, in 2014, JAKIM launched the Integrity Plan and Code of 
Ethics, where it pledged its commitment for the realisation of the national 
mission Wawasan 2020 (JAKIM, 2014d, p.36). 
^^^ Interview with Ustaz Azhar Tuarno, 18 April 2013 
On the other hand, some ulema genuinely believe Wawasan 2020 and other 
UMNO slogans will accelerate Muslim development. In 2011, Nik Mustapha Nik 
Hasan, IKIM director, wrote a paper entitled Dari Model Baru Ekonomi Ke 
Pencapaian Wawasan 2020 (From the New Economic Model to achieving 
Vision 2020). The paper highlights the failures of Western capitalism and 
secularism and asserts how Wawasan 2020 can correct these problems. He 
regarded the values promoted by Wawasan 2020 as promoting Islamic spirit, 
namely the spirit of al-Adl Wal Ihsan (Justice and Welfare). This spirit included 
resilience in economic development, harmonisation of the self and society, and 
harmonisation of public and private sectors (Nik Mustafa, 2011). Undeniably, 
the ulema's application of the slogan is at times rhetorical, but their continuous 
reference to the slogan shows their alignment with UMNO, because the 
opposition rarely used such concepts. 
Under the Abdullah Badawi government (2003-2009), the official ulema were 
active in promoting Islam Hadhari (Abdullah, 2006). The government first 
introduced the concept in 2004 during the UMNO General Assembly. Abdullah 
Badawi titled his opening speech "Islam Hadhari and the Malay Agenda." There 
are ten values in Islam Hadhari: faith and piety in Allah; just and trustworthy 
government; freedom and independence to the people; mastery of knowledge; 
balanced and comprehensive economic development; good quality of life for all; 
protection of the rights of minority groups and women; cultural and moral 
integrity; protection of the environment; and a strong defence policy. Worthy of 
note, the 1 g e n e r a l elections was held on the same year Abdullah introduced 
Islam Hadhari, where UMNO managed a resounding victory. The BN coalition 
(where UMNO is the leading party) won 63.9 per cent of the popular votes and 
secured 198 out of 218 seats in the federal parliament. Since Islam Hadhari 
became one of the main themes of UMNO's campaign, some would 
immediately link UMNO success to the concept.^"® 
JKF-MKI, JAKIM, and IKIM ulema have been active in campaigning and 
socialising UMNO's Islam Hadhari. They continued to do so even though 
opposition ulema argue that the concept is rhetorical and political (Abdul Hadi, 
2005).2'"' On 21-22 November 2005, JAKIM and IKIM jointly organised the 
"Islam Hadhari Seminar." In all, 11 papers were presented during the seminar. 
The main aim of the seminar was to explain to the public the significance of faith 
to God in ensuring Islam Hadhari's success. In 2005, JAKIM (2005) published 
Konsep Islam Hadhari Satu Penjelasan (The concept of Islam Hadhari: A 
Clarification) to clarify the concept to the public. The Islam Hadhari Mosque in 
Terengganu (Masjid Hadhari) was also built in the same year. The muftis had 
also committed themselves in promoting Islam Hadhari to the masses. 
Harussani Zakaria, the Perak mufti, pledged to support the contents and 
objectives of Islam Hadhari. He believed that Islam Hadhari will bring Malaysia 
greater prosperity and promised to explain what Islam Hadhari means to the 
Muslims at the grassroots level (New Straits Times, "Fatwa Commission 
thumbs-up to Islam Hadhari," 7 May 2005). Kelantan mufti, Dato' Muhammad 
See Hoffstaeddter, 2009, p.115. There is very little evidence, nevertheless, to suggest Islam 
Hadhari's contribution to UMNO's 2004 resounding victory. In 2008, UMNO suffered its worst 
electoral defeat while Islam Hadhari remained the thrust of its campaign. In that election, BN 
lost five negeri, did not win two-thirds majority in parliament, and only secured over 50 per cent 
popular votes. 
^^ Syed Farid Alatas opines that the concept Islam Hadhari is progressive. See Alatas, 2010. 
Shukri, also supported Islam Hadhari. In an interview, he remarked "I am one of 
those who support Islam Hadhari, and asked critics to prove if it is not good. 
Critics say [Islam Hadhari] is a new religion. How is it a new religion? 
Civilisation Islam is encouraged by Islam. I don't see why it is not good."^"® 
Discussions on Islam Hadhari, nonetheless, lost momentum since 2009 after 
Abdullah's retirement. Since then, JAKIM actively promote the concepts One 
Malaysia {Satu Malaysia) and Islam Wasatiyyah (Moderate Islam), coined by 
Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak. In other words, they follow the rhetoric of the 
incumbent government. These UMNO slogans feature in Friday sermons and 
advisories issued by JAKIM. On 2 December 2011, a JAKIM Friday prayer 
sermon entitled Persefahaman Asas Perpaduan Ummah (Understanding Key to 
Unity of the community) stated, "In our nation, we have intelligent leaders. We 
must build on the concept of One Malaysia," clearly endorsing UMNO's 
ideology. The same sermon states that "In order to move forward to achieve 
Vision 2020, the government has introduced New Economic Policy that is based 
on economic transformation in order to improve social, economic standards" 
(JAKIM, 2011c). During the 2013 Prophet's Birthday {Maulidur Rasul) 
celebration, JAKIM published a document entitled Wasatiyyah Tunggal< 
Kesatuan Ummah which means "Moderation: The Thrust for Unity" (Mohamad 
Kamil, 2013). The theme of the document coincided with Najib Abdul Razak's 
commitment to promote Islam Wasattlyah (Moderate Islam) as part of the 
state's vision. Thus, UMNO's ideology guided the tone and theme of JAKIM's 
sermons and documents. 
Interview with Mohamad Shukri, 7 April 2013 
In addition, JKF-MKI members have given opinions inimical to the opposition. 
The muftis, for instance, openly condemned opposition rallies against the state. 
In 2012, the JKF-MKI issued an advisory discouraging Muslims participation in 
BERSIH 3.0 (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil or Coalition for a Free and 
Fair Elections), a reform movement calling for free and fair elections (Aziz 
Jamaludin, 2012). JKF-MKI's Chairman Abd Shukor Hussin said "If such 
demonstrations were intended to topple a legitimate government that is chosen 
by the people, it is haram" (Nazura, 2012). The Kelantan mufti, Muhammad 
Shukri, warned Muslims against exploitation by certain interest groups by 
participating in the BERSIH rally (Zulkiflee, 2012). The ulema's warnings on 
BERSIH were questionable because the protesters were not trying to bring 
down the government through violence; BERSIH was only seeking electoral 
reform. 
More controversially, in January 2014, Harussani classified those who attended 
the TURUN (Gerakan Turun Kos Sara Hidup or Movement to Reduce Living 
Costs) rally as "bughah" or rebellion against a just and Islamic ruler. In Islamic 
jurisprudence, it is legitimate to kill a person committing bughah. The TURUN 
rally was organised by opposition parties protesting against rising living costs in 
Malaysia (Berita Harian, "Harussani tak gentar kecaman," 4 January 2014). The 
rally demanded the government reduce prices of necessities, fuel and road tolls. 
Harussani was called in for questioning by the police though he was neither 
arrested nor charged for sedition. 
Instead of criticising him for using the term bughah, Pahang mufti Abdul 
Rahman Othman defended Harussani and echoed his view that Muslims must 
not topple a "legitimate" government. According to the Abdul Rahman, 
There may be people who think that Malaysian muftis are just trying to earn a 
living by saying this [not to topple a legitimate government]. But Muslims must 
remember that they have to resolve problems amicably through discussions, 
and not to criticise the government (Berita Harian, "Islam larang usaha guling, 
buruk kerajaan," 5 May 2014). 
For the official ulema, maintaining UMNO's rule has two merits. First, they 
believe UMNO could not obtain Muslims' support on religious issues without 
them and the party would make many concessions to retain their services. 
UMNO leaders are not as competent as PAS ulema on Islamic matters, and 
they relied mostly on the official ulema to provide them with Islamic legitimacy. 
The official ulema were considered crucial to countering PAS. The government 
disbursed large sums from the yearly budget to Islamic institutions. In 2014, 
JAKIM channelled RM 885 million (A$303 million) to the negeri religious 
councils {The Malaysian Insider, "Jakim peruntuk RM885 juta bagi 
perkembangan syiar Islam di seluruh negara tahun ini," 31 March 2014). RM 
540 million (A$185.4 million) of the budget is used to pay allowance for religious 
teachers, imams, and mosque administrators. The 2014 budget saw a 10 per 
cent increase from the previous year. The state has also upgraded welfare 
schemes for JAKIM ulema. In the 2014 budget, the Prime Minister announced 
that ulema who had served more than 15 years in JAKIM, and had passed their 
retirement age, would be given RM 300 (A$103) a month (Berita Harian, "Teks 
Ucapan Bajet," 10 October 2014). 
Second, the official ulema wanted to retain the UMNO government because 
PAS presents a threat to them. Some PAS ulema have already spoken about 
overriding the official ulema's powers if the opposition forms the next 
government. Nasruddin Tantawi said that in PAS-governed Kelantan, the 
party's ulema are more powerful than religious council members. Nasruddin, 
who is a PAS Shura member, remarked, "The PAS government in Kelantan 
makes laws. For example, we make laws on entertainment and tourism. The 
role of the Majlis Agama [religious council] is to enforce these laws."^''®He also 
pointed out that if PAS becomes the federal government one day, it will control 
JAKIM. He said that PAS has the duty to "correct" the country and "reform" 
JAKIM.^®° These two reasons demonstrate why official ulema were inclined to 
support UMNO, rather than the opposition, in many circumstances. 
Supporting the Malay rulers 
Apart from supporting UMNO ideology, the official ulema wholeheartedly 
defended the Malay rulers' constitutional role as the custodians of Islam and 
Malayness in the country. On 21 October 2011, JAKIM issued a sermon 
entitled Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Pemacu Transformasi Ummah (The state 
Islamic Religious Council a Catalyst for Social Transformation), which indicates 
Malay rulers' role as crucial for Malaysia's development. Quoting the Quranic 
verse 59 Surah An-Nisa (4:59), the sermon called on the Muslims to 
demonstrate their unquestioning loyalty to the King and the Malay rulers in their 
respective negeri. The sermon declared loyalty to Malay rulers to be part of 
Islamic teachings, and warned Malaysians not to criticise the religious councils 
' Interview with Nasrudin Tantawi, 10 February 2013 
(JAKIM, 2011 b).^^^ In the same sermon, JAKIM called on the state to boost the 
powers of religious bureaucracies 
We need to update the enactment [law] regarding the role of the religious 
councils so that they are given more authority. This will improve the councils' 
effectiveness and autonomy while remaining accountable to God and the Malay 
rulers. More importantly, the council should not be dragged into divisions in 
party politics. 
The sermon concluded by cautioning Malays not to suffer like other nations, 
where "natives" are evicted from their own country (JAKIM, 2011b). 
Every year, JAKIM will issue one Friday sermon to commemorate the King's 
birthday. For example, on 9*^  December 2011, JAKIM issued a sermon entitled 
"The Malaysian King: The Protector of Religion and State" {Seri Paduka 
Baginda Yang Di Pertuan Agong Payung Agama dan Negara). The sermon 
reminded Malaysians about the Malaysian King's position in the constitution 
Article 181(1), and that he has a duty to protect Malays' special privileges and 
legitimate interests over other ethnic groups. The sermon underscored the 
duties of the Council of Rulers, in ensuring Islamic laws apply to all aspects of 
Malaysian Muslims' social life (JAKIM, 201 Id). The sermon closes with a prayer 
and call for Malays to be loyal to the King, and hopes that the King will continue 
to help develop the country. While such sermons are largely rhetorical, the 
official ulema are constantly reminding the Malays about the constitutional role 
of the Malay rulers as protectors of Islam and Islamic institutions in the country. 
They are also reminding the Malays of their own constitutional position, as 
The sermon was clearly targeted at the opposition's supporters and those who questioned 
the religious councils. In the same sermon, it was stated that "The position of the Islamic 
religious councils is often criticized and regarded as the agency of the government. The powers 
and authority of the religious councils cannot be questioned. The purity of our faith is dragged in 
politics and disunity. This affects the role of the religious councils." 
advisors to the rulers. Implicitly, they remind the Malays that their position as 
Islam's gatekeepers in the country is only second to the Malay rulers. 
There were occasions when official ulema defended the Malay rulers more 
resolutely than they would to UMNO leaders. In 2009, Harussani famously 
defended the Sultan of Perak at the height of the Perak constitutional crisis. 
During the crisis, four PR (Pakatan Rakyat) Perak assemblymen quit the party 
to become independent MPs who supported BN. The Perak Sultan stepped in 
and allowed BN to take over the Perak government, leading to opposition 
claims that the Sultan's move was unconstitutional. Harrusani was quick to 
defend the Sultan, declaring Malaysians who criticised the Perak Sultan to be 
menderhaka or treacherous (Utusan Malaysia, "Tidak taat pada Raja adalah 
derhaka—Mufti," 7 February 2009). The Sultan's actions met with 
demonstrations, which accused him of overstepping his role as a constitutional 
monarch. In response to the protests, Harussani remarked 
The Malays do not defy the Sultans. As Malays, they (demonstrators) should 
not be cursing, swearing, and destroying other people's property as Malay 
culture is refined. How can we say we are struggling for Islam when we behave 
in such an un-lslamic way? (Bernama, "Act that goes against Islamic culture 
and Islam teachings," 6 February 2009) 
The Federal Territory mufti. Wan Zahidi Wan Teh, agreed with Harussani's 
defense of the Sultan of P e r a k . H e said, "It is obvious that the statement 
made by Harussani Zakaria recently on the need to be loyal to the Sultan of 
Perak is correct and in line with religious requirements {syarak). Classical 
ulema, the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet, supported Harussani's views" 
(MAIWP Website, undated, p.4). 
Wan Zahidi stepped down in 2014. 
Why are the official ulema so trenchant when defending the Malay rulers? First, 
they owe their appointments to the rulers. All Malay rulers—with the exception 
of Negeri Sembilan—have exclusive rights to determine mufti and council 
appointments.^" In Kelantan, the ruler has the right to reject the 
recommendation by the negeri secretary. Reading out his appointment 
certificate during an interview, Kelantan Mufti Muhammad Shukri emphasised 
the Sultan's authority in his appointment: 
The letter of appointment of the Mufti of Kelantan, Alwasiq Billah Islamil Petra 
Ismail Yahya Sultan and King of Kelantan and his people, to the trusted Date' 
Shukri, All Praises to God, and praises to the Prophet Muhammad, his family, 
based on Section 6/ 1982, I can appoint anyone as the Mufti of Kelantan. It 
should be known to everyone that with this appointment, based on the Islamic 
laws, that the mufti of Kelantan, from January 2008, is given the authority to 
deliver fatwa, in writing, to anyone or any organisation based on the enactment, 
and cultural laws {adat) of Kelantan 1994.^^ 
Clearly, the official ulema support UMNO and Malay rulers. However, does 
supporting the rulers and UMNO render the ulema's capture less significant? As 
will be discussed shortly, co-optation allows the ulema to shape policies, 
counter the state's wishes, and even set the state's agenda in certain fields. 
Some ulema were able to prolong their stay in state institutions and not 
replaced by younger, better educated scholars; even though renewal process in 
other departments in the Malaysian civil service was expedited. Therefore, the 
greater official ulema expressed their loyalty to the state and rulers, the longer 
they will retain their position in state institutions. 
Muftis prolonging appointments in institutions 
In Malay feudal society, the ruler acts as the protector of his subjects on the 
condition they showed unquestioning loyalty to him (Chandra, 1979). This 
argument remains relevant in contemporary Malaysian society. The Malay 
rulers reward ulema for the support given the monarchical institution and in 
return, the ulema retain their positions in the religious councils for as long as the 
rulers assent. In other words, even UMNO could not force the ulema into 
retirement without the rulers' consent. It is also a culture in the Malaysian civil 
service that respect seniority. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, 
the senior ulema expect the younger ones not to challenge their authority. This 
culture has its roots in Malay society, which emphasises reverence for the 
elderly. 
One mufti who has prolonged his stay in the religious bureaucracy is Harussani 
Zakaria, who has been serving as the Perak mufti since 1985. Before this 
appointment, he worked in the Perak religious bureaucracy.^®® Harussani has 
been conferred many titles and state honours. In 2008, Harussani was named 
the Tokoh Maai Hijrah 1430 (Maal Hijrah Person of the Year), a prestigious 
recognition awarded to Muslims for their contributions to Malaysia. In 2009, the 
Sultan of Perak conferred him with the title of "Tan Seri," a title that only 75 
individuals in Malaysia can hold at one time. These awards were an addition to 
the awards received much earlier in his career (Azman et al., 2008, p. 62). The 
Perak royal family has been retaining Harrusani's services for the last three 
decades despite him only having a diploma in Islamic education. Harussani 
He is also concurrently sitting in various committees, both at the state and federal levels, 
which I will discuss in another section in the chapter. 
managed to stay in his position this long even though Malaysia has produced 
hundreds of Islamic Studies graduates and PhD holders every year. This 
suggests personal ulema power has been established, which undermines 
corporate aspects of official ulema. 
Anecdotal evidence from activists who frequently interacted with the muftis and 
JAKIM officials provide clues to Harrusani's dominance in the JFK-MKI. He 
wields significant influence in the committee because he is the most senior mufti 
in Malaysia. According to Ratna Osman, 
The Majlis Fatwa Commission...has its own politics. When it comes to agreeing 
which fatwa is the most credible, It does not go through a process. But it goes 
through seniority. It is a question of who is the most senior ulema. A junior 
ulema may come out with a strong argument, but seniority that matters. It is 
never about maslahah (public good). 
Another mufti who activists see as playing a dominant role in the JKF-MKI is 
Nooh Gadut. He was the former mufti of Johore from 1999 to 2008. Marina 
Mahathir confirms Harussani's and Nooh Gadut's dominance in the JKF-MKI 
more than other muftis. According to Marina, 
In the Fatwa Commission, you are supposed to have discussion. Somebody is 
supposed to prepare a paper. But in reality, there may be a paper prepared, but 
the discussion is among a few people. The chief is Harussani [mufti of Perak]. 
You should talk to Nooh Gadut [implying that he is the other powerful figure]. 
Why are Harussani and Nooh Gadut "untouchables" in the JKF-MKI? The two 
muftis had close ties with their states' royal families. The closeness of Nooh 
Gadut with the Johor royal family is demonstrated by his appointment as the 
advisor to MAIJ (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Johor or Johor Islamic Religious 
^^ Interview with Ratna Osman, 7 February 2013 
Interviews with Ratna Osman and Marina Mahathir, 7 February 2013 
Council) after his retirement as Johore mufti in 2008. Even after Nooh was 
replaced by liis deputy, Mohd Tahir Samsudin, he continues to be in the public 
limelight, making more religious pronouncements than his successor. 
These senior muftis also dominate the discussion in the Muzakarah JKF-MKI. 
Former JKF-MKI member, Mohd Ash, recounted how seniority matters in the 
JKF-MKI meetings, which to some extent, marginalised young muftis such as 
him. Recalling his experience in the committee, "In the JKF-MKI, there is no 
equality. In the meetings, they are not happy with my ideas, even though they 
are based on sound religious arguments...Some of my evidences and 
arguments are ignored because they argue on the basis of seniority of the 
muftis."^®® One example Mohd Asri gives where his ideas were rejected by 
senior muftis is whether a child born out of wedlock can be named after his 
father. A Muslim normally carries the name of his father.^ ®® The practice in 
Malaysia is that a person born out of wedlock cannot carry the name of the 
father, but "Abdullah" (servant of God). Hence, such a person carries the name 
"Bin Abdullah" (for male) or "Binte Abdullah" (for female). Mohd Asri was 
concerned about the social stigma this practice will have on the child and urged 
that a person born out of wedlock can be named after the father. The senior 
members of the JKF-MKI, however, turned down his opinion. 
Thus, the muftis are rewarded with titles and contract renewals in the religious 
councils for their loyalty towards UMNO and Malay rulers. Pro-UMNO and rulers 
Interview with Mohd Asri, 21 April 2013. 
For example, a Muslim man's name Ahmad Bin Isyak means Ahmad Is the son of Isyak. For 
a woman's name, Mariam Binte Ahmad means Mariam is the daughter of Ahmad. 
muftis stay longer in the JKF-MKI compared to others, allowing them to 
dominate and shape discussions (and fatwas). Some muftis have overstayed in 
their positions to the extent that their powers have outgrown what was originally 
intended by UMNO. Arguably, the muftis have become more conservative than 
UMNO in championing for Malay supremacy. They have also exerted pressure 
on the state to adopt more pro-Malay and Islamic policies that threaten the 
multi-cultural fabric of Malaysia. 
Shaping and directing state policies: The case of Harussani 
The official ulema have used their closeness with the state to push their 
conservative ideas in policies and government regulation. These ideas reflect 
the discourse of the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s that calls for greater 
Islamisation of state and society in Malaysia. The powers of the official ulema 
today, arguably, have transcended those originally intended by the state. 
As the mufti of Perak for the almost 30 years, Harussani can express his 
conservative ideas publicly without any sanctions or disapproval from the state. 
He has issued controversial statements through the mainstream m e d i a -
including the UMNO-owned Utusan Malaysia—that embarrassed the state. 
During the Abdullah Badawi government, many of his remarks ran counter to 
the state's interest. On 8 July 2006, Harussani made the unsubstantiated 
remark that 100, 000 Muslims in Malaysia had become apostates. This remark 
elicited a response by Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Liow, 2009, p. 51). Even 
though no evidence was cited, YADIM's Patron, Mohd Nakhaie Ahmad, later 
echoed his views {myMetro, "Gejala murtad tinggi," 27 July 2008). Harussani's 
284 
views on apostasy have shaped public opinion about Christian proselytization 
and evangelicalism. The alarmist overtones of Harrusani's views increased 
mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims. Many Islamic NGOs such as ISMA 
(Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or Malaysia Muslim Network) and ABIM had come 
out publicly to pressure the state to halt all efforts to convert Muslims out of 
Islam. 
The official ulema's conservative stance complicated cases involving religious 
conversion cases, such as that of Lina Joy, which had been ongoing since 
2001. Lina Joy was not allowed to remove the word "Islam" from her identity 
card without obtaining Shariah Court Order, even though she had converted to 
Christianity. In Malaysia, Muslims cannot marry people of other faiths without 
the non-Muslim converting. The Una Joy case is about the right of personal 
choice of faith; yet, the official ulema's depiction of it as Islam versus Christian 
evangelism, and fanned by Harussani's statement, sensationalised the case 
into a national controversy. In 2007, the Federal Court—the country's highest 
court—turned down Lina Joy's appeal to have the word Islam removed from her 
identity card. 
For being long enough in the service, and obtaining protection from the Perak 
royal family, Harussani has the freedom to express his views without fear of 
retribution from the state. Harussani admitted 
The government mainly pointed out the cases [that requires a religious ruling], 
and my job is to issue a fatwa. I have never been forced to adopt the position of 
the government. I have never been influenced by the government. If I say it is 
permissible and the sultans says it is okay, and then we shall gazette the fatwa. 
This is 
There is truth in Harussani's claim. In 2008, he created a public outcry when he 
declared the "Sure Heboh" carnival organised by TV3 as "haram" (forbidden) in 
Islam {Bernama, "No TV3 Jom Heboh carnival in Perak this year," 27 April 
2008). The "Sure Heboh" carnival was organised by the UMNO-linked television 
station TV 3 that featured top entertainers and artists. Harussani labels this 
carnival as promoting immoral activities. While the carnival continued despite 
Harussani statement, the organisers made changes to the celebrations by 
reducing the Western cultural content and promoting family values instead. 
Harussani claimed that he can request to see the prime ministers at any time, 
and they have never turned him down. He professed to be in constant contact 
with Prime Ministers Tun Abdul Razak and Mahathir when they were in power. 
He also said to be in close contact with Najib Abdul Razak. Describing his 
closeness with some of the Prime Ministers, he remarked that: 
I am very close to three prime ministers. The first one is Abdul Razak, Najib's 
father [likely before he became mufti of Perak in 1985]. For many other people, 
they require your appointment to see him. I don't. I can just call him and he wili 
take immediate action. There were three instances that I met him. I was very 
satisfied with the meetings. The other Prime Minister that I have close relations 
with is Mahathir. He is a close friend. But only some of my advice was 
accepted, others were not. I have criticised him. I advised him not to break up 
the Malays. But he formed a new UMNO [in 1987].^®' 
Harussani also admitted that he had held several closed-door meetings with 
Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak. The meetings with Najib normally concerns 
Malay issues. UMNO politicians also see the benefits of having close ties with 
Interview with Harussani Zakaria, the Mufti of Perak, 7 May 2013. 
Interview with Harussani Zakaria, 7 May 2013. 
Harussani. His relations with PAS ulema, especially Nik Aziz, have been frosty. 
As mentioned earlier, Harussani warned Nik Aziz not to belittle Malaysian 
muftis. 
However, Harussani confessed that his relationship with Abdullah Badawi is not 
as cordial as with other prime ministers. Even though he claimed to support 
Islam Hadhari, Harussani had criticised the Abdullah Badawi government and 
adopted positions that contradicted those of the state. Harussani's rulings on 
Malay culture and traditions at times tainted the state's appeal to moderate 
Islam. In March 2011, Harussani declared the Poco-Poco—a form of line 
dancing—as un-lslamic. He declared the dance onginated from Christianity 
(Roshidi & Lai, 2011). Harussani voiced his opinion on the Poco-Poco before 
the JKF-MKI formally met on 20 April 2011 to discuss the dance's status. Earlier 
in 2008, Harussani declared Yoga—a form of meditation—as un-lslamic 
because it originated from Hinduism. In that same year, the JKF-MKI issued a 
fatwa echoing Harussani's views. While the fatwa declared that the moves and 
sitting postures in Yoga are permissible, it also states that Muslims must be 
careful not to taint their faith with such practices. So far, the Perak, Federal 
Territory, Kedah, and Malacca have gazetted the Yoga fatwa. Later, Prime 
Minister Abdullah had to intervene and contradict the JKF-MKI declaring 
Muslims can practise Yoga as long as it does not contain Hindu "elements" in it 
{Reuters, "Malaysia backs down from yoga ban amid backlash," 26 November 
2008). 
In another instance, Harussani, along with several other official ulema, was not 
supportive of Abdullah Badawi's efforts in promoting inter-civilisation dialogue. 
The muftis rejected such dialogues even though one of the tenets Islam Hadhari 
emphasises is "Protection of the rights of minority groups and women" and 
"Cultural and moral integrity." Abdullah Badawi expressed his regret towards the 
muftis. He said, 
It's not been easy to get inter-faith dialogue going. It's not that I did not meet 
people (of other faiths). I did but there is still a lack of understanding of what 
inter-faith means. Just like plurality, there is misunderstanding when talking 
about pluralism. People do not understand what interfaith dialogue is, especially 
the muftis (Welsh & Chin, 2013, p. 7). 
The ulema's support for dialogues has not been forthcoming, and many 
Malaysian Muslims are sceptical about them. In 2006, human rights groups 
Aliran and Article 11 planned to organise an interfaith dialogue in Penang. The 
dialogue would serve as a platform to clarify controversial race and religious 
issues in Malaysia. However, the event was cancelled after protest by about 
500 Malays. In April 2010, Harussani was adamant that Muslims should not 
participate in dialogues. He protested against the state's plan to set up a 
committee dealing with inter-religious issues. He said, "Other faiths should not 
be seen as occupying the same position as Islam. Any form of dialogue that 
can corrupt the sanctity of Islam should be avoided" (Utusan Malaysia, "Perak 
Bantah Badan antara Agama," 13 April 2010). Other popular Islamic preachers 
later joined in to reject interfaith dialogue. They rejected the call for dialogue by 
the MCCBCHST (Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhist, Christianity, 
Hindusim, Sikhism, and Taoism). Prominent preacher, Dr Ridwan Tee posited 
...the decision of Muslims not to participate in the Malaysian Consultative Council 
of Buddhist, Christianity, Hindusim, Sikhism, and Taoism (MCCBCHST) and the 
Inter-faith Council (IFC) is the right one, as it prevents them from being 'trapped.' 
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Even then, they [non-Muslims] have not given up and continue to pressure us 
[Muslims] (cited in Norshahril, 2010a, p. 156).^ ®^ 
In sum, the official ulema's embrace of UMNO's ideology, and their 
unquestioning support for Malay rulers, are no longer manifestations of 
passivity. They undertook these tasks because it is part of the co-optation pact. 
Nevertheless, the ulema capitalised on their closeness with state officials to 
shape and direct state policies. Some muftis used their close relations with the 
Malay rulers to prolong their stay in the religious councils and thereby expand 
their power. The ulema have strengthened their power base in the councils and 
JKF-MKI to such an extent that they can ignore the state's directives. This has 
been largely the case since the Abdullah Badawi government. 
Ulema defying authority 
The most important measure of successful capture is when official ulema can 
disregard the states' orders. The following paragraphs demonstrate how 
Malaysian official ulema have moved from being UMNO loyalists to a group that 
can defy the party. During the Mahathir era, ulema dared not express their 
disagreements with the government openly. Ishak Baharom, the former 
Selangor Mufti, said that Malaysian muftis are generally careful not to offend the 
state even though they disagree with it. For example, in the 1990s, JKF-MKI 
members were divided about the status of ASM (National Trust Fund Scheme 
or Amanah Saham Nasional) and ASB (Bumiputera Trust Fund or Amanah 
Saham Bumiputera), which were state-owned trust schemes. Although some 
• This is based on my MA research. 
muftis viewed these schemes as un-lslamic, they chose not to voice their 
disagreements publicly in order not to create problems with the state (Ahmad 
Lutfi, 1997, p. 79). In 2008, JKF-MKI finally relented to the state's wishes. It 
issued a fatwa declaring the scheme as hams (encouraged). However, only the 
MAIWP had gazetted the fatwa, which demonstrates that the ulema continue to 
feel the scheme as not encouraged in Islam. 
One of the earliest open disagreements between a mufti and Mahathir occurred 
in 1997. This episode was documented in Ahmad Lutfi's (1997) Mufti Lawan 
Mahathir? (Mufti versus Mahathir?). The controversy began when the then 
Selangor mufti, Ishak Baharom referred to Mahathir as murtad (an apostate) 
during a sermon in Ipoh. Although he denied making the statement, he later 
argued that some of the statements made by the cabinet ministers could lead to 
apostasy. Ishak retired as mufti later that year, which led to speculation that his 
disagreements with Mahathir resulted in him being sacked from the post. 
Since then, there were instances where the JKF-MKI ulema defied state's 
demands, though most of them occurred towards the end of Mahathir's rule. In 
2002, the state appealed to the JKF-MKI to issue a fatwa admonishing Nik Aziz 
for labelling Allah as "Samseng" (a Thug), arrogant and more wicked than any 
other human being. UMNO leaders accused Nik Aziz of insulting Islam. The 
JKF-MKI refused to issue a fatwa, but urged all Muslims to respect God (Van 
Dijk, 2007, pp.63-64). In another instance, Kelantan Mufti Muhammad Shukri 
pointed out how the state requested him to issue a fatwa banning political 
parties carrying the term "Islam." The state's attempt was intended to target 
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PAS. The Kelantan Mufti turned down the government's request and conversely 
said the use of the label Islam for political parties is not only permissible but 
highly encouraged {harus). According to Mohamad Shukri, "When we make a 
decision, it is based on law. It is not based on interest. This perception [about 
being co-opted] is normal. 
Similarly, the muftis refused UMNO's request to declare the Amanat Hadi 
Awang (Hadi Awang's Message) as deviant. In 2001, JAKIM, through the 
instruction from UMNO, directed the muftis to gazette the Amanat Hadi Awang 
as deviant teaching (JAKIM, 2013a). UMNO members claimed that in 1987, 
Abdul Hadi Awang, a PAS ulema, categorised UMNO members as infidels. The 
JKF-MKI rejected UMNO's request. Only the Malacca religious council issued 
the fatwa. On 25 July 2002, the council issued and gazetted the fatwa declaring 
the Amanat Hadi Awang as contrary to Islamic teachings, contradicting public's 
and Muslims' interests, and flouting the principles of dakwah. The fatwa forbids 
Muslims from selling, distributing, purchasing, or owning the amanat (JAKIM, 
201 Sa).^ ®" 
Conversion of minors to Islam controversy 
Under the Abdullah Badawi government, the ability of the official ulema to 
influence policies that contradict the state became more common. The religious 
conversion of minors issue demonstrates how official ulema could bring 
additional influence and pressure to bear on the government. Article 12 of the 
Federal Constitution states, "The religion of a person under the age of 18 year 
Interview with Mohamad Shul<ri, 7 April 2013 
^^ See fatwa on Amanat Haji Hadi. 
shall be decided by his parent or guardian." The constitution also indicates that 
words in the singular include the plural and vice-versa. Still, there were 
contrasting interpretations of what "parent" means in legal terms, particularly 
whether it applies to only one or both parents. These contrasting interpretations 
were at the core of a divorce case Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh C 
Mogarajah in 2002. Both Jeyaganesh and Shamala were Hindus when they 
were married, but Jeyaganesh converted to Islam and secretly converted their 
two children to Islam while he was still married to Shamala. Shamala said it was 
illegal for her husband to convert her children to Islam without her consent, 
which also meant that the children would face difficulties converting out of Islam 
later.^ ®= 
In 2009, the de facto law minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Nazri 
Aziz, pointed out that the cabinet is against such unilateral conversion and on 
the 22 April 2009, the cabinet decided that one parent cannot decide on 
conversion {New Straits Times, "Let them decide at 18," 5 July 2013). Several 
opposition members of parliament, including DAP (Democratic Action Party) 
Chairman Karpal Singh wanted the law amended and the term "parent" to be 
made clearer to explicitly state both parents {New Straits Times, "Let them 
decide at 18," 5 July 2013). However, the 2009 cabinet proposal was not 
The High Court initially awarded Shamala custody of the two children, while the Shariah 
Court awarded it to Jeyaganesh. The case raises questions on whether the Shariah court order 
on custody matters have jurisdiction over Shamala who is not a Muslim. After a series of legal 
challenges, in 2004, the High Court ruled that both Shamala and Jeyaganesh have joint custody 
over the two children. Shamala has care and control of the two children, but is not permitted to 
teach them her religious values, and they were not allowed to consume pork {New Straits 
Times, "Child Conversion Issue Goes up to Federal Court," 29 April 2009). A series of court 
hearings followed for contempt of court by Shamala. The case was finally referred to the 
Federal Court, which in November 2010, refused to pass any judgements because Shamala 
was absent. 
discussed in parliament as expected. Instead, on 26 June 2013, the 
government introduced a bill for the Federal Territories that allowed one parent 
to consent for the religious conversion of a child. On 1 July the same year. 
Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin defended the bill even though 
acknowledging it contradicted the 2009 cabinet's decision. It was, he claimed, in 
line with recent court decisions and the constitution (Syed Jaymal, 2013). 
Why did the government not table the 2009 cabinet decision in parliament, 
instead tabling a contradictory bill in 2013? Nazri cited that the Council of Rulers 
rejection of the 2009 decision (Sivanandam, 2013). The Council of Rulers 
apparently acted on the advice of the JKF-MKI, which held a Muzakarah on the 
23-25 June 2009, discussing the issue. During that sitting, the committee issued 
a fatwa declaring that conversion of a minor by the one parent is in line with 
Islam. The fatwa states that when one parent converts to Islam, the religion of 
the minor is automatically Islam, and the child is placed under the care of the 
Muslim parent. The fatwa indicates that under the Federal Constitution Article 
12 (4), one parent or guardian can decide the religion of a person under 18 
(JAKIM, 2013a).^ ®® At least two muftis publicly supported the government to 
pass the 2013 Bill. The mufti of Selangor, Taymes Abd Wahid, argued that a 
minor must follow the religion of the Muslim parent. Similarly, Harussani argued 
that single-parent conversion of minors to Islam has always been the practice in 
Islam and cannot be disputed {The Malay Mail, "Selangor, Perak muftis tell 
critics of child conversion law to back off," 1 July 2013). This controversy 
demonstrates how official ulema convinced the Malay rulers to pressure the 
See Fatwa 2009/87/4 entitled "Status Agama Anak Bawah Umur Selepas Salah Seorang 
Pasangan Memeluk Islam" (The Status of a Minor when one of the parents converts to Islam). 
state to ignore the cabinet's 2009 decision. The government withdrew the Bill in 
face of public opposition but promised to redraft and resubmit it. It remains to be 
seen which party will get their way in the matter. 
The "Allah" controversy 
The "Allah" controversy, which started during the Abdullah Badawi government 
but continued on to the Najib government, demonstrates official ulema's ability 
to rally radical groups to pressure the state. In May 1986, the Federal cabinet, 
following earlier actions by the Terengganu government in 1980, banned non-
Muslims from using the term "Allah" in their publications or rituals. Other terms 
that were also described as exclusive to Muslims include kaabah (a cube-like 
structure in Mecca which indicates the direction Muslims pray to); solat 
(prayers) and baitullah (house of Allah). However, the state did not strictly 
enforce the policy until January 2007, when the Home Affairs Ministry declared 
The Herald, a weekly Catholic publication, to desist from using the term "Allah" 
to describe God. The ministry threatened it would not renew The Herald's 
permit if the publication continued using the term (Masilamany, 2007). The 
Home Ministry's declaration sparked protests and the initiation of legal action by 
Christian groups who argued the move curtailed religious freedom. On 5-8 May 
2008, the Muzakarah JKF-MKI discussed the issue and declared the term 
"Allah" is exclusive to Muslims. Harussani then urged the Home Affairs Ministry 
not give in to pressure for the use of the term by non-Muslims (Utusan 
Malaysia, "Bantah guna perkataan Allah," 28 February 2009).^®^ 
Even Indonesian artists were not excluded from this ban. Agnes Monica's song, Allah Peduli 
(Allah cares), was banned because it contains the verse "sebab Allah Jesusku mengertl" or 
"Allah My Jesus understands" {Utusan Malaysia, "Haramkan lagu nyanyian Agnes Monica," 14 
March 2009). 
Between the end of 2009 and early 2011, several court and state's decisions 
seemed to allow non-Muslims using the term. On 31 December 2009, the High 
Court contradicted the Home Affairs' directive and ruled that The Herald can 
refer "Allah" as God. This decision sparked a number of Muslim protests and 
bombings of churches, and the official ulema pressed the state not to concede 
to the Catholic newspaper's demands.^®® In Apnl, a day before the Sarawak 
negeri elections, the Prime Minister issued a 10-point solution that allowed the 
Al-Kitab, the Malay version of the Christian Bible to be printed, distributed, and 
carry the word " A l l a h . I n essence, the 10-point solution states that Bibles of 
all languages can be imported into Malaysia. Bibles can also be locally printed 
and distributed without any restrictions, though those to be exported for 
Peninsular Malaysia must include the term "Christian publication" and cross 
signs stamped on the front covers. The Prime Minister and ministers also 
pledged they would conduct regular meetings with Christian representatives to 
resolve any issues facing the Christian community. It has to be pointed out that 
the 10-points were not issued as a solution to the "Allah" issue, but to the 
problem of the confiscation of around 30,000 copies of Malay and Iban-
language Bibles in Sarawak—and some other 5,000 Bibles in Port Klang—for 
using the term "Allah." The Catholic Church then argued that since Malay-
language Bibles were allowed to contain the word "Allah," then logically. The 
Hera/d should also be allowed to use the term (Su-Lyn, 2013). 
As a result of this decision, between 8 and 13 January 2010, radical Muslim groups attacked 
a number of churches in Selangor, Sarawak, Malacca, Johor and Negeri Sembilan. 
The agreement was made between the cabinet and Christians to appease the Christian 
community in Sarawak and Sabah, in the run up to the Sarawak negeri elections that year. 
However, on 14 October 2013, the Malaysian Court of Appeal overturned the 
2009 High Court ruling, and declared The Herald could not use the term Allah. 
There were various interpretations to the Court of Appeal's ruling. The Muslim 
Lawyers Association said the ruling only applied to The Herald (Zachariah, 
2013). Cabinet Ministers Joseph Kurup and Maximus Ongkili argued that the 
ban would not affect Christians in Sabah and Sarawak (Gomez & Zachariah, 
2013). Nazri Aziz, then the Tourism Minister, said Christians from Sabah and 
Sarawak could not use the term in the Peninsular while Home Affairs Minister, 
Ahmad Zaid Hamidi, said The Herald could not even use the term in the East 
Malaysian negeris of Sabah and Sarawak (Anbalangan, 2013). In June 2014, 
the Federal Court, the highest court in Malaysia, upheld the Court of Appeal's 
ban and rejected the challenge by the Malaysian Roman Catholic Church. 
Although there were many arguments forwarded by civil activists about the use 
of the term Allah by non-Muslims in many parts of the world, the court claimed 
that Christian evangelical groups use of the term "Allah" might confuse Muslims. 
Prime Minister Najib then assured Malaysians that the courts' ruling only apply 
to The Herald, meaning there is no prohibition for the term appearing in Bibles 
{Channel NewsAsia, "Another case in M'sia tests ban on use of 'Allah,'" 30 June 
2014). Najib announced that he was committed to honouring the 2011 10 point-
agreement, which in essence, allowed Bibles in all negeris to use the word 
"Allah." He also urged the issue not to be politicised further. According to Najib 
When the Appeals Court made its decision on the use of the word Allah, it did 
not at all touch on the practices of Christians in Sabah and Sarawak...The 10-
point agreement remains (that allowed Bibles of all language to be imported into 
Malaysia and Bibles to be printed locally in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and 
Sarawak) (BBC, "Malaysia "Allah" court ruling: PM Najib speaks out" 22 
October 2013). 
However, Najib insisted that negeri laws should take precedence over the 
Cabinet's 10-point solution, which means that non-Muslims use of the term 
depends on the Malay rulers' assent and negeris' religious enactments. Indeed, 
in November 2013, the Selangor Ruler, Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shah Al-Haj 
reminded his citizens to obey the Selangor Non-Islamic Religious Enactment 
1988, which prohibited usage of Islamic words by non-Muslims without the 
negeri government's authority. He reiterated that JKF-MKI had issued a fatwa 
barring the use of the term "Allah" by non-Muslims, and that the Selangor Fatwa 
Committee had also gazetted the fatwa. He urged Al-Kitab and The Herald to 
respect these religious rulings and the Court of Appeal's decision (The Malay 
Mail, "As 'Allah' case drags on, Selangor Sultan insists on non-Muslim ban," 14 
November 2013). 
More importantly, the official ulema ignored Najib's call that the courts' decision 
only applies to The Herald and his guarantee that Bibles can use the term 
"Allah." On 2 January 2014, religious officials from JAIS conducted raids on 
BSM (Bible Society Malaysia), confiscating Bibles. JAIS confiscated 321 AlKitab 
(Bibles) because they contained the word "Allah." During the raid, JAIS also 
detained BSM president, Lee Min Choon, and manager, Sinclair Wong. The 
Selangor government, then under Chief Minister Khalid Ibrahim, urged the AGC 
(Attorney General's Chambers) to take action against JAIS and the AGC 
ordered JAIS to return the seized Bibles. Yet, JAIS refused to do so and even 
declared it would continue to arrest those who distribute Bibles in the negeri 
(Akil, 2014). JAIS only relented after the Selangor Sultan ordered the Bibles be 
returned to the Association of Churches in Sarawak but not to be redistributed 
in Selangor. The Bibles were to be marked with instructions which prevented 
their distribution in Selangor. The Sultan's decree clearly showed no regard for 
Najib's 10-point solution, and urged all parties to respect the Selangor Islamic 
Enactment 1988 that prohibited Bibles from using the word "Allah." This episode 
demonstrates how the official ulema could defy decisions by the federal 
government and the Selangor government by co-operating with the Malay 
rulers. The "Allah" issue shows official ulema are not passive actors who simply 
take orders from the incumbent government. This does not only apply to the 
federal government but negeri governments too. 
With reference to the official ulema in Selangor, Marina Mahathir said that they 
could disregard the PR (Pakatan Rakyat) government of the negeri.^^° Abdul 
Aziz Bah, a former MUM lecturer, claimed that Selangor has three governments: 
Sultan, the chief minister and JAIS (Abdul Aziz, 2014). The Selangor 
government does not wield any powers to curb JAIS because they answer to 
MAIS and the Sultan. Earlier, in August 2011, JAIS officials raided Damansara 
Utama Methodist Church as they suspected the church members of conducting 
proselytization activities among Muslims. In June 2013, JAIS stormed a Hindu 
wedding because they thought the bride was a Muslim. These are some 
illustrations where JAIS acted without the Selangor government's consent. 
Why can the official ulema defy the state? 
Malaysian official ulema have shown they can act coherently as a unit against 
external challenges. They were also able to forge key alliances with radical civil 
Interview with IVIarina Mahattiir, 7 February 2013 
society groups to support their cause. The unity showed by the muftis, IKIM 
scholars, Perkasa (Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Malaysia or Malaysian 
Glorious Indigenous Association), and ISMA (Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or 
Malaysian Muslim Network) in pointing out the exclusive use of "Allah" by 
Muslims allowed them to contradict the cabinet's decision. IKIM Director, Syed 
Ali Taufik Al-Attas said "...the term Allah is a proper name which is never 
shared by others throughout the history of language. The term Allah is not 
"communicable both in reality and in opinion'" (Al-Attas, 2008). IKIM scholar, Md 
Asham (2008), also said that Islam's reference to Allah could never be the 
same how other religious communities use the term. In 2013, Abdullah Zaik, 
ISMA's President, issued a stern warning to the Malaysian Council of Churches 
and Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng for requesting the state allow 
Christians use of the term "Allah." He reiterated his support for the Home 
Ministry and JFK-MKI's fatwa in banning the use of the term in all Christian 
publications {Portal Islam & Melayu, "Kenyataan ISMA berkenaan isu kalimah 
Allah," 10 January 2013). In the same year, Perkasa expressed its 
disappointment with Najib's 10-point solution and requested the Council of 
Rulers to intervene {The Malaysian Insider, "Kalimah Allah: Kecewa dengan 
UMNO, Perkasa gesa Majlis Raja-Raja campur tangan," 25 January 2014).^'^'' 
The "Allah" controversy is not the only example that shows Selangor official ulema's defiance 
of the federal government's wishes. In 1997, JAIS officials arrested and handcuffed three 
Muslim women for participating in a beauty pageant. The Selangor Mufti them, Ishak Baharom 
supported the officials' actions {New Straits Times, "Selangor Mufti: Action against beauty 
contestants justified," 7 July 1997). In 2005, JAWI officials conducted a raid of the Zouk Night 
club. During the raid, Muslims were told to assemble separately from the non-Muslims so that 
the Muslims can be charged for indecency. One hundred Muslims were detained during the raid 
and were locked up for more than ten hours. They were told to parade in front of the religious 
officers so that they can determine whether the attire is appropriate. Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi and Arts Minister Rais Yatim disapproved the raids, calling for a review of the laws 
concerning such operations (Lau, 2005). Neither the Selangor mufti not the Federal Territory 
mufti reprimanded the religious officials' conduct. 
Also, ulema at the federal level co-operated well with the religious machinery at 
the negeri level. The JKF-MKI members do not voice their differences opinions 
publicly, and they do not welcome dissenting voices within the institution. 
Former Perils Mufti, Mohd Ash, claims that he was a victim of the collective 
responsibility and disciplining which took place at the JKF-MKI.^''^ Once the 
JKF-MKI has issued a fatwa, there has never been an instance when muftis 
came out publicly to issue contradictory statements. The differences in opinions 
are only manifested whether the JKF-MKI's fatwas are gazetted or not in the 
various negeri. Besides, there is a high level of secrecy into the meetings in the 
fatwa committees, both at the federal and the negeri levels. The public only 
know such fatwas are passed when they are gazetted and enacted in the 
shariah courts. 
Moreover, the official ulema were able to tap into factional tensions within the 
state. This factor also applies to the MUl case discussed in the previous 
chapter. MUl 's ability to garner the support of Suryadharma AN, Gamawan 
Fauzi and Sudi Silalahi convinced the Indonesian state to restnct the 
Ahmadiyah teachings. Within the current Malaysian cabinet, there are 
conservatives sympathetic towards the official ulema cause. They include the 
Minister in Prime Minister's Department, Jamil Khir, and the Minister of Home 
Affairs, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, In June 2014, Jamil Khir told parl iament that 
Malaysia is not a secular state, but an Islamic Malay Sultanate government 
{The Straits Times, "Malaysia not a secular state: Islamic affairs minister," 17 
June 2014). Jamil Khir's statement departs from the tenets of the Malaysian 
constitution, which upholds secularism (based on the drafters of the 
Interview with Mohd Asri, 21 April 2013. 
constitution, Reid Commission). In another example that reflects the 
conservative voices in the Cabinet, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi approved the 
dissemination of an anti-Christian book Pendedahan Agenda Kristian (Exposing 
the Christian Agenda) published by the Islamic Religious Council of Selangor 
(MAIS) and Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM).Ahmad Zahid said that the book 
was not banned as it is mainly for research purposes (Ng, 2014). Ahmad 
Zahid's conduct was consistent with the warnings about the dangers of 
Christian evangelism issued by the official ulema and religious bureaucrats. 
The official ulema also establish key allies in the judiciary, including the 
members of the Attorney-General's Chambers. The Attorney General's 
Chambers has been tasked to oversee the shariah law-making processes. 
Under Mahathir's rule, more laws, including criminal and family laws, were 
placed under shariah statutes. "Islamic" crimes include lesbianism, fornication, 
sodomy, prostitution, eating during the day of Ramadan, and alcohol 
consumption. Certain crimes are deemed to be exclusively Islamic even though 
there is a common penal code for Malaysians (Maznah 2010, p. 515-516). 
Several civil activists interviewed mentioned Mahamad Naser Disa, formerly the 
head of shariah division in the Attorney-General's Chambers, as the person 
responsible for clamping down on liberal groups. After Mahamad Naser was 
appointed as a member of the SSM (Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia or 
Companies Commission Malaysia), a body that regulates the corporate sector, 
he began targeting human rights groups such as SUARAM (Suara Rakyat 
Malaysia or The Voice of Malaysians)."^ Mahamad Naser has been promoting 
the exclusive use of the term Allah to Muslims. Zulkifli Mohamad al-Bakri, the 
Interviews with Ratna Osman and IVIarina Matiathir, 7 February 2013. 
current Federal Territory mufti of, lias openly endorsed IVIahamad Naser's view 
(Zulkifli, Rastiidy, & Mohd Aizam, 2013, p. 43). Hence, the ability of the official 
ulema to have sympathisers and like-minded individuals in the cabinet and 
judiciary strengthened the official ulema's capture. 
Enhancing authority beyond domains specified by the state 
A measure of successful co-optation is the state's ability to constrain the 
authority of the official ulema as they work in the state-sponsored institutions. 
However, the Malaysian official ulema have been expanding their powers 
beyond institutional domains the state originally intended for them. This section 
highlights how official ulema extended their authority beyond the platforms or 
roles defined by the state. They have emerged from their original roles as the 
Malay rulers' and state's advisors to become social commentators who shape 
public opinion. Furthermore, they have been able to obtain appointments in key 
positions in non-religious institutions. 
Official ulema as political and social commentators 
Under the leadership of Prime Ministers Abdullah Badawi and Najib Abdul 
Razak, the muftis frequently appear in public commenting on current affairs. 
The subjects they are required to speak on include politics, economics and 
culture. They also regularly appear on mainstream television channel RTM 1 or 
mainstream newspapers Utusan Malaysia or the Berita Harlan (Malay Daily). 
RTM hosted a weekly program featuring the muftis called Bicara Mufti 
(Conversations with Muftis). The program features one mufti every week and 
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they speak on issues pertaining to morality, laws, and faith. Besides, IKIM also 
hosts Web television and radio channels that feature the official ulema. In the 
past, the muftis were less visible in the public's sphere as they mainly function 
in the negeri religious councils. The traditional mainstream media has given the 
official ulema additional platforms to participate in national discourse on top of 
the new media is more popular these days. 
Some muftis have become "celebrity" public commentators. One of them is 
Mohd Ash, former Perils Mufti, who was regularly invited to be a panelist in 
religious forums. In addition, he also served as a panelist for political forums 
during the 2008 and 2013 general elections.^'" He was active as a social 
commentator even when he was a mufti (2006-2008), but received more 
invitations after his resignation. Mohd Ash was a regular contributor to Utusan 
Malaysia (a national newspaper run by UMNO), Malaysian Insider, and kept a 
blog.^ '^ ® Given his populahty, there were rumours that the state offered him the 
position of Head of YADIM (Yayasan Dakwah Islam Malaysia or Islamic Da'wah 
Foundation Malaysia) after he resigned as Pedis mufti in 2008. His popularity 
continued after he stepped down as mufti, and he was asked many times to 
speak on opposition and state's platform, which he rarely turned down. For 
example, on 21 April 2013, Mohd Ash spoke at the Ke Arab Malaysia Sejahtera 
(Towards a Prosperous Malaysia) forum, which discussed issues in the run up 
" " Born in 1971, was probably one of the youngest muftis ever to be appointed in IVIalaysia 
when he was appointed as the Mufti of Pedis in 2006. In 2008, he refused to renew his contract. 
Mohd Asri is an expert in hadith, and he obtained a bachelor's degree in Arabic and Shariah 
(Islamic Law) from Jordan University. He later completed his Masters at the University Sains 
Malaysia (USM), the university, in which he is currently based, and later completed his PhD 
from the International Islamic University of Malaysia (MUM). Some would consider Mohd Asri's 
views as modernist, other prefer to call him Wahhabi (Norshahril, 2010b). 
to the 2013 elections. This forum was largely pro-opposition.^'® Occasionally, he 
was invited as a discussant to the UMNO General Assembly. 
Apart from Mohd Ash, the other muftis have also publicly commented on 
political and economic issues. The muftis see themselves as having abilities to 
provide "Islamic" perspectives on current affairs. For example, Harussani was 
approached to comment on political issues before the Malaysian general 
election in 2013. On 24 August 2011, Harussani was a panellist for Forum 
Ulama Politik—Untuk Dakwah atau Parti? (Political Ulema: Struggling for Islam 
or Party?). The forum was organised by Sinar Harian and held in Shah Alam, 
Selangor. Journalists also solicit muftis' views on political and economic issues. 
As previously mentioned, the Kelantan mufti, journalists approached Kelantan 
Mufti Muhammad Shukri for comments on the BERSIH rally. 
Some muftis comment on current affairs even though they were not approached 
by journalists. The Mufti of Sabah, Bungsu@Aziz Jaafar, once made a sensitive 
remark on Sinar IHarian that called for more Malay unity through Malayisation of 
Sabahans (Nizam, 2013). His comments offended some Sabahans, particularly 
the indigenous communities who maintained their identities as distinct from 
Malays. In 2014, the Pahang mufti, Abdul Rahman Osman, urged all Muslims to 
support the federal government's Goods and Service Tax (GST). The state's 
plans to introduce the GST have divided the country and the opposition has 
questioned the timing of the implementation. Yet, the Pahang mufti has openly 
endorsed the govemment's decision. Hence, the muftis have stepped beyond 
I attended the forum and conducted participant observation. 
the domains of the religious bureaucracies and religious councils commenting 
on national, political and economic issues, areas not specifically related to their 
domains. 
Apart from commenting on current affairs, the official ulema have also been 
directly involved in politics. In 2008, Dr Mohd Asri was requested by UMNO to 
run against Wan Azizah (PKR Presiden and Anwar Ibrahim's wife) for the 
Permatang Pauh seat in Penang (Zulkifli J, 2008). Dr Mohd Asri was still the 
Perils mufti when the election was held on 26 August 2008. For the 2013 
general elections, both UMNO and PAS invited Mohd Asri contest for 2013 
elections.^^^ There was speculation that the current mufti of Perils, Juanda Jaya 
would run as a PKR candidate for GE 13. He later denied this speculation and 
said he has always been an UMNO voter. On the other hand, Harrussani has 
been an active member of Perkasa activities, a right wing group that champions 
Malay supremacy even more so than UMNO leaders. Some official ulema in the 
past have also participated in politics. Ustaz Firdaus Ismail, the Imam of the 
National Mosque, ran on UMNO's ticket in the 1999 General Elections against 
Keadilan (Malaysia's Justice Party) president Wan Azizah Wan Ismail for the 
Permatang Pauh seat. While the official ulema have increased their prominence 
in the public domain, in most instances they supported the state. Yet, there 
were instances in which they took a different position from the state. 
This is based on my conversations with Mohd Asri and his followers during a public forum on 
21 April 2013. 
Securing other influential appointments 
Having muftis occupying other influential institutions shows their authority 
spreading wider than the religious domain. They are appointed in important 
decision-making positions in the non-Islamic banking and business sectors. For 
example, Harussani Zakaria and Nooh Gadut are advisors to the SC 
(Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia or Securities Commission Malaysia). The 
functions of this commission include supervising exchanges and central 
depositories; approving authority for corporate bond issues; and regulating take-
over and mergers of companies (Suruhanjaya Sekuriti, 2013). Nooh Gadut is 
also member of the Advisory Council for the KFC Holdings Malaysia BHD. They 
secure these appointments even though their training is largely in religious 
sciences. 
In addition, ulema have the power to determine which publications can be 
allowed into the country. Harussani, for instance, is the head of the book 
censorship committee in JAKIM.^^® The committee recommends to the Home 
Affairs Ministry books that should be banned. In February 2012, the Home 
Ministry, on JAKIM's advice, banned 12 books because they "threatened" public 
order and morality. These books include Akhirnya Ku Temui Kebenaran (I see 
the truth at last) and 99 Wariat Imam Ja'far Ash-Shadiq Lentera Hati (99 
guidelines from Imam Ja'far Ash-Shadiq, the light of the heart). These books 
are banned because they promote Shiism {The Malaysian Insider, "Home 
Ministry bans 12 books, citing public order, morality— Bernama," 4 February 
2014). In 2012, the book Kebebasan dan Cinta (Liberty and Love) by Irshad 
At the federal level, he was a distinguished member of the JKF-MKI and IKIM (Azman et al 
2008, pp. 60-61). 
Manji was also banned by the Home Ministry, although the ban was later 
removed by the High Court because the English version of the book had 
already been in public circulation since the previous year. 
Harussani is also the chairman of the LPPPQ (Lembaga Pengawalan dan 
Perlesenan Pencetakan Al-Quran or Quran Printing Control and Licensing 
Board), a conservative body that oversees printing of the Quran. In April 2014, 
the LPPPQ and the al-Quran Texts Review and Assessment Committee called 
for the amendment of the existing Printing of Quranic Text Act 1986. The 
amendment would make it illegal for Quranic verses as amulets to be displayed 
on premises for business purposes. The Home Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, 
promised the tabling of the amendment in parliament {New Straits Times, 
"Quran prints to be regulated," 16 April 2014). Ahmad Zahid later invited the 
LPPPQ to become Ministry Home Affairs' advisors {Borneo Post, "Police, 
MCMC to join forces against those insulting Prophet," 19 June 2013). 
Universities have also appointed muftis and former muftis in academic 
positions, even though most of them do not hold PhD degrees, and have never 
undertaken academic research. In August 2012, the UUM (University Utara 
Malaysia or Northern University of Malaysia) appointed Harussani, Hassbullah 
Abd Halim (former Kedah mufti) and Mat Jahya Hussin (former Perils Mufti) as 
adjunct professors. They were also made advisors and consultant in matters 
concerning Islamic affairs in the university, especially at the Islamic Centre 
{Bernama, "Mufti, former muftis appointed as UUM adjunct professors," 10 
August 2012). Harussani's highest qualification is a Diploma in Education, 
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which he attained in Kolej Islam Malaya in 1950s. He claimed, however, that 
this diploma is equivalent to a Bachelor's degree from Al-Azhar University in 
Egypt.^ '^ ® On the other hand, Hasbullah's highest qualification is a Bachelor's 
degree from Al-Azhar, while Mat Jahya obtained a Masters degree from USM 
(Azman et al, 2008, p. 17; p.63). Their appointments to academic positions 
seem to owe more to their positions as muftis, rather than academic 
qualifications. 
Compared to other official ulema, Harussani holds the highest number of 
appointments in religious and non-religious domains. Table 4 shows his 
appointments at the federal and negeri levels. They show how Harussani has 
penetrated domains outside his expertise and formal training. These 
appointments show he plays a significant role in the economics, education, 
finance, and politics sector, even though his training was only in the religious 
sciences. 
Table 4. Other appointments of Harrusani Zakaria 
Institution Federal Nature of 
Position or Negeri Institution 
Chairman Perak Syariah Council Negeri Religious 
Board Member Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Perak Negeri Economics 
Member Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Melayu Perak Negeri Religious 
Board Member IDC Urus Ladang Sdn Bhd Negeri Economics 
Board Member IDC Urus Niaga Sdn Bhd Negeri Economics 
Interview with Harussani Zakaria, 7 IVlay 2013. 
Patron Persekutuan Seruan Islam Negeri Perak Negeri Religious 
Senator Dewan Negara Negeri Perak Negeri Political 
Board member Kolej Islam Darul Ridzuan Negeri Educational 
Executive Member Majlis Keutuhan Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan Negeri Political 
Member JKF-MKI Federal Religious 
Member Lembaga Teks Ai-Quran Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Federal Religious 
Member IKIM Federal Religious 
Chairman Penyelaras Dakwah dan Pembelajaran 
Negeri 
Negeri Religious 
Member Majlis Pengawasan Syariah Takaful Negeri Economics 
Chiairman Penapisan Bahan-Bahan penerbitan 
berunsur Islam 
Negeri Religious 
Source: (Azman et al., 2008). 
Some may argue that Harussani's appointment to these positions Is only to 
provide advice in matters pertaining to shariah, but these appointments 
nonetheless show a societal trend that wants Islamic "perspectives" on a broad 
range of issues. This trend derives from the Islamic resurgence movement that 
always questions modernity as a "secular" project. Ulema ride on this trend 
providing their Interpretations of "Islamic" modernity. 
Other revenue related captures 
In the previous chapter, I discussed MUl's attempts to consolidate their 
authority in the halal certification and shariah economics sector. It is generally 
successful in the shariah economics sector, but its success was limited In the 
halal certification sector. LPPOM-MUl has been unable to monopolise and 
shape the halal certification sector the way it wanted, and its role remained 
disputed from Suharto's time. These two sectors are also important for the 
official ulema in Malaysia because they generate income and lucrative business 
opportunities for the religious institutions. 
The following paragraphs assess the extent the Malaysian official ulema have 
been successful in capturing the halal certification and Islamic economics 
sector. More broadly, their ability to generate income and allocate resources in 
their favour will be examined. I consider both the official ulema and the state 
mutually benefitting from the two sectors. In these sectors, the state and official 
ulema are not competing with one another, but they propelled Malaysia to 
become one of the biggest halal and Islamic finance hubs in the world. The 
level of authority the state accords to the official ulema in halal certification and 
Islamic economics varies. JAKIM oversees the country's halal certification 
sector but their involvement in Islamic economics is small. The federal 
government has regulated the industry, which falls directly under the purview of 
the central bank. This does not mean that their capture in Islamic economics is 
non-existent. Arguably, official ulema's capture in halal certification is 
institutional, whereas in Islamic economics, personal. I then take the discussion 
of personalised capture to the muftis' position in the religious bureaucracy itself. 
I contend that the muftis were not striving as hard as Indonesian ulema in doing 
business because they are occupying the higher rungs of the civil service. 
Halal certification and Islamic economics 
Halal-certificates in Malaysia are issued either by JAKIM or by the JAIN (negerl 
religious departments). JAKIM's halal certificates apply to both the international 
and domestic markets, whereas JAIN's apply to domestic markets only. Apart 
from issuing halal certificates for food products, JAKIM also certifies cosmetics. 
The federal government does not allow private companies to participate In halal 
certification (Berita Harian, "Hanya JAKIM, JAIN keluar sijil halal," 2010, 26 
July). JAKIM's monopoly of halal certification has led it to become one of the 
largest halal exporters in the world. According to the 2013 Nikkei Asian Review, 
Malaysia exported RM 10 billion (A$3.5 billion) of halal products (Tan, 2014). 
Some consumer groups have raised concerns about JAKIM's and JAIN's 
monopoly of halal certification. However, Jamil Khir denied rumours that JAKIM 
and JAIN made huge profits out of it. The rates for halal certification are: RM 
200 (A$ 70) for small industries; RM 400 (A$ 141) for medium industries; and 
RM 800 (A$283) for large-scale industries {myMetro, "Jakim tak raih 
keuntungan," 5 May 2012). 
JAKIM and JAIN employees are active in conducting spot-checks to ensure that 
halal certification is not abused (myMetro, "Kosmetik halal dijamin kualiti," 17 
May 2008). These spot-checks are conducted at least once a month. 
Businesses or food operators found abusing JAKIM's halal labels would have 
their certificates suspended. (Halal Malaysia Website, 2011). Its Indonesian 
counterpart, LPPOM-MUl, does not have JAKIM's capacity, efficiency and 
manpower. As discussed in Chapter Six, LPPOM-MUl is even struggling to 
monitor compliance for the halal certificates it has issued. LPPOM-MUI's 
relative weakness in this aspect is part of Suharto's legacy that did not finance 
the institution to fulfil this role. 
The official ulema adopted conservative attitudes towards food consumption 
habits with the hope to expand JAKIM's halal certification business. In 2010, 
JAKIM Director, Datuk Wan Mohamad Sheikh Abdul Aziz reminded Malaysian 
Muslims who intended to break their fast (in Ramadan) in hotels to patronise 
restaurants carrying JAKIM's halal certificates (myMetro, "Pastikan berbuka dl 
hotel diiktiraf halal," 28 July 2010). Wan Mohamad added that restaurant 
operators should not serve cuisines that Islam forbids. 
In May 2014, JAKIM's credibility was hurt by the Cadbury controversy. The 
Ministry of Health detected two samples of Cadbury chocolate—Cadbury Dairy 
Hazelnut and Cadbury Milk Roast Almond—containing traces of pig DNA 
(porcine). This created a public outcry because these chocolates carry JAKIM's 
certificate {New Straits Times, "Jakim has taken Cadbury chocolate samples 
from factory for tests," 1 June 2014). The JKF-MKI stepped in and declared the 
chocolates to be halal though some Muslim consumer groups and opposition 
politicians wanted to take Cadbury to court, Mahfudz Omar, PAS Information 
Chief, was one of those who urged JAKIM to sue Cadbury {The Malaysian 
Insider, "DNA babi: Jakim patut dakwa Cadbury bukan pengguna, kata ahli 
Parlimen PAS," 29 May 2014). Later, JAKIM declared that the Ministry of Health 
had erred in raising the contamination issue in the first place because 
subsequent lab tests detected no contamination occurred. 
Compared to the halal certification sector, the official ulema's role in the Islamic 
banking industry is smaller, though it remains significant and powerful. In 
Malaysia, the Central Bank and the SC oversee the Islamic banking sector. In 
1983, the Islamic Banking Act was enacted leading to the establishment of the 
country's first Islamic bank. On 1 March 1993, the state established the SC to 
manage Malaysia's capital market, and the body reports to the Ministry of 
Finance. The Central Bank also oversees the national Islamic insurance 
scheme or Takaful. In 1985, with the passing of the Takaful Act/1984, 
Malaysia's first Islamic insurance company was established. Besides, the 
Central Bank also resolves disputes pertaining to Islamic finance and insurance. 
In 2010, the Central Bank published the Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance 
which compiles all the resolution cases between 1997and 2009 as a guide for 
future disputes (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). 
Malaysia's shariah banking and finance sector has recorded significant growth 
since the 1980s. This resulted from the Malaysian federal government's 
involvement in backing and regulating this sector, which began a decade earlier 
than the Indonesian central government. In 2007, the Takaful sector recorded 
total assets amounting to US$2.8 billion (A$3.2 billion). By 2010, Islamic 
banking assets had increased to US$65.6 billion (A$75.5 billion) with an annual 
growth of 18-20 per cent (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). 
Since Islamic economics is highly regulated by the Malaysian state, have the 
official ulema failed in capturing this sector? Mahathir developed this sector 
since taking power in 1981 and the development of this sector had always been 
his response to Islamic resurgence. His eagerness in developing this sector 
also emerged out of his desire to make Malaysian Islamic discourse parallel his 
capitalistic and industrialisation agenda. Mahathir's policies limited the official 
ulema involvement. 
Although Islamic finance sector is highly regulated by the state, the official 
ulema have been able to ride on the state's efforts to carry out state capture at 
both personal and institutional levels. Key state financial institutions in Malaysia 
have appointed JAKIM officials and muftis as advisors. JAKIM Director, Wan 
Mohamad, sits in the shariah advisory body of the Bank Negara Malaysia (BIMB 
Holdings Berhad, 2009). He is also an Exco member of the MIFC (Malaysia 
Pusat Kewangan Antarabangsa or Malaysia International Islamic Financial 
Centre), which Is a network of Malaysia's financial regulators that includes 
Central Bank, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, ministries and agencies and 
private enterprises (MIFC Website, 2014). The Mufti of Pulau Pinang, Hassan 
Ahmad, is currently one of the eleven members of the MPS (Majlis Penasihat 
Shariah or Shariah Advisory Council), for the period of 2013 to 2016. The main 
task of this council is to provide guidelines and arbitration for financial 
institutions (Berita Harian, "Bank Negara umum anggota baru MPS," 9 
November 2013). This appointment is carried out by the Malaysian Central 
Bank but must be endorsed by Malaysian King. 
Hassan's appointment in tlie MPS demonstrates liow a mufti, within his 
personal capacity, can play a powerful role in the shariah banking and finance 
sector. Established in 1997, the MPS has the powers to ascertain whether 
Islamic banking business, takaful (\s\am\c insurance), and financial business are 
in line with shariah principles (Lindsey & Steiner, 2012, p. 126). It also oversees 
and regulates the SSBs (Shariah Supervisory Board), which are tasked to 
monitor transactions in Islamic banks whether shariah-compliant. The SSB 
functions like the DPS in Indonesia, except that SSB's rulings are binding on the 
banking and finance sector. The MPS also advises the SC on matters dealing 
with shariah. The MPS has the authority to determine if products listed in the 
stock exchange are shariah compliant (Md Nurdin, 2009, pp.138-141). Since 
2003, the state accords the MPS exclusive authority in Islamic finance so that 
any case before the civil courts involving Islamic finance has to be referred to it 
(Lindsey & Steiner, 2012, p. 126). Thus, regulations issued by MPS members 
have the powers of gazetted fatwas at the negeri level. 
JAKIM also plays a role in the shariah economics sector. JAKIM acts as the 
secretariat for the conference of MPS (JAKIM, 2011a, pp. 17-18). It also runs a 
journal on shariah economics entitled Jurnal Muamalat. In addition, it facilitates 
research on the shariah economics and provides guidelines to Muslims about 
the subject. Its research focuses on the following aspects: multi-level marketing 
(MLM), currency exchange through online, shares trading via online, and online 
business (JAKIM, 2011a, pp.18). JAKIM also organises seminars, conferences, 
and training courses for officials involved in shariah economics. Thus, in the 
shariah economics sector, the Malaysian official ulema have been able to 
capture the state at personal and institutional levels in the shariah economics 
sector. On one hand, the state has invited some muftis and senior official ulema 
to be advisors in shariah financial institutions. On the other hand, JAKIM has 
played a supportive role in the sector. 
Muftis as senior bureaucrats 
There are other aspects in which being an official ulema is beneficial. The level 
of income attained by official ulema is generally high and stable; they are paid 
salaries similar to top-ranking non-ulema in the civil service. This salary 
excludes payments received for additional teaching or preaching. It also 
excludes those obtained by being appointed in positions external to the religious 
bureaucracy. The position of muftis equals to senior bureaucrats in the civil 
service. In 2012, the Minister Jamil Khir suggested that the muftis have the 
same payment as a state executive committee member. The muftis' pay would 
then be equal to that of a minister at the negeri level (Hussaini, 2012). There 
were also attempts to promote the position of the deputy muftis to a higher level 
in the civil service: from S44, S48 to S52 to S54. Scales S52 and S54 are 
equivalent to directorship levels in the civil-service. The following table indicates 
a guide to the salary scale of civil servants in Malaysia. 
Table 5. Salary scale for civil servants 
Grade Minimum Pay (RM) Maximum Pay (RM) Annual Increment 
(RM) 
S54 5830.00 (A$2006) 9562.90 (A$3291) 320.00 (A$110) 
S 5 2 5531.25 (A$1903) 8955.52 (A$3082) 290.00 (A$99) 
S44 4193.30 (A$1156) 8219.84 (A$2446) 270.00 (A$85) 
S41 3362.91 (A$656) 7114.68 (A$2337) 250.00 (A$77) 
Source: (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia, 2013, p. 54). 
If one takes the Selangor Executive Members' pay as a guide, the mufti of 
Selangor's pay could be as high as RM 10, 000 (A$ 3535) a month since 1 
January 2014 {Sinar Harian, "MB, Adun Selangor naik gaji mulai 1 Januari 
2014," 27 November 2013). Selangor's case however can be considered an 
exception. Sinar Harian reports that the pay Kelantan Exco members is about 
RM 5,400 (A$1908) without allowance. The pay could be between RM 8,000 
(A$2828) to RM 12, 000 (A$4242) a month when allowance is added to it 
(Habsah, 2013). The crux of the issue, nevertheless, is that the ulema are paid 
as high as negeri ministers, and this is how the state acknowledges their status. 
Former Perlis Mufti, Dr Mohd Ash admitted that the official ulema generally 
occupy the middle class or upper socio-economic class. The senior official 
ulema receive many entitlements and they can use those for personal benefit. 
According to Dr Mohd Asri, 
The government's budget given to the official ulema is huge. From the directors 
to the ordinary officers in the religious bureaucracy, every year they receive an 
increment to their salaries. Their cars and office chairs are luxurious. I am not 
sure if they go on overseas for work or for leisure. With that amount of budget 
that they receive, they need to solve society's problems...I am disappointed that 
these official ulema who received huge budget from the government cannot 
become the society's icon (Mohd Asri, 2010, pp. 336-337). 
One rarely hears of any corruption involving the religious establishment in 
Malaysia. In 2014, the Malaysian Transparency International conducted a 
survey on public's perception towards corruption of Malaysian public 
institutions. The findings showed that Malaysians perceive religious institutions 
as the least corrupt, compared to others such as political parties, judiciary, 
police and NGO (Transparency International Malaysia, 2014, p.18). However, 
there have been times when the public questioned the transparency of 
managing zakat and Haj funds. In 2011, Jamil Khir's wealth received media 
scrutiny after it was found he renovated his luxurious house at Kampung Batu 
Muda (Selangor). He denied the allegations, claiming that he used his own 
money for the renovations (Syed Mu'az, 2011). Still, the public wanted to know 
how he was able to accumulate so much wealth since he had only been a 
minister for three years when the media raised the issue. The public claimed 
that his monthly salary was not more than RM 15, 000(A$5143), and to be able 
to finance the renovations was impossible. Jamil Khir replied to these 
allegations that he was a former Major General in the army and currently 
receiving pension. Apart from Jamil Khir's case, there were other isolated cases 
of mismanagement of Haj funds from the Tabung Haji. In 2001, Tabung Haji 
loses RM 200 million (A$71 million) through investments in Metrowangsa Asset 
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Management. Six senior staff from Tabung Haji was questioned by the ACA 
(Anti-Corruption Agency) to explain for the decision to invest in a risky business 
(A. Firdaus, 2002). The agency reported no wrongdoings. 
in short, there are several advantages for being an official ulema. Apart from 
receiving a monthly salary, the person also receive other benefits of a civil 
servant, and status. Being official ulema do not prevent them from teaching 
religion privately or engaging in business. Some official ulema travel overseas, 
especially Singapore, to give sermons. The organisers mostly fund these trips 
and the ulema received two to three times the amount they receive by giving 
talks in Malaysia.^^° 
Wither moderate Islam in Malaysia? 
Overall, the Malaysian official ulema have been successful in meeting their 
capture objectives. They have been able to dominate the religious discourse 
and affect policies. Moreover, there have been instances where they have 
defied the state, asserted their authority beyond religious domains, and 
generated additional revenues. Mahathir's policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
shaped the contemporary ulema's objectives. Their empowerment allows them 
to act autonomously from societal pressure. Their success in Islamic economics 
and halal certification were outcomes of state's infrastructural and capital 
investments. Overall, the state upgraded ulema institutions and then accorded 
them with powers that MUl could not match. 
I obtain this information through conversations with Singapore imams. 
The Malaysian ulema's success is measured by their ability to influence 
government's policies through their conservative brand of Islam. The behaviour 
of the official ulema's does not help Prime Minister Najib's quest to build an 
image of a progressive, moderate and inclusive Islamic country internationally. 
The views and behaviour of the official ulema do not reflect a progressive 
image, which contradicts the slogans One Malaysia and Islam Wasatiyyah. 
Conversely, their behaviour only cemented UMNO's image as a conservative 
and chauvinistic party. Marina Mahathir reflected on the challenge posed to the 
Najib government. She felt that unlike her father, Najib was too weak to confront 
the official ulema's conservative agenda. According to Marina, 
And I think this is particularly the case since 2003. Since my dad [Mahathir] 
stepped down, suddenly now you have a PM [Najib] who wants to talk about 
religion. And the trouble with (UMNO) is that they think they have to contest for 
votes based on religion, so they competing with PAS. But they have gotten 
worse now because they are on very shaky ground religiously. There are not 
man people now who know about religion. My dad (Mahathir) was willing to 
'berlaga' (head on) with these people. But you get one like Najib, who does not 
know [about Islam]. And the people around him do not know [about Islam]. 
On UMNO's weakening position today compared to under Mahathir's rule, Marina said, 
UMNO is on shaky ground to fight the Malay votes with PAS through religion. It 
is secular. So it is trying to get all this 'imam' muda (young imam) to come and 
shore up [support for it], which comes to show how insecure it is. Where is the 
original contestation with PAS? Before, it's PAS wanting hudud. Now everybody 
wants to have hudud; even Wanita UMNO [UMNO women's wing] wants 
hududP®^ 
While the Malaysian prime ministers after Mahathir hope to reunite Malaysians, 
the ulema's discourse, which continues to fan ethnic and religious mistrusts, did 
not help UMNO leaders' cause. Abdullah Badawi's failure to curb UMNO's 
' Inten/iew with Marina Mahathir, 7 February 2013 
extreme right-wing groups internal and external to UMNO proved costly for the 
party in the 2008 elections. During the 2005, 2006, and 2007 UMNO General 
Assemblies, UMNO youth-wing {Pemuda UMNO) made several insensitive and 
chauvinist remarks that angered the non-Malays. UMNO Youth Chief then, 
Hishammudin Hussein, hoisted the keris (a dagger) during that three 
assemblies, which signified as a warning to other communities not to question 
Malay supremacy. UMNO leaders were also ineffective to tackling issues facing 
minority communities. In the run up to the 2008 elections, the Abdullah Badawi 
BN government failed to address the demands by HINDRAF (Hindu Rights 
Action Force). The movement wants the government to guarantee Hindu rights 
and cultural heritage after several UMNO negeri governments ordered the 
demolition of Hindu temples. BN's inability to appease the growing resentment 
amongst the Indian and Hindu community contributed to weakening support for 
the ruling coalition. 
Occasional comments made by the official ulema caused further distrust 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Earlier, I mentioned the implication of 
Harussani's unsubstantiated claim regarding Muslims converting to Christianity. 
In 2011, Selangor mufti Tamyes Abdul Wahid said that many new Muslim 
converts reverted to their previous faiths. He posited that they converted to 
Islam because they wanted to marry Muslims, and once the marriage failed, 
they left Islam (Fernandez, 2011). The mufti's comments sparked criticisms 
from HINDRAF chairman P Waythamoorthy, who suggested that the state and 
religious establishment were trying to persecute non-Muslims in the country by 
constantly blaming them for Muslims converting out of Islam (Fernandez, 2011). 
Similarly, Najib Abdul Razak's inability to resolve ethnic tensions and curb the 
official ulema's conservatism contributed to the ruling coalition's even poorer 
performance in the 2013 e l e c t i o n . W h i l e there are many factors that 
contributed to BN's poorer showing, including Malaysians' unhappiness with the 
failing economy, ethnic tensions, elite corruption, and effective opposition 
campaign, official ulema's conservatism only aggravated tensions between 
Muslims and non-Muslim further, and this turned voters to the opposition. 
Beginning in 2010, UMNO began co-opting Salafi ulema into the party, and in 
2013, they had been given a formal role in the party through the formation of 
ILMU (Ulama Muda UMNO or UMNO Ulama Youth) (Mohamed Nawab, 2014, 
p. 219). ILMU had adopted conservative positions, which included asking 
Malaysian Airlines to stop serving alcohol on its flights (Fathul Bah, 2014). 
Also, the prime minister had repeatedly failed to condemned Malay-rights 
groups such as Perkasa, ISMA, and JATI (Jalur Tiga: Islam, Melayu dan Raja 
or Three Streams: Islam, Malays, and Royalty), in which the official ulema are 
involved.^®^ Harussani, for example, is an ardent supporter of Perkasa, and has 
received an award from the right-wing organisation (Utusan Malaysia, 
"Harussani dianugerah Bintang Perkasa Negara," 10 December 2012). 
Likewise, ISMA has also defended the views of Sabah mufti on the need to 
282 Even though it retained federal government and regained the state of Kedah (after losing it to 
PAS in 2008), BN's popular votes were lower than the PR. Prime Minister Najib- quoted in 
Utusan Malaysia- was quick to attribute the poor performance of the ruling coalition as a 
'Chinese tsunami' (Utusan Malaysia, "Apa lagi Cina mahu?," 7 May 2013). 
283 These are right wing Malay-Muslim groups that promote the ideology of Islam Malays and 
Raja. These groups are however largely unconnected. For instance, Perkasa is strongly linked 
to UMNO, while JATI is formed by Dr Hassan Mohammad Ali, former PAS Vice-President 
"Malayanise" Sabahans (Portal Islam & Melayu, "ISMA: Kenyataan Mufti Sabah 
benar jika rujuk sejarah," 12 October 2013). The coalition of the official ulema 
with these extreme groups would further marginalise the support of the non-
Malays towards UMNO. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows the relative success of the Malaysian official ulema capture 
of the state. More competitive political environments since the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, especially after Mahathir's retirement in 2003, has given the 
opportunity for the official ulema to shape the country's Islamisation agenda. As 
a result of co-optation, the official ulema inherited the institutions created or 
strengthened under the Mahathir government. Since 2008, the official ulema 
have the flexibility to switch alliances between UMNO and/or Malay rulers. At 
times, though rarely, they took sides with the opposition. The official ulema have 
buttressed their authority in monopolising Islam, to the extent that it does not 
tolerate any parties from questioning their religious rulings. The authority 
accorded to them by the state since 1988, which was mainly to win over the 
Islamic resurgence and counter an increasingly Islamist PAS, is either used to 
strengthened the state's policies or challenge them. Moreover, the conservative 
attitude of the official ulema has hindered UMNO's desire to project an 
international image as a progressive and moderate Islamic country. 
The Malaysian official ulema have utilised three modalities of capture presented 
to them. First, they have exercised their authority as recognised in the laws and 
regulations beyond the means originally intended: as advisors to the Malay 
rulers and state on religious affairs. Second, the official ulema supported 
UMNO's and Malay rulers' ideology. This ideological homogeneity secured their 
positions in the religious institutions and prolonged their stay in the religious 
bureaucracies. The official ulema then claimed the right to define how this ruling 
ideology is in line with Islamic principles. Third, the official ulema practise 
collective responsibility and elite cohesion effectively when responding to 
external challenges by state, civil society, and PAS. The official ulema 
institutions are equipped with efficient religious bureaucracies and think-tanks— 
JAKIM and IKIM at the federal level—and the religious departments in the 
various negeris. Indirectly, these institutions elevated the prominence of the 
muftis at the negeri levels. This is manifested in the increasing prominence 
accorded to the JKF-MKI, even though the fatwas issued were legally non-
binding. The official ulema have also forged key alliances with radical groups 
such as ISMA and Perkasa which supported them in the drive for greater 
Islamisation in the country. 
The muftis are more visible in the public domain during the Abdullah Badawi 
and Najib Abdul Razak administrations than the Mahathir era. They began to 
comment on issues beyond the religious domain, including being critical of 
government's policies and programmes. The official ulema also sit in important 
positions both at the federal and negeri levels. They are invited to sit in 
important bodies that may not be in line with their own training. Some assert 
great influence in the censorship board and financial sector, as well as being 
actively involved in NGOs, Nevertheless, the official ulema's success in meeting 
the aims of capture does not mean their powers are not challenged by the state, 
PAS, and civil society. In line with Migdal's state-in-society approach whereby 
state and society constantly construct their authority vis-a-vis one another, 
UMNO continues to ensure that the official ulema authority are kept in check. 
While the official ulema know that there are limits which they should not cross, 
they have generally captured the state in ways the state had not intended in 
their co-optation strategy. 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
If one were a graduate of an Islamic university, would a career as a Malaysian 
mufti, JAKIM official, or MUl ulema be a good option? During my interview with 
the Perak mufti, Harrusani Zakaria, he remarked, "People say the state instructs 
me what to do. I have served for 28 years and never once did the Perak Chief 
Minister tell me what to do...I don't follow his instructions. Islamic laws are 
clearl"^®" Likewise, Amirsyah Tambunan, MUl vice-secretary, said, "People think 
Suharto is so powerful that he can influence everybody. However, MUl has 
always been independent!"^®^ These dilemmas facing official ulema have been 
the heart of this study. 
Existing writings by Islamic studies scholars have been generally sceptical 
about the power of official ulema to influence states. The common perception is 
that ulema cannot fulfil the tasks Islam has entrusted to them as legatees of the 
Prophet once they co-operate with the ruling elites. In other words, once ulema 
serve within state-sponsored institutions, they lose the autonomy to make 
credible and objective religious judgements. Saeed's account, which opened 
this study, argues for the decline in authority of the official ulema in the modern 
world. Non-official ulema interviewed during my fieldwork also felt that 
participation in state-sponsored institutions compromises ulema's authority. 
Interview with Harussani Zakaria, 7 IVlay 2013 
Interview with Amisyah Tambunan, 8 January 2013. 
Nevertheless, the findings of my study suggest that co-operating with the state 
does not necessarily detract from the official ulema's authority or power. The 
preceding chapters demonstrate how Indonesian and Malaysian ulema 
responded to and capitalised on state co-optation. Instead of being passive 
actors receiving orders from the states that co-opted them, ulema have devised 
strategies to capture parts of the state based on the objectives they had set for 
themselves. 
This study's findings are consonant with recent scholarship on Middle Eastern 
ulema which has also questioned the perception that official ulema are passive 
or biddable. Meir Hatina (2009a), Levy (1983), Marsot (1973) and al-Atawneh 
(2009) underscore official ulema's ability to resist state co-optation and 
determine their own agenda. My study builds on these scholars' observations 
and, at the same time, applies political science theories such as pluralism, 
corporatism and state-in-society to conceptualise its empirical findings. Among 
these theories, Migdal's state-in-society approach best explains the study's 
empirical findings because it focuses on the interplay between state and society 
leading to their mutual influence upon each other. Thus, the study is not 
entangled in the ineffectual exercise of classifying states and societies as strong 
or weak. Instead, it accepts that states and societies are strong in certain 
aspects and weak in others. The bigger question is what factors determine 
these strengths and weaknesses. The concept of co-optation is applied to 
measure state's ability to ensure that social actors conform to its goals. The 
study used "capture" to appraise social actors' ability to capitalise on co-
optation. Capture measures the ulema's ability to influence laws, policies, 
appointments, and distribution of resources. My application of the concept of 
capture—adapted from political economy—mainly develops, rather than rejects, 
Migdal's interest in "practices" of states and societies. 
Comparative cases are often difficult to justify even though comparisons are 
important for theorising in political science. In the case of this study, official 
ulema institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia are different in terms of structure 
and centre-branch relations, though I maintain that comparing MUl and MKI 
(particularly JKF-MKI) is valid and useful for several reasons. First, the 
departments being compared within the two institutions fulfil the same functions: 
they make fatwas; generate revenue; and conduct research. Second, 
authoritarian leaders from both countries established these institutions for 
similar purposes. The two institutions facilitated their political and economic 
agendas, and served to harness the accelerated Islamisation that had been 
underway since the 1970s. Third, the ulema see merits in joining these state-
institutions: they can get direct access to states' resources and gain authority to 
shape policies. 
Suharto's and Mahathir's Islamic policies have had a significant influence on 
contemporary ulema, particularly their capture priorities. I distinguish Suharto's 
co-optation strategies as symbolic institutionalism and Mahathir's as substantive 
institutionalism. The two leaders' co-optation strategies can be differentiated by 
the extent to which they empower official ulema institutions; their motivations for 
control; and their techniques of control. Suharto expected MUl to support 
Pancasila and the regime, while Mahathir, and his successors, expected the 
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Malaysian ulema to support UMNO's policies. However, Suharto was less 
interested in giving real power to the official ulema than Mahathir, and he 
applied repressive tactics to contain dissent. Suharto conceded little to the 
ulema's demands. In contrast, Mahathir empowered Islamic institutions to 
attract the ulema to support for his development policies. Mahathir also sought 
to out-flank PAS on Islamic issues, which had successfully drawn ulema into its 
fold. In this regard, Suharto's institutionalisation of ulema was more superficial 
than that undertaken by his Malaysian counterpart. 
The different degree of ulema empowerment shapes contemporary capture 
objectives in two ways. First, the Malaysian ulema are focussing on 
consolidating their authority while the Indonesian ulema are preoccupied with 
having their authority recognised. Malaysian laws and regulations have clearly 
defined the extent of the ulema's power. There are areas in which they have 
less authority compared to their Indonesian counterparts, such as shariah 
economics, but there are other areas in which they enjoy a monopoly, such as 
halal certification, fatwa declaration, and public censorship on Islamic issues. By 
contrast, the Indonesian state does not grant MUl such authority. In the post-
New Order period, MUl is lobbying the state to expand their powers on halal 
and morality issues, though, to date, with little success. 
Second, MUl relies more on societal conservatism to strengthen its authority 
whereas the Malaysian official ulema can act independently of societal 
demands. For MUl, the more conservative the society, the higher the demand 
for services such as shariah banking and finance, halal certification, and shariah 
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tourism. While ormas and civil activists can challenge MUl's fatwas, the 
Malaysian ulema are empowered by law enabling them to ignore with impunity 
public opinion. The fatwas they issued, if gazetted, have the force of law. The 
iVlalaysian ulema derive their legitimacy from the powers accorded to them by 
the Malay rulers, who are the constitutionally prescribed protectors of Islam and 
the Malays, and support from federal and negeri governments. 
I also maintain that history and social context are critical to understanding 
contemporary ulema behaviour. The Islamic resurgence movement, which 
emerged in the 1970s to the 1990s, has had a significant impact on 
contemporary Islamic ideas in both countries. The rise in Islamisation was 
directly linked to the push for Islamic order which scholars have described as 
"shariasation." Today, a more competitive political environment in Indonesia and 
Malaysia has reignited the ulema's push for an "alternative" Islamic order. This 
is the reason why MUl and JKF-MKI ulema are making shariah economics, 
halal certification, and public morality their areas of capture. The official ulema 
also feel that only under their leadership can an "authentic" Islamic discourse 
prevail in their respective societies. 
Significance of study 
By discussing the dynamics of co-optation and capture between states and 
official ulema, this study enriches existing scholarship, both empirically and 
theoretically. The study's empirical findings mainly engage writings by Islamic 
studies, legal, and area studies scholars who have done research on 
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Indonesian and Malaysian ulema. For theory, the study contributes to the 
discussion on interest-mediation models in the field of comparative politics. This 
study attempts to develop Migdal's state-in-society approach by applying the 
concept of "capture." Besides contributing to empirical and theoretical 
knowledge, the study also hopes to reflect critically on official ulema's struggles 
to capture their respective states as well as their impact. 
Empirical contributions 
The study responds to the perception among many scholars, civil activists, and 
Muslims that official ulema are the state's lackeys. To their detractors, official 
ulema are not genuine Islamic scholars, because they are compromised in their 
work by having to serve the government. Are they right in making this 
judgement? Arguably, stating that ulema are minions of the state downplays 
their ability to influence states, the logical conclusion of which would be they are 
impotent on policy and appointment matters, and unable to Islamise states from 
within. My study's findings show how Indonesian and Malaysian official ulema 
have contributed to their respective states' conservative policies. The 
Yudhoyono government, for instance, relented to pressure from the official 
ulema on the Ahmadiyah issue. It also passed laws that previous governments 
were reluctant to pass such as the Shariah Banking Law and Pornography Law 
in 2008. The Malaysian state, on the other hand, has been unable to contain the 
conservative official ulema, particularly on issues such as the use of the term 
"Allah" by Christians, conversion of minors, and proscription of Shiism. 
The study not only responds to the negative perception of ulema and the 
conclusions that some scholars have drawn about MUl and JKF-MKI but also 
advances two claims that differ from prevailing scholarship. First, post-New 
Order MUl is not as influential as existing writings suggest. These works 
maintain that contemporary MUl fatwas have been responsible for violence 
against religious minorities, such as Ahmadiyahs, Shias, and liberal Muslims. 
The present study argues that MUl's positions on these issues have been 
consistent since its founding in 1975, and the fatwas generally have limited 
impact on society. MUl issues fatwas mainly in response to ummat pressure or 
its fatwas are seized on by groups that were already sectarian. Thus, MUl's 
fatwas were reflecting the attitudes of sections of the ummat rather than 
shaping them. It is true, however, that conservative groups often seized on MUl 
fatwa to legitimise their vigilante actions. In the preceding chapters, I have also 
cited cases where Indonesian Muslims ignored MUl's role. They paid no 
attention to its halal certificates; disregarded its requests to be consulted on 
public morality; and took no notice of its declaration of important dates in the 
Islamic calendar, such as Elds and the beginning of the fasting month of 
Ramadhan. 
However, MUl's ability to gain support from several cabinet ministers has 
contributed to its success in capturing parts of the state. For example, the 
religious minister and several other members of the Yudhoyono's cabinet 
supported MUl's demands to restrict Ahmadiyah's role. The passing of the 
Islamic Banking Law in 2008 represented another success for MUl as the state 
finally recognised its role in shariah finance. Yet, MUl has failed to replicate this 
success in monopolising halal certification, obtaining a role in morality 
censorship bodies, and determining what constitutes mainstream and orthodox 
Islam. Ideological differences among MUl members, and ineffective use of 
Pancasila, have also hindered the institution's progress in making its views 
heard by the state. Conservative voices within MUl had to compete with 
progressives in the institution, including the liberal-minded scholars in its 
Advisory Board. 
The second main conclusion from my research is that Malaysian official ulema 
are more powerful than what scholars believe. The preceding chapters trace the 
historical factors that led to the contemporary ulema's strength. Since the 
1980s, the Malaysian ulema have benefitted from Mahathir's Islamisation drive, 
which were targeted contain the influence of PAS and Islamic NGOs. They were 
loyal supporters of UMNO during the Mahathir era. Yet, the study also 
demonstrates how they have extended their authority beyond what the state 
originally envisaged. Under the Abdullah and Najib governments, the official 
ulema have the option to support UMNO, Malay rulers, or even the opposition 
as and when circumstances benefit them. Their support for UMNO and the 
Malay rulers are conditional: they want to preserve the existing social order 
which defines the institutions they occupy. Furthermore, UMNO has become 
weaker under Najib and his government is more dependent on ulema support. 
The success of the Malaysian official ulema in capturing the state is 
demonstrated in several aspects. The state and other key political, 
administrative and economic institutions have appointed official ulema to 
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strategic decision-making positions, such as advisory positions in banks, 
religious councils, and universities, including in positions not related to their 
religious training. The state gives generous funding to institutions dominated by 
official ulema. In addition, the ulema have reliable and plentiful revenue by 
virtue of their role in halal certification and shariah finance that gives them a 
measure of autonomy. The success of Malaysian official ulema is most evident 
in their ability to determine who can speak on religious matters. They restricted 
those seen as promoting liberalism and secularism the right to speak on Islam. 
Some official ulema, such as Harussani Zakaria and Nooh Gadut, have been 
able to prolong their membership on religious councils, thereby establishing and 
entrenching personal power bases, at the expense of the many young and 
equally capable religious scholars who are denied influential positions. This 
allows senior ulema to dictate the way institutions are run and, in some cases, 
disregard the wishes of UMNO politicians and ministers. The Malaysian culture 
of respect for seniority also means that the longer ulema stay in the institutions, 
the more difficult it is for junior ulema to question them. Furthermore, the high 
level of unity within the JKF-MKI and the effective use of the state's ideology, 
Rukunegara (especially on "Belief in God" and "Loyalty to the King") and Malay 
supremacy (ketuanan Melayu), explain their relative success in capturing the 
state. 
Arguably, the ulema's successful capture contributed to the state's conservative 
"turn" in ways that Mahathir and Abdullah Badawi did not anticipate. For 
instance, ulema used state's platforms such as the JKF-MKI, JAKIM and IKIM 
to promote Islamist ideas that Mahathir tried to contain in the 1980s. Since 
Mahathir's retirement, ulema in state institutions have been championing an 
Islamic state and greater shariaisation of society. 
Despite the success of Malaysian official ulema in capturing parts of the state, 
UMNO will remain critical to the management of religious affairs. While it is true 
that the Malaysian official ulema have outgrown their original status as religious 
advisors to the Malay rulers and UMNO loyalists to become an "exclusive" 
group, this is not to say that UMNO has lost the ability to shape policies 
pertaining to Islam. While UMNO is weaker under Najib Abdul Razak than it 
was under Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Badawi, the party continues to 
dictate Islamic affairs. The findings of this study only suggest that UMNO does 
not have the dominance over Islamic affairs as it once enjoyed. 
Contributions to comparative politics approaches 
Besides making empirical contributions, the study also engages with 
comparative politics approaches. Existing works have applied the corporatist 
theory to describe state-society relations during Suharto's and Mahathir's rule. 
While there are studies that apply Migdal's state-in-society approach for 
Indonesia after the Suharto era, scholars on Malaysian politics have largely 
ignored the approach. The present study adds new perspectives to the debate 
by applying the state-in-society approach to both Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Migdal has founded a scholarly tradition that paints a complex picture of state 
and society relations. He argues that states are not as omnipotent as political 
scientists believe. According to Migdal, "rule making, especially in complex 
institutions, is itself a complicated undertaking, involving numerous parties. 
coming from different standpoints at the question of what the rule should be" 
(2013, p. viii). 
My only criticism of Migdal relates to how he and his followers have applied the 
theory to the cases they examine. Migdal's works concentrate on proving the 
limitations of the state rather than those of society. Applying Migdal's approach, 
contributors in his edited volume The Everyday Life of the State are also guilty 
of this oversight. In his most recent works, Migdal describes the difficulties 
facing the Israeli state in handling the Palestinians. The Israeli foot soldiers, 
when faced with exigencies and threats from Palestinian villagers, often 
deviated from the state's orders (Migdal, 2013, p. xi). Describing the soldiers' 
struggle, Migdal posits. 
The army's chain of command frayed quickly as lower-level officers and recruits 
had to deal with real-life problems and entreaties in local communities, while 
trying to remain reasonably faithful to the orders they received from on high 
(p.x). 
This study adopts Migdal's approach, but shifts the focus to societal actors as 
units of analysis as it is important to examine the struggles and successes of 
societal actors in influencing states. Different units within society have different 
objectives towards states, and they apply various strategies to accomplish 
these objectives. Similarly, states wanted to achieve various goals using 
societal groups, and apply different strategies for this purpose. Therefore, any 
attempts to measure success or failure in co-optation and capture should 
establish what state and societal actors want to achieve and are subsequently 
able to achieve. 
Moreover, the study does not analyse the behaviour of actors that live on the 
peripheries of the country to demonstrate the state's limitations. Unlike many 
other studies that apply Migdal's approach, this study is not focussing on actors' 
"everyday lives." Instead, it highlights that states' limitations can be 
demonstrated within the very structures they strive to control. Hence, scholars 
need not go to villages or local towns to look at how central governments 
struggle to co-opt social actors. By applying the concept of "capture," my study 
concentrates on the "practices" of social actors while not losing sight of the 
state's authority. Through the application of this concept, it is possible to 
analyse the tools that social actors use to influence states, such as laws, 
policies, and state institutions. One can also examine how religious ideas serve 
as tools for authority construction and consolidation. 
Critical reflections on official ulema's struggle 
This study has demonstrated how the ulema today are making similar demands 
to those Muslim resurgence groups made between the 1970s and the 1990s. 
The resurgence groups were advocating an alternative to the modern, secular 
system. Although Suharto and Mahathir acceded to some of these demands, 
they had the powers to reject those that do not meet the states' agenda. 
However, the ulema today continue many aspects of this resurgence agenda, 
albeit under different political conditions. The 1997 Asian financial crisis has led 
to greater plurality in both countries—more so in Indonesia than Malaysia. The 
widening of democratic contest in the two countries has allowed the ulema to 
press their demands with less resistance from national leaders. Furthermore, 
both countries have witnessed the rise of a strong, pious Muslim middle class 
that supports greater shariaisation. This trend is evident in Muslims' less 
tolerant attitudes towards the multi-racial and multi-religious societies in which 
they live. Muslims are indeed less accepting of heterodoxy within their own faith 
community and are more likely to seek action against perceived 'deviancy' from 
orthodox Islamic doctrine. 
The discussion on Islamic resurgence is also significant in responding to the 
question of intent: did the ulema enter religious institutions mainly for personal 
gain or for religious purposes? I acknowledge the limitations of determining 
intent, but from the study's empirical data, both elements are present. The 
alleged abuses carried out by MUl ulema on halal certification and Islamic 
banking suggest they are mainly interested in making personal gains. MUl 
ulema also showed their pragmatism when they adopted a progressive religious 
opinion related to banking loans for the haj ritual because that would lead to 
more demand for their services. Incidences of corruption by the Malaysian 
ulema were less common, though some muftis sat in important boards in the 
civil service and financial institutions. These boards have a reputation for 
providing opportunities to members to self-enrich themselves. They are 
important sources of key networks to businesses. They also sat on censorship 
and leadership committees. These examples show that there might be political 
and economic motivations for being official ulema. 
The similarity of the ulema's discourse and that of the Muslim resurgence in the 
1970s also indicates that the majority of the ulema genuinely believe that their 
338 
struggle is in line with shariah principles. One reason for this similarity is 
because the generation of ulema that participated in the resurgence movement 
four decades ago is now heading religious institutions of their respective 
countries: for Malaysia, as muftis, JAKIM directors, IKIM academics, and 
shariah court judges; and for Indonesia, MUl members, civil servants in 
Kemenag, and university lecturers. For the case of Malaysia, they could be 
formerly ABIM or Darul Arqam activists; and for the case of Indonesia, they 
could be former ICMI or members of the tarbiyah movement. 
The Islamic discourse since the 1970s condit ioned the ulema's responses to 
contemporary problems. According to Mannheim (1936, p.3), an individual's 
thinking is shaped by the surrounding environment in which he grows up, and 
he simply adopts the ready-made solutions available to him. Growing up during 
the Islamic resurgence period, the ulema are exposed to the dominant view that 
Islam is Ad-Deen or a way of life. They interpret this Quranic verse to mean 
Islam has the solution to every problems societies face, including the lack of 
development. The belief in an alternative Islamic order—through Islamic 
banking. Islamic insurance, halal certification. Islamic entertainment, Islamic 
tour ism—is borne out of their desire to counter the Western way of life. Thus, 
their discourse is part of the shariaisation drive to bring Indonesia and Malaysia 
closer to what they see as the Islamic ideal. 
The official ulema-led shariaisation has contrasting effects in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. MUl 's shariah implementation drive in Indonesia is more contained 
compared to a similar process undertaken by the Malaysian ulema. Whi le MUl 
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has made inroads in pushing their conservative agenda, the state, civil society, 
and progressive intellectuals have been able to restrict its influence in society. 
Suharto played a large part in keeping MUl's powers in check. His decision not 
to grant significant power MUl has hannstrung the Council even after the fall of 
the regime in 1998. During the New Order, Suharto developed strong Islamic 
intellectualism that could neutralise Islamic conservatism. He sent young 
students to study in Western universities who later returned and promoted 
progressive ideas in society. He hoped that these reform-minded Muslim 
intellectuals abandoned the old agendas of Islamic state and shariah clauses in 
the Constitution. In the 1980s and 1990s, these intellectuals played a significant 
role in countering MUl and radical groups' endeavours to create an alternative 
Islamic order. This trend is like to continue in the 21®' century, where extremism 
and radicalism will be kept in check (Azyumardi, 2005, p.19). 
The Yudhoyono government rejected MUl's demands for exclusive rights to 
determine public morality, issue halal certificates, and only partly acted on its 
plan to define mainstream Islam. However, it lacks the gumption of Suharto's 
New Order regime. It was unable to contain MUl's role in promoting sectarian 
violence towards the Ahmadis as well as other religious minority groups. 
Yudhoyono also allowed MUl to oversee shariah banking and finance, which led 
to many MUl ulema becoming extremely wealthy through their work as advisors 
of Islamic banks. It is likely that MUl leaders will continue to pressure the state 
to meet their demands by taking advantage of societal conservatism. The more 
conservative the society becomes, the higher the demand for MUl's shariah 
certificates for banks, restaurants, hotels, and clothing. 
In the case of the Malaysian official ulema, they have clearly entrenched 
thennselves as a class within the Malaysian bureaucracy. Because of that, being 
official ulema have been advantageous for them as a sectional interest group. 
The benefits come from the fact that there is a coherent set of policies regarding 
economic and financial activities, as well as the right to determine public 
morality. Laws relating to Islamic practice and faith were also in place. The 
official ulema sit on important decision-making bodies such as book and 
entertainment censorship boards, as well as other financial, academic and 
political institutions. In short, Mahathir's substantive institutionalism has created 
a coordinated and effective religious bureaucracy in Malaysia which then allows 
ulema to tap on the state's resources for their political and financial gains. 
However, there is a cost to this. Mahathir's policies are responsible for 
developing a powerful and conservative ulema class that civil society groups 
and Muslim intellectuals struggle to challenge. Substantive institutionalism 
worked well with a strong leader at the helm of the country. During his 
administration, Mahathir was active in challenging conservative groups in the 
country. With his retirement, however, the official ulema no longer have 
redoubtable leaders blocking their conservative agenda. There has been a 
concerted effort on the part of the Malaysian ulema to monopolise the right to 
voice religious opinions. 
Recently, the Malaysian ulema have sought to ridicule civil society groups 
pronnoting religious pluralism and progressivism—such as SIS (Sisters in Islam) 
and IRF (Islamic Renaissance Front)—whenever they make statements on 
Islamic matters. In July 2014, MAIS gazetted SIS as "deviant" because the 
women's rights group promotes liberalism. The fatwa states that all publications 
associated with liberalism are unlawful and can be confiscated. The ulema have 
also dominated the religious discourse in which progressive Malaysian 
intellectuals, such as Chandra Muzaffar, Farouk Musa, Hashim Kamali, and 
Norani Othman, have been marginalised. While the Malaysian official ulema 
could use fatwas to prevent progressive intellectuals from speaking and writing 
on Islamic issues, they have not used their authority to prevent harassment on 
religious minorities. Conversely, they went as far as seeking to manage the 
private lives of Malaysian Muslims by authorising negeri religious officials to 
conduct raids in hotels, parks, and entertainment outlets to filter out immoral 
behaviour and "deviancy." 
It is important to note that the rise in Islamic conservatism in Malaysia has 
caused some discomfort among citizens. There has been resistance to the 
ulema and their control of Islamic affairs. On 8 December 2014, 25 prominent 
Malays—including former Malaysian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Noor 
Farida Arrifin—wrote an open letter calling for a dialogue on the role of Islam in 
a democratic country {The Malaysian Insider, "Champion open debate and 
discourse on Islamic law—Noor Farida Arrifin and 24 others," 8 December 
2014). The letter asserts that Malaysia is a secular country and calls for 
moderation of the role of Islamic law. It expresses concern that the official 
ulema are issuing fatwas that disregarded the Federal Constitution. This is the 
most influential challenge to the conservatives so far. 
Yet, three Malaysians—two of them Muslim lawyers—penned a counter open-
letter stating the way Islamic laws has been applied in the country is moderate 
(The Malaysian Insider, "A response to letter by 25 eminent Malaysians—Zainul 
Rijal, Tuan Musa Awang and Azril Mohd Amin," 13 December 2014). The three 
writers claimed that "moderation" practised in Malaysia is based on Quranic 
values and in line with JAKIM's position. Hence, it remains doubtful if the 
progressives, even as they continue to speak up against the conservatives, will 
succeed in moderating the ulema's stance. The ulema will continue seeking to 
consolidate their authority by riding on societal conservatism and forging 
alliances with radical and supremacist NGOs. They will continue portraying 
themselves as the "gate-keepers" of Islamic faith, Malay supremacy, and 
monarchy. 
Prospects of a capture theory 
A theory depicts the broad causal relationship between variables that can 
generate better understanding of social phenomena. The present study 
proposes three main independent variables explaining why the Malaysian 
ulema are more successful than Indonesian ulema in meeting their capture 
objectives. The three variables are: clear institutional role; a coherent ideology; 
and organisational unity. However, the study does not deny other contributory 
factors that explain my findings. Factors such as splits within states, 
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demography, history and geography also play a role in explaining the relative 
success of the Malaysian ulema. 
In order to generate a broader analytical abstraction, similar studies should be 
carried out in other countries in Southeast Asia, especially where authoritarian 
regimes have grappled with the rise in piety since the 1970s. A good case study 
is Singapore. Writings on the Singapore official ulema are inclined to portray 
strong state co-optation (Hussin, 2012; Lily, 2009; Walid, 2012). Could applying 
the concept of capture draw new conclusions on Singapore official ulema's 
behaviour? The study's approach should also be replicated in other 
authoritarian, Muslim majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Turkey. As pointed out in the literature review, existing writings tend to depict 
Saudi Arabian and Egyptian ulema as weak due to state co-optation. The 
concept of capture may offer different perspectives on these ulema. The 
previously mentioned states are comparably authoritarian to the Suharto and 
Mahathir governments, yet very few studies have investigated the reason 
official ulema in these states remain in power for long periods. To what extent 
can religious institutions provide official ulama with legitimacy and popularity? In 
the same vein, Turkey is another relevant case study. During the Ottoman 
Empire, the official ulema worked under the Caliph's tutelage. In the 1920s, 
however, Kemal Ataturk led the country into secularisation and exerted strong, 
top-down control over the religious establishment. How do the Turkish official 
ulema behave under the present Islamic government? 
Replicating this study in other cases in the Islamic world is important because 
as this study of Indonesian and Malaysian official ulema behaviour has shown, 
there is a multiplicity of interpretive possibilities. The data collected over a 
period of three years questions conclusions scholars have made on ulema 
behaviour in Indonesia and Malaysia. Information gathered through 
conversations with official ulema in these two countries—by observing their 
fatwa meetings and events and analysing their fatwas, sermons and 
speeches—provides further insights into the complexity of their relations with 
state officials. The evidence from this study suggests that there is a fine line 
between states forcing ulema to support their ideology and ulema embracing 
them to fulfil other political and material gains. On the one hand, ulema are not 
passive social actors as some scholars assume, but on the other hand, their 
quest for greater Islamisation is constrained by policies undertaken by the 
strongmen who once ruled their counthes. 
Even as the political competition opens up in Indonesia and Malaysia, 
particularly after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Islamic policies Suharto 
and Mahathir pursued throughout their rule will continue either to affect ulema's 
strive for greater authority for many years to come. Still, relying on state 
institutions is not the only strategy available to official ulema to consolidate their 
authority. As the study has demonstrated, Muslim conservatism has greatly 
aided Indonesian and Malaysian official ulema in capturing the state. The rise of 
conservatism in Indonesia and Malaysia would only facilitate the ulema's 
mission for greater capture of power. 
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